The document discusses geopolitical developments in the Middle East and North Africa, highlighting key events such as Iranian support for Syrian President Assad, Yemen's President Hadi returning from exile, and Al-Qaeda's continued opposition to ISIS. It notes the ongoing military actions by the Pakistani military against militants, the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen, and the evolving power dynamics among jihadist groups in Libya and Somalia. Additionally, it addresses Iranian criticisms of Saudi Arabia regarding the recent hajj stampede and emphasizes Iran's commitment to a political resolution in Syria involving Assad.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
September 30, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Iranian officials voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad and for Russian
involvement in the conflict in Syria.
2. Yemen’s president returned to the country after six months in exile in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Abdu
Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government is re-establishing itself in Aden, in southern Yemen.
3. Malian factions met for the first time in Mali’s capital, Bamako, to improve implementation of a June
ceasefire agreement and continued talks.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri released the third episode of his “Islamic Spring” audio series. Zawahiri continued the
themes of his previous episodes and called for jihadists in Iraq and Syria to to set aside differences to focus on the common
goal of attacking the West, secularists, and Shia Muslims. Zawahiri also criticized the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS)
Caliphate and detailed how it fails to meet the requirements of a legitimate caliphate.
Outlook: Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri will continue his series, drawing attention to al Qaeda’s opposition to ISIS, but
encouraging cooperation between the fighters.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) released a list of secular bloggers and writers, who are allegedly on the group’s hit list. Many of
the people targeted in the hit list live in North America and Europe. Separately, ISIS claimed the killing of an Italian national,
Tavera Cesare, in Dhaka, Bangladesh. This is ISIS’s first attack in Bangladesh, a region where al Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent (AQIS) and affiliated groups have conducted a targeted campaign on secular writers and bloggers.
The Pakistani military continued its ground and air operations in the Shawal Valley area of North Waziristan. Operation Zarb-e-
Azb, the Pakistani military’s offensive in North Waziristan, is in its final phase.
Outlook: ISIS fighters in Bangladesh may try to expand the group’s presence in the country. Pakistani military will continue its
campaign against militancy in the FATA.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is working to reestablish legitimacy in Yemen to shift
power away from the al Houthis. President Hadi, Vice President Khaled Bahah, and cabinet ministers returned to Aden after six
months in exile. Hadi addressed the UN General Assembly on September 29.
Outlook: Hadi’s government will have little effective control beyond Aden’s borders as the coalition airstrikes continue to erode
support.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition is continuing its airstrike campaign despite rising civilian casualties and international criticism. Coalition
airstrikes targeted al Houthi camps and missile launch sites in northern and central Yemen. The coalition denied responsibility
for several strikes on civilian targets, but the perception of coalition responsibility persists on the ground and has been a
recruiting tool for the al Houthis and their allies. Saudi Arabia increased humanitarian aid delivery to Aden, but the coalition has
failed to secure territory for safe aid delivery in al Houthi-controlled governorates. Al Houthi and pro-Saleh forces attempted to
infiltrate Saudi territory, and several Saudi officers died in border clashes this week, including a brigadier general.
Outlook: The coalition is unlikely to end airstrikes or support negotiations while al Houthi forces threaten Saudi territory. The
humanitarian crisis will worsen near entrenched al Houthi positions in Sana’a, Taiz, al Bayda, and al Hudaydah.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS continue to expand their operational and governance capabilities. AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia militants destroyed
several shrines near al Mukalla city, Hadramawt, which is still under AQAP control. ISIS continues to target mosques
frequented by al Houthis. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a detonated a suicide bomb in a Sana’a mosque on the first day of Eid al Adha.
Outlook: AQAP and ISIS will continue to exploit the security vacuum in Yemen to expand and strengthen recruitment.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN
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1) SEP 22: Ansar al
Sharia destroyed Sufi
shrines near al
Mukalla, Hadramawt.
2) SEP 23-27: Popular
resistance and
Yemeni army forces
clashed with al
Houthis in Taiz.
3) SEP 25: Yemeni
troops arrived in
Ma’rib after training
in Saudi Arabia.
4) SEP 25: Al Houthis
killed two Saudi
border officers near
al Horth, Saudi
Arabia.
5) SEP 28: Popular
resistance forces took
control of the Ma’rib
dam region.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
International support for the Somali Federal Government and its struggle for stability are high. The UK will provide 70
peacekeeping troops to Somalia for training purposes. Additionally, the impeachment against Somalia’s president has been
dropped in favor of a dialogue based approach to the issue. Galmudug State officials invited Ahlu Sunna al wa Jama’a (ASWJ)
to negotiate for peace after the latter declared war on the administration and is reportedly poised to attack.
Outlook: The Somali Federal Government is likely to continue receiving international backing as it tries to secure the country,
while it is uncertain how ASWJ will react to the invitation.
Security
The campaign against al Shabaab militants in Somalia’s central regions is progressing well, with joint Somalia National Army
(SNA) and AMISOM ground forces, supplemented by air support, retaking al Shabaab-held villages and eradicating their
hideouts. Security forces not receiving pay is a growing issue, which has led to SNA members robbing civilians and high level
officials threatening to resign; however, the government refutes these claims, saying that salaries are being paid.
