CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS. 2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.] 3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
May 31, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Al Qaeda affiliates Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb eulogized Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour.
2. ISIS may launch a mosque bombing campaign in Aden in order to spark sectarian divisions and
exacerbate disorder in the city.
3. ISIS is retreating into Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance from the east and west, but these
offensives will likely stop short of ISIS’s stronghold.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM)—issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour. The eulogy, published through Jabhat al Nusra’s
channels, did not mention the new emir, Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. The three affiliates had issued a similar eulogy for the
late Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Omar in August 2015 that had also omitted reference to Mullah Mansour, Mullah Omar’s
successor. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that the absence of al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in East Africa, and al
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), from the August 2015 and May 2016 joint statements is very likely an indicator of the
strength of the relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri, whose
last public statement appeared on May 7, has yet to eulogize Mullah Mansour or pledge bayat, allegiance, to Mullah
Akhundzada. Zawahiri had pledged bayat to Mullah Mansour two days after his appointment was made public.
Outlook: Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s
leadership.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
There are reports of a draft peace deal circulating from Kuwait that remain unverified, but build on the optimism that the UN Special
Envoy to Yemen expressed in that the parties might be close to an agreement on key principles. A negotiated settlement is unlikely
to resolve the multiple levels of political conflict, but is necessary to begin de-escalating the war. The negotiating parties did agree
to release 1,000 prisoners and detainees by the beginning of Ramadan, June 6-7. Significant international pressure has been
brought to bear on the negotiating factions to remain in Kuwait and participate in the talks.
Outlook: A breakthrough in the talks could be imminent, but it is unlikely that the negotiated deal will resolve core issues.
Security
Ceasefire violations continue in key strategic hotspots, particularly in the regions surrounding Sana’a. Clashes occurred near the
Shabwah-Ma’rib border along a key artery into Sana’a, and coalition airstrikes targeted al Houthi and allied forces in al Maslub and
al Ghayl districts of al Jawf governorate, as well as Nihm district on the outskirts of Sana’a. Clashes continued along the Saudi-
Yemeni border, and Saudi Arabia intercepted a ballistic missile fired by al Houthi forces toward Najran, southern Saudi Arabia. The
security situation continues to deteriorate in Aden, where blackouts prompted protests and a violent police response.
Outlook: The coalition and the al Houthis will exchange retaliatory strikes, but large-scale offensives are unlikely.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continues to benefit from Yemen’s civil war. A Reuters report described how AQAP still makes a profit from smuggling fuel,
which has become more lucrative due to fuel shortages in the country. Salafi-jihadi militants continue to conduct improvised
explosive device (IED) attacks in Aden. Two IEDs were found and cleared in a mosque before Friday prayers. Militants also
detonated an IED at Sana’a University. The Saudi-led coalition targeted suspected AQAP positions in al Hawta and Yafa’ in Lahij
governorate in attempts to clear the area.
Outlook: IED attacks on military and civilian targets will continue as ISIS and AQAP attempt to destabilize major populations
centers like Sana’a and Aden to reduce government legitimacy.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The United Nations Security Council issued an extension of its support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until
July 8 to give the body time to consider its recent trip to Somalia. Last year, the UNSC decided that the end of 2016 was too
early to deploy a UN-peacekeeping mission to Somalia to phase out AMISOM. Separately, Somalia’s military court sentenced
an al Shabaab-affiliated airport security official and several accomplices for the February 2 Daallo Airlines bombing, signaling a
high level of al Shabaab penetration at Aden Adde International Airport.
Outlook: Increasing challenges to AMISOM’s budget, which receives support from the UN, European Union, and the United
States, among others, may incentivize the UNSC to move the AMISOM mission under the UN.
Security
Al Shabaab has sustained a force presence in the Lower Shabelle region capable of contesting Somali National Army (SNA)
and AMISOM control of terrain. Al Shabaab re-established itself in Toratorow, Lower Shabelle region, which SNA and AMISOM
forces recently captured from the group. SNA and AMISOM forces continued counter-al Shabaab operations in the Gedo and
Bakool regions following an al Shabaab improvised explosive device (IED) attack on military and security personnel in Gedo.
Outlook: SNA and AMISOM forces will not consolidate gains against al Shabaab in the Lower Shabelle region without
additional forces.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab may be shaping to launch a campaign in northern Kenya that would threaten the Kenyan AMISOM logistics line. At
least 45 al Shabaab militants crossed from Somalia into northeastern Kenya and militants have targeted Kenyan troops near
the Somali-Kenyan border. Separately, Kenyan police arrested two suspected ISIS militants in Nairobi who confessed to
planning retaliatory attacks for the arrest of a fellow ISIS supporter in early May.
Outlook: Kenyan forces may crack down in the Somali-Kenyan border region, risking popular backlash. ISIS will not dedicate
significant resources to East Africa, but may provide limited support in order to drive recruitment and compete with al Qaeda.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The President of Libya’s House of Representatives (HoR) did not capitulate to U.S. and EU sanctions and is now obstructing
the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) by removing pro-GNA members from prominent positions. The Arab
League renewed its support for the GNA, and Italy threatened to sanction LNA commander Gen. Khalifa Haftar for blocking the
GNA. The LNA’s unofficial channels to military and financial support remain open despite international pressure.
Outlook: The HoR and the LNA will continue to undermine the GNA as long as unofficial channels remain open.
Security
Libyan armed groups are advancing on ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte on two fronts. Militias from the Petroleum Facilities Guard
(PFG), a federalist and tribal coalition that controls the bulk of the hydrocarbon infrastructure in eastern Libya, seized two towns
at the eastern limits of ISIS’s zone of control. GNA-aligned Misratan militias continued to advance on Sirte from the west and
announced plans to encircle the city. The Misratan militias have used air power to thwart ISIS’s explosive attack campaign.
Outlook: East-west resource competition and will likely hinder counter-ISIS operations once the frontlines converge near Sirte.
The LNA may also enter the fray, likely disrupting any tacit cooperation between the PFG and the Misratans.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. Pressure
on Sirte may be causing a schism between ISIS’s foreign fighters and its Libyan militants, and disagreements over tactics may
have escalated to violence between the two factions. A schism may signal the persistence of the al Qaeda-linked Ansar al
Sharia network in Sirte, which is locally oriented and will persist after ISIS’s ultimate defeat. ISIS is likely capable of quelling the
present dissent and remains capable of conducting explosive campaigns and counterattacks.
Outlook: ISIS will attempt SVBIED attacks west of Sirte to halt the Misratans’ offensive and will likely pursue the same tactic to
fix the PFG to the east.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

7. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM reaffirmed its vitality at home and abroad by displaying ties to al Qaeda’s global network and local recruitment
successes. AQIM, together with AQAP and Jabhat al Nusra, released condolences for Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour,
killed in a U.S. airstrike on May 21. The eulogy was released through Jabhat al Nusra channels just three days after AQIM’s
Sahara Emirate disseminated its second pictorial video of militants in northern Mali, highlighting AQIM’s close ties to al Qaeda
in Syria and its simultaneous efforts to promote a strong and sustained network in West Africa. AQIM militants in northern
Algeria disengaged from offensive action following operations by security forces there last week.
Outlook: AQIM will recruit from local tribes and conduct attacks in northern Mali while regrouping and consolidating resources
in northern Algeria.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
ISIS continues to permeate territory historically operated by AQIM’s affiliate, Uqba Ibn Nafa’a. Tunisian security forces arrested
eight suspected terrorists with links to Libyan ISIS cells in Sfax, eastern Tunisia. Militants, possibly linked to ISIS, detonated
two anti-tank mines in Jebel Samama in the past week, possibly in response to the death of Abu al Qaqa, an ISIS-linked Jund
al Khalifa (Soldiers of the Caliphate) leader who died in clashes with Tunisian forces on May 19. The area is a common hideout
for Uqba Ibn Nafaa militants, who are likely engaging in some pro-ISIS activity.
Outlook: ISIS will attack security forces in western Tunisia in an effort to recruit weakened Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
AQIM-affiliated groups in the Sahel continued to target symbols of Western influence to disrupt implementation of the Malian
peace process. AQIM claimed a Grad rocket attack on a French mining base in Arlit, Niger, which AQIM-linked militants had
targeted in 2013. French forces intensified new operations in northern Mali to combat militant activity.
Outlook: AQIM affiliates will conduct attacks on Western commercial targets and against French forces in northern Mali to
impose costs for French presence there.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

8. ACRONYMS
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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

9. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
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