CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Yemen’s al Houthis presented a seven-point plan to the UN to resolve the ongoing conflict and have expressed willingness to participate in political negotiations. Both AQAP and ISIS have been able to expand significantly as Yemeni factions fight each other. 2. ISIS-affiliated forces operating out of Sirte, Libya, appear to be positioning themselves to secure Libya’s oil crescent, which would be a step toward securing control of Libyan oil facilities. 3. Senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated calls for fact-finding committees and international management of the Hajj following the September 24 stampede in Mina, Saudi Arabia.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
October 7, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. Yemen’s al Houthis presented a seven-point plan to the UN to resolve the ongoing conflict and have
expressed willingness to participate in political negotiations.
2. ISIS-affiliated forces operating out of Sirte, Libya, appear to be positioning themselves to secure Libya’s oil
crescent, which would be a step toward securing control of Libyan oilfacilities.
3. Senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated calls for fact-finding
committees and international management of the Hajj following the September 24 stampede in Mina, Saudi
Arabia.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda continues to face a challenge from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), especially in terms of recruitment and
attracting new groups. Some groups previously aligned with al Qaeda have declared allegiance to ISIS, probably in a bid for the
ISIS name-brand, currently associated with success, and the ISIS resources. These groups that have switched from al Qaeda
to ISIS do not constitute the core al Qaeda network, however. That network remains intact and will remain a long-term threat.
Al Qaeda statements have recently pointed toward ISIS’s division of the Sunni Muslim world and its brutal stance toward those
who disagree with it in part as undermining Sunni Islam. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri recently noted he had asked al
Qaeda leaders in the affiliates, especially in al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, to push back on ISIS’s messaging. AQAP’s
focus on the growth of ISIS in its statements should be seen as a response to a directive from the al Qaeda leader, indicating
continued overall direction of the network.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to contest ISIS’s legitimacy based on ISIS’s actions and how it self-declared itself to be the
Islamic Caliphate.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. The Pakistani
military killed at least 25 militants during airstrikes in the Dattakhel area of North Waziristan, on October 1, 2015. Operation
Zarb-e-Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase.
Outlook: The Pakistani military will continue Operation Zarb-e-Azb to eliminate militancy in the tribal areas of North Waziristan.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia are playing out in the Yemen theater. Multinational naval forces intercepted
an Iranian ship allegedly smuggling weapons to the al Houthis. Efforts remain underway to negotiate a political settlement,
however. There are continued reports of Russian mediation between Yemeni stakeholders. Separately, an al Houthi delegation
reportedly met with the leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon before traveling to Tehran.
Outlook: Saudi actions in Yemen could scuttle a negotiated political solution brokered among Yemeni stakeholders should the
terms appear favorable to the al Houthis.
Security
Yemeni forces aligned with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi launched major offensives to retake Taiz and Ma’rib
governorates, and the Saudi-led coalition is providing air, ground, and naval support. Pro-Hadi forces have reclaimed several
strategic sites in central Yemen, including the Bab al Mandeb strait, and are advancing slowly towards al Houthi-held Sana’a.
Pro-al Houthi forces claimed to attack coalition and government targets in Aden and continue to attack Saudi Arabian territory
near the Saudi-Yemeni border. They are also contesting the coalition’s positions in Lahij, between Aden and Taiz.
Outlook: Pro-Hadi forces will not launch an offensive on Sana’a before securing Taiz and Ma’rib. The al Houthis will
consolidate positions in central and northern Yemen, but will continue to contest control of territory in southern Yemen.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS continue to expand their operational capabilities. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed a series of bombings on
Yemeni government and coalition targets in Aden. AQAP militants claimed credit for attacks on al Houthi fighters in Ibb in
central Yemen. Airstrikes killed several AQAP members in Ma’rib and al Jawf governorates in central and northern Yemen.
Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment. AQAP
will continue to expand from its stronghold in Hadramawt governorate into central Yemen.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
2
3
45
1) SEP 29 – OCT 01:
Popular resistance
and al Houthi forces
clashed in al
Waz’iyah, Taiz.
2) OCT 01: A coalition
airstrike destroyed a
bridge connecting
Sana’a and al
Hudaydah.
3) OCT 01: Pro-Hadi
forces seized Bab al
Mandeb strait.
4) OCT 05: Popular
resistance forces
seized Kawful military
base in Ma’rib.
5) OCT 05: Coalition-
backed Yemeni forces
took control of al
Hamra plateau in
Ma’rib.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Tensions are growing in Somalia’s Federal Government, as members of parliament are refusing to attend talks intended to
address the issues cited for a dropped presidential impeachment motion. Members of parliament (MPs) are accusing
parliament speaker Mohamad Osman Jawari of siding with the president. Many of the parliaments who supported the
impeachment motion have refused to attend the aforementioned talks scheduled for October 7 as a sign of protest.
Outlook: It is likely that Somali MPs will actively push to reinstate the impeachment motion against the president.
