The document outlines critical geopolitical developments and security threats in various regions, particularly focusing on Yemen, Pakistan, and Somalia. Key highlights include Russia's diplomatic engagement in Yemen, Iran's internal political tensions, and the growing influence of al-Qaeda and ISIS in these regions. It emphasizes the ongoing violence and military operations against Islamist groups while noting that political negotiations remain fraught with challenges.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
September 23, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. Russia’s Yemen ambassador shuttled between Riyadh and Sana’a and has held meetings with
principal Yemeni stakeholders in what may be a shift in Russian diplomacy in the region.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei continued to push back on President Hassan Rouhani when
the Supreme Leader claimed that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has a “constitutional
duty” to protect the Islamic Revolution.
3. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan attacked a mosque on a Pakistani Air Force base in Peshawar,
Pakistan, in retaliation for Pakistani military operations against the group in the FATA region.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda continues to face a challenge from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), especially in terms of recruitment and
attracting new groups. Some of the groups that previously expressed affiliation with al Qaeda have moved over to ISIS,
probably to align themselves with what is seen as the more successful and richer of the two. The core al Qaeda network
remains intact, however, and will remain a long-term threat.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to emphasize the differences between its strategy and ISIS’s strategy and will point toward
ISIS’s division of the Sunni ranks in Iraq and Syria as an example.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) launched an attack on a Pakistani Air Force base in retaliation for the increased military
operations in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), a safe haven for Islamist militants. TTP militants killed at least 29
people in an attack on a mosque at the Badabher Air Force base in Peshawar, Pakistan. Twenty-three of those killed are known
to be Pakistani Air Force officials. The Pakistani forces managed to kill 13 militants in the exchange.
The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-
Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase. Last week, Pakistan announced that the
Pakistani army would remain in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) until 2019.
Outlook: Pakistani military might increase its offensive against militancy in the FATA, following the TTP attack on the Badabher
Air Force Base.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Russia has taken a more overt role in the ongoing Yemeni political negotiations. The Russian ambassador to Yemen met with
Saudi government officials and members of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government in Riyadh and then met with al Houthi
representatives in Sana’a. A delegation of al Houthi and General People’s Congress representatives then traveled to Oman to
meet with the UN envoy to Yemen. The al Houthis continue to express openness toward negotiations, but have refused to
accept the Hadi government’s condition that they disarm and withdraw before peace talks begin.
Outlook: A negotiated political settlement remains unlikely as long as redlines remain intact. However, if Russia successfully
brokers a peace deal, Russian interests and Russo-Iranian cooperation will likely challenge U.S. interests in Yemen.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition continues to prepare for a future offensive in Sana’a. Coalition forces support anti-al Houthi Yemeni
army and popular resistance fighters in central Yemen. Coalition airstrikes targeted bridges and government sites in Sana’a, as
well as military sites in al Bayda and Taiz and al Houthi strongholds in Sa’ada. The al Houthis retain control over northern
Yemen and have fixed the coalition forces along a frontline running from Taiz through southern al Bayda and western Ma’rib.
Outlook: It is not yet clear whether the coalition intends to seize Sana’a or to pressure the al Houthis into abandoning their
redlines. Indicators to watch are the failure of negotiations and/or major coalition troop movement in Ma’rib or Taiz.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS continue to expand their operational and governmental capabilities. Ansar al Sharia militants launched targeted
attacks on al Houthis in al Bayda, Ibb, and al Hudaydah, and AQAP kidnapped three Yemeni security officials in al Mukalla,
Hadramawt. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt released a video addressed to Muslim refugees worldwide, but reacting to the migrant
crisis in Europe.
Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
2
3
4
5
1) SEP 16: Yemeni
army and popular
resistance advanced
against al Houthis in
western Ma’rib.
2) SEP 18: AQAP
kidnapped three
security officials in al
Mukalla.
3) SEP 20: Ansar al
Sharia assassinated
an al Houthi financier
in al Hudaydah.
4) SEP 20: Al Houthis
killed two Saudi
border guards near
Najran, Saudi Arabia.
5) SEP 21: Al Houthis
clashed with
resistance forces and
shelled residential
areas in Taiz.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN again stresses the need for dialogue to resolve the presidential impeachment. Tensions remain over the formation of
the Central “Galmudug” State. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had backed the Somali Federal Government against al
Shabaab, declared war against the SFG-sanctioned administration in Galgudud and Mudug regions.
Outlook: Political tensions in the Galmudug region are likely to escalate between the ASWJ and SFG-backed administrations.
Security
Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) continued operations to clear al Shabaab from the Boni Forest region, which is on the coastal
border between Somalia and Kenya. KDF and the al Shabaab-linked cell, Jaysh Ayman, clashed in the area. A number of
crackdowns on suspected al Shabaab cells has also occurred in neighboring areas. Some members of the Somali security
forces have occupied government buildings and set up illegal checkpoints along roads to extort travelers for money after not
being paid.
