The document outlines key developments regarding the positions of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Iranian politics as of September 16, 2015. Ayman al-Zawahiri criticized ISIS and its legitimacy while Iran released senior al-Qaeda figures, possibly impacting the network's operations. The situation in Yemen and Libya highlights ongoing conflicts and military operations by various factions, with deteriorating humanitarian conditions and political instability apparent in both countries.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
September 16, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Ayman al Zawahiri issued a critique of ISIS and its leader, dismissing the Caliphate as illegitimate
and calling for all Muslims to defend themselves against the West.
2. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to correct President Hassan Rouhani publicly as he defended the
Guardian Council’s role in elections as its “rational right” in response to Rouhani’s August 19
critique of the Council’s growing involvement in Iran’s upcoming elections.
3. ISIS consolidated control in Sirte and the surrounding areas in Libya using methods similar to those
seen in Syria and Iraq.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri released two episodes of a new “Islamic Spring” audio series. Zawahiri stated that the Islamic
State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) caliphate is illegitimate and strongly criticized ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for claiming
the title of Caliph. Zawahiri explained that Muslims are not obligated to declare their allegiance to Baghdadi and his Islamic
State. He noted that ISIS has been focused on conquering other Muslims instead of uniting against external threats, such as
the West, and called for fighters to set aside differences to focus on the common goal of attacking the West, secularists, and
Shia Muslims in Iraq and Syria.
A report indicated that Iran released three senior al Qaeda leaders and two senior al Qaeda operatives from detention in
exchange for AQAP’s release of an Iranian diplomat kidnapped in Yemen. The al Qaeda leaders released, including Abu al
Khayr al Masri, Saif al Adel, and Abu Muhammed al Masri, could relocate to Syria or the militant havens along the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. It is not clear if the released al Qaeda members have been able to communicate with the rest of the al Qaeda
network while they were under arrest in Iran.
Outlook: Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri will continue his series, drawing attention to al Qaeda’s opposition to ISIS, but
encouraging cooperation between the fighters.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-
Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase. Last week, Pakistan announced that the
Pakistani army would remain in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) until 2019.
Outlook: Pakistani military will continue to strengthen its offensive against militancy in the country as Operation Zarb-e-Azb is
in its final phase.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Announced UN-led peace talks collapsed before they began because of continued preconditions for negotiations. Abdu Rabbu
Mansour Hadi’s government pulled out of the talks scheduled for this week in Oman, again calling for the al Houthis to abide by
the terms of UNSCR 2216, which calls for the al Houthis to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The al Houthis continue
to express openness toward negotiations, but refuse to make concessions in advance. UN and humanitarian organizations
continue to warn of the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian conditions in Yemen.
Outlook: A negotiated political settlement remains unlikely as long as there are demands for the al Houthis to implement
UNSCR 2216 without any guarantees that their interests will be protected in the future.
Security
The Saudi-led Arab coalition is preparing for a future offensive against Sana’a. Coalition forces supported Yemeni army and
popular resistance forces in Ma’rib against the al Houthis and continued to support popular resistance forces in southern and
central Yemen, especially in Taiz. They also mobilized police forces in Aden to secure the city. The al Houthis have fixed the
coalition forces along a frontline that runs from Taiz into southern al Bayda and continue to control northern Yemen.
Outlook: The anti-al Houthi forces are unlikely to advance closer to Sana’a as positions once again become entrenched.
Civilian deaths due to coalition airstrikes are driving support toward al Houthi-aligned forces.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP is continuing its offensive against the al Houthis, particularly in al Bayda governorate, and a senior operative described
AQAP’s mission in Aden as one to restore governance. Several ISIS media offices in Yemen released materials designed to
support recruitment and displayed pictures of training exercises. ISIS Wilayat Shabwah released a video in support of the new
ISIS dinar, released in territory under ISIS control.
Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment.
4
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN
5
1) SEP 10: Saudi-led
airstrikes targeted al
Daylami airbase and
other military sites in
Sana’a.
2) SEP 09-12: Two
U.S. airstrikes killed
AQAP militants in
Hadramawt.
3) SEP 13: Al Houthi
gunfire killed Saudi
soldiers near the
Saudi-Yemeni border.
4) SEP 13: Saudi-led
coalition forces
launched a ground
offensive in al
Jufaynah, Ma’rib.
5) SEP 09-15: Al
Houthis and popular
resistance forces
clashed in Taiz.
1
2
3
4
5

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The U.S. re-opened a diplomatic mission to Somalia in Kenya. The signal is one of support for the Somali Federal Government
(SFG). A Charge d’Affaires will lead the mission until Congress approves a new ambassador. The SFG faces challenges to its
authority in central Somalia, however. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a, a group that had previously cooperated with the government
against al Shabaab, controls territory in Galgudud region and refuses to recognize the SFG-backed regional authority.
Outlook: It is unlikely the U.S. will move its mission to Somalia to Mogadishu in the near future because of ongoing security
concerns.
