CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. In what may be a shift in Russian diplomacy in the region, Russia’s ambassador to Yemen, Vladimir Dedushkin, met with Saudi officials and members of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government in Riyadh before meeting with al Houthi representatives in Sana’a. A delegation of al Houthis and members of Yemen’s ruling party, the General People’s Congress, led by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, then traveled to Oman to meet with the UN envoy to Yemen.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has a “constitutional duty” to protect the Islamic Revolution. Khamenei’s statement was probably in response to President Hassan Rouhani’s September 15 remark that the IRGC is not the “sole guardian” of the Islamic Revolution. This is the latest in the Supreme Leader’s public corrections of President Rouhani, likely in an effort to curb Rouhani’s influence in the wake of the nuclear deal.
3. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacked a mosque on a Pakistani Air Force base in Peshawar, Pakistan, in retaliation for Pakistani military operations against the group in the FATA region. Twenty-three of at least twenty-nine casualties were Pakistani Air Force officers.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, positioned itself to be part of the leadership of a unified armed Syrian opposition. Jabhat al Nusra leader Abu Mohammed al Joulani announced the end of Jabhat al Nusra’s operations and the formation Jabhat Fatah al Sham, which will not have ties to al Qaeda. This organizational restructuring is a strategic move intended to facilitate the unification of the armed Syrian opposition around a Jabhat al Nusra core. Al Qaeda sanctioned the decision in advance, emphasizing the need for Jabhat al Nusra to preserve unity above organizational relationships. Jabhat Fatah al Sham still holds al Qaeda’s objective of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria.
2. The start of U.S. military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may prolong the ground conditions that permit ISIS and al Qaeda to operate in the country by undermining support for the UN-backed unity government. The U.S. conducted its first airstrikes targeting ISIS in Sirte, Libya, at the request of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Some of the Libyan factions that had backed the GNA and constituted the GNA’s military forces are now protesting its support for Western intervention. These factions may not sustain their military operations against ISIS, prioritizing instead their own objectives. ISIS and al Qaeda expanded operations in Libya during the civil war.
3. Violence is escalating along the Saudi-Yemeni border as the UN-led peace process to negotiate a political resolution to the civil war breaks down. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance launched a series of attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi Arabia to warn that violation of Saudi territory is a “red line.” The al Houthi-Saleh faction may be seeking to induce Saudi Arabia to enter into direct negotiations with it outside of the UN-led negotiations, bypassing Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government. Both the al Houthi-Saleh alliance and Hadi’s government are preparing for the collapse of UN-led peace talks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The loss of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) stronghold in Sirte may not significantly reduce the group’s threat to European targets. U.S.-backed forces allied with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) seized ISIS’s headquarters in Sirte on August 10. ISIS will survive the loss of Sirte. The group may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy and ties to a cell in Milan, Italy, according to documents recovered in Sirte. CIA director John Brennan assessed in June 2016 that ISIS in Libya has the capability and intent to attack beyond Libya’s borders, including across the Mediterranean Sea.
2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities. The death of Umar, who had suppressed pro-ISIS sentiment in al Shabaab, may facilitate the integration of some al Shabaab factions into ISIS’s network.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term setback that will not weaken the group in the long term. Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition forces drove AQAP from Azzan, Shabwah governorate on August 9 and Zinjibar, Ja’ar, and al Shaqra in Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP withdrew to preserve its capabilities in Abyan governorate in 2012. The group will again maintain its ties to the local population and set conditions to resurge in the future.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, positioned itself to be part of the leadership of a unified armed Syrian opposition. Jabhat al Nusra leader Abu Mohammed al Joulani announced the end of Jabhat al Nusra’s operations and the formation Jabhat Fatah al Sham, which will not have ties to al Qaeda. This organizational restructuring is a strategic move intended to facilitate the unification of the armed Syrian opposition around a Jabhat al Nusra core. Al Qaeda sanctioned the decision in advance, emphasizing the need for Jabhat al Nusra to preserve unity above organizational relationships. Jabhat Fatah al Sham still holds al Qaeda’s objective of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria.