Security
Security concerns are particularly high in the Central “Galmudug” State in central Somalia. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a’s (ASWJ)
conflict with the local Galmudug administration created space for al Shabaab militants to seize new territory in Mudug region.
Additionally, clan conflicts in the Gedo region required a Somali National Army (SNA) presence to mediate a ceasefire.
Outlook: ASWJ is very likely to try to liberate al Shabaab-controlled towns and secure them as a way to further entrench itself
as the de facto administration in the region as it competes with the Galmudug Administration for legitimacy and control of land.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab expanded into Mudug region in north-central Somalia, seizing towns, which may be a result of SNA and African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operations in the central Hiraan region. Additionally, al Shabaab allegedly internally
arrested up to five pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) members of its forces. Shortly after this occurred, ISIS released
multiple videos requesting al Shabaab to pledge its allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Al Shabaab has not responded to the
videos and previous statements displayed continued allegiance to al Qaeda.
Outlook: Al Shabaab is likely to increase activities in central Somalia as the military has much less of a presence in the area.
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
3
1
4
2
1) 02 OCT: Al
Shabaab seizes
undefended towns in
Mudug region.
2) 02-04 OCT: NISA
and police arrest
suspected al Shabaab
members and
affiliates in
Mogadishu.
3) 04 OCT: Ras
Kamboni Brigade
allegedly attacks SNA
camp in Kismayo,
Lower Jubba region.
4) 29-30 SEP: KDF
forces launch
airstrikes at
unspecified al
Shabaab targets in
the Gedo region.
7

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The internationally recognized Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) voted to extend its mandate beyond an
October 20 deadline, which increases the likelihood that the Tripoli-based competing government, the General National
Congress (GNC), will accept terms for a national unity government. HoR and GNC delegates are scheduled to return to
Sakhirat, Morocco, to continue talks.
Outlook: The HoR decision to unilaterally extend its own mandate will generate further distrust between the rival governments.
Security
The LNA’s allied support forces continued to test an increasingly divisive Libya Dawn through the repeated acquisitions of new
territory within Tripoli, Libya. These operations place the LNA increasingly closer to central Tripoli and heighten the chances of a
resumption of hostilities if the reconciliation talks end in failure. The recent fighting between Misratan and Tripoli militias in
Tajoura, Tripoli, indicates that Libya Dawn may break apart regardless of the negotiations in Morocco.
Outlook: The LNA’s allied support forces in Western Libya will continue to secure key positions in the outskirts of Tripoli, Libya,
and will begin posturing for a potential resumption of hostilities.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
ISIS’s Sirte forces appear to be preparing for a new offensive in the oil crescent near al Sidra and Ras Lanouf, Libya. A raid
against the al Naqa oil field and the massing of ISIS militants near Nufaliya indicates ISIS’s increased confidence in its
capability to seize and hold oil facilities against a counterattack by the Libyan Oil Guard and/or the LNA. Any successful capture
of an active well or refinery would be a turning point in ISIS’s Libya campaign because it would provide a stable and lucrative
source of income to bolster its recruitment and arming efforts.
Al Qaeda-aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces continued to resist ISIS’s attempts to recapture eastern
Derna, which ISIS’s Derna forces held in the aftermath of their expulsion from Derna in June 2015.
Outlook: ISIS’s Benghazi forces will undertake a new campaign of disruptive operations to distract the LNA and prevent any
reinforcements to the Libyan Oil Guards. MSCD militants will probably launch a final offensive against ISIS in Derna.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
2
3
4
9
1) 29 SEP: LNA Tribal
Support Forces
secured positions
within Janzour in
Tripoli, Libya.
2) 03 OCT: Alleged
Boko Haram
reinforcements
arrived in Abu Hadi
IVO Sirte, Libya.
3) 04 OCT: Gunmen
raided al Naqa Oil
Field IVO Zillah, Libya.
4) 05 OCT: ISIS Sirte
forces conducted raids
on suspected LNA and
Libya Dawn spies in
Sirte, Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM continues to publish videos to connect with its regional network. It released footage of a successful December 10, 2014,
prisoner exchange in which AQIM negotiated the release of seven militants for one French citizen. Abu Obeida Yusuf al Annabi,
head of AQIM’s Council of Notables, also released a statement calling for direct attacks against Western capitals, installations
and multinational corporations.
Outlook: AQIM’s call for attacks may inspire smaller groups or individuals to attempt attacks. AQIM will continue to attempt to
unite radical Islamist groups operating in West and North Africa.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Ansar al Sharia and related groups remain focused on defensive jihad, protecting their operating areas from Tunisian security
forces, and pro-ISIS militants are attempting to conduct small-scale attacks. Clearing operations in the Ouergha mountains
have had limited effects. The Libyan sanctuary will continue to challenge Tunisia. Several explosive-laden vehicles with ISIS
propaganda material inside were interdicted at the Tunisian-Libyan border.
