Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects. 2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow. 3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
October 20, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of
Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was a member of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda
affiliate Jabhat al Nusra.
2. Iranian officials stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus orMoscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to
reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
The U.S. confirmed the death of senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr in a coalition airstrike in Syria alongside two other al
Qaeda operatives. Al Nasr was a leader in al Qaeda’s “Khorasan group,” a Syrian-based cell of veteran al Qaeda operatives
providing strategic advice and training for al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and also probably oriented on planning
attacks against the West. His death is significant in terms of immediate effects on the Khorasan group in Syria, but it is unlikely
to have lasting effects.
Al Qaeda groups continue to release statements contesting the legitimacy of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS).
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to contest ISIS’s legitimacy based on ISIS’s actions and how it self-declared itself to be the
Islamic Caliphate.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Unclaimed attacks killed numerous people in various parts of Pakistan. A bomb blast killed at least 11 people and injured 20
others in a commuter bus in Quetta, Balochistan on October 19, 2015. Separately, a suicide attack killed at least 7 people and
injured 4 others during an attack on a Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) lawmaker’s office in Dera Ghazi Khan, Punjab.
The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-
Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase.
Outlook: The Pakistani military will continue Operation Zarb-e-Azb to eliminate militancy in the tribal areas of North Waziristan.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Arab coalition-backed Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi agreed to participate in UN-led
peace talks that will take place in Geneva at the end of October. President Hadi had previously dismissed an al Houthi-
proposed peace plan as a “maneuver.” International pressure for a negotiated political solution in Yemen continues to rise.
Outlook: International pressure will likely compel the Hadi government to participate in peace talks, but the Saudi-led coalition
will continue to pursue a military solution on the ground.
Security
The coalition-backed offensives in central Yemen have stalled as al Houthis continue to target coalition and pro-Hadi positions.
The Saudi-led coalition rebuffed an al Houthi attack on Saudi territory, continued airstrikes in northern and central Yemen, and
set up defensive missile systems in Ma’rib and Aden in response to al Houthi Scud missile capabilities. Al Houthi fighters
pushed pro-Hadi forces out of al Bayda and are reportedly mobilizing in neighboring Shabwah. Pro-al Houthi militias launched a
counterattack on coalition-backed forces in Ma’rib. The fight for control of Taiz governorate remains entrenched. Coalition-
backed forces are reportedly planning to attack al Houthi strongholds in al Jawf, northern Yemen.
Outlook: Coalition airstrikes will continue in an attempt to degrade the al Houthis’ ability to strike pro-Hadi and coalition targets.
The al Houthis will continue to push north toward the Saudi-Yemeni border region and south into al Bayda and Shabwah.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS continue to expand their operational capabilities throughout Yemen. AQAP militants seized a government
complex in Zinjibar near Aden, attacked Yemeni military headquarters in Hadramawt, and stormed a government security
building in al Houthi-controlled al Hudaydah. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a detonated an IED near an al Houthi gathering in Sana’a.
Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment. AQAP
will likely consolidate its gains in the south and continue to shift its focus toward conflict zones in northern and central Yemen.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
2
3
4
5
6
1) OCT 13-19: Al
Houthis besieged
popular resistance
forces in Taiz.
2) OCT 14: AQAP
seized a government
complex in Zinjibar.
3) OCT 15: Al Houthis
fired a Scud missile
from Sana’a.
4) OCT 14: AQAP
attacked Yemeni
military HQ in Sayun,
Hadramawt.
5) OCT 16: Ansar al
Sharia attacked gov’t
security building in al
Hudaydah.
6) OCT 16: Al Houthis
pushed pro-Hadi
forces out of al Bayda
governorate.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali Federal Government (SFG) is determining how the 2016 presidential election process will take place through a
consultative forum being held in Mogadishu called the Vision 2016 forum. Forum participants include many of the regional
administration officials. Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), a prominent group in central Somalia, was not among those invited
to participate. ASWJ declared it will reject decisions made at the forum, jeopardizing the legitimacy of the outcomes.
Outlook: ASWJ’s exclusion provides basis for an argument that the Vision 2016 forum is not representative, a challenge that
the SFG will need to address if it seeks a popularly legitimate outcome.
Security
Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces continue clearing al Shabaab from the
Gedo and Hiraan regions, although logistical security is a clear issue as military forces face ambushes. Inter-clan violence
threatens stability in the Hiraan region as disagreements over land ownership lead to severe clashes that will likely require
mediation or a military presence to resolve. This will likely put further personnel strain on military forces that are spread thin.
Outlook: SNA and AMISOM forces will likely drive al Shabaab from population centers in the Gedo and Hiraan regions.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is engaged in combat with AMISOM and SNA forces in the Gedo and Hiraan regions. The group vacated many
populated centers in favor of trying to control the main roadways so as to disrupt the movement of enemy forces and supplies.