2. The start of U.S. military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may prolong the ground conditions that permit ISIS and al Qaeda to operate in the country by undermining support for the UN-backed unity government. The U.S. conducted its first airstrikes targeting ISIS in Sirte, Libya, at the request of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Some of the Libyan factions that had backed the GNA and constituted the GNA’s military forces are now protesting its support for Western intervention. These factions may not sustain their military operations against ISIS, prioritizing instead their own objectives. ISIS and al Qaeda expanded operations in Libya during the civil war.
3. Violence is escalating along the Saudi-Yemeni border as the UN-led peace process to negotiate a political resolution to the civil war breaks down. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance launched a series of attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi Arabia to warn that violation of Saudi territory is a “red line.” The al Houthi-Saleh faction may be seeking to induce Saudi Arabia to enter into direct negotiations with it outside of the UN-led negotiations, bypassing Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government. Both the al Houthi-Saleh alliance and Hadi’s government are preparing for the collapse of UN-led peace talks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The loss of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) stronghold in Sirte may not significantly reduce the group’s threat to European targets. U.S.-backed forces allied with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) seized ISIS’s headquarters in Sirte on August 10. ISIS will survive the loss of Sirte. The group may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy and ties to a cell in Milan, Italy, according to documents recovered in Sirte. CIA director John Brennan assessed in June 2016 that ISIS in Libya has the capability and intent to attack beyond Libya’s borders, including across the Mediterranean Sea.
2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities. The death of Umar, who had suppressed pro-ISIS sentiment in al Shabaab, may facilitate the integration of some al Shabaab factions into ISIS’s network.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term setback that will not weaken the group in the long term. Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition forces drove AQAP from Azzan, Shabwah governorate on August 9 and Zinjibar, Ja’ar, and al Shaqra in Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP withdrew to preserve its capabilities in Abyan governorate in 2012. The group will again maintain its ties to the local population and set conditions to resurge in the future.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The failure of Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to achieve legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other enemy groups in Libya. A democratically elected body, whose mandate expired in October 2015, based in eastern Libya voted no-confidence in the GNA and its prime minister on August 22. The vote is contested, but might invalidate prior GNA decisions if upheld. These decisions could include the GNA’s July 2016 request for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Sirte. Political turmoil will continue to undermine local and international efforts to defeat ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. Russia is attempting to use Yemen’s political crisis opportunistically to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports in an interview with a Russian state news outlet on August 21. Saleh’s statement follows the Russian Charge d’Affaires for Yemen’s vocal support for an al Houthi-Saleh power-sharing body established on August 15. Russia has opposed measures that favor President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, though it has also taken steps to placate Saudi Arabia and other international supporters of the Hadi government. Russia will continue to maneuver on both sides of the political crisis in order to advance its own interests in the event of a negotiated settlement in Yemen.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS’s resurgence in parts of Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS. Zawahiri’s statement was likely timed to rally support for an ongoing Taliban offensive to control Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, of sowing discord among the mujahideen.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials said an Iranian cargo ship, which left from Bandar Abbas, Iran, for al Hudaydah, Yemen, and is escorted by the Artesh Navy’s 34th Fleet, will refuse inspections by countries involved in the conflict in Yemen. Iran appears to be testing U.S. redlines in the Gulf of Aden and will probably continue to challenge the U.S. Navy there. Recent incidents of involving the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington, Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk Tigris, and a convoy of seven cargo ships reportedly carrying weapons for the al Houthis demonstrate Iran’s willingness to test the line.
2. A five-day ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s al Houthi movement allowed humanitarian aid to enter Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders did not make progress in political negotiations during the pause in hostilities, and both sides may have used the time to regroup. Clashes between the al Houthi movement and local tribal militias continued in central and southern Yemen during the ceasefire as well.
3. The al Qaeda-linked al Murabitoun group, which operates in the Sahel, may be fracturing. Al Murabitoun was formed in August 2013 by a merger between the AQIM splinters MUJAO and al Mulathamun. A MUJAO leader pledged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the name of al Murabitoun, which was then denied by an al Mulathamun leader. ISIS has had a growing presence in North Africa among smaller militant Islamist groups and may be extending its reach south into the Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and the Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and for Russian involvement in the conflict in Syria.
2. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi returned to the country after six months in exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadi’s cabinet returned in advance of him and began re-establishing the Hadi-led central government in Aden, in southern Yemen.
3. Malian factions met for the first time in Mali’s capital, Bamako, to improve implementation of a June ceasefire agreement and continued talks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-linked Islamist groups have taken advantage of the conflict in Mali and are pushing their area of operations southward.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The failure of Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to achieve legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other enemy groups in Libya. A democratically elected body, whose mandate expired in October 2015, based in eastern Libya voted no-confidence in the GNA and its prime minister on August 22. The vote is contested, but might invalidate prior GNA decisions if upheld. These decisions could include the GNA’s July 2016 request for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Sirte. Political turmoil will continue to undermine local and international efforts to defeat ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. Russia is attempting to use Yemen’s political crisis opportunistically to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports in an interview with a Russian state news outlet on August 21. Saleh’s statement follows the Russian Charge d’Affaires for Yemen’s vocal support for an al Houthi-Saleh power-sharing body established on August 15. Russia has opposed measures that favor President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, though it has also taken steps to placate Saudi Arabia and other international supporters of the Hadi government. Russia will continue to maneuver on both sides of the political crisis in order to advance its own interests in the event of a negotiated settlement in Yemen.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS’s resurgence in parts of Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS. Zawahiri’s statement was likely timed to rally support for an ongoing Taliban offensive to control Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, of sowing discord among the mujahideen.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials said an Iranian cargo ship, which left from Bandar Abbas, Iran, for al Hudaydah, Yemen, and is escorted by the Artesh Navy’s 34th Fleet, will refuse inspections by countries involved in the conflict in Yemen. Iran appears to be testing U.S. redlines in the Gulf of Aden and will probably continue to challenge the U.S. Navy there. Recent incidents of involving the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington, Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk Tigris, and a convoy of seven cargo ships reportedly carrying weapons for the al Houthis demonstrate Iran’s willingness to test the line.
2. A five-day ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s al Houthi movement allowed humanitarian aid to enter Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders did not make progress in political negotiations during the pause in hostilities, and both sides may have used the time to regroup. Clashes between the al Houthi movement and local tribal militias continued in central and southern Yemen during the ceasefire as well.
3. The al Qaeda-linked al Murabitoun group, which operates in the Sahel, may be fracturing. Al Murabitoun was formed in August 2013 by a merger between the AQIM splinters MUJAO and al Mulathamun. A MUJAO leader pledged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the name of al Murabitoun, which was then denied by an al Mulathamun leader. ISIS has had a growing presence in North Africa among smaller militant Islamist groups and may be extending its reach south into the Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front" against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may have growing influence and strength in North Africa, despite recent setbacks in Derna, Libya. ISIS claimed the terrorist attack on a tourist beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people. The attack was the deadliest in Tunisia’s history.
3. ISIS is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a has claimed credit for three separate VBIED attacks, including four bombings on the first day of Ramadan, June 17, another on June 20, and the third on June 29. The press releases frame these attacks specifically as targeting the “dens” of the al Houthis, which is distinct from how Wilayat Sana’a has laid claim to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials such as Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian and the Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and for Russian involvement in the conflict in Syria.
2. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi returned to the country after six months in exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Hadi’s cabinet returned in advance of him and began re-establishing the Hadi-led central government in Aden, in southern Yemen.
3. Malian factions met for the first time in Mali’s capital, Bamako, to improve implementation of a June ceasefire agreement and continued talks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb-linked Islamist groups have taken advantage of the conflict in Mali and are pushing their area of operations southward.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Ayman al Zawahiri issued a critique of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Zawahiri, who has remained largely silent on ISIS, dismissed the Caliphate as illegitimate and called for all Muslims to defend themselves against the West. Zawahiri still seeks to unify the global jihad and sees ISIS as a dividing force.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right,” pushing back on President Hassan Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Guardian Council. Khamenei’s public correction of Rouhani may be aimed at ensuring the latter’s influence and politico-economic reforms do not become unmanageable.
