CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The death of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets. Abdul Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, died of natural causes in prison in North Carolina on February 18. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. The joint statement from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) eulogizing Abdul Rahman and calling for revenge attacks indicates the continued close coordination between the two affiliates. Al Shabaab released a separate statement. Al Qaeda’s al Nafeer bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning and abusing him.
2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration. Al Shabaab militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) in a crowded market in Mogadishu on February 19, killing dozens of people. A senior al Shabaab official threatened a “vicious war” against the new government on February 19. Al Shabaab is also conducting an assassination campaign targeting government officials and elders who supported the electoral process. Former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ceremonially transferred power to new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on February 16 in a ceremony that al Shabaab attempted to disrupt with mortar fire.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base. This faction, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), seeks to attack Western targets throughout West Africa. It has built ties to local populations that allow it to access supplies and deliver aid in the midst of widespread food insecurity. A rival Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau has alienated the local population may lose militants to the better-resourced ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, which will in turn expand the scope and scale of its operations against regional states.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG.
2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017.
3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali.
2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert.
3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict.
2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit.
3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement. Reuters reported that Iran surged arms shipments to Yemen in recent months and may have sent advisors. An aggressive American policy against the Iranian-backed al Houthis risks driving the group further into Iran’s orbit.
2. The Libyan National Army’s declared offensive to seize strategic locations in southwestern Libya will draw opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda both retain Libyan safe havens. Spiraling conflict would give both al Qaeda and ISIS the opportunity to co-opt factions within the civil war and could erase the recent progress made in degrading ISIS’s strength in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support. The group distributed food aid to more than 200 families in Galgudud region, central Somalia on March 19. Al Shabaab may strengthen in regions where the Somali Federal Government is unable to facilitate the delivery of food aid.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Two rival governments appear to be emerging in Yemen – one based in Sana’a and controlled by the al Houthis and the other based in Aden under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi, however, will likely have to contend with Southern Movement factions who reject his presence in southern Yemen.
2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December 1 call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations. The operational framework of the military drills, moreover, seemed to be aimed at deterring a potential attack, in the event that Tehran and the P5+1 fail to reach a final deal.
3. Violent clashes between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias in central Somalia risk undermining the Somali government’s ability to combat al Shabaab, potentially allowing the al Qaeda affiliate to regain territory in the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The death of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets. Abdul Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, died of natural causes in prison in North Carolina on February 18. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. The joint statement from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) eulogizing Abdul Rahman and calling for revenge attacks indicates the continued close coordination between the two affiliates. Al Shabaab released a separate statement. Al Qaeda’s al Nafeer bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning and abusing him.
2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration. Al Shabaab militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) in a crowded market in Mogadishu on February 19, killing dozens of people. A senior al Shabaab official threatened a “vicious war” against the new government on February 19. Al Shabaab is also conducting an assassination campaign targeting government officials and elders who supported the electoral process. Former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ceremonially transferred power to new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on February 16 in a ceremony that al Shabaab attempted to disrupt with mortar fire.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base. This faction, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), seeks to attack Western targets throughout West Africa. It has built ties to local populations that allow it to access supplies and deliver aid in the midst of widespread food insecurity. A rival Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau has alienated the local population may lose militants to the better-resourced ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, which will in turn expand the scope and scale of its operations against regional states.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG.
2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017.
3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali.
2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert.
3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict.
2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit.
3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement. Reuters reported that Iran surged arms shipments to Yemen in recent months and may have sent advisors. An aggressive American policy against the Iranian-backed al Houthis risks driving the group further into Iran’s orbit.
2. The Libyan National Army’s declared offensive to seize strategic locations in southwestern Libya will draw opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda both retain Libyan safe havens. Spiraling conflict would give both al Qaeda and ISIS the opportunity to co-opt factions within the civil war and could erase the recent progress made in degrading ISIS’s strength in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support. The group distributed food aid to more than 200 families in Galgudud region, central Somalia on March 19. Al Shabaab may strengthen in regions where the Somali Federal Government is unable to facilitate the delivery of food aid.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Two rival governments appear to be emerging in Yemen – one based in Sana’a and controlled by the al Houthis and the other based in Aden under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi, however, will likely have to contend with Southern Movement factions who reject his presence in southern Yemen.
