CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized. 2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war. 3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
June 14, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
2
3
1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri pledged allegiance (bayat) to new Afghan Taliban emir
Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya
as the country’s political conflict resurges.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni
populations in Yemen despite recent counterterrorism operations.
1

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah
Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21,
2016, in a 14-minute message released by al Qaeda’s media arm, al Sahab. The statement followed the same template
Zawahiri used to pledge bayat to Mullah Mansour in August 2015, but added a call for the Afghan Taliban to fight against the
“global aggression” that seeks to eradicate Islam. Zawahiri also implicitly criticized the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
by emphasizing the “prophetic method” as the proper way to establish a caliphate and describing the Taliban emir as the leader
of the world’s only “legitimate emirate.” Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the
global Salafi-jihadi movement and draw further distinctions between al Qaeda and ISIS by naming Mullah Haibatullah
Akhundzada, not ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, as “commander of the faithful.”
Al Qaeda affiliates continue to cultivate local ties by disavowing unpopular attacks. Ansar al Islam, the Bangladeshi division of
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), released a statement condemning militants for killing the wife of an anti-terror
investigator. The attack is considered unjust under al Qaeda’s rules against the targeting of noncombatants.
Outlook: Al Qaeda affiliates will continue to restrict spectacular attacks and distance themselves from ISIS in order to preserve
and deepen relationships with local populations.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The motivation to negotiate is diminishing as the Kuwait peace talks yield no significant agreements. Al Houthi representatives
warned that they will reject a peace deal that does not account for their interests just one day after the UN Special Envoy for
Yemen presented a roadmap for political reconciliation, indicating that core issues remain unresolved.
Outlook: The Kuwait talks will fail to produce a significant agreement, leading combatants to pursue new lines of effort.
Security
The perceived failure of peace talks may be incentivizing both the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the Saudi-led coalition to seek to
change the frontlines on the ground. Al Houthi forces are intensifying attacks in Lahij near coalition-held al Anad air base, and
the coalition has responded with airstrikes on al Houthi positions in the surrounding area of al Qabaytah, Lahij governorate.
Government forces continued efforts to advance on northeastern Sana’a governorate in order to pressure the al Houthis, and
Taiz remains actively contested. Internal conflict within both al Houthi and popular resistance units likely reflects diminishing
cohesion and resource constraints after more than one year of war.
Outlook: Government forces will likely escalate in Sana’a if peace talks deteriorate further.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP remains focused on bolstering its support in local Sunni populations. Reported U.S. airstrikes killed AQAP militants in
Ma’rib, Shabwah, and al Bayda governorates but remain unlikely to break the group’s ties with the population, its main source
of strength. ISIS did not conduct an explosive attack this week, but its attack cell in Aden remains viable.
Outlook: ISIS will likely conduct a suicide attack on a government or military attack in Aden in the coming weeks. AQAP will
continue to forego spectacular attacks in order to preserve its relationships with the population.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
4
3
2
5
1) 08 JUN: Al Houthi
militants attacked
near al Anad air base
in Lahij.
2) 08 JUN: Al Houthis
arrested Sunni imams
for leading a banned
prayer in Sana’a.
3) 10 JUN: Militants
detonated an IED
targeting an officer in
Buraiqa, Aden.
4) 11 JUN: Reported
U.S. airstrike
targeted AQAP
militants in Ma’rib.
5) 12 JUN: Reported
U.S. airstrike
targeted AQAP
militants in Habban,
Shabwah.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Eritrea and Ethiopia exchanged artillery fire in a contested border region on June 13 for the first time since a UN intervention
prevented the outbreak of war in 2008. Eritrea fought a 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia from 1961 to 1991, and
the two fought a border war from 1998 to 2000 that killed approximately 80,000 people.
Outlook: Outright warfare between Ethiopia and Eritrea is highly unlikely, but tensions in the border region and support for
rival proxies will likely grow, exacerbating disorder in the region and possibly curtailing Ethiopia’s commitment to African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) counter-al Shabaab operations.
Security
Al Shabaab continues to impede AMISOM, Somali National Army (SNA), and Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) troop
movements in the Hiraan region in south-central Somalia, along the Somali-Kenyan border. Al Shabaab remains capable of
targeting convoys, checkpoints, and fortified bases despite efforts to clear the group from the region.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to disrupt AMISOM, SNA, and KDF operations and defend its safe havens in rural areas.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab conducted a high-casualty complex attack on an Ethiopian AMISOM base in Halgan, Hiraan region on June 9.
This is the first major assault on an AMISOM base since the U.S. began conducting airstrikes to defend AMISOM partners in
March 2016. The failure of the U.S. to intervene in this case may generate negative reactions from AMISOM members. It is
also possible that al Shabaab has adjusted to U.S. posture and developed tactics to avoid detection before large attacks. Al
Shabaab also continued improvised explosive device (IED) attacks and assassinations in Mogadishu, in line with an earlier
promise to increase attacks in Mogadishu during the Ramadan season.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely attempt another large-scale base attack or hotel attack during the Ramadan season.
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
4
2
2
3
1
1) 13 JUN: Ethiopian
and Eritrean forces
exchanged artillery
fire in the contested
Tsorona region.
2) 09 JUN: Al
Shabaab conducted a
complex attack on an
AMISOM base in
Halgan, Hiraan
region.
3) 09 JUN: Al
Shabaab ambushed
an SNA convoy near
Tiyeglow, Bakool
region.
4) 11 JUN: Militants
detonated an IED
near Mandera,
Kenya.
HoA Significant Activity 07 JUN-13 JUN