3. ISIS consolidated control in Sirte, Libya, and the surrounding areas. ISIS is using methods similar to those seen in Syria and Iraq.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The claim of responsibility from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) for an attack in Tunis may mark a shift in how ISIS is selecting targets in Tunisia. An ISIS suicide bomber attacked a bus transporting presidential guards on November 24, killing at least 13 people in the center of Tunis, according to Tunisian authorities. The attack occurred near the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, a secure area in Tunis. Previous ISIS attacks focused on the tourism industry.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in Mali. At least two Islamist militants laid siege to an American-owned hotel in the center of Mali’s capital, Bamako, on November 20, temporarily holding 170 hostages and killing at least 19 people, similar to an attack in August. Multiple Islamist jihadist groups are implicated in the attack. Al Murabitoun claimed responsibility with support from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Saharan Brigade. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din’s southern brigade, the Macina Liberation Front, also claimed credit for the attack. The attack was reportedly in retaliation for the French counterterrorism campaign in Mali, Operation Barkhane. AQIM affiliates in Mali will likely build off of the Bamako attack to target UN, French, and Malian security forces, as well as those who cooperate with them.
3. Iran’s decision to join the Syrian peace talks in Vienna does not signal a thawing of relations with the West; the Supreme Leader will not shift his position and authorize direct negotiations with the U.S. on non-nuclear issues.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials continue to voice their opposition to peace plans for regional crises that involve the partitioning of Iraq or Syria. Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei claimed that the reconstitution of borders would be “detrimental to Muslims” and stated, “We have clearly said that absolutely no border must be changed and that no country can be broken apart.” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, meanwhile, warned of foreign plots to undermine Iraqi national unity during a meeting with Iraqi President Fuad Masum in Tehran.
2. An outright military victory in Yemen grows increasingly unlikely as the Saudi-led coalition shifts from combat to stabilization operations. The UAE is training Colombian mercenaries and Eritrean forces to replace Emirati combat troops in Yemen, and Emirati Special Forces troops are focused on securing only Aden and its immediate environs. The primary frontlines in central Yemen remain fixed along lines of support in the human terrain, and the coalition is focused on maintaining its current positions against al Houthi-Saleh counterattacks.
3. Al Shabaab is taking advantage of Kenyan-Somali tensions to cross the border and expand its operational and recruitment capabilities in Kenya. Militants stormed at least two villages in Kenya this week, raising flags and preaching to residents before evading security forces and crossing back into Somalia. Al Shabaab will likely exploit this freedom of movement to drive recruitment in the border region and conduct attacks within Kenya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis presented a seven-point plan to the UN to resolve the ongoing conflict and have expressed willingness to participate in political negotiations. Both AQAP and ISIS have been able to expand significantly as Yemeni factions fight each other.
2. ISIS-affiliated forces operating out of Sirte, Libya, appear to be positioning themselves to secure Libya’s oil crescent, which would be a step toward securing control of Libyan oil facilities.
3. Senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated calls for fact-finding committees and international management of the Hajj following the September 24 stampede in Mina, Saudi Arabia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Key Iranian regime players’ meetings with senior Syrian and Iraqi government officials and the Hezbollah Secretary General may signal Iranian efforts to bring more force to bear in defense of Assad and Baghdad against the growing ISIS threat. The Supreme Leader’s senior foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati met with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon before meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria while Iran’s defense minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi in Baghdad, Iraq. IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani also levied criticism directly against the United States for not stopping ISIS.
2. Al Houthi attacks on Saudi territory will continue to antagonize Saudi Arabia and will decrease the likelihood that warring factions will participate in political negotiations in the near future. The al Houthis fired rockets at populated locations within Saudi Arabia and raided Saudi Arabian border posts over the past week. An al Houthi-affiliated TV channel ran video footage of al Houthis allegedly firing into Saudi Arabia. UN-sponsored talks in Geneva announced last week have been delayed.
3. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate its capability to conduct attacks within Kenya and carried out multiple attacks, including temporarily seizing territory, in northern Kenyan over the week. Al Shabaab militants took control of a mosque in Garissa county in Kenya and spoke to the congregation, which was held hostage, before fleeing ahead of security forces and also briefly held a town close to the border with Somalia. This the first time the group has carried out such activities in Kenya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei conditionally approved the implementation of the nuclear deal in an open letter to President Hassan Rouhani on October 21. His approval will likely end domestic debate over whether Iran should reject the deal before a violation by other parties.
2. Yemeni stakeholders agreed to resume talks under UN auspices, but the conflict on the ground continues unabated. There will be an initial round of talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia with Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and in Muscat, Oman with the al Houthis, before both sides come together.
3. An al Shabaab religious leader based in Puntland publicly pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), sparking a round of internal al Shabaab arrests as the group attempts to limit ISIS’s influence in Somalia. Al Shabaab has actively sought to maintain a cohesive front against ISIS outreach.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for attacks against Western, particularly American, interests. Zawahiri also called on jihadist factions to unify in what he described as a war against a Russian-Iranian-American axis.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei forbade non-nuclear negotiations with the U.S. on November 1, indicating that Iran's participation in the Syria peace talks does not mark a new willingness to negotiate on regional issues. Khamenei also dismissed Western rhetoric regarding shifting foreign policy priorities in Iran.
3. Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham-linked group in Sirte, Libya, continued to consolidate control over the city’s population and the surrounding environs. Warplanes targeted ISIS positions in the vicinity of Sirte, Libya, on October 27.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Iranian regime asserted that it will continue to grow and preserve its missile program, doing whatever it deems necessary and without permission or resolution, according to President Hassan Rouhani.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is benefitting from the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive against the al Houthis and their allies. It is strengthening its presence in Aden and Abyan governorates in southern Yemen.
3. The Arab League held an emergency meeting to discuss how to counter Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) gains in Libya. ISIS continues to consolidate control over the area surrounding Sirte on the central Libyan coastline.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
Similar to 2015-09-22 CTP Update and Assessment (20)
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
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What is the point of small housing associations.pptxPaul Smith
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
Presentation by Jared Jageler, David Adler, Noelia Duchovny, and Evan Herrnstadt, analysts in CBO’s Microeconomic Studies and Health Analysis Divisions, at the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists Summer Conference.
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This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. Russia’s Yemen ambassador shuttled between Riyadh and Sana’a and has held meetings with
principal Yemeni stakeholders in what may be a shift in Russian diplomacy in the region.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continued to push back on President Hassan Rouhani when
the Supreme Leader claimed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has a “constitutional
duty” to protect the Islamic Revolution.
3. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan attacked a mosque on a Pakistani Air Force base in Peshawar,
Pakistan, in retaliation for Pakistani military operations against the group in the FATA region.
2
3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda continues to face a challenge from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), especially in terms of recruitment and
attracting new groups. Some of the groups that previously expressed affiliation with al Qaeda have moved over to ISIS,
probably to align themselves with what is seen as the more successful and richer of the two. The core al Qaeda network
remains intact, however, and will remain a long-term threat.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to emphasize the differences between its strategy and ISIS’s strategy and will point toward
ISIS’s division of the Sunni ranks in Iraq and Syria as an example.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) launched an attack on a Pakistani Air Force base in retaliation for the increased military
operations in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), a safe haven for Islamist militants. TTP militants killed at least 29
people in an attack on a mosque at the Badabher Air Force base in Peshawar, Pakistan. Twenty-three of those killed are known
to be Pakistani Air Force officials. The Pakistani forces managed to kill 13 militants in the exchange.
The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-
Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase. Last week, Pakistan announced that the
Pakistani army would remain in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) until 2019.
Outlook: Pakistani military might increase its offensive against militancy in the FATA, following the TTP attack on the Badabher
Air Force Base.
3
AL QAEDA
4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Russia has taken a more overt role in the ongoing Yemeni political negotiations. The Russian ambassador to Yemen met with
Saudi government officials and members of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government in Riyadh and then met with al Houthi
representatives in Sana’a. A delegation of al Houthi and General People’s Congress representatives then traveled to Oman to
meet with the UN envoy to Yemen. The al Houthis continue to express openness toward negotiations, but have refused to
accept the Hadi government’s condition that they disarm and withdraw before peace talks begin.
