The document provides an assessment and updates on critical threats from various regions around the world from January 19, 2016. It discusses developments in several areas including: - Iran implementing its commitments under the nuclear deal and freeing prisoners in exchange for Iranians held in the US. - The IRGC detaining and releasing US Navy sailors who entered Iranian waters, calling it a show of strength. - Al Qaeda and al-Shabaab conducting attacks in Somalia, Yemen, and the Sahel region of Africa. - Islamic State expanding its presence in Libya through attacks on oil infrastructure and consolidating control over territory.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
January 19, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. The U.S. and EU revoked nuclear-related sanctions after the IAEA issued its report verifying Iran’s
compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal.
2. AQIM is expanding its attack zone. AQIM-affiliated al Murabitoun attacked a hotel in Ouagadougou, Burkina
Faso, killing over 28 people. The attack demonstrated the al Qaeda groups’ coordinated efforts in the Sahel.
3. Al Shabaab continued a military campaign of high-profile raids of AMISOM bases. Militants attacked a
Kenyan AMISOM unit based in el Adde, Gedo region.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri issued two audio speeches and a statement in the past week, an increase from the monthly
releases he had made fall 2015. The statements were anti-Saudi Arabia, calling for Syrians to be wary of Saudi efforts and for
residents of the Arabian Peninsula to get rid of the “rotten regime,” and also anti-Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).
Zawahiri attacked the House of Saud in a January 12 statement, “Al Saud are the Killers of the Mujahideen.” He argued the
Saudi regime was aligned fully with the U.S. and must be brought down. Zawahiri also mourned the deaths of al Qaeda
operatives, especially Fares al Zahrani, among the 47 prisoners Saudi Arabia executed on January 2. He spoke to Southeast
Asians, especially Indonesians, Malaysians, and Philippians in his January 13 audio message. The final statement, dated from
December 2015 and released on January 14, was on Syria. Zawahiri warned the groups who participated in the Riyadh
conference that Saudi Arabia’s interests were not aligned with theirs and called on Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate,
to unify the ranks in Syria. Zawahiri also discussed the first Kharijites, using them as a basis for comparison for ISIS, but
describing ISIS as worse because it lied about its role in the death of Syrian Ahrar al Sham leader and al Qaeda member Abu
Khalid al Suri, for example.
Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups will continue to conduct their local and regional military campaigns as al Qaeda leadership
attempts to counter ISIS messaging.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UN-led peace talks remain postponed. The al Houthis released several prisoners, a minister and several activists, but did not
release Yemeni Defense Minister Gen. Mahmoud al Subaihi, captured late March 2015, and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour
Hadi’s nephew, detained since late February 2015. The al Houthis accuse the Saudi-led coalition of using previous talks as
cover to make military gains. The temporary truce achieved in December has ended.
Outlook: Distrust between Yemen’s warring factions will continue to present an obstacle to any substantive peace agreement.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition continued its campaign of airstrikes in northern and central Yemen in an effort to degrade al Houthi-
Saleh missile launch capabilities and reduce cross-border attacks. Hadi’s and coalition-backed forces have not secured Aden,
where militants attempted to assassinate the city’s security chief and reportedly attacked oil pipelines. Hadi also ordered a
crackdown on al Houthi smuggling activity in Shabwah. Al Houthi-Saleh supply lines may already be under pressure, as
demonstrated by a recent confrontation between al Houthi-Saleh forces and a local arms trafficker in al Hudaydah.
Outlook: Anti-government and Salafi-jihadi groups in Aden will continue to destabilize the city, threatening Hadi’s government.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP may be shifting resources from its support zone in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, to other fronts in Yemen, indicating the
possible launch of a renewed campaign in al Bayda or southern Yemen or of a new campaign contesting control in Wadi
Hadramawt. AQAP also established checkpoints on the Aden-Abyan road. Reported U.S. airstrikes targeted AQAP militants in
Abyan and Shabwah, possibly indicating that the group is shifting personnel into those theaters.
Outlook: AQAP will continue to take advantage of the security vacuum to entrench itself in southern and central Yemen.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1) 16 JAN: Reported
U.S. airstrike killed
three suspected
AQAP militants in
Shabwah.
2) 13 JAN: AQAP
erected checkpoints
along the Aden-
Abyan road.
3) 13 JAN: Suspected
AQAP militants fired
rocket-propelled
grenades at a
security checkpoint
in Wadi Hadramawt.
4) 15 JAN: An
explosion struck two
oil pipelines in Aden.
5) 17 JAN: Reported
U.S. airstrike targeted
AQAP near Ja’ar,
Abyan.
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6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali National Consultative Forum convened in Kismayo from January 15 – January 18. The parties involved were
unable to reach a consensus on how to structure the upcoming federal election’s electoral system. Additional consultative
meetings are being scheduled in preparation for the August 2016 elections for parliamentary and other federal government
positions.
Outlook: Continued disagreement between the Somali states on the upcoming electoral process may lead to protests and
instability, straining Somalia’s security resources.
