CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. 1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya. 2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West. 3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
January 12, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. ISIS cells in Libya demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack
on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure.
2. AQAP is conducting media campaigns to further its image within the Yemeni domestic audience and to
reaffirm its and al Qaeda’s status as a leader in the global jihadist movement.
3. AQIM and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an
associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian
army posts.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda groups have strongly condemned Saudi Arabia’s mass execution of convicted terrorists. A significant number of the
47 individuals executed had been convicted of terrorism and ties to al Qaeda. Among them were Faris Ahmed Jama’an Al
Showail, a high-ranking member of al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia arrested near the Yemeni border in August 2004, and Adel bin
Saad bin Jaza al Dhubaiti, who was convicted for his role in the murder of BBC cameraman Simon Cumbers and the shooting
of correspondent Frank Gardner in June 2004. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has criticized Saudi Arabia for its
detention of al Qaeda members and supporters previously. AQAP issued a joint statement with al Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) on January 10 threatening Saudi Arabia, referencing previous warnings from AQAP.
AQIM continued al Qaeda’s effort to counter the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s messaging in an interview with one of its
leaders. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri revealed in previous communications he had asked the late AQAP leader Nasser
al Wahayshi to lead the rhetorical effort against ISIS.
Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups will likely remain focused on regional developments and message to local constituencies
while threatening the West with further attacks.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Planned peace talks for January 14 have been postponed until at least January 20 as the UN envoy searches for a location in
the region acceptable to all parties. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government reacted to a UN statement that the
Saudi-led coalition’s use of cluster bombs could be a human rights violation by briefly expelling a UN official. Separately, Saudi
Arabia denied Iran’s accusation that it deliberately bombed the Iranian embassy in Sana’a.
Outlook: Al Houthi-Saleh and Hadi representatives may set a date for talks this month, but the lack of confidence-building
measures and the breakdown in Saudi-Iranian relations will probably further delay substantive agreements.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition launched airstrikes in northern and central Yemen in an effort to degrade al Houthi-Saleh missile launch
capabilities. Coalition-backed forces took control of Midi, a port city in northern Hajjah governorate, and launched clearing
operations in the region, likely in an effort to prevent cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces.
Outlook: Continued cross-border attacks will draw the Saudi-led coalition deeper into the conflict on the Saudi-Yemeni border.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continues to use military and media efforts to capitalize on anti-al Houthi sentiment in Taiz, al Bayda, and Ibb. An AQAP
video celebrated the re-capture of Ja’ar and Zinjibar in Abyan in early December, and AQAP’s chief bombmaker, Saudi Ibrahim
al Asiri, threatened Saudi Arabia and the U.S. in an audio statement.
ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan assassinated a Yemeni colonel, targeting security and governance officials to undermine the Hadi
government’s attempts to reestablish governance in Aden.
Outlook: AQAP will continue to take advantage of the security vacuum to entrench itself in southern and central Yemen.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somalia cut diplomatic ties with Iran, citing alleged Iranian efforts to spread Shi’a sentiment and destabilize the country, and
condemned the attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. A meeting between Somali Federal Government (SFG) officials and
moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) angered officials from the SFG-recognized Galmudug
Administration. ASWJ contests the Galmudug Administration’s legitimacy.
Outlook: A breakdown in relations between the Galmudug Administration and ASWJ may tie up state security resources,
compromising their ability to combat al Shabaab.
Security
Kenyan authorities are on high alert following a raid on an al Shabaab safe house in Mombasa that yielded an arms caches
reportedly intended for a New Year’s Eve attack, and police are actively searching for suspects who escaped the initial raid.
Additionally, Kenyan police arrested eight suspected al Shabaab militants in Kenyan’s northeastern Mandera Country.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to try to establish networks in Mombasa County to facilitate future attacks in Kenya.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab conducted numerous car bomb attacks against Somali government officials in Mogadishu. The group also
conducted multiple attacks targeting Turkish nationals and people employed by Turkish companies in the capital, likely in
response to Turkey’s construction of a military base in Mogadishu and its support for the SFG. Al Shabaab also re-released a
recruitment statement in Indonesian, likely in an effort to expand its foreign recruit base. A video featuring Somali ISIS militants
in Libya praised former al Shabaab militants for defecting to ISIS and threatened those targeting them.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to conduct attacks and drive recruitment to counter the growing ISIS presence in East
Africa.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime Minister Faiz Serraj faced opposition in Misrata while paying his
respects to the victims of the January 7 bombing in nearby Zliten, demonstrating the divisiveness of the GNA. Some reports
indicate that pro- and anti- GNA groups clashed near Misrata during Serraj’s visit.
Outlook: International backers will struggle to implement the unity government without the support of local power brokers and
the GNA will likely create a third political bloc claiming national legitimacy.
Security
The House of Representatives (HoR)-affiliated Libyan National Army (LNA) continues to conduct airstrikes in Benghazi and
denied responsibility for a January 10 airstrike on an ISIS convoy near Sirte. The LNA continued air and ground operations
targeting ISIS- and Ansar al Sharia-held positions in western and southern Benghazi. An LNA-affiliated battalion is fighting
Ajdabiya Revolutionary Shura Council militants for control of key resources and transit routes in Ajdabiya.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to prioritize a campaign in Benghazi and its environs, but ISIS’s expansion east of Sirte toward
Ajdabiya may shift the LNA’s priorities.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS affiliates in Libya are collaborating in an effort to take control of key oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus claimed credit
for a January 7 suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) truck bombing at a police training camp in Zliten,
Libya, near Misrata. This attack was likely intended to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive
operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil ports, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. Suspected ISIS militants also attempted to
attack the Zueitina oil port near Ajdabiya by boat.
Al Qaeda-linked Ansar al Sharia released media reaffirming its military capabilities, religious credentials, and ties to the al
Qaeda global network.
Outlook: ISIS in Libya will continue to launch attacks on oil infrastructure on the central Libyan coast. It may also continue to
push toward Ajdabiya in an effort to extend both territorial control and influence east of Sirte.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

7. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM released several statements and videos demonstrating its ability to continue operations despite the recent death of its
Shari’a Committee head Abu al Hassan Rashid al Bulaydi. A joint statement with AQAP, along with an interview by the head of
AQIM’s Sahara Emirate, reaffirmed AQIM’s close relationship with local and global jihadist networks. The group also used
media, including a video threatening the French intervention in Mali and a proof-of-life video for two Western hostages, to
publicize its current operations, share its ideology, and drive recruitment.
Outlook: AQIM and its affiliates will continue to release statements and conduct operations in an effort to drive recruitment and
unite radical Islamist militants in the region.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a remained hidden in its mountain strongholds, likely attempting to replenish resources and avoid military
patrols. It published condolences for AQIM Shari’a Committee head al Bulaydi, honoring him by publishing comments on his
past writings. The statement, the first since December 10, verifies the group’s continued operations and connection to AQIM.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will defend its strongholds only if the Tunisian military breaches them. It may publish more
statements during this time of lessened kinetic activity.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Malian forces intercepted a letter from Ansar al Din to its affiliate, the Macina Liberation Front, calling for increased attacks
against isolated army posts. Furthermore, reports indicate that militant leaders met in Menaka, Gao in northeastern Mali near
the end of December. The leader of AQIM’s Sahara Emirate confirmed their coordination with Ansar al Din and its affiliates,
despite Ansar al Din’s focus on local jihad.
Outlook: AQIM and associated jihadist groups in Mali will continue to coordinate, increasing the likelihood of large-scale
spectacular attacks like the November 20 Bamako hotel siege.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

8. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
Iranian officials attempted to create an equivalency between a January 7 airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Sana’a, Yemen,
and Iranian protesters’ January 2 storming of the Saudi embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad after Saudi Arabia’s
execution of prominent Shi’a cleric Sheikh Nimr al Nimr. Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian said that Iran
intends to pursue “this issue through international law” by submitting a report to the UN and reiterated Saudi Arabia’s
responsibility to protect diplomats and embassies. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hossein Jabari Ansari similarly claimed that the
airstrike “violates all the international conventions and legal regulations for protecting the security and safety of diplomatic
places in all situations.”
Iranian senior officials, meanwhile, continued to distance government ministries and military forces from involvement in the
attacks on the Saudi embassy and consulate as Iran faced growing international backlash. Law Enforcement Forces (LEF)
Commander Brigadier General Hossein Ashtari labeled the attacks “suspicious,” claiming that no pro-revolutionary or pro-
government individual “would allow such aggression.” IRGC Mohammad Rasoul Allah unit Commander Brigadier General
Mohsen Kazemeini also distanced the IRGC and the Basij from any association with the attacks. Several officials also claimed
that outside forces could have been responsible for the storming of the Saudi embassy; Justice Minister Hojjat ol Eslam
Mostafa Pour Mohammadi, for example, said it was possible that “infiltrators” were responsible for designing and supporting the
attacks. The Interior Ministry did accept some responsibility by announcing the replacement of Safar Ali Baratlou, the security
deputy for Tehran province's governor general, on state television on January 9 in response to his handling of the attacks.
Outlook: Iran will attempt to use the January 7 Saudi airstrike near the Iranian embassy in Yemen as a distraction from the
attacks on the Saudi embassy and consulate in Iran, for which it continues to receive international backlash.
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IRAN

9. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

10. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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