Outlook: Kenya’s anti-terror arrests will likely increase and security will likely be increased in Kismayo due to its proximity to
the Boni Forest region, while political dialogue with unpaid SNA forces will likely occur to maintain the military’s loyalty.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab sharply increased attacks on military and government targets within southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab
targeted Villa Somalia in Mogadishu, the presidential complex, in a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED)
attack and seized territory in Lower Shabelle region, just south of Mogadishu. There are also growing reports of al Shabaab
militants massing in the Lower Jubba region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely step up attacks on government officials and military targets in Lower and Middle Shabelle while
preparing for greater conflict with KDF, AMISOM, and SNA forces in Jubbaland state.
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
3
4
1
5
2
1) 21 SEP: Al Shabaab
detonated SVBIED at
Somali Presidential
Palace in Mogadishu.
2) 16-17 SEP: KDF
clashed with al
Shabaab in Boni
Forest and arrested
suspected members.
3) 16-17 SEP: Al
Shabaab attacked MP
convoys near
Beledweyne, Hiraan.
4) 19 SEP: Al Shabaab
overran and looted
AMISOM military
camp in Janale.
5) 17 SEP: Al Shabaab
conducted targeted
bombings of SNA
officers in Kismayo.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) unveiled a final draft agreement for the formation of a Libyan unity
government as the way forward in Libya. The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), the internationally recognized Libyan
government until September 20, and the General National Congress (GNC), a rival government in control of Tripoli, are now in
the position of accepting the proposal or rejecting it before an October 20 deadline.
Outlook: It is not clear whether the HoR and the GNC will accept the final terms for a unity government.
Security
General Khalifa Hafter announced the start of Operation Doom, which seeks to clear Benghazi of entrenched Islamist militias
and restore Libyan government control to the city. The previous operation, Operation Dignity, appeared to have stalled, despite
a significant investment of soldiers and resources to the Libyan National Army (LNA).
Outlook: The LNA may make initial gains in Benghazi in the upcoming week, but will encounter strong, organized resistance
from the al Qaeda-linked Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council, which includes Ansar al Sharia, and ISIS forces.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
ISIS Sirte forces continue to consolidate in Sirte and the surrounding areas, establishing governance and control. The
emergence of religious police in Sirte and Harawa signals greater integration of Islamic institutions throughout their coastal
enclave. Al Qaeda-aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces continued to resist ISIS’s attempts to recapture
Derna, which had previously been an ISIS stronghold in Libya.
Outlook: ISIS Sirte will continue to follow methods of control seen in Iraq and Syria to consolidate strength in Libya. MSCD
militants will probably launch a new offensive against ISIS in Derna.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
2
3
4
9
1) 15 SEP: ISIS Sirte
recalled its forces
from Nufaliya and
established new
checkpoints in the
vicinity of Sirte, Libya.
2) 18 SEP: ISIS Wilayat
Tarablus units
attempted to breach a
prison complex at
Mitiga Airbase in
Tripoli, Libya.
3) 19 SEP: LNA units
began Operation
Doom with attacks on
enemy positions in
Benghazi, Libya.
4) 21 SEP: Tebu
militants attacked
Zwai checkpoints in
Kufra, Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM continues to compete for predominance in the region. Djamaat Houmat Daawa Salafia (DHDS), a radical Islamist group
that broke from the Armed Islamic Group after AQIM’s predecessor split from it, pledged allegiance to ISIS. The Algerian group
may have decided to pledge to ISIS to gain financial and recruitment resources. Although it does not represent a major loss to
AQIM’s network, DHDS extends ISIS influence into western Algeria.
Outlook: ISIS will continue to challenge AQIM’s network in northern Africa, but additional AQIM brigades are unlikely to defect
to ISIS unless ISIS clearly begins to dominate.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisia continues to strengthen its cyber security measures and locate terrorist operations. Security forces monitor social media
pages, and the actions taken against those that have suspected terrorist connections seem to impede terrorist recruitment
tactics. Other forces eliminated terrorist encampments in the Kef and Kasserine mountain ranges. These areas are known to
hold militant training camps. Disrupting these suggests future operations will be fewer, less organized and not as well
performed.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia may seek to move their camps to a more secure location, but until then will face lower recruitment
numbers and plan fewer attacks.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Growing violence in Mali threatens to throw the country back to civil war. Al Murabitoun and the Emirate of Abu Saharan, an
AQIM affiliate, claimed responsibility for the September 13 attack against MINUSMA forces, perhaps in an attempt to
demonstrate their continued presence and strength. Meanwhile, GATIA, a pro-government militia, and the Coordination of
Movements of Azawad (CMA), a separatist rebel group, clashed in northern Mali; and the Front for the Liberation of Massena,
an AQIM-linked group, attacked the south-central region. People will look to the government and MINUSMA forces to intervene.