Security
Kenyan authorities continued to pressure al Shabaab militants in northeastern Kenya, disrupting several suspected cells and
confiscating a cache of weapons in Mandera and Wajir counties. In Uganda, U.S. Marines finished training a Ugandan AMISOM
contingent in urban warfare and counter-IED tactics.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to try to establish networks in northeastern Kenya to facilitate future attacks in the country.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab militants attacked and overran a Kenyan AMISOM contingent in el Adde, Gedo region, killing dozens of soldiers
and capturing many. The attackers used a stolen Burundian APC as well as AMISOM uniforms obtained in a June 2015 attack
against the Burundian-manned Lego military base. Al Shabaab also ambushed Kenyan military convoys traveling to support the
base during the attack and stole large stores of ammunition and several vehicles from the base. The el Adde base attack
continues a trend of periodic high-profile al Shabaab attacks on key AMISOM military bases in Somalia.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely use the weapons and equipment looted from the el Adde base in future attacks on AMISOM or
Somali government targets.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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1) 15 JAN: Al
Shabaab attacked
AMISOM base in el
Adde, Gedo region.
2) 14 JAN: Kenya
deployed troops to
Mandera County to
support anti-terror
operations along the
Somali border.
3) 14 JAN: SNA and
AMISOM troops
conducted
operations against al
Shabaab militants in
Lego, Lower Shabelle
region.
4) 12 JAN: Kenyan
police clear
suspected IED in
Nairobi, Nairobi
County.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-backed Presidency Council (PC) announced a new cabinet for the Government of National Accord (GNA). Two of the
nine PC members suspended their membership after the group appointed Mahdi al Barghathi as defense minister, signaling
their support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander and Tobruk-based House of Representatives backer, General Khalifa
Haftar. Gen. Haftar has been commanding “Operation Dignity” against Islamist groups in Benghazi.
Outlook: The unity government will continue to founder on questions of who receives key cabinet positions.
Security
Libyan National Army (LNA) forces intensified their campaign to take Ajdabiya city from the Ajdabiya Revolutionary Shura
Council (ARSC), seizing the southeast of the city. LNA forces discovered stockpiled weapons, munitions and explosives as well
as ISIS leaflets. Unidentified aircraft conducted three airstrikes against ISIS targets in Sirte, al Nawfaliya, and Ben Jawad. The
characteristics of the strike indicate that a non-Libyan air force was responsible for the strikes.
Outlook: LNA forces will continue efforts to take control of Ajdabiya and Benghazi from Islamist militants in eastern Libya.
Foreign powers may increase airstrikes on ISIS targets as the group threatens to seize more territory and oil infrastructure.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS militants attacked an oil pipeline near Ras Lanuf and captured several Libyan guards. The group may also be attempting to
establish a new support zone in western Libya, where it is reportedly massing forces near Zliten. ISIS continues to consolidate
its authority through intimidation and violence in Sirte, Bin Jawad, and al Nawfaliya. ISIS continues to construct a resilient safe
haven in Libya.
Outlook: ISIS will continue efforts to expand throughout Libya in the absence of any strong opposition forces, with particular
focus on oil infrastructure on the central Libyan coast.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
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1) 13-14 JAN: LNA
forces pushed back
Islamist militias in
southeastern
Ajdabiya city.
2) 14-18 JAN:
Unidentified fixed-
wing aircraft bombed
ISIS positions near
Sirte.
3) 14 JAN: An ISIS
convoy moved
westward from Sirte.
4) 14 JAN: ISIS
attacked on oil
pipeline near Ras
Lanuf.
5) 18 JAN: Clashes
resumed between
Islamist fighters and
the LNA near
Benghazi.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM Council of Dignitaries head Sheikh Abu Ubayda Yusuf al Annabi released an audio statement calling Salafi-jihadists to
fight in Libya and warning against Western intervention in the UN-brokered Libyan Political Accord. The call-to-arms in Libya is
a shift from previous positions, which prioritized the fight in Syria.
Outlook: AQIM and its affiliates will continue to release statements and conduct operations in an effort to drive recruitment,
unite radical Islamist militants, and deter Westerners from engagement in regional peace processes.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a stayed silent this week, possibly training militants or replenishing resources. At least 32 members have
resigned from Tunisia’s former ruling party, Nidaa Tunis, giving the Ennahda Islamist party a majority in parliament and sowing
the seeds for a weakened government.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will temporarily remain inconspicuous in their mountain strongholds, likely preparing to take
advantage of the weakening political situation in Tunisia.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Al Murabitoun carried out the January 15 attack on the Splendid Hotel and the surrounding area in Ouagadougou, Burkina
Faso. Three attackers detonated VBIEDs outside the hotel prior to the attack and specifically targeted westerners inside the
hotel and the café across the street. The attack reaffirms al Murabitoun’s reemergence within AQIM, which threatened regional
French targets the week before, and mirrored the group’s November 20 hotel attack in Bamako, Mali. An Ansar al Din
spokesman claimed that militants linked to AQIM’s Sahara Emirate is holding an Australian couple kidnapped on Friday in
northern Burkina Faso.
