CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold. 2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31. 3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
June 7, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
2
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely take the shape of a prolonged siege of ISIS’s
stronghold in Sirte as anti-ISIS forces move to isolate the city and ISIS hardens defenses.
2. Al Shabaab may surge attacks against government and AMISOM targets in Somalia during
Ramadan. An attack on the Ambassador Hotel in Mogadishu killed two parliamentarians.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent echoed guidance from al Qaeda senior leadership in
condemning attacks that kill civilians and calling for a fight against the far enemy.
3

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda’s affiliates continue to release statements that are intended to preserve and build popular support for the groups. Al
Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) emir Asim Umar released an Urdu-language statement warning fighters against
targeting Muslim non-combatants specifically to retain popular support. He encouraged militants to attack the “head of the
serpent,” echoing the language of late al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, and cited the 9/11 attacks as an example. AQIS
spokesman Usama Mahmoud criticized the January 2016 attack at Bacha Khan University that killed at least 22 people and the
December 2015 bombing of the Pakistani National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) that killed at least 26 people.
Jamatul Ahrar claimed the NADRA attack and a splinter from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, under the leadership of recently
U.S.-designated terrorist Umar Mansoor, claimed the university attack. Both Asim Umar and Usama Mahmoud argued that
such attacks do not advance the fighters’ cause. Similarly, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) retracted an April 2016
statement that threatened attacks on the homes of military leaders in Abyan, likely seeking to soften its image on the ground.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to prioritize relationships with local populations over local spectacular attacks that kill civilians.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Kuwait talks may produce a preliminary agreement next week, but it is unlikely to resolve core issues. The al Houthi-Saleh
delegation accepted current President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as head of a transitional government. This is a significant
concession, but is likely meant to move negotiations toward the real political battles, including cabinet appointments. Former Vice
President Khalid Bahah indicated that the UN is reviewing a UN- and Gulf Cooperation Council-led plan should the Yemeni-led
peace process fail, but the UN is unlikely to abandon the Kuwait talks at this time.
Outlook: The Kuwait talks will likely produce minor compromises during Ramadan, but no major agreement.
Security
Yemeni government forces with limited coalition air support are putting pressure on Sana’a, likely in an effort to extract al Houthi-
Saleh concessions in Kuwait. The ceasefire remains formally in place, but fighting is ongoing along established frontlines and both
sides are using accusations of ceasefire violations to justify retaliatory attacks. The al Houthis and allied forces are responding to
government pressure by intensifying attacks in Taiz city and seeking gains in al Bayda governorate.
Outlook: Both sides will continue to seek quid pro quo gains, but the established frontlines are unlikely to change significantly.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
ISIS may have temporarily slowed its operational tempo in Aden due to counterterrorism operations. An armed group likely led by a
relative of a recently arrested ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan leader led an attempt to free the militant, and future efforts will likely
succeed. Security forces also dismantled a bomb-making cell in al Mukalla, where ISIS launched an explosive campaign in the
wake of AQAP’s withdrawal in April 2016. AQAP continues to prioritize its relationships with local populations. The group retracted
an April 2016 statement that threatened attacks on the homes of military leaders in Abyan governorate.
Outlook: ISIS will resume its explosive attack campaign in Aden, and possibly al Mukalla. AQAP will refrain from spectacular
attacks that kill civilians in order to retain popular support.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
4
3
2
5
1) 31 MAY: Aden
police arrested seven
ISIS members,
including a French
national.
2) 01 JUN: Al Mukalla
police dismantled a
reported AQAP cell,
which included
Pakistani nationals.
3) 05 JUN: Militiamen
attacked Aden
International Airport.
4) 03 JUN: Al Houthi
forces shelled a
market in Taiz.
5) 01 JUN:
Government forces
recaptured Nihm,
Sana’a, from al
Houthi-Saleh forces.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Kenya is expediting efforts to close Dadaab refugee camp, which it sees as an al Shabaab recruitment ground, despite Somali
opposition. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud visited the camp shortly after a Kenyan cabinet secretary said that
Kenya will close Dadaab by November 2016 at the latest, moving up the proposed closure date from May 2017.
Outlook: The camp’s closure will exacerbate Kenyan-Somali tensions and may drive al Shabaab recruitment.
Security
Al Shabaab is targeting Kenyan security forces along the Kenyan-Somali border. Militants attacked two Kenyan police vehicles
in Mandera County, Kenya and targeted a Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) convoy in Liboi, Garissa County, Kenya.The Somali
National Army (SNA) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops are attempting to consolidate gains against al
Shabaab in the Gedo region and target the group’s sources of strength in the Lower Jubba region, where they destroyed an al
Shabaab taxation center in Berhani, Kismayo. Kenyan airstrikes also targeted al Shabaab in Berhani.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue attacking Kenyan forces in the Somali-Kenyan border region, especially in Mandera County.
The group may attempt to regain territory in the Gedo region and stage a retaliatory attack in Kismayo.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab remains capable of conducting complex attacks despite leadership attrition. Al Shabaab militants killed at least 16
people, including two Somali parliamentarians, at the Ambassador Hotel in Mogadishu on June 1, following warnings that it will
conduct more attacks during the Ramadan season. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and
intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27. U.S. forces also advised Somali special forces and AMISOM troops in a raid
targeting al Shabaab’s mid-level commanders near Kismayo on May 31. The raid killed al Shabaab’s senior commander and
head of external operations in Kenya Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa
University.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely increase its operational tempo in Mogadishu during the Ramadan season.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), whose leaders are blocking the implementation of the UN-backed Government of
National Accord (GNA), is leveraging Libya’s liquidity crisis to strengthen itself as an alternative center of power. Cooperation
between Libya’s competing central banks, one aligned with the Government of National Accord (GNA) in the west and the other
aligned with the House of Representatives (HoR) in the east, is a short-term solution to Libya’s financial woes that undermines
the GNA’s authority in the long term.
Outlook: The GNA will make concessions to draw the HoR into the unity government but will fail to consolidate its authority in
eastern Libya.
Security
Misratan armed groups operating under the GNA continue to advance on ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte and are shaping their
offensive to thwart any potential controlled withdrawal by ISIS. Misratan forces shifted the front line from west of Sirte to its
south and seized a strategic site that sits along a key road to the Fezzan, where ISIS has a small affiliate and lines of
communication to the Sahel. Libyan control of this road will restrict ISIS’s ability to withdraw southwest from Sirte. CTP has
assessed that ISIS has laid the groundwork to withdraw into southwest Libya, should holding Sirte become untenable.
Outlook: GNA-aligned forces will hold their frontlines outside of Sirte but are unlikely to advance into the city itself without
additional support.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS is dedicating significant resources to harden Sirte’s defenses and slow its enemies’ advances. ISIS called militants to
deploy to Libya, underscoring the city’s importance for the group’s global campaign. ISIS has lost key terrain in Iraq and Syria
and appears determined to retain a North African base, which provides redundancy for its claim to govern a territorial caliphate.
Outlook: ISIS will plant explosives in ceded territory and conduct explosive attacks at the frontlines to slow Libyan offensives.
7
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

8. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM is drawing its affiliates together in northern Algeria in order to counter ISIS’s rise in the Maghreb and Sahel regions.
Algerian security forces killed eight suspected terrorists in Setif, northern Algeria. Three of the deceased militants were
emissaries of AQIM’s Sahara Emirate emir, while three others were linked to AQIM’s Tunisian affiliate, the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a
brigade. AQIM is likely attempting to facilitate cooperation between cells and solidify their al Qaeda loyalties in order to protect
its position as the leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement in western Africa.
Outlook: AQIM will launch a media campaign to recruit and retain militants in contested regions such as western Tunisia and
eastern Algeria.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Likely AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants attacked a Tunisian official in Kasserine governorate, possibly in retaliation for
security operations in Jebel Chaambi, a primary Uqba Ibn Nafa’a hideout. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a militants are severely weakened by
ISIS’s growth and recruitment in the area, and those militants still loyal to al Qaeda are actively defending their terrain.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will conduct defensive operations against Tunisian forces patrolling in the mountains of Kasserine.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
AQIM-affiliated groups in the Sahel launched a campaign against MINUSMA and Malian Army forces in retaliation for French
operations in northern Mali. Militants have conducted at least four separate attacks on MINUSMA in the past three weeks, in
addition to coordinated IED attacks on the Malian Army. AQIM released a statement praising these attacks, singling out the two
conducted by AQIM’s affiliate, al Murabitoun, on June 1. AQIM affiliates in northern Mali have increased their operational tempo
against MINUSMA in recent months.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to provide rhetorical support to its affiliates’ counter-MINUSMA campaign. AQIM affiliates may
attempt to conduct a complex attack on a MINUSMA target in northern Mali in the near term.
8
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
9
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
2
31
4
1) 31 MAY: Algerian
security forces killed
eight suspected
terrorists in Setif.
2) 31 MAY-01 JUN:
Likely Uqba Ibn
Nafa’a militants
attacked a Tunisian
official in Kasserine.
3) 02 JUN: Tunisian
security forces
arrested a suspected
terrorist in Sousse.
4) 03 JUN: Moroccan
security forces
dismantled a six-
member pro-ISIS cell
active in Casablanca,
Martil, and Tetouan.

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
10
SAHELWEST AFRICA
3
2
1
1) 31 MAY: AQIM
affiliate al
Murabitoun attacked
two MINUSMA sites
in Gao region.
2) 01 JUN: Likely
AQIM militants
attacked Burkinabe
police officers in the
Sahel region of
Burkina Faso.
3) 06 JUN: A Malian
Army vehicle struck
an IED, likely placed
by Ansar al Din, in
Menaka.

11. ACRONYMS
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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

12. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
12