The document outlines key threats and developments in the Middle East and North Africa as of August 2015, highlighting Iran's expansion of its missile program, an uptick in al Qaeda and ISIS activities in Yemen and Libya, and the ongoing conflict in Somalia. It reports on the Arab League's emergency meeting addressing the ISIS threat in Libya and military actions against militant groups in various regions. The document further assesses the implications of these threats on local and regional stability, indicating a potential increase in violence and the need for coordinated international responses.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
August 26, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. The Iranian regime asserted that it will continue to grow its missile program, doing whatever it
deems necessary and without permission or resolution, according to President Hassan Rouhani.
2. AQAP is benefitting from the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive against the al Houthis and their allies. It
is strengthening its presence in Aden and Abyan governorates in southern Yemen.
3. The Arab League held an emergency meeting to discuss how to counter ISIS gains in Libya. ISIS
continues to consolidate control over the area surrounding Sirte on the central Libyan coastline.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), a Central Asian militant group with closes ties to al Qaeda, pledged allegiance (bay’a) to the new
Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour. The IJU is a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which pledged
allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). The confirmation of Mullah Omar’s
death has led a few groups to switch their allegiance to ISIS, but there are also those who have re-pledged to Mullah Akhtar
Mansour, indicating that the al Qaeda network remains active, though weaker.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will need to prove that it is a viable leader of the global jihadist movement in order to retain the support of its
followers, which introduces a requirement of relevance. The 9/11 anniversary may be a time for significant leadership
statements or attacks.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Pakistani military strengthened its offensive against militancy in North Waziristan by launching a ground operation in the
troubled Shawal Valley. The ground operation follows multiple days of airstrikes in the region. These attacks are a part of
Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistani military’s offensive against militancy in the country. The operation is now in its final phase.
The scheduled bilateral talks between the National Security Advisors of India and Pakistan broke down hours before the start
as tensions escalated between both sides. The talks broke down after India insisted that the talks be purely about terrorism,
while Pakistan argued that conversations based solely on terrorism would be pointless.
Outlook: Pakistani military will continue to strengthen its offensive against militancy in the country as Operation Zarb-e-Azb is
in its final phase.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Negotiations to end Yemen’s conflict appear to be continuing, although with limited success. Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s
government submitted a plan to the UN to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for the al Houthis’
withdrawal from seized territory and disarmament.
Outlook: It is unlikely the al Houthis will currently agree to any political solution that calls for the group’s withdrawal and
disarmament, but the al Houthis may be willing to make some concessions.
Security
The success of local tribal forces in liberating areas of central and southern Yemen from the al Houthis appears to be
galvanizing more local support for anti-al Houthi forces. Tribal forces in Dhamar, central Yemen, have mobilized to liberate the
governorate. Popular resistance forces also continued to liberate areas of Taiz, Ibb, and al Bayda in central Yemen. The al
Houthis have responded to the loss of territory in Taiz by shelling civilian neighborhoods.
Outlook: The al Houthis will continue to lose territory in central Yemen as Popular Resistance forces maintain a steady
momentum in seizing territory and continue to receive support from Saudi-led coalition forces.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continues to exploit Operation Golden Arrow’s success to seize territory in southern Yemen. AQAP militants reportedly
temporarily seized multiple districts in Aden city, southern Yemen, before withdrawing the next day for unknown reasons. AQAP
is also presenting itself as a force against the al Houthis. Jalal al Marqishi, the leader of AQAP’s insurgent arm Ansar al Sharia,
detailed AQAP’s role in cooperating with local forces to fight the al Houthis in southern and eastern Yemen. Separately, AQAP
continues to refuse to withdraw from al Mukalla, eastern Yemen, despite calls from both Hadi’s government and local tribal
forces for the group to do so.
Outlook: AQAP will continue its successful campaign alongside anti-al Houthi forces throughout southern and eastern Yemen.
The Saudi-led coalition’s focus on the fight against the al Houthis will continue to distract from the fight against AQAP, allowing
for the militant group to expand its operational reach.
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GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN
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1) 22 AUG: AQAP
seized a number of
districts in eastern
and northern Aden
before withdrawing
on August 23.
2) 23-24 AUG: Al
Houthis shelled Saudi
military sites near
Jizan Province.
3) 22 AUG: U.S.
airstrike killed four
AQAP militants
traveling in a vehicle.
4) 21 AUG: Thirteen
prisoners escaped
from the central
prison in al Mahrah.
5) 18-24 AUG:
Ongoing battles for
the liberation of Taiz
city.
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5

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali Parliament is attempting to impeach Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahmoud on charges of violating the
constitution. UN Special Envoy to Somalia Nicholas Kay criticized parliament’s move, stating that the Somali federal
government must work to have elections in 2016. Separately, AMISOM commanders acknowledged that their troops were
responsible for shooting civilians in July in Lower Shabelle region. Tensions have remained high between AMISOM forces and
Somali civilians after the incident.