Outlook: Tunisia lifted the State of Emergency put into effect in June 2015, which signals an end to the intensive security
operations against militants.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
A YouTube account released a video purportedly from al Qaeda confirming the death of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, co-founder of al
Murabitoun, in June 2015 U.S. airstrikes. Groups close to Belmokhtar denied reports of his death and subsequent statements
referred to him as a current leader, indicating that Belmokhtar remains at large. A suspected Ansar al Din member appeared
before the International Criminal Court (ICC) on September 30. He faces charges of war crimes committed in 2012 for the
destruction of holy shrines in Timbuktu, Mali.
Outlook: Continued progress made in peace talks will make it more difficult for AQIM-affiliates to conduct attacks in the north.
10
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
3
2
4
1) 29-30 SEP:
Tunisian forces
diffused explosive-
laden vehicles that
entered from Libya.
2) 02 OCT: Tunisian
military units
performed a clearing
operation in the
Ouergha mountains.
3) 04 OCT: The
Algerian National
People’s Army seized
seven arms caches in
Boumerdes, Algeria.
4) 04-05 OCT:
Security forces
arrested pro-ISIS
recruitment cells in
Casablanca, Morocco
and Medenine,
Tunisia.
1

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
1) 01 OCT:
Authorities detained
Senior MNLA leader
at Ouagadougou
Airport in Burkina
Faso.
2) 02 OCT: Mali and
French forces cleared
a suspicious package
containing
ammunition IVO
Faladie, Mali.
12

13. ASSESSMENT:
Domestic Politics and Reactions to the Nuclear Deal
The Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) submitted its generally
critical findings to a tense session of Parliament on October 4. In response, five members of the special commission issued a
joint statement criticizing the report, claiming that it ignores the “very positive points” of the nuclear deal. Parliament also voted
on the review process of a resolution that, if passed, would “conditionally” approve the JCPOA. The resolution was then sent to
the National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Parliamentary Commission for “review.”
Outlook: Domestic disagreements surrounding the JCPOA will not prevent the government’s final approval of it.
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated on September 30 that Saudi Arabia will face a “harsh” Iranian reaction if it fails
to return the bodies of Iranian pilgrims killed during the September 24 Hajj stampede. IRGC Commander Major General
Mohammad Ali Jafari also stated on October 3 that the IRGC is prepared to “hold the Saudis accountable” with an “aggressive”
response. Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli, several
members of the NSFP Parliamentary Commission, and the Supreme Leader each called throughout the week for the formation
of fact-finding committees to investigate the stampede.
Rezaei stated on September 29 that Iran “foresees” a new regional coalition composed of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. Foreign
Ministry Spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham subsequently announced Iran’s official support for Russian action in Syria on October
1. On October 2, Rezaei stated that “it is possible” for Russia to enter Iraq “for the benefit” of the Iraqi government. On October
2 and 5 respectively, an unnamed “high-ranking diplomatic official” and IRGC Navy Commander Brig. Gen. Ali Fadavi denied
reports claiming that Iran had sent ground forces to Syria to participate in a campaign with Russian forces.
Outlook: Iranian-Saudi animosity over the Hajj stampede will remain tense, but rhetorical as Iranian officials advocate for the
formation of fact-finding committees and international management of the Hajj. Iran and Russia will continue tactical
cooperation in the Middle East, particularly in Syria.
13
IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
29 SEP: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei stated
that Iran “foresees” a new regional coalition of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia.
29 SEP: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif presented Iran’s proposal for a “political solution” to the
Syrian crisis, which includes a “national inclusive government” and the “reform of political structures.”
30 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for the formation of a fact-finding committee on the
Hajj stampede and stated that Iran will give a “harsh and tough reaction” if Saudi Arabia does not return
the bodies of the Iranian victims.
01 OCT: Rezaei stated that “it is possible” for Russia to enter Iraq “for the benefit” of the Iraqi government.
01 OCT: An unnamed “high-ranking diplomatic official” denied reports claiming that Iranian troops have joined
Syrian President Bashar al Assad’s forces in a ground offensive in Syria, supported by Russian airstrikes.
01 OCT: Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry recalled its ambassador to Iran in response to Iranian “interference” in
Bahraini affairs and ordered the Iranian chargé d'affaires to leave the country within 72 hours.
01 OCT: Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli and several members of the National Security and
Foreign Policy (NSFP) Parliamentary Commission called for the formation of a fact-finding committee to
investigate the Hajj stampede.
02 OCT: Rezaei called for a fact-finding committee on the Hajj stampede.
03 OCT: IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari stated that the IRGC is prepared to give a “fast
and aggressive response… to hold the Saudis accountable.”
04 OCT: The Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA submitted its generally critical report
to Parliament. Five members of the special commission released a joint statement claiming that the report
unfairly ignores the nuclear deal’s “very positive points.”
04 OCT: Parliament voted to approve the review of a resolution that “conditionally” approves of the JCPOA.
The resolution was then sent to the relevant parliamentary commissions for review.
05 OCT: IRGC Navy Commander Brig. Gen. Ali Fadavi denied reports claiming that Iran had sent ground
forces to Syria to participate in a campaign with Russian forces.
29 SEP – 05 OCT

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16