Iranian conservatives are expected to dominate the assembly of experts elections following the disqualification of reformist candidates. Meanwhile, al-Qaeda affiliates continue to gain ground in various regions, conducting significant attacks, including al-Shabaab's claim of an in-flight bombing in Somalia. In response to rising threats, security measures are intensifying in Pakistan and Yemen as militant activities increase.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
February 16, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1
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1. Iranian conservatives will likely dominate the February 26 elections after Iran’s vetting body upheld its
decision to disqualify prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with
selecting the supreme leader.
2. AQIM-linked militants launched a second complex attack on UN forces in Mali in as many weeks, an uptick
in AQIM affiliates’ efforts against international forces in the Sahel and disrupted the Malian peace deal.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in
Mogadishu, confirming a significant step-change in the group’s capabilities and tactics.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
U.S. Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper assessed that al Qaeda’s affiliates are positioned to make gains in the
coming year, despite the counterterrorism operations that have degraded al Qaeda leadership in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Al
Qaeda will continue to attack the West in order to advance its long-term objectives of removing the West from the Muslim-
majority world and then defeating the West. DNI Clapper described al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen and Jabhat al
Nusra in Syria as al Qaeda’s most capable affiliates.
Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri’s guidance to Jabhat al Nusra to refrain from attacking the West in order to prevent a
disruption of the Syrian conflict likely now extends to al Qaeda’s other affiliates, particularly in Yemen. AQAP still has the
capabilities and will to attack the United States, but it has likely decided to delay attacks in order to not draw policymakers’
attention.
Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups will continue to conduct their local and regional military campaigns, building strength and
local resilience.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
The Pakistani military’s spokesman Asim Bajwa announced that security forces arrested 97 al Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent (AQIS) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) militants during raids in Karachi. Many of the arrested militants were in
advanced stages of planning a jailbreak attempt on Hyderabad Central Jail, according to Bajwa. Bajwa, however, declined to
give further details about the raids, including their timing. These arrests are likely in response to the recent increase in attacks
carried out by militant groups, especially Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
Outlook: Pakistani security forces are likely to increase security in the country, following the recent large-scale attacks.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Losses near Sana’a and the one-year anniversary of the February 11 protests against Saleh and the al Houthis inflamed
tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh alliance. Saleh’s press secretary linked the al Houthis’ February 11 rally in Sana’a to
setbacks in Furdat Nihm, accusing the al Houthis of surrendering the base. A pro-Saleh tribal leader condemned Saleh loyalists’
participation in the rally and expressed disappointment in Saleh’s General People’s Congress party. Separately, a nephew of al
Houthi leader Abdul Malik al Houthi praised the Iranian Revolution on its 37th anniversary. Semi-official Iranian media referred
to him as Hojjat-ol-Islam, a Shi’i title of respect.
Outlook: The core al Houthi-Saleh alliance remains unlikely to fragment, absent significant developments on the ground.
Security
Coalition-backed forces continued to push toward Sana’a, capturing Furdat Nihm and contesting the Bin Ghaylan pass, while al
Houthi-Saleh forces pushed back in parts of Ma’rib and Taiz. Pro-Hadi military and security forces clashed with militants in Aden
over the course of two days, with Saudi-led coalition air support. Most sources identify the militants as AQAP, but one security
official attributed an attack to southern secessionists. There are multiple armed groups active in Aden. Secessionist militants
exerted authority in Sanah, al Dhaleh governorate, closing a government office.
Outlook: Fighting will continue along established frontlines while instability in the south will draw increased military attention.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP held its positions after a rapid expansion over the past month. The Saudi-led coalition reportedly conducted airstrikes on
AQAP positions in Lahij and Abyan, likely in response to an international narrative that the Saudis are aiding, not opposing,
Salafi-jihadi groups. The coalition has focused its air power on al Houthi-Saleh targets up to this point.
Outlook: The coalition may continue to strike AQAP targets, especially as it attempts to secure Aden and its environs.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1) 09-10 FEB:
Suspected AQAP
militants clashed with
pro-Hadi security
forces in Aden.
2) 11 FEB: Pro-Hadi
forces captured
Furdat Nihm, Sana’a.
3) 09-10 FEB:
Southern Movement
militants clashed with
security forces in
Sanah, al Dhaleh.
4) 15 FEB: Reported
coalition airstrikes
target AQAP in al
Hawta, Lahij.
5) 12 FEB: Pro-Hadi
forces clashed with al
Houthi-Saleh forces
near Bin Ghaylan
pass, Sana’a.
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3
1
5
4

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud spoke at the Munich Security Conference (MSC) and claimed that many al
Shabaab recruits are motivated by money to join. He also stated that some of Boko Haram’s fighters have trained with al
Shabaab in Somalia. Al Shabaab trained multiple Boko Haram members in 2010-2011. It is unclear whether President
Mohamud was referencing more recent intelligence.