Outlook: Ansar al Din will take advantage of continued, escalated fighting, where it could reinforce its positions in the south.
10
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
1
3
2
4
1) 17 SEP: Tunisian
National Guard and
Army units
discovered terrorist
encampments in the
mountains of Kef and
Kasserine, Tunisia.
2) 19 SEP: Algerian
troops gathered in
Dellys, Algeria, due to
reports of terrorist
activities.
3) 19 SEP: Tunisian
forces arrested two
wanted militants in
Tunis, Tunisia.
4) 19 SEP: Tunisian
forces arrested a
suspected ISIS
militant in Kairouan,
Tunisia.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
4
2
3
1
1) 15 SEP: Security
forces arrested three
members of the
Massena Liberation
Front in Bamako,
Mali.
2) 17 SEP: The CMA
and GATIA clashed
near Inafarak, Mali.
3) 19 SEP: CMA
seized Anefis, Mali
and refused to
withdraw.
4) 19 SEP: The
Massena Liberation
Front killed two
policemen and two
civilians in Bih, Mali.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Domestic Politics
President Hassan Rouhani declared that the IRGC is not the sole guardian of the Islamic Revolution at a gathering of senior
IRGC commanders and officials on September 15. He added that Parliamentary representatives, the Supreme National
Security Council, the armed forces, and “other institutions” share this duty with the IRGC. On September 16, Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushed back against Rouhani’s comments by stating that no institution bears “the responsibility to
protect the Islamic Revolution like the IRGC.” IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari and IRGC Qods Force
Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani also proclaimed that the IRGC’s institutional role and responsibility is
“incomparable.” Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani reinforced the Supreme Leader’s opinion by declaring the IRGC to be the living
embodiment of the Islamic Revolution. Larijani also advocated measures to increase the IRGC’s role in the economy by
potentially allotting it funds from the Sixth Development Plan.
Outlook: The Supreme Leader and the IRGC will jointly seek to contain Rouhani‘s influence by resisting his efforts to limit the
IRGC’s economic and political role.
Domestic Politics and Reactions to the Nuclear Deal
IRGC Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi claimed that Russia is in sync with Iran regarding regional crises, including Syria. The
Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor stated that Iran, Russia, and Lebanese Hezbollah are supporting “the government
and people of Syria as well as [providing] military consultations to the axis of resistance [Syria].” Safavi also stressed that Iran’s
“friendly” relations with Syria began with former Syrian President Hafez al Assad during the Iran-Iraq War. Deputy Foreign
Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian discussed regional developments with his Russian counterpart Mikhail Bogdanov in Moscow
on September 21. These events follow Russia’s recent buildup at the port of Tartus and near the airfield in Latakia, Syria, as
well as reports alleging that IRGC Qods Force Commander Major Qassem Soleimani met with President Vladimir Putin on July
24 in Moscow.
Outlook: Regime officials will make a concerted effort to paint Iranian-Russian involvement in the Syrian crisis as cooperation
amongst equals with complimentary goals.
13
IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
15 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani declared that the IRGC is not the sole guardian of the Islamic Revolution and stressed the
need for national unity.
15 SEP: IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami stated that there are “no restrictions on missile launches” and
denied that Iranian armed forces have a “direct presence” in Syria.
16 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei pushed back on President Rouhani’s comments by reinforcing the IRGC’s
constitutional duty to protect the Islamic Revolution.
16 SEP: IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari stated that the IRGC “will properly protect the principles” of the
Islamic Revolution during a meeting with the Supreme Leader.
16 SEP: IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani called the IRGC’s role in preserving the Islamic
Revolution “incomparable.”
16 SEP: Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani declared the IRGC to be the living embodiment of the Islamic Revolution and said the
IRGC could potentially be allotted funds from the Sixth Development Plan.
17 SEP: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission member Mohammad Esmail Kowsari stated that the
JCPOA commission report will be presented to Parliament on October 2.
17 SEP: Islamic Republic News Agency reported that American diplomats in Iraq are interested in holding talks with Iran’s
Ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaeifar.
17 SEP: Former Iraqi Vice President al Nujaifi requested that Tehran help release 18 kidnapped Turkish workers during a
meeting in Baghdad with Ambassador Danaeifar, who promised Tehran's “all-out aid and assistance.”
17 SEP: The Supreme Council of Cyberspace held its first meeting after the Supreme Leader appointed new members to serve
four-year terms on September 5.
18 SEP: Cultural Media Advisor to the Commander of the IRGC Hamid Reza Moghaddam Far called the enemy’s “project of
influence” the most important danger facing Iran.
20 SEP: President Rouhani and AEOI Head Ali Akbar Salehi met with IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano in Tehran. Amano
also attended a session of the Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the JCPOA.
21 SEP: AEOI Spokesman Behrouz Kamalvandi stated that Iranian experts took samples at the Parchin military complex
instead of IAEA inspectors.
15 SEP – 21 SEP

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16