Outlook: A negotiated political settlement remains unlikely as long as redlines remain intact. However, if Russia successfully
brokers a peace deal, Russian interests and Russo-Iranian cooperation will likely challenge U.S. interests in Yemen.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition continues to prepare for a future offensive in Sana’a. Coalition forces support anti-al Houthi Yemeni
army and popular resistance fighters in central Yemen. Coalition airstrikes targeted bridges and government sites in Sana’a, as
well as military sites in al Bayda and Taiz and al Houthi strongholds in Sa’ada. The al Houthis retain control over northern
Yemen and have fixed the coalition forces along a frontline running from Taiz through southern al Bayda and western Ma’rib.
Outlook: It is not yet clear whether the coalition intends to seize Sana’a or to pressure the al Houthis into abandoning their
redlines. Indicators to watch are the failure of negotiations and/or major coalition troop movement in Ma’rib or Taiz.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS continue to expand their operational and governmental capabilities. Ansar al Sharia militants launched targeted
attacks on al Houthis in al Bayda, Ibb, and al Hudaydah, and AQAP kidnapped three Yemeni security officials in al Mukalla,
Hadramawt. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt released a video addressed to Muslim refugees worldwide, but reacting to the migrant
crisis in Europe.
Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
2
3
4
5
1) SEP 16: Yemeni
army and popular
resistance advanced
against al Houthis in
western Ma’rib.
2) SEP 18: AQAP
kidnapped three
security officials in al
Mukalla.
3) SEP 20: Ansar al
Sharia assassinated
an al Houthi financier
in al Hudaydah.
4) SEP 20: Al Houthis
killed two Saudi
border guards near
Najran, Saudi Arabia.
5) SEP 21: Al Houthis
clashed with
resistance forces and
shelled residential
areas in Taiz.
6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN again stresses the need for dialogue to resolve the presidential impeachment. Tensions remain over the formation of
the Central “Galmudug” State. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had backed the Somali Federal Government against al
Shabaab, declared war against the SFG-sanctioned administration in Galgudud and Mudug regions.
Outlook: Political tensions in the Galmudug region are likely to escalate between the ASWJ and SFG-backed administrations.
Security
Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) continued operations to clear al Shabaab from the Boni Forest region, which is on the coastal
border between Somalia and Kenya. KDF and the al Shabaab-linked cell, Jaysh Ayman, clashed in the area. A number of
crackdowns on suspected al Shabaab cells has also occurred in neighboring areas. Some members of the Somali security
forces have occupied government buildings and set up illegal checkpoints along roads to extort travelers for money after not
being paid.
Outlook: Kenya’s anti-terror arrests will likely increase and security will likely be increased in Kismayo due to its proximity to
the Boni Forest region, while political dialogue with unpaid SNA forces will likely occur to maintain the military’s loyalty.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab sharply increased attacks on military and government targets within southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab
targeted Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, the presidential complex, in a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED)
attack and seized territory in Lower Shabelle region, just south of Mogadishu. There are also growing reports of al Shabaab
militants massing in the Lower Jubba region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely step up attacks on government officials and military targets in Lower and Middle Shabelle while
preparing for greater conflict with KDF, AMISOM, and SNA forces in Jubbaland state.
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
3
4
1
5
2
1) 21 SEP: Al Shabaab
detonated SVBIED at
Somali Presidential
Palace in Mogadishu.
2) 16-17 SEP: KDF
clashed with al
Shabaab in Boni
Forest and arrested
suspected members.
3) 16-17 SEP: Al
Shabaab attacked MP
convoys near
Beledweyne, Hiraan.
4) 19 SEP: Al Shabaab
overran and looted
AMISOM military
camp in Janale.
5) 17 SEP: Al Shabaab
conducted targeted
bombings of SNA
officers in Kismayo.
8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) unveiled a final draft agreement for the formation of a Libyan unity
government as the way forward in Libya. The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), the internationally recognized Libyan
government until September 20, and the General National Congress (GNC), a rival government in control of Tripoli, are now in
the position of accepting the proposal or rejecting it before an October 20 deadline.