Outlook: Al Murabitoun and other affiliates will continue to carry out attacks on soft targets throughout the Sahel in order to
dissuade regional partners from collaborating with France and assisting in the peacekeeping mission in Mali.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
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1) 14 JAN: Tunisian
forces arrested nine
suspected pro-ISIS
militants in Jebel
Lahmar, Tunisia.
2) 15 JAN: Tunisian
counterterror forces
discovered a
weapons workshop in
Menzel Temime,
Tunisia.
3) 17 JAN: Algerian
security forces found
and cleared four
homemade bombs in
Bouira, Algeria.
4) 18 JAN: Moroccan
forces arrested Gelel
Attar, linked to the
NOV 13 Paris attacks,
in Mohammedia,
Morocco.
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12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA
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1) 15 JAN: Armed
men ambushed a
Malian army convoy
in Goundam,
Timbuktu region.
2) 15 JAN: AQIM-
linked militants
kidnapped two
Australians in
Baraboule, north
Burkina Faso.
3) 15 JAN: Armed
men attacked police
in Tin Abao, Oudalain
region, Burkina Faso.
4) 15 JAN: Al
Murabitoun militants
attack a hotel in
Ouagadougou,
Burkina Faso.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was officially implemented on January 16 after the IAEA issued its report
verifying Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal. The U.S. and EU took legal steps to revoke nuclear-
related sanctions in response, although the UN arms embargo and sanctions on Tehran’s ballistic-missile program remain in
place. Tehran also freed four Iranian-Americans on January 16, including Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian, in
exchange for the release of seven Iranians held in the U.S. for sanction evasion. President Hassan Rouhani, who was elected
in 2013 on a platform of economic recovery, hailed the removal of sanctions as “a golden page” in Iran’s history.
Outlook: The full effects of sanction relief are unlikely to be fully felt before the all-important parliamentary and Assembly of
Experts elections in February.
The IRGC branded its overnight detention of ten U.S. Navy sailors and their two vessels as a military victory after a purported
mechanical error caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters on January 12. IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier
General Hossein Salami called the detainment a demonstration of the IRGC’s strength, boasting that “since World War II, no
country in the world has been able to detain an American soldier” except Iran. Expediency Discernment Council Secretary and
former Commander of the IRGC Mohsen Rezaei said that the detainment was a direct message to Iran’s adversaries,
“especially Saudi Arabia, not to play with fire.” Iranian state TV, meanwhile, aired footage on January 13 of the sailors as they
were being detained as well as footage of a sailor apologizing for mistakenly entering Iranian territorial waters.
Outlook: The IRGC Navy will continue to act confrontationally in the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf.
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IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1412 - 18 January
JAN 12: The IRGC seized two U.S. Navy vessels and ten crew members in the Persian Gulf after a mechanical error reportedly
caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters.
JAN 13: Iranian state TV aired footage of the sailors surrendering to the IRGC as well as of a sailor apologizing for mistakenly
entering Iranian territorial waters.
JAN 13: The IRGC released the seized U.S. Navy vessels. It announced that the release was made following an “apology”
from the crew and an investigation that determined they had entered Iranian territory “unintentionally.”
JAN 13: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif credited the sailors’ overnight release to “dialogue and respect, not threats
and impetuousness.”
JAN 13-14: Iranian news outlets reported that seven Iranian fighters were killed in Syria, including an IRGC colonel.
JAN 14: Iran removed the core of the Arak heavy water reactor and filled it with cement, thereby preventing the reactor from
producing weapons-grade plutonium.
JAN 15: IRGC Deputy Commander Brigadier General Hossein Salami praised the U.S. Navy vessels’ detainment as a
demonstration of the IRGC’s strength and deterrence capabilities.
JAN 16: Iran freed four Americans, including Washington Post reporter Jason Rezaian, in exchange for the release of seven
Iranian nationals held in the U.S. on charges of sanctions evasion. The U.S. also agreed to drop Interpol notices on 14 other
Iranian nationals, several of whom have ties to Mahan Air, an Iranian airline sanctioned for transporting IRGC-Qods Force
members and materiel for Hezbollah.
JAN 16: The International Atomic Energy Agency verified that Iran has complied with its initial commitments under the nuclear
agreement, thereby triggering sanctions relief.
JAN 17: President Hassan Rouhani hailed Implementation Day as “a golden page” in Iran’s history. He also criticized the
second round of vetting in the parliamentary elections, during which only 40 percent of registered candidates were approved
to run and reformist candidates disproportionately disqualified.
JAN 17: Rouhani submitted the annual budget and the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan to Parliament for review.
JAN 18: Rouhani stressed the continued strength of Iran’s nuclear program under the JCPOA in an open letter to Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

15. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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