2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December 1 call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations. The operational framework of the military drills, moreover, seemed to be aimed at deterring a potential attack, in the event that Tehran and the P5+1 fail to reach a final deal.
3. Violent clashes between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias in central Somalia risk undermining the Somali government’s ability to combat al Shabaab, potentially allowing the al Qaeda affiliate to regain territory in the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks.
2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue.
3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
CTP’s Threat Updateseries is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is using military force to secure his power at the expense of political resolution in Libya. Pro-Haftar forces stormed the headquarters of a constitutional drafting body in eastern Libya on July 20 and demanded the abandonment of a draft constitution that barred Haftar from running for president in 2018. Haftar’s rise as a strongman may stabilize Libya in the near term, but it will exacerbate the grievances that drive the civil war and galvanize support for Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
2. The U.S. is attempting to divide the al Houthi-Saleh bloc in order to reduce Iranian influence in Yemen and revive the UN peace process. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller began the diplomatic effort by praising former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s cooperation with a UN plan and criticizing the al Houthi faction for impeding negotiations. Elite-level diplomatic engagement is unlikely to progress, however, as long as the military situation on the ground remains stalemated.
3. Political violence is surging in Kenya before general elections on August 8. Recent incidents include the murder of a senior election official and an attack on the home of the Deputy President, as well as accusations of election rigging. Civil unrest in Kenya will strain Kenyan security forces and provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand in eastern Kenya and southern Somalia, where Kenyan forces play a major role.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, positioned itself to be part of the leadership of a unified armed Syrian opposition. Jabhat al Nusra leader Abu Mohammed al Joulani announced the end of Jabhat al Nusra’s operations and the formation Jabhat Fatah al Sham, which will not have ties to al Qaeda. This organizational restructuring is a strategic move intended to facilitate the unification of the armed Syrian opposition around a Jabhat al Nusra core. Al Qaeda sanctioned the decision in advance, emphasizing the need for Jabhat al Nusra to preserve unity above organizational relationships. Jabhat Fatah al Sham still holds al Qaeda’s objective of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria.
2. The start of U.S. military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may prolong the ground conditions that permit ISIS and al Qaeda to operate in the country by undermining support for the UN-backed unity government. The U.S. conducted its first airstrikes targeting ISIS in Sirte, Libya, at the request of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Some of the Libyan factions that had backed the GNA and constituted the GNA’s military forces are now protesting its support for Western intervention. These factions may not sustain their military operations against ISIS, prioritizing instead their own objectives. ISIS and al Qaeda expanded operations in Libya during the civil war.
3. Violence is escalating along the Saudi-Yemeni border as the UN-led peace process to negotiate a political resolution to the civil war breaks down. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance launched a series of attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi Arabia to warn that violation of Saudi territory is a “red line.” The al Houthi-Saleh faction may be seeking to induce Saudi Arabia to enter into direct negotiations with it outside of the UN-led negotiations, bypassing Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government. Both the al Houthi-Saleh alliance and Hadi’s government are preparing for the collapse of UN-led peace talks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates.
2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu.
3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. An international coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to restore President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. The coalition includes the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan, and Pakistan and Turkey both voiced support for it. The U.S. is providing logistical and intelligence support for coalition airstrikes. Initial Iranian reactions focused on the blowback to Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni response and include a letter penned by Mohsen Rezaei, Iran's Expediency Discernment Council Secretary and former senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander.
2. The Iranian negotiating team projected cautious optimism that final differences could be resolved as nuclear talks between Tehran and the P5+1 continue up until the March 31 deadline to reach a political framework for a deal. Ali Akbar Salehi, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said Tehran and the P5+1 are working to resolve two remaining technical issues.
3. Tunisian security forces began wide-scale counter-terrorism operations throughout Tunisia following last week’s ISIS-claimed attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Similar to 2018 03-27 CTP Update and Assessment (20)
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
What is the point of small housing associations.pptxPaul Smith
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
Canadian Immigration Tracker March 2024 - Key SlidesAndrew Griffith
Highlights
Permanent Residents decrease along with percentage of TR2PR decline to 52 percent of all Permanent Residents.
March asylum claim data not issued as of May 27 (unusually late). Irregular arrivals remain very small.