Outlook: It is not clear whether the HoR and the GNC will accept the final terms for a unity government.
Security
General Khalifa Hafter announced the start of Operation Doom, which seeks to clear Benghazi of entrenched Islamist militias
and restore Libyan government control to the city. The previous operation, Operation Dignity, appeared to have stalled, despite
a significant investment of soldiers and resources to the Libyan National Army (LNA).
Outlook: The LNA may make initial gains in Benghazi in the upcoming week, but will encounter strong, organized resistance
from the al Qaeda-linked Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, which includes Ansar al Sharia, and ISIS forces.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
ISIS Sirte forces continue to consolidate in Sirte and the surrounding areas, establishing governance and control. The
emergence of religious police in Sirte and Harawa signals greater integration of Islamic institutions throughout their coastal
enclave. Al Qaeda-aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces continued to resist ISIS’s attempts to recapture
Derna, which had previously been an ISIS stronghold in Libya.
Outlook: ISIS Sirte will continue to follow methods of control seen in Iraq and Syria to consolidate strength in Libya. MSCD
militants will probably launch a new offensive against ISIS in Derna.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
2
3
4
9
1) 15 SEP: ISIS Sirte
recalled its forces
from Nufaliya and
established new
checkpoints in the
vicinity of Sirte, Libya.
2) 18 SEP: ISIS Wilayat
Tarablus units
attempted to breach a
prison complex at
Mitiga Airbase in
Tripoli, Libya.
3) 19 SEP: LNA units
began Operation
Doom with attacks on
enemy positions in
Benghazi, Libya.
4) 21 SEP: Tebu
militants attacked
Zwai checkpoints in
Kufra, Libya.
10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM continues to compete for predominance in the region. Djamaat Houmat Daawa Salafia (DHDS), a radical Islamist group
that broke from the Armed Islamic Group after AQIM’s predecessor split from it, pledged allegiance to ISIS. The Algerian group
may have decided to pledge to ISIS to gain financial and recruitment resources. Although it does not represent a major loss to
AQIM’s network, DHDS extends ISIS influence into western Algeria.
Outlook: ISIS will continue to challenge AQIM’s network in northern Africa, but additional AQIM brigades are unlikely to defect
to ISIS unless ISIS clearly begins to dominate.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisia continues to strengthen its cyber security measures and locate terrorist operations. Security forces monitor social media
pages, and the actions taken against those that have suspected terrorist connections seem to impede terrorist recruitment
tactics. Other forces eliminated terrorist encampments in the Kef and Kasserine mountain ranges. These areas are known to
hold militant training camps. Disrupting these suggests future operations will be fewer, less organized and not as well
performed.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia may seek to move their camps to a more secure location, but until then will face lower recruitment
numbers and plan fewer attacks.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Growing violence in Mali threatens to throw the country back to civil war. Al Murabitoun and the Emirate of Abu Saharan, an
AQIM affiliate, claimed responsibility for the September 13 attack against MINUSMA forces, perhaps in an attempt to
demonstrate their continued presence and strength. Meanwhile, GATIA, a pro-government militia, and the Coordination of
Movements of Azawad (CMA), a separatist rebel group, clashed in northern Mali; and the Front for the Liberation of Massena,
an AQIM-linked group, attacked the south-central region. People will look to the government and MINUSMA forces to intervene.
Outlook: Ansar al Din will take advantage of continued, escalated fighting, where it could reinforce its positions in the south.
10
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA
11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
1
3
2
4
1) 17 SEP: Tunisian
National Guard and
Army units
discovered terrorist
encampments in the
mountains of Kef and
Kasserine, Tunisia.
2) 19 SEP: Algerian
troops gathered in
Dellys, Algeria, due to
reports of terrorist
activities.
3) 19 SEP: Tunisian
forces arrested two
wanted militants in
Tunis, Tunisia.
4) 19 SEP: Tunisian
forces arrested a
suspected ISIS
militant in Kairouan,
Tunisia.
12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
4
2
3
1
1) 15 SEP: Security
forces arrested three
members of the
Massena Liberation
Front in Bamako,
Mali.