Outlook: The MSC speech is likely an attempt to bolster international aid for Somalia’s security and civil society programs.
Security
Somali National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces began an operation to push al Shabaab
out of the Middle Shabelle region. Interim Jubbaland Administration (IJA) forces, backed by Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) also
launched the “Jubba River Offensive,” which is meant to liberate al Shabaab-controlled settlements along the southern Jubba
River, setting a foundation for an eventual offensive against al Shabaab in the Middle Jubba region. AMISOM officials also
warned of attacks by al Shabaab using AMISOM uniforms seized during the January 15 el Adde base attack.
Outlook: It is likely that SNA and AMISOM forces are trying to clear the Middle Shabelle region in preparation for its
incorporation into the new federal state.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the February 2 bombing of a Daallo Airlines plane. The group said it was targeting
Western and Turkish intelligence officials onboard the plane, and that the attack is part of a larger operation to discourage
foreign security aid to the Somali Federal Government. The group also conducted multiple mortar attacks on military bases
near airports in both Mogadishu and Kismayo, claiming that it was targeting foreign intelligence and drone operators.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely continue to launch attacks against what it perceives as Western and foreign actors in Somalia.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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3
1
2
1) 14 FEB: Al Shabaab
launched mortars at
AMISOM base near
airport in Kismayo,
Lower Jubba region.
2) 11 FEB: Al Shabaab
launched mortars at
AMISOM base near
airport in Mogadishu,
Banadir region.
3) 14 FEB: Al Shabaab
assassinated former
Somali defense
minister with car
bomb in Mogadishu,
Banadir Region.
4) 11 FEB: SNA and
AMISOM forces
recaptured Biya
Cadde from al
Shabaab in Middle
Shabelle region.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-backed Presidency Council (PC) finalized an 18-member cabinet for the Government of National Accord (GNA). The
internationally recognized Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) will vote on the proposal this week. Two members of the PC
affiliated with the HoR, Ali Gatrani and Omar al Aswad, refused to sign the proposal because it does not include Libyan National
Army (LNA) General Haftar. It is not clear if Haftar’s other supporters within the HoR will approve the cabinet.
Outlook: Haftar’s role in the unity government will continue to hamper the unification process.
Security
The LNA is fighting against militants affiliated with ISIS Wilayat Barqa, al Qaeda-linked Ansar al Sharia, and other Islamist
militants in western Benghazi. The LNA Air Force conducted several bombing missions in support of LNA operations there, as
well as in Derna. The LNA has been unable to make any decisive gains in Benghazi. In Derna, the Mujahideen Shura Council
of Derna took several positions from ISIS Wilayat Barqa militants in the eastern Sahel Sharqi area. Ansar al Sharia militants
claimed to shoot down an LNA MiG-23 near Derna, and ISIS militants claimed to shoot down another LNA MiG-23 in Benghazi.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to focus its ground forces and limited air power on the eastern Libyan coast.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
Misratan militias reinforced Abugrein with a convoy of approximately 200 armed vehicles in addition to support vehicles,
reportedly in response to ISIS’s recent seizure of nearby al Buerat. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus then mobilized a large force to the
west of Sirte. Suspected international aircraft bombed two ISIS positions in Sirte. The strikes targeted an ISIS base in
Sawawa, outside of the city, and a possible weapons cache near the port. A Nigerien intelligence official said that ISIS
personnel are traveling south into the Sahel to avoid coalition airstrikes.
Outlook: Misratan forces will likely attempt to prevent ISIS’s westward expansion from Sirte. ISIS will continue to prepare for
ground and air assaults on its stronghold.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
9
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
3
4
1
2
5
6
1)08-12 FEB:
Misratan militias
established positions
near Abugrein and al
Buerat.
2)08-10 FEB: ISIS
moved forces to
western Sirte.
3)15 FEB: Aircraft
bombed two ISIS
positions near Sirte.
4)10-15FEB: LNA
fought with militants
in western Benghazi.
5)07 FEB: Ansar al
Sharia claimed to
shoot down a LNA
Mig-23.
6)12 FEB: ISIS
claimed to shoot
down a LNA MiG-23.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM released an article written by prominent AQIM scribe Abu Ashbal al Maghrebi on 11 FEB and a video published by al
Andalus Media Foundation on 13 FEB. Both publications threatened Westerners against intervention in Libya and a perceived
war on Islam, calling for Muslims to defend their land against infidels. The video is the second in AQIM’s “From the Depths of
the Desert” series, the first of which was published on 06 JAN. AQIM is likely reacting to an international focus on ISIS in the
region, and acting to increase recruitment and secure their operational territory.