Study permit applications experiencing sharp decrease as a result of announced caps over 50 percent compared to February.
Citizenship numbers remain stable.
Slide 3 has the overall numbers and change.
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale warAntti Rautiainen
Anarchist group ANA Regensburg hosted my online-presentation on 16th of May 2024, in which I discussed tactics of anti-war activism in Russia, and reasons why the anti-war movement has not been able to make an impact to change the course of events yet. Cases of anarchists repressed for anti-war activities are presented, as well as strategies of support for political prisoners, and modest successes in supporting their struggles.
Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
Anarchist Black Cross Moscow
http://Avtonom.org/abc
Solidarity Zone
https://t.me/solidarity_zone
Memorial
https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
OVD-Info
https://en.ovdinfo.org/antiwar-ovd-info-guide
RosUznik
https://rosuznik.org/
Uznik Online
http://uznikonline.tilda.ws/
Russian Reader
https://therussianreader.com/
ABC Irkutsk
https://abc38.noblogs.org/
Send mail to prisoners from abroad:
http://Prisonmail.online
YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
Many ways to support street children.pptxSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
1. 1
Threat Update: March 27, 2018
Iranian police forces are preparing for future internal security
challenges and the potential revival of anti-regime protests. Iran’s
parliament increased the Law Enforcement Forces budget to purchase
weapons and equipment by about 400 percent from last year. This
increase follows months of deadly protests across Iran that exposed
grave security flaws in front-line defenses, particularly in smaller cities.
The al Houthi movement displayed its ballistic missile range in a barrage
of missiles targeting Saudi sites to mark the three-year anniversary of
the Saudi-led coalition’s intervention in Yemen. The al Houthis framed the
attack as a justified response to Saudi military actions in Yemen,
demanding an end to the air campaign and blockade in order for the al
Houthis to participate in negotiations. Continued al Houthi ballistic missile
launches against Saudi Arabia could undercut attempts to resume UN-
mediated peace talks.
Yemen
Iran
2. 2
Threat Update: March 27, 2018
China seeks to counter Indian nuclear capabilities in South Asia by
assisting Pakistan with developing its nuclear program. China
provided Pakistan with an advanced missile tracking system for Pakistan’s
missile arsenal. India successfully tested a supersonic cruise missile near
the Pakistani border on March 22. Chinese nuclear assistance to Pakistan
may escalate a regional arms race with India.
Al Shabaab is escalating attacks in Mogadishu to exploit the security
vacuum created by a political crisis in the Somali parliament. Security
forces deployed to the parliament building after a political standoff
between the Speaker and Prime Minister. Al Shabaab militants later
conducted multiple IED attacks in the capital, including an SVBIED attack
targeting the parliament building. Al Shabaab will likely conduct more
attacks in Mogadishu if the political crisis persists, which may stall
offensives against al Shabaab strongholds near the capital.
Somalia
Pakistan
3. 3
Threat Update: March 27, 2018
Libya
Egypt seeks to become a key influencer in the Libyan reconciliation
process to secure the Egyptian-Libyan border and counter Algerian
influence. Egypt is mediating Libyan army unification talks between
opposing military factions in Cairo. Libyan National Army commander
Khalifa Haftar’s rising power as a potential commander-in-chief of a
unified army will allow Egypt to secure its sphere of influence in
Libya. A political deal outside of the UN process may encourage
international actors, like Algeria, to counter growing Egyptian authority.
Social and economic grievances are driving inhabitants of peripheral
regions of Morocco and Tunisia to the streets seven years after the
2011 Arab Spring. The people from mining regions such as Gafsa in
Tunisia and Jerada in Morocco are protesting to demand more economic
opportunities. The Moroccan and Tunisian governments have cracked
down on protests in response. Protests have nevertheless continued and
may pressure both regimes to engage in structural and political change.
Maghreb
4. Yemen
4Tomás Padgett Perez
Al Houthi forces launch missiles in reprisal for
the coalition’s bombing campaign
23 MAR: The al Houthi
movement launched a Badr 1
ballistic missile targeting Saudi
ARAMCO facilities in Najran
province, southern Saudi Arabia.
22 MAR: The al Houthi
movement claimed to have
developed a new short-
range ballistic missile
dubbed the Badr 1.