Security
Kenyan security forces are conducting a large-scale operation against an al Shabaab-run cell, Jaysh Ayman, in the Boni Forest
near the Somali-Kenyan border along the coast. Al Shabaab has used the area to move between Kenya and Somalia and
reportedly ran cells out of it. AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) forces remain overstretched in Somalia and are
vulnerable to al Shabaab attacks. Efforts remain underway to train additional Somali security and police forces.
Outlook: AMISOM and SNA forces may consolidate in southern and central Somalia, ceding some territory to al Shabaab, to
protect against al Shabaab attacks.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab remains in control of territory in southern and central Somalia. It beheaded three young men it accused of being
SNA soldiers near the border of Hiraan and Lower Shabelle regions. Al Shabaab continues to conduct complex attacks against
underdefended AMISOM positions. An attempted bombing of a Kenyan mall may have been linked to al Shabaab.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to exploit the weak force posture in southern and central Somalia to attack AMISOM and
SNA positions and contest territory.
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
3
2
1
4
7
1) 08 SEP: Kenyan
security forces
disrupted an IED
attack against Garden
City Mall in Nairobi,
Kenya.
2) 10 SEP: Galmudug
regional forces
clashed with Ahlu
Sunna wa al Jama’a
militia in Abudwak
and Guriel, Galgudud
region.
3) 12 SEP: Kenyan
Defense Forces
conducted anti-al
Shabaab operations
in Boni Forest region.
4) 14 SEP: Al Shabaab
beheaded youth in
central Somalia.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) delegates and others voiced discontent with the United Nations’ Support Mission in
Libya (UNSMIL) for its perceived bias toward the internationally recognized General National Congress (GNC) in the final round
of Government of National Accord (GNA) negotiations in Sakhirat, Morocco. Several independent delegates have already left
the negotiations over pressure to accept the GNC-proposed amendments to the draft agreement.
Outlook: The UN-led talks for a national unity government are unlikely to advance as long as key factions, including the HoR,
perceive a bias toward the GNC and could collapse if those factions withdraw completely.
Security
A sharp uptick in vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks and kidnappings indicates militant groups may
now be focused on a military campaign in Tripoli or possibly that the GNC has lost further territorial control. The attacks have
not caused significant collateral damage and are occurring as ISIS consolidates its positions along the Libyan coastline in Sirte.
Outlook: Security in Tripoli will continue to deteriorate as Libya Dawn forces remain overextended and unable to disrupt
operations.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
ISIS Sirte forces are consolidating in Sirte and the surrounding areas, establishing governance and control. ISIS’s declared
Abdul Mughira al Qahtani to be the emir of Wilayat Libya and is implementing reforms in the local banking system. Al Qaeda-
aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces continued to resist ISIS’s attempts to recapture Derna and may be
negotiating for ISIS’s voluntary evacuation from its strongholds in Sahel Sharqi and Fatahia.
Outlook: ISIS Sirte will continue to follow methods of control seen in Iraq and Syria to consolidate strength in Libya. MSCD
militants will probably launch a new offensive against ISIS in Derna.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
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2
3
4
9
1) 09 SEP: Warshifana
tribesman, operating
as Libyan National
Army units, attacked
Libya Dawn troops IVO
Janzour, Libya.
2) 09 SEP: A VBIED
detonated outside of
Hadaba Prison IVO
Tripoli, Libya.
3) 12 SEP: ISIS
militants began
construction on
underground
compounds and
prisons in Sirte, Libya.
4) 14 SEP: A VBIED
detonated in Tajoura,
Tripoli, Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
The National People’s Army and National Gendarmerie have reported a heightened level of smuggling this week with multiple
recoveries of arms caches, indicating a rise in Islamist militant activity. These arms caches are arming both AQIM and ISIS
cells. Moroccan security forces found a militant group allegedly pledged to ISIS with weapons that came from Algeria. The
group only consisted of five men, but presents a direct challenge to AQIM as they struggle to recruit new forces.
Outlook: AQIM continues to lose support to ISIS, but may be arming themselves for an attack in order to regain favor among
the militants.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisia continues to fight against terrorists and faces a growing threat to its prison system. Terrorists plotted to bomb
Mornaguia prison in Manouba and planned to hold Algerian tourists hostage to negotiate for prisoners’ release. Prime Minister
Habib Essid may lift the state of emergency in light of the successful security operations, but if the government perceives any
type of instability, before 02 OCT it may look to lengthen the state of emergency until the winter.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia has not claimed any recent attacks, but the cells within Tunisia may continue to target the prisons
until they successfully release their comrades. If Tunisia lifts the state of emergency, Ansar al Sharia or other aligned groups
may take advantage of the lessened security measures.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Mali continues to witness militant violence, further extending into the south. Special forces arrested terrorists with connections
to the Front for the Liberation of Massena, an AQIM linked group operating in central Mali. Those arrested admitted to receiving
orders and money from Ansar al Din in the north, indicating the latter’s intentions of gaining control of the south. This move
could strengthen AQIM’s position in Mali, prevent their supporters from defecting to ISIS.