Outlook: AQIM and its affiliates will continue to recruit and threaten attacks on the West based on Western intervention in
Africa and the Middle East.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a remained quiet this week as Tunisia prepares for possible intervention in Libya by conducting mock operations
along its southeast border. Tunisia is a big source of foreign fighters to Libya and forces are closely patrolling cross-border
militant flows while preparing for an influx of Libyan refugees.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will stay in hiding while Tunisian forces sustain efforts against suspected militants.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
AQIM-linked militants launched a second complex attack against UN peacekeeping forces in as many weeks. Ansar al Din
targeted a UN base in Kidal, northeastern Mali. The group detonated a SVBIED and launched rockets while fighters stormed
the base. Meanwhile, suspected militants ambushed a Malian army convoy on the same day near Timbuktu, northern Mali. The
Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an affiliate of Ansar al Din operating in central Mali, used an IED to target an army convoy and
attacked a customs post in Mopti Region, central Mali.
Outlook: Ansar al Din and other AQIM affiliates will continue to use complex attacks on security forces to draw greater
publicity, dissuade regional participation in the peacekeeping mission, and disrupt the Malian peace deal.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
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3
1
4
1) 09 FEB: Tunisian
forces conducted
mock operations to
prepare for a Libyan
intervention in
Medenine, Tunisia.
2) 11 FEB: Tunisian
forces arrested four
members of a
suspected terror cell
in Kairouan.
3) 11 FEB: Algerian
forces arrested two
suspected Katibat al
Farouq terrorists in
Kaf Lahssene, Bouira.
4) 10-13 FEB:
Algerian forces
destroyed up to 36
terrorist bunkers and
20 homemade
bombs in Ain Defla.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA
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2
3
1
4
1) 09 FEB: The MLF
targeted a Malian
army convoy using an
IED in Mondoro,
central Mali.
2) 11 FEB: The MLF
attacked a customs
post in Hombori,
central Mali.
3) 12 FEB: Ansar al
Din launched a
complex attack
against a UN base in
Kidal, northeastern
Mali.
4) 12 FEB: Suspected
militants ambushed a
Malian army convoy
near Timbuktu,
northern Mali.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Domestic Politics
Iran’s vetting body upheld its disqualification of prominent Reformists when it finalized the approved candidate list for the
elections to the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader’s successor, on February 10. Hassan
Khomeini, a Reformist-inclined grandson of former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was among those
disqualified. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a
February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
Outlook: The February 26 elections will likely produce another conservative-leaning Assembly of Experts.
Military and Security
Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan announced that Iran will unveil a “precision” upgrade to its Emad ballistic missile during the
next Iranian year, which starts on March 20. Washington’s new sanctions in January against Iran’s ballistic missile program
were in part motivated by an October test-firing of the Emad missile, which is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Dehghan
also stated that Iran and Russia have begun talks on the purchase of Sukhoi-30 fighter jets and added that Russia will deliver
the S-300 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran within the first half of 2016.
Outlook: Iran will continue to develop its ballistic missile program despite new sanctions.
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IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1409 - 12 February
FEB 09: Interior Ministry Spokesman Hossein Ali Amiri announced that the Guardian Council has approved approximately 50
percent of candidates to run in the parliamentary elections.
FEB 09: Senior Reformist leader Mohammad Reza Aref criticized the Guardian Council’s refusal to reverse the disqualifications
of prominent Reformists.
FEB 09: Defense Minister Hossein Dehghan announced that Iran will unveil a “precision” upgrade to its Emad ballistic missile
during the next Iranian year, which begins on March 20.
FEB 09 – FEB 12: Iranian news outlets reported the deaths of at least eleven IRGC and Basij members, including IRGC Col.
Saadat Khavae, in Syria.
FEB 10: The Guardian Council released its final list of approved candidates for the Assembly of Experts election. The Council
upheld its disqualification of Hojjat ol Eslam Hassan Khomeini, a Reformist-inclined grandson of former Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
FEB 10: Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani criticized Saudi Arabia’s and other regional countries’
readiness to deploy forces to Syria.
FEB 11: The top strata of Iran’s leadership, including IRGC Quds Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, marked the
37th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution by attending mass rallies.
FEB 11: President Hassan Rouhani emphasized the importance of domestic economic development and called for Iran’s
various political factions to remain united during remarks commemorating the Islamic Revolution’s anniversary.
FEB 11: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif attended a meeting of the International Syria Support Group and the Munich
Security Conference in Germany.
FEB 12: Law Enforcement Forces Commander Hossein Ashtari said the police will “certainly confront” candidates who attempt
to hold “street meetings or gatherings,” reflecting the regime’s ongoing fear of protests during the upcoming parliamentary
and Assembly of Experts elections.

15. ACRONYMS
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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16