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The likelihood of a peaceful political reconciliation is decreasing as the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) fails to
extend its authority in eastern Libya. The GNA’s connections to elements of the former Libya Dawn bloc and the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood, which supported the Islamist government in Tripoli, is further alienating Gen. Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan House
of Representatives (HoR). Gen. Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) and the HoR opposed Libya Dawn in the civil war and will
not cede power to a body that they see as aligned with Islamist interests.
Outlook: GNA-aligned Misratan forces and the HoR-backed Libyan National Army may clash in central Libya in the territorial
dispute that will follow ISIS’s defeat in Sirte.
Security
Islamist militants in both Benghazi and Derna are renewing their resistance to the LNA. ISIS claimed several attacks against the
LNA in Benghazi in recent weeks, indicating a possible influx of resources following losses in Sirte. Recent explosive attacks
may reflect this re-orientation, or a counterattack by Ansar al Sharia and its allies in response to recent LNA pressure.
Outlook: Both ISIS and Ansar al Sharia will conduct explosive attacks on the LNA in the near term to undermine its efforts to
secure Benghazi. The LNA may lose ground in Benghazi if it chooses to position against Misratan forces in central Libya.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely regroup in southern Libya. Misratan forces operating under the GNA advanced
into Sirte city center and have blockaded the port. ISIS leaders have reportedly fled the city for the southwestern Libyan desert.
The estimated number of ISIS fighters in Sirte halved this month, indicating withdrawal to other parts of Libya.
Outlook: ISIS will continue to fight for Sirte city center in order to facilitate its withdrawal, aided by the dense urban terrain. ISIS
will likely withdraw the bulk of its force from Sirte, probably to the southwest, in order to preserve combat power.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
9
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1
4
2
5
3
1) 08 JUN - 13 JUN:
Misratan forces
attacked ISIS in Sirte.
2) 12 JUN: Militants,
possibly ISIS,
detonated a VBIED in
Salmani district,
Benghazi.
3) 09 JUN: LNA
airstrikes killed at
least five civilians in
Derna.
4) 09 JUN: The PFG
took control of
Harawa after ISIS
militants withdrew.
5) 11 JUN: ISIS and
BRSC detonated IEDs
against LNA soldiers
and destroyed LNA
vehicles in Benghazi.

10. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM continues to compete with ISIS for relevance in northern Algeria. Algerian security forces killed seven suspected
terrorists, arrested four others, and seized weapons caches in Medea, northern Algeria. Medea is home to both AQIM and ISIS
militants, and increased movement indicates a possible uptick in activity by either group in an effort to be the dominant Salafi-
jihadi group in North Africa. ISIS’s presence may also be growing in Morocco, emphasizing extensive regional competition
between the two groups.
Outlook: AQIM will launch a media campaign to recruit and retain militants loyal to al Qaeda while protecting its hideouts from
security forces conducting clearing operations in northern Algeria.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
AQIM’s affiliate Uqba Ibn Nafa’a disengaged from militant activity, likely in an effort to consolidate resources and build strength.
ISIS is heavily co-opting weakened Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants, and the group’s silence may also be a sign of further defections
to ISIS, which is developing long-term ambitions in Tunisia. A lack of significant militant activity may signal that ISIS is preparing
for a larger attack intended to undermine the Tunisian state.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a may form a resurgent base in western Tunisia; however, spikes in activity will indicate that ISIS is
planning to advance its operational capabilities throughout the country, likely assisted by co-opted Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
MINUSMA and French forces are increasing troop numbers in response to increased militant activity in northern Mali. French
forces deployed to the Malian-Nigerien border, and the UN called for a quick reaction force and 2,500 additional troops to
combat militants. AQIM affiliate al Murabitoun called for Muslims to attack French forces in Mali during Ramadan.
Outlook: AQIM affiliates will likely attempt a complex attack on MINUSMA or French forces in northern Mali during the
remaining three weeks of the Ramadan season. An attack on a soft target in the Sahel, like a hotel, is also possible.
10
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
2
3 1
4
1) O8 JUN: Tunisian
security forces
arrested two
teachers recruiting
for ISIS in Sidi Bouzid.
2) 08 JUN-12 JUN:
Algerian security
forces killed seven
suspected terrorists
in Medea.
3) 12 JUN: Moroccan
security forces
arrested a suspected
pro-ISIS militant at
Oujda airport.
4) 13 JUN: Algerian
security forces killed
two suspected
terrorists in Jijel.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
3
2
1
4
1) 10 JUN: Suspected
AQIM militants
kidnapped an MNLA
member in Bir,
Timbuktu region.
2) 10 JUN: About 40
French troops
deployed along the
Malian-Nigerien
border.
3) 12 JUN: Gunmen,
possibly Ansar al Din,
attacked the CMA in
Gao region.
4) 13 JUN: Militants
from pro-
government militia
GATIA clashed with
the insurgent Ganda
Izo group in
Timbuktu.

13. ACRONYMS
13
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
14