Outlook: Ansar al Din will continue using the Front for the Liberation of Massena and other cells to expand to the south and
attack targets closer to the capital.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
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1
3
2
1) 13 SEP: National
Gendarmerie
arrested seven
smugglers in el Tarf,
Algeria.
2) 14 SEP: Moroccan
forces arrested five
militants pledged to
ISIS in Essaouira,
Morocco.
3) 14 SEP: Algerian
National People’s
Army arrested arms
smugglers and seized
an arms cache in
Djelfa, Algeria.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
3
1
2
1) 08 - 14 SEP:
Algerian National
People’s Army
arrested multiple
smugglers and
confiscated an arms
cache in Bordj Baji
Moktar and
Tamanrasset, Algeria.
2) 12 SEP: Gunmen
killed two police
officers in Ouerkoro,
Mali.
3) 13 SEP: Gunmen
injured two
MINUSMA
peacekeepers near
Gao, Mali. 4

13. ASSESSMENT:
Military and Security
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed new members of the High Council for the Supreme Council of Cyberspace
(SCC) on September 5. He also enumerated a 10-point mission for the SCC. Along with consolidating authority under the SCC
by dissolving “parallel” space councils, Khamenei wrote that the SCC’s mission includes transforming Iran into a global “cyber
power.” Other points are for the SCC to accelerate the launch of a “national information network,” to combat foreign “infiltration
into and infringement of” Iranian cyberspace, and to formulate “services in compliance with Islamic-Iranian values.” On
September 11 and 14 respectively, Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Kazem Sedighi and Judiciary Head Sadegh Amoli
Larijani called for vigilance against foreign influence in Iran.
Outlook: Authorities’ anxieties about foreign infiltration after the nuclear agreement will accelerate efforts to enhance
cyberspace capabilities, particularly online censorship.
Domestic Politics and Reactions to the Nuclear Deal
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right.” He
added that “some objections [to the role of the Guardian Council] are gratuitous.” The Supreme Leader was likely pushing back
against President Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Guardian Council’s expanding oversight of elections. Regime officials also
continued to censure the Supreme Leader’s Representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili’s
September 7 criticism that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, violates the Supreme Leader’s nuclear redlines
and requires Iran to renounce many of its nuclear rights. Nuclear negotiator Hamid Baeidinejad and Special Parliamentary
Commission to Review the JCPOA member Abbas Ali Mansouri Arani singled out Jalili’s record as a senior nuclear negotiator
under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, while Arani’s fellow commission member Parliamentarian Massoud
Pezeshkian stated that Iran was “seeking just two rights, [both of] which we obtained.”
Outlook: The Supreme Leader will continue to publically correct Rouhani in order to ensure the latter’s influence and politico-
economic reforms do not become unmanageable.
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IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
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05 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei appointed new members of the High Council for the Supreme Council of
Cyberspace (SCC) for a four-year term.
07 SEP: Supreme Leader’s Representative to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili argued that Iran is
forced to renounce some of its “inalienable rights” under the JCPOA.
08 SEP: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stressed that Jalili’s criticism was Jalili’s “own
interpretation.”
08 SEP: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that access to military sites would be granted 24 days after UN
inspectors first formally request access.
09 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani announced the formation of a “Resistance Economy headquarters.”
09 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal”
and “rational right,” and argued that “objections [to the role of the Guardian Council] are gratuitous.”
09 SEP: Vice President Eshagh Jahangiri called for preparations to implement the Resistance Economy.
10 SEP: Saeed Jalili said that the supervision required under the JCPOA is “beyond [the] accepted protocol.”
10 SEP: Nuclear negotiator Hamid Baeidinejad responded to Saeed Jalili’s disapproval of the JCPOA by criticizing Jalili’s
record as a nuclear negotiator under former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
10 SEP: Iran’s Permanent Representative to the IAEA Board of Governors Reza Najafi stated that it is “possible” that Iran will
export its nuclear stockpile to Russia.
11 SEP: Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA members Massoud Pezeshkian and Abbas Ali Mansouri
Arani pushed back on Saeed Jalili’s criticisms of the JCPOA.
11 SEP: Tehran Interim Friday Prayer Leader Hojjat ol Eslam Kazem Sedighi warned that Iran must remain alert to the threat of
foreign influence.
12 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani called for transferring parts of the government’s share of the economy to the private sector.
14 SEP: Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Hassan Firouzabadi stated that the Iranian military should “exploit
their capabilities” to implement the Resistance Economy.
14 SEP: Members of the Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA inspected the Arak heavy water reactor.
14 SEP: Officials from Iran, the U.S., and China held a trilateral meeting regarding the JCPOA on the sidelines of the IAEA
General Conference.
05 SEP – 14 SEP

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16