25 MAR: The al Houthi
movement launched seven
ballistic missiles targeting
Riyadh, Jizan City, Najran
City, and Khamis Mushayt
city. Saudi Arabia claimed to
have intercepted all seven
missiles, though video
footage raises doubts.
1
2 3
present
Al Houthi ballistic
missile targets,
March 25.
Target city
Najran City
Khamis Mushayt
Jizan City
5. Pakistan
5Matthew Cassidy
China seeks to counter Indian nuclear progress
22 OCT 2016: India began
to negotiate a deal with
Russia to acquire the S-400
missile defense system.
1
23 NOV 2017: India tested the joint
Indian-Russian made BrahMos
supersonic cruise missile. India claimed
the missile is the fastest in the world.
22 MAR 2018: China
acknowledged it sold a
missile tracker to Pakistan.
China has not recognized
most missile sales to
Pakistan in the past.
2 3
6. Horn of
Africa
6Peter Cialone
Al Shabaab escalates attacks in Mogadishu
after parliamentary crisis
1. 16 MAR: Somali security forces deployed to the
parliament building after a motion of no confidence
against the Lower House Speaker sparked a standoff
with the Prime Minister.
2. 22 MAR: Al Shabaab killed 17 people with a vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) outside
Wehliye Hotel on Makka al Mukarama road, Mogadishu.
3. 25 MAR: Al Shabaab killed one Somali soldier with an
SVBIED targeting a security checkpoint in Sinka Dheer,
Kahda district.
4. 25 MAR: Al Shabaab detonated an SVBIED at
Sayidka junction near the parliament building. The blast
killed at least six people.
5. 26 MAR: Al Shabaab detonated two roadside IEDs
targeting security forces in Odweyne and 21 October
road, Daynile district.
3
5
4
2
1
Sinka Dheer
Parliament building
Wehliye Hotel
Sayidka junction
Odweyne
Mogadishu
7. Maghreb
7
Economic protests spread in Morocco and
Tunisia
present
Wiam Aimade
1
3
21 MAR: Tunisian police disrupted an economic protest after demonstrators burned a police station and
blockaded roads in Mdhila town, central Tunisia.
23 MAR: A Tunisian teachers’ union announced plans to strike in response to the Ministry of Education’s
plan to cut salaries.
23 MAR: The Tunisian prime minister announced he will not change plans to reduce the public debt by
cutting wages and social welfare.
25 MAR: Douar El Garaa slum residents protested their forced relocation from Morocco’s capital, Rabat.
1
2
3
4
4
2
8. Libya
8
Cairo-based unification talks create discord
within Libyan factions
Theresa Fellner
18 MAR: Delegations from the LNA and GNA arrived in Cairo to begin talks on the unification of the Libyan
military. Egypt mediated the meetings.
19 MAR: Participants agreed to separate the military institution from the political process if the delegations
named LNA commander Khalifa Haftar commander-in-chief of the unified army under a new presidential council.
20 MAR: Spokesperson for the Presidency Council’s Ministry of Defense Mohamed Ghasri said that the Cairo
talks would not succeed. GNA Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj dismissed Ghasri in response.
23 MAR: Libyan Grand Mufti Sheikh al Sadiq al Gharyani stated that Egypt should not interfere with Libya’s
domestic affairs and military officers should oppose Egypt’s influence.
1
2
3
4
1
2
3 4
9. Acronym List
AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia
AQAP: al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AQIS: al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
BDB: Benghazi Defense Brigades
BRSC: Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council
CJA: Congress for Justice in Azawad
CMA: Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad
GATIA: Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham
JNIM: Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen
GNA: Libyan Government of National Accord
LNA: Libyan National Army
MAA: Arab Movement of Azawad
MINUSMA: United National Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of the
Azawad
MSCD: Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna
MUJAO: Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
SNA: Somalia National Army
TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
9
10. For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Contact us at criticalthreats@aei.org or (202) 888-6575.
Frederick W. Kagan
Director
Critical Threats Project Team
Katherine Zimmerman
Research Manager
Caroline Goodson
Program Manager
10
al Qaeda Analysts
Emily Estelle
Maher Farrukh
Iran Analysts
Marie Donovan
Mike Saidi
Digital Content
Associate
Katie Donnelly