Outlook: The Somali federalization process may collapse completely before it reaches its 2016 deadline, potentially causing
international forces to assist in reinstituting an interim federal government or causing an outbreak of violence in the nation.
Security
Tensions continued in central Somalia between the Somali government-backed forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ)
militants. Somali forces made a failed attempt to arrest ASWJ’s self-proclaimed Vice President Abdullahi Hersi Diirshe in
Galgudud region. ASWJ, a moderate Sufi rebel group opposed to Somalia’s federalization process, seized Dhusamareb, the
capital of Galmudug region in June.
Outlook: The attempted arrest of an ASWJ leader may inflame tensions between security forces and ASWJ militants in central
Somalia, leading to a renewed outbreak of clashes in the region.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab militants continue to carry out deadly asymmetrical attacks on security forces and civilians despite losing territory in
southern Somalia. Al Shabaab detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) at a military camp in Kismayo,
southern Somalia. The same day, suspected al Shabaab militants detonated a VBIED targeting civilians in the capital,
Mogadishu.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely continue to use asymmetrical attack tactics targeting both civilians and security forces as the
group continues to lose territory in southern Somalia.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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4
3
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1) 22 AUG: Al
Shabaab detonated a
VBIED targeting a
military camp in
Kismayo.
2) 22 AUG:
Suspected al Shabaab
militants detonated a
VBIED near a
restaurant in
Mogadishu.
3) 24 AUG: SNA
forces retook villages
from al Shabaab in
Lower Shabelle.
4) 18 AUG:
Unclaimed IED
detonated, targeting
AMISOM vehicle in
Afgoi, Lower
Shabelle.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN continues to delay the final phase of the reconciliation talks, which are expected to restart on August 27 in Sakhirat,
Morocco. These bureaucratic delays have not shifted the deadline of the talks that was previously declared to be August 31.
Outlook: The U.S., UN, and EU have not amended demands for a unity government to precede any increase in military aid. In
the absence of a negotiated settlement, the Arab League may decide to intervene on its own. These considerations may
provide enough pressure on the parties to reach a successful agreement on the future of Libya.
Security
The numerous warning and statements on an imminent attack against ISIS in Sirte fell short and further demonstrated the
weakness of Libya’s fractious military groups and militias. The Arab League, which held an emergency session to discuss
Libya, agreed to allow member states to provide aid through any means necessary.
Outlook: If the LNA and Libya Dawn continue to embrace paralysis over concrete action against ISIS in Sirte, the Arab League
may choose to pursue a Yemen-style military solution in Libya. This threat is growing in credibility and will be discussed during
the next Arab League meeting on August 27.
Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya
The revolt against ISIS in Sirte raised many questions about ISIS’s ability to maintain its base in Sirte, Libya, against the many
distinct external threats. The reprieve has allowed ISIS to regroup and reinforce its hold on the city and rural countryside.
Recent reports of a Boko Haram presence in the city highlight ISIS’s growing logistical capabilities and their diminishing need to
recruit directly from the Libyan civilian population.
Outlook: ISIS in Libya, and Sirte in particular, are increasingly in a race against time. The August 27 meeting of the Arab
League may see the announcement of a coalition force to eradicate ISIS’s bases in Libya. This growing threat will force ISIS to
accelerate its recruitment and its defensive positions outside of Sirte, Libya.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
Algerian security forces continue to battle terrorists, particularly in northern regions of the country. Militants ambushed a group
of soldiers in Skikda, northern Algeria. The Algerian government reportedly deployed more security forces to the region
following the attack.
Outlook: Instability in Libya will continue to affect Algeria’s security as al Qaeda and ISIS terrorists continue to move across the
border into Algeria.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Terrorists continue to carry out small-scale attacks on security forces throughout northern and central Tunisia. Militants riding on
a motorcycle shot and killed a Tunisian police officer in the beach resort of Sousse, northern Tunisia on August 19. Separately,
Uqba Ibn Nafaa Brigade militants opened fire on Tunisian customs workers near the Algerian border in eastern Tunisia, killing
one customs agent. Tunisia continues to crack down on smuggling along its borders with Algeria and Libya.
Outlook: Militants groups in Tunisia’s central and eastern regions will continue to target security forces in northern and central
Tunisia as Tunisian military forces continue efforts to crack down on terrorism throughout the country.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Conflict between Mali’s warring rebel groups continues to threaten the country’s security. The separatist group the Coordination
of Azawad Movements (CMA) withdrew from the committee that monitors a June peace agreement between separatist and pro-
government fighters. The CMA withdrew after a pro-government militia violated the peace agreement last week by taking the
town of Anefis in Kidal from the CMA. Separately, a mine explosion in Gao struck a UN vehicle, injuring two soldiers.
Outlook: The breaking of Mali’s peace accord will likely lead to increased violence throughout Mali both by separatist and pro-
government groups and by jihadist groups.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
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1) 18 AUG: BRSC
forces continued an
aggressive campaign
to consolidate control
of Sabri, Benghazi.
