CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation. 2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP. 3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
June 21, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-
based House of Representatives, increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism
mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though
IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda.
1

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Groups that are part of the al Qaeda network continue to re-affirm their association with al Qaeda. The Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU) rejected the pledge of allegiance (bayat) that former leader Uthman Ghazi made to the Islamic State in Iraq
and al Sham (ISIS), noting that a significant faction of the IMU had remained loyal to al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Al
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) likewise released a statement that eulogized the late Afghan Taliban leader Mullah
Akhtar Mansour, an indicator of affiliation with al Qaeda, and a statement of condolences for the new emir Mullah Haibatullah
Akhundzada. The statement also encouraged Muslims and Pakistanis to fight America and the Pakistani military, which is
consistent with al Qaeda’s strategic objectives for Pakistan.
Former Guantanamo Bay detainee Jihad Ahmed Mustafa Diyab likely escaped from Uruguay to Brazil recently. U.S. law
enforcement officers have not yet located Diyab. The U.S. released Diyab to Uruguay in 2014. The Department of Defense
Detainee Assessment of Diyab, issued in 2008, outlined that the detainee was accused of having connections specifically to al
Qaeda officials.
Outlook: It is likely that additional groups whose leadership announced support for ISIS may come forward as having remained
part of the al Qaeda network as ISIS suffers from tactical setbacks.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Yemeni delegations have not reached a negotiated political settlement during the Kuwait talks, probably because they each
hold irreconcilable demands based on current ground conditions. The Hadi government has focused on bolstering local
legitimacy in Aden, its de facto capital. The government expanded public services in Aden and prepared to export oil from
Shabwah after a year-long hiatus. Additionally, Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed bin Daghir met with political representatives,
including secessionist political leaders, to ask for their support.
Outlook: The peace talks in Kuwait will not collapse, but the delegations will also not reach a negotiated settlement until ground
conditions change the demands they hold.
Security
The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. Special Forces mission to advise and assist Emirati counter-terrorism
operations in al Mukalla, which Emirati-backed Yemeni troops recently seized from AQAP. The coalition troops are primarily
engaged in rebuilding Yemeni security forces and stabilization operations now. Fighting continues along the front line in Yemen.
Pro-Hadi forces advanced toward the capital, Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh fighters clashed with Yemeni popular resistance and
Yemeni army forces along the southern front, gaining ground near the al Anad air base outside of Aden in Lahij governorate.
Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city, remains actively contested.
Outlook: Coalition-backed forces will launch an offensive to recapture terrain near al Anad base from al Houthi-Saleh forces.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
ISIS continued its explosive campaign in al Mukalla. Yemeni security forces foiled a terrorist attack in al Mukalla, Hadramawt
governorate, likely committed by an ISIS militant with former AQAP affiliations. AQAP resumed a previous campaign of
assassinations, targeting individuals that have spoken out against it, in its Abyan stronghold.
Outlook: ISIS will attempt to conduct a large-scale attack in Aden or al Mukalla by the end of Ramadan.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
2
3
4
5
1) 14 JUN: Al Houthi-
Saleh fighters clashed
with government
forces in Maris,
Dhaleh.
2) 15 JUN: Police
foiled suspected
AQAP attack in al
Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3) 15 JUN: Suspected
AQAP militant
assassinated an imam
in Jaar, Abyan.
4) 17 JUN: Al Houthi-
Saleh and pro-Hadi
forces clashed in
Haradh, Hajjah.
5) 20 JUN: Al Houthi-
Saleh fighters took
control of Jales
Mountain, Lahij, near
al Anad air base.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali Federal Parliament amended Article 60 of the provisional constitution to extend their term length from the stated
four years to the next occurrence of elections. The lawmakers enacted the change to stay in power beyond their term’s original
August 2016 expiration. The amendment takes away much of the lawmakers’ incentive to ensure that the expected August
2016 elections take place.
Outlook: The political and legal maneuvering of the Somali parliament decreases the likelihood that Somali federal elections
will be held in August 2016.
Security
Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces are struggling to secure southern Somalia
from al Shabaab attacks. AMISOM forces killed two civilians in the ensuing chaos of an improvised explosive device (IED)
attack in Afgoi, Lower Shabelle region on June 14. In a separate incident on June 14, al Shabaab militants launched mortars at
the AMISOM base in Marka, Lower Shabelle. The AMISOM artillery response inadvertently killed two additional civilians.
Outlook: Counterattacks by AMISOM and SNA forces that kill civilians will alienate the multinational effort from the Somali
populace and will support the al Shabaab counter-narrative that the federal government is unfit to lead.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab maintains the capability to conduct precision attacks in both rural and urban areas throughout Somalia and Kenya.
Suspected al Shabaab gunmen assassinated a senior intelligence officer in Mogadishu on June 15, and killed five Kenyan
police officers in an ambush in Mandera County, Kenya on June 20. The militant group also launched a series of violent
ambushes and mortar attacks throughout the Lower Shabelle region throughout the week.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will disrupt SNA and AMISOM operations in Lower Shabelle region and may even seek to regain control
of territory.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
1) 14 JUN: AMISOM
troops inadvertently
killed two civilians
after IED attack in
Afgoi, Lower Shabelle.
2) 18 JUN: Al
Shabaab ambushed
AMISOM convoy near
Barawe, Lower
Shabelle.
3) 19 JUN: Al
Shabaab launched
mortars into Marka,
Lower Shabelle.
4) 20 JUN: Al
Shabaab launched
complex attack on
Kenyan Police in
Mandera County,
Kenya.
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2
4
1