2) 17 SEP: The CMA
and GATIA clashed
near Inafarak, Mali.
3) 19 SEP: CMA
seized Anefis, Mali
and refused to
withdraw.
4) 19 SEP: The
Massena Liberation
Front killed two
policemen and two
civilians in Bih, Mali.
13. ASSESSMENT:
Domestic Politics
President Hassan Rouhani declared that the IRGC is not the sole guardian of the Islamic Revolution at a gathering of senior
IRGC commanders and officials on September 15. He added that Parliamentary representatives, the Supreme National
Security Council, the armed forces, and “other institutions” share this duty with the IRGC. On September 16, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushed back against Rouhani’s comments by stating that no institution bears “the responsibility to
protect the Islamic Revolution like the IRGC.” IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari and IRGC Qods Force
Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani also proclaimed that the IRGC’s institutional role and responsibility is
“incomparable.” Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani reinforced the Supreme Leader’s opinion by declaring the IRGC to be the living
embodiment of the Islamic Revolution. Larijani also advocated measures to increase the IRGC’s role in the economy by
potentially allotting it funds from the Sixth Development Plan.
Outlook: The Supreme Leader and the IRGC will jointly seek to contain Rouhani‘s influence by resisting his efforts to limit the
IRGC’s economic and political role.
Domestic Politics and Reactions to the Nuclear Deal
IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi claimed that Russia is in sync with Iran regarding regional crises, including Syria. The
Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor stated that Iran, Russia, and Lebanese Hezbollah are supporting “the government
and people of Syria as well as [providing] military consultations to the axis of resistance [Syria].” Safavi also stressed that Iran’s
“friendly” relations with Syria began with former Syrian President Hafez al Assad during the Iran-Iraq War. Deputy Foreign
Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed regional developments with his Russian counterpart Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow
on September 21. These events follow Russia’s recent buildup at the port of Tartus and near the airfield in Latakia, Syria, as
well as reports alleging that IRGC Qods Force Commander Major Qassem Soleimani met with President Vladimir Putin on July
24 in Moscow.
Outlook: Regime officials will make a concerted effort to paint Iranian-Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis as cooperation
amongst equals with complimentary goals.
13
IRAN
14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
15 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani declared that the IRGC is not the sole guardian of the Islamic Revolution and stressed the
need for national unity.
15 SEP: IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami stated that there are “no restrictions on missile launches” and
denied that Iranian armed forces have a “direct presence” in Syria.
16 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushed back on President Rouhani’s comments by reinforcing the IRGC’s
constitutional duty to protect the Islamic Revolution.
16 SEP: IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari stated that the IRGC “will properly protect the principles” of the
Islamic Revolution during a meeting with the Supreme Leader.
16 SEP: IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani called the IRGC’s role in preserving the Islamic
Revolution “incomparable.”
16 SEP: Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani declared the IRGC to be the living embodiment of the Islamic Revolution and said the
IRGC could potentially be allotted funds from the Sixth Development Plan.
17 SEP: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari stated that the
JCPOA commission report will be presented to Parliament on October 2.
17 SEP: Islamic Republic News Agency reported that American diplomats in Iraq are interested in holding talks with Iran’s
Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaeifar.
17 SEP: Former Iraqi Vice President al Nujaifi requested that Tehran help release 18 kidnapped Turkish workers during a
meeting in Baghdad with Ambassador Danaeifar, who promised Tehran's “all-out aid and assistance.”
17 SEP: The Supreme Council of Cyberspace held its first meeting after the Supreme Leader appointed new members to serve
four-year terms on September 5.
18 SEP: Cultural Media Advisor to the Commander of the IRGC Hamid Reza Moghaddam Far called the enemy’s “project of
influence” the most important danger facing Iran.
20 SEP: President Rouhani and AEOI Head Ali Akbar Salehi met with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano in Tehran. Amano
also attended a session of the Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA.
21 SEP: AEOI Spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi stated that Iranian experts took samples at the Parchin military complex
instead of IAEA inspectors.
15 SEP – 21 SEP
15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16