The group has been active in Mogadishu and the surrounding Lower Shabelle region, targeting government employees and
launching attacks on military and security personnel.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely continue to disrupt the key lines of communication used by AMISOM and the SNA, particularly
those connecting Somalia and Ethiopia in southern and central Somalia.
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
3
1
4
2
7
1) 17-19 OCT: SNA
and AMISOM forces
fought al Shabaab in
and near Garbaharey
town, Hiraan region.
2) 15 OCT: Al
Shabaab arrested
pro-ISIS members in
Jilib, Middle Jubba
region.
3) 18 OCT: Al
Shabaab killed two
government
employees in
Mogadishu, Banadir
region.
4) 19 OCT: Clans
clashed over land
ownership in
Beledweyne, Hiraan
region.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The internationally recognized Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Tripoli-based General National
Congress (GNC) voted to reject the UN-proposed reconciliation accord, which would create a national unity government. The
HoR’s electoral mandate ended on October 20, though it voted to extend its mandate. The HoR and the GNC remain open to
negotiating terms for a unity government.
Outlook: Both the GNC and the HoR will continue to seek a negotiated settlement, but representatives remain under pressure
from commanders on the ground to maintain certain positions that have created an impasse.
Security
The HoR-aligned Libyan National Army (LNA) continued to test the GNC’s Libya Dawn coalition through the sustained
consolidation of territory within Tripoli, Libya. Recent Libya Dawn-LNA hostilities in Sabrata, west of Tripoli, indicate that a
resumption of open conflict may be imminent. The participation of Misrata, which commands a majority of Libya Dawn’s overall
strength, potentially represents the return of Misrata’s hard-liners to power following several months of self-imposed ceasefires.
Outlook: The LNA’s allied support forces in Western Libya will continue to secure its positions in the outskirts of Tripoli, Libya,
and will begin organizing for an impending resumption of hostilities.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
ISIS Wilayat Barqa forces appear to be preparing for a new offensive near Ajdabiya, Libya. Wilayat Barqa has been conducting
an assassination and kidnapping campaign against public and military officials. The previous summer campaign ended with the
large-scale kidnapping of LNA 21st Border Guard personnel. These targeted operations likely aim to weaken the LNA presence
in the city.
Al Qaeda-aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces continued to resist ISIS’s attempts to recapture eastern
Derna, which Wilayat Barqa forces held in the aftermath of their expulsion from Derna in June 2015.
Outlook: The official rejection of the unity government will embolden ISIS’s forces to undertake new offensives throughout the
country with a specific focus on Benghazi and Ajdabiya.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1 23
4
9
1) 13 OCT: Local
Sabratan gunmen
kidnapped dozens of
Tunisians in Sabrata,
Libya.
2) 13 OCT: MSCD
forces arrested an
alleged ISIS leader in
Derna, Libya .
3) 17 OCT: Libya
Dawn conducted
airstrikes and ground
engagements against
LNA positions in
Ajaylat, Libya.
4) 18 OCT: ISIS
Wilayat Barqa
initiated new
campaign of
kidnappings and
assassinations in
Ajdabiya, Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
The Algerian People’s National Army (ANP) managed to arrest civilians who provided resources and military movement
information to AQIM cells in the Bejaia, Batna, Biskra and el Oued provinces. ANP also seized a large arms cache on the
Malian border in Tin Zaouatine, suggesting AQIM is sending arms into Mali to aid its affiliated groups there.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to unite and organize its network of radical Islamist militant groups in the region, while defending
its resource supply lines.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Militant activity from the AQIM-linked Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade continues to transpire in Tunisia’s north-western mountainous
region, probably to intimidate local civilians and attain resources. The Tunisian forces dismantled several recruitment cells, and
reports indicate that those recruited intended to train in Libya but return to Tunisia. These reports demonstrate the sustained
threat from the Libyan/Tunisian border.
Outlook: The Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade will continue to threaten civilians in order to attain its resources, but will avoid open
confrontations with Tunisian armed forces.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Iyad ag Ghaly, leader of Ansar al Din, released an audio recording condemning the Coordination of the Movements of Azawad
(CMA) following recent steps taken by the CMA to reconcile with the government of Mali. Ag Ghaly calls for increased attacks
against French and Malian troops. Soldiers operating under France’s counterterrorism mission in the Sahel, Operation
Barkhane, purportedly killed an Ansar al Din commander in northern Mali near the border of Algeria.
Outlook: Ansar al Din will continue to take advantage of the government’s weak security presence in the north by targeting
French security forces, MINUSMA, and civilian convoys.