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) may be working with the Libyan National Army (LNA) to provoke clashes
between the LNA and allies of the Government of National Accord (GNA). The HoR declared a state of emergency and created
a military zone from Tobruk to Ben Jawad, a town currently occupied by the GNA-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG).
The LNA launched an airstrike against a PFG base in southern Ajdabiya and Benghazi after Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB)
attacks on the LNA in the region. The close relationship between the LNA and HoR indicates that the airstrikes and martial law
declaration occurred concurrently to incite the GNA and PFG to violence.
Outlook: The GNA and HoR may clash in central Libya between Ben Jawad and Ajdabiya as the LNA implements martial law
in the region.
Security
Ansar al Sharia (AAS) affiliates consolidated to establish a new stronghold in Ajdabiya, south of Benghazi. Two of the AAS-
linked groups in Benghazi merged into the Benghazi Defense Brigade (BDB), which then launched an offensive on Ajdabiya.
Recent LNA efforts against AAS affiliates in Benghazi have led the BDB to move its focus to Ajdabiya. The BDB will ally with
other Islamists to overpower LNA Ajdabiya forces.
Outlook: The BDB will carry out multiple attacks on LNA forces in Ajdabiya to gain control of the town. The LNA will struggle to
hold its multiple fronts in Derna, Benghazi, and now Ajdabiya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS in Libya plans to attack in Europe and expand its influence in Africa, according to CIA director John Brennan. As ISIS
continues to withdraw resources and personnel from Sirte, the group will likely reorganize in the southern desert of Libya and
may launch attacks abroad to emphasize their continued relevance.
Outlook: ISIS will continue to hold territory in Sirte to facilitate its withdrawal from Sirte and distribute resources to other fronts.
This redistribution may include allocation of resources and personnel to plan an attack abroad, especially in Europe.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
9
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
4
2
5
3
1) 14 - 20 JUN:
Misratan and ISIS
fighters fought for
control of Sirte.
2) 16 JUN: The LNA
launched airstrikes
against ISIS boats in
Benghazi.
3) 20 JUN: The LNA
targeted a PFG camp
with air strikes near
Ajdabiya.
4) 18 JUN: Islamist
militias began
offensive against LNA
in Ajdabiya.
5) 16 JUN: An ISIS
SVBIED killed at least
ten Misratan soldiers
behind Misratan lines
in Abu Grein.

10. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM is competing to be the vanguard of the Salafi-jihadi movement with ISIS in Algeria. Algerian security forces killed at 18
suspected terrorists, arrested four others, and seized weapons caches in Medea, northern Algeria. AQIM and ISIS militants
both operate in Medea, and increased movement indicates a possible uptick in activity by the groups.
Outlook: AQIM will attempt to retain members loyal to al Qaeda while protecting its hideouts from Algerian security forces
conducting clearing operations in northern Algeria.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
The Tunisian government is working to combat terrorism by addressing the country’s economic stagnation. Tunisian Prime
Minister Habib Essid voluntarily resigned due to his acknowledged inability to enact crucial economic reform. ISIS has
intentionally targeted the Tunisian tourism industry in order to damage the country’s economy and create instability. Tunisia’s
struggling economy and perceived governmental neglect serves as a major recruitment tool for extremist groups, such as ISIS.
Outlook: The decline of the Tunisian economy will continue to fuel ISIS recruitment, despite recent efforts by the government
to address economic stagnation.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
AQIM-linked Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun are increasing calls for attacks against MINUSMA and French forces. Al
Murabitoun circulated a photo praising a suicide attack on French forces in Ramadan 2014 and called for attacks against
Western forces during the remainder of Ramadan, which ends on July 5. Ansar al Din also claimed six attacks against French
and MINUSMA forces. These attacks occurred during this Ramadan month in Mali’s Kidal region and occurred at a more
frequent pace than the previous month.
Outlook: AQIM affiliates will likely attempt a complex attack on MINUSMA or French forces in northern Mali during the
remaining two weeks of the Ramadan season. An attack on a soft target in the Sahel, like a hotel, is also possible.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
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3
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1) 14 JUN: Algerian
security forces
destroyed a terrorist
bunker and seized
weapons in Medea.
2) 15 JUN: Tunisian
security forces
arrested six suspected
terrorists in Kasserine.
3) 16 JUN: Algerian
security forces
destroyed a terrorist
shelter and seized
weapons in Skikda
and Jijel.
4) 19 JUN: Algerian
security forces killed
18 suspected terrorists
in Rouakeche.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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SAHELWEST AFRICA
3
2
1
4
1) 16 JUN: Ansar al
Din detonated an IED
targeting two French
vehicles in Kidal.
2) 18 JUN: French
Operation Barkhane
forces arrested four
suspected militants in
Taglit, Kidal.
3) 19 JUN: Ansar al
Din attacked a Malian
National Guard post in
Gossi, Timbuktu.
4) 20 JUN: Militants,
likely Islamist, killed
HCUA military chief
Alhassane Ag Intouwa
in Ber, Timbuktu.

13. ACRONYMS
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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
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