2) 19 AUG: 1,100
families fled Sirte for
numerous cities
throughout Libya.
3) 24 AUG: ISIS Derna
began campaign to
recapture Sahel
Sharqi, Derna.
4) 24 AUG: LNA
warplanes bombed 5
suspected enemy
supply boats IVO
Marissa, Benghazi.

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
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3
2
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41) 22-24 AUG:
Tunisian security
forces arrest militants
attempting to enter
Libya.
2) 24 AUG: Uqba Ibn
Nafaa attacked
Tunisian checkpoint
at Bouchebka border
crossing.
3) 21, 23, 24 AUG:
Suspected AQIM
militants clashed with
Algerian security
forces near Skikda.
4) 22 AUG: Tunisian
security forces arrest
ISIS recruiting cell IVO
Bizerte and Ariana,
Tunisia.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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SAHELWEST AFRICA
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3
4
1) 17-18 AUG:
MINUSMA troops
deployed in Kidal
region, Mali.
2) 22 AUG: IED attack
targeted MINUSMA
logistics convoy on
Asongo-Menaka
road, Gao region.
3) 20 AUG: CMA
protested
establishment of
Kidal security zone in
Bamako, Mali, and
threatened to
remove it by force.
4) 23 AUG: Gunmen
targeted Burkinabe
checkpoint in Oursi,
Oudalane province.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Military and Security
Iran marked “Defense Industry Day” on August 22. Senior Iranian officials attended a ceremony to unveil the Defense Ministry’s
Fateh 313 ballistic missile. President Hassan Rouhani reassured the domestic audience that the nuclear deal will not limit Iran’s
defense capacity, claiming: “We will sell and buy weapons whenever and wherever we deem it necessary… we will not wait for
permission…or any resolution.” Defense Minister IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan reiterated the Supreme Leader’s
position that the regime’s missiles are nonnegotiable and claimed that Russia will deliver four modernized S-300 surface-to-air
missile “battalions” to Iran “soon.” The Defense Ministry also released a statement saying Iran will not suspend its missile
activities. Meanwhile, IRGC Air Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh confirmed the IRGC’s plans to hold
missile exercises “in the near future.”
Outlook: Economic partnership in the post-sanctions era will bolster Iran’s military capabilities as it insists on preserving and
growing its missile program.
Domestic Politics
Two Assembly of Experts members pushed back on President Hassan Rouhani’s August 19 comments criticizing the Guardian
Council’s growing involvement in vetting political candidates. Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami called Rouhani’s comments “incorrect,”
while Ayatollah Abbas Kaabi stated that no one should “undermine” the Guardian Council’s legal and regulatory authority.
Guardian Council member Siamak Rahpeyk also defended the Guardian Council’s duty to vet candidates as based on both the
Constitution and years-long tradition. IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari also criticized Rouhani indirectly,
stating on August 20, “This kind of language that would weaken one of the pillars of the Islamic Revolution, as in the Guardian
Council, damages national unity.”
Outlook: Despite Rouhani’s criticism, the Guardian Council will continue to vet candidates heavily before the upcoming
elections for Parliament and the Assembly of Experts.
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IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
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18 AUG: Planning and Strategic Supervision Deputy to the President Mohammad Bagher Nobakht reiterated that the
nuclear deal “does not require the approval of any institution other than the Supreme National Security Council.”
18 AUG: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif rejected allegations that IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen.
Qassem Soleimani traveled to Russia in late July.
19 AUG: IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami claimed that America’s military power has lost its
credibility “against Iran.”
19 AUG: Parliament elected 15 members of a special committee to review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or
JCPOA.
20 AUG: IRGC Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari criticized some Iranian officials for blindly supporting the nuclear deal and
restoring relations with the West.
20 AUG: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani reiterated the importance of the “resistance
economy” doctrine, claiming that “today, our main war is an economic war.”
20 AUG: Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi dismissed a recent Associated
Press report claiming that Iran will use its own inspectors at the Parchin military site.
20 AUG: Artesh Navy Deputy Commander Rear Admiral Mahmoud Mousavi stated that the Artesh Navy 35th Fleet has
repelled three pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden, including one on an Iranian oil tanker.
22 AUG: President Rouhani stated that Iran will buy and sell weapons “whenever and wherever we deem it necessary.”
22 AUG: The Defense Ministry introduced the new Fateh 313 missile in Tehran.
23 AUG: Iran reopened its embassy in London, while Britain reopened its embassy in Tehran.
24 AUG: In response to earlier comments from President Rouhani criticizing the Guardian Council, Assembly of Experts
member Ayatollah Ahmad Khamati stated that the Guardian Council has the duty to “stand against individuals in the
elections who seek to monopolize Parliament with wealth.”
24 AUG: An Iranian delegation traveled to Moscow to “ascertain the exact date for delivery of the S-300” surface-to-air
missile systems.
24 AUG: President Hassan Rouhani met with British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond to discuss the need for “mutual
trust” between their two nations.
18 AUG – 24 AUG 2015

15. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
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