10
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
3
2
1
1) 14, 18 OCT: ANP
arrested groups
aiding terrorist cells
in Bejaia, Batna,
Biskra and el Oued,
Algeria
2) 18 OCT: Tunisian
forces dismantled
recruitment cells in
Ariana, Sidi Bouzid,
Gabes, Medenine,
and Tatouine, Tunisia.
3) 18 OCT: Uqba Ibn
Nafa’a Brigade moved
to Jebel Mghila,
Tunisia and forced
civilians to provide
transportation and
food.
4) 18 OCT: ANP seized
an arms cache in Tin
Zaouatine, Algeria.
4

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
1
2
4
3
1) 13 OCT: IED attack
wounded three
French soldiers in
northern Mali.
2) 13 OCT: French
forces killed Ansar al
Din commander in
northern Mali.
3) 13 OCT: Militants
ambushed MINUSMA
convoy in Goundam,
near Timbuktu, Mali.
4)13-14 OCT:
Gunmen raided two
villages in Timbuktu,
Mali.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi met with Syrian President
Bashar al Assad on October 15 during a three-day trip by Iranian lawmakers to Syria. Boroujerdi said the trip’s purpose is to
reiterate Iranian support for Assad’s government and added that Iran would “consider” sending ground forces if Damascus
asked. During a discussion on IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Hamedani’s recent death in Syria, Boroujerdi stated that Iran
has “accepted these costs” in order to fight terrorism. Meanwhile, Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian said a
“military advisory group” was sent to Syria and that Iranian military advisors will “help Russia if Moscow asks.” Defense Minister
IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan referenced a new “joint action plan” among Iran, Russia, Syria, and Iraq against ISIS
on October 14 and claimed that “new developments” in Syria will lay the groundwork for greater counterterrorism efforts.
Outlook: Iranian military support for Assad will increase alongside Russian cooperation despite Hamedani’s death.
Military and Security
IRGC Air Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh unveiled footage of an underground missile base on October
14 and stated that “a new and advanced generation of long-range missiles” will be operationalized next year. On October 15,
Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi acknowledged that Iran’s October 11 test-firing of a long-range ballistic missile named
the Emad violated UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1929, which bans Iran from engaging in ballistic missile activity.
The timing of the test is significant as UNSCR 1929 was in effect before it was superseded by UNSCR 2231 on October 18, the
nuclear deal’s “Adoption Day.” UNSCR 2231 “calls upon” but does not legally require Iran to refrain from “activity related to
ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons.” Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali
Shamkhani stated on October 18 that Iran had not “accepted” UNSCR 1929 and claimed that the Emad missile test did not
violate UNSCR 2231. He added that Iran “will not stop its defensive or deterrence capabilities because of any threat.”
Outlook: The nuclear deal’s implementation will embolden Iranian military activity and its missile program in particular.
13
IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
OCT 13: Parliament approved a resolution authorizing the government to fulfill its commitments under the nuclear deal.
OCT 14: The Guardian Council ratified the resolution “conditionally approving” the nuclear deal.
OCT 14: IRGC Air Force Commander Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh unveiled footage of an underground missile base
and stated that “a new and advanced generation of long-range missiles” will be operationalized next year.
OCT 14: Defense Minister IRGC Brigadier General Hossein Dehghan referenced a new “joint action plan” among Iran, Syria,
Iraq, and Russia against ISIS.
OCT 14: A Yemeni delegation including al Houthi members of Yemen's Supreme Revolutionary Committee arrived in Tehran.
OCT 14: A delegation of lawmakers led by National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin
Boroujerdi arrived in Damascus.
OCT 15: Boroujerdi met with Syrian President Bashar al Assad.
OCT 15: Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Hossein Amir Abdollahian said a “military advisory group” was
dispatched to Syria and added that Iranian military advisors in Syria will “help Russia if Moscow asks.”
OCT 16: Boroujerdi stated that Iran has “accepted these costs” during a discussion on IRGC Brigadier General Hossein
Hamedani’s recent death in Syria.
OCT 16: Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs Abbas Araghchi acknowledged that Iran’s October 11 test-
firing of the Emad, a long-range ballistic missile, violated UNSC Resolution 1929.
OCT 17: Abdollahian said that Iran will “strengthen” its “advisory” presence in Syria.
OCT 17: IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said Iran is witnessing “the formation of around 100,000
individuals in Syria to fight against instability.”
OCT 18: Deputy Police Chief for Social Affairs Rahman Mousavi announced the arrest of two suspects in a drive-by shooting
that killed two during an Ashura ceremony in Khuzestan province.
OCT 18: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani said Iran “will not stop its defensive or
deterrence capabilities because of any threat.”
OCT 18: On the nuclear deal’s “Adoption Day,” Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica
Mogherini issued a statement asserting that Iran will begin implementing its nuclear commitments while the IAEA begins
“necessary preparations” for monitoring.
13 OCT – 19 OCT

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16