Outlook: AMISOM and SNA forces will likely maintain their momentum and continue to retake towns in central Somalia,
although it is difficult to ascertain whether they will be able to maintain control as the military moves on.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab has largely been put on the defensive in central Somalia as a result of AMISOM and the SNA’s anti-al Shabaab
operations in the region. The group has primarily been occupied with combating Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) near Boni
Forest and in the southern Lower Jubba and Gedo regions, ambushing military targets when it has the chance.
Outlook: It is likely that al Shabaab will focus on conducting hit-and-run attacks on KDF forces along the Kenyan-Somali
border as it is able to hide with greater ease.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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1) 22-28 SEP: Al
Shabaab launched
multiple ambushes on
KDF forces in Gedo.
2) 27 SEP: Al Shabaab
kidnapped civilians;
police launched
manhunt.
3) 22-28 SEP: SNA and
AMISOM forces clash
retake al Shabaab-
controlled villages in
Hiraan region.
4) 28 SEP: AMISOM
killed civilian youth in
Mogadishu.
5) 17- 29 SEP: Ship
with undeclared
weapons inside UN-
marked vehicles
discovered in
Mombasa, Kenya.
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8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The President of the UN-recognized Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), Aqila Saleh, announced his intention to continue
negotiations with the Tripoli-based Islamist General National Congress (GNC) at the UN General Assembly. The next set of
negotiations are expected to begin on September 30. The HoR’s mandate expires on October 20.
Outlook: It is not clear whether the HoR and the GNC will abide by a draft agreement proposed by the UN last week to form a
national unity Libyan government.
Security
The Libyan National Army’s (LNA) offensive in Benghazi, under Operation Doom, seems to show initial gains against the al
Qaeda-linked Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC). The LNA-led coalition is closing in on former key LNA
encampments, Camp 319 and the Saiqa divisional headquarters, in Bu’atni, Benghazi.
Outlook: The LNA will prioritize seizing Camp 319 and the Saiqa divisional headquarters to establish positions from which to
fight the BRSC in Benghazi.
Ansar al Sharia and ISIS in Libya
ISIS Sirte forces continue to establish governance and control in Sirte and the surrounding areas. The targeted isolation of
Qaddhafi and Ferjani tribal neighborhoods and the kidnapping of their youth is a tactic to encourage the tribes’ acquiescence to
ISIS control in outlying towns, such as Nufaliya. Al Qaeda-aligned Mujahideen Shura Council Derna (MSCD) forces, which may
have cooperated with the LNA, reportedly drove ISIS Derna’s remaining forces out of Fatahia, Derna. MSCD militants
documented the occupation of ISIS’s former positions. Ansar al Sharia refuted the assertion made by ISIS’s emir in Libya in an
interview for Dabiq, an ISIS magazine, that it had declared loyalty to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in Iraq. Ansar al Sharia remains
within the al Qaeda network in Libya.
Outlook: ISIS Sirte will continue to follow methods of control seen in Iraq and Syria to consolidate strength in Libya. Ansar al
Sharia will seek to defend its positions in Derna and Benghazi through the militia councils there.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
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1) 22-23 SEP: ISIS
Sirte blockaded and
kidnapped Qaddhafi
youths from Abu
Hadi, Sirte, Libya.
2) 24 SEP: LNA air
units conducted
airstrikes on several
ISIS positions near
Derna, Libya.
3) 27 SEP: LNA units
conducted numerous
raids on Benghazi
Revolutionary Shura
Council and ISIS
positions throughout
Benghazi, Libya.
4) 28 SEP: ISIS Derna
reportedly withdrew
from Fatahia, Derna,
Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM continued its public outreach campaign during the Eid al Aidha holidays. AQIM’s head of Judicial Authority, Sheikh Abu al
Hasan Rashid al Bulaydi, released an Eid al Adha video sermon preaching to AQIM’s supporters.
Outlook: AQIM will remain the predominant jihadist group based in the Maghreb region, especially in Algeria and Tunisia,
because of its historical network. Recent shifts from smaller groups to ISIS will challenge AQIM, but not sufficiently weaken it.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisian military operations to clear the Kef region appear to have been ineffective as militants continue to operate there.
Similarly, the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, an AQIM affiliate, released pictures of its Eid al Adha celebration in the Mt. Chaambi
region, even though Tunisian officials announced the group’s defeat this past summer.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia and other similar groups will maintain their stronghold in the mountains until Tunisian forces can
support a large operation to thoroughly locate and eliminate the established camps there.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to push operations southward in Mali, taking advantage of continued disagreements between
separatist Tuareg and pro-government groups. The Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), a separatist rebel group,
and Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA), a pro-government militia, met for the first time in Mali’s capital,
Bamako, and pledged to respect the June ceasefire agreement. A ministerial delegation also mediated talks between the CMA
and The Platform, a coalition of pro-government militias which includes GATIA, to encourage communication between the
groups and a ceasefire of hostilities.
Outlook: Mali’s government will seek to reestablish authority in the north to prevent further violations of the ceasefire
agreement in light of this week’s meetings between the CMA and pro-government militias.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
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21) 23 SEP: Tunisian
forces arrested a
suspected terrorist in
Kef, Tunisia.
2) 27 SEP – 28 SEP:
Terrorists raided
homes and a land
mine exploded in Kef,
Tunisia, prompting a
National Guard
search operation.
3) 28 SEP: The
Algerian National
Gendarmerie
dismantled a drug
trafficking ring in Ain
Defla, Algeria.

12. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for Saudi Arabia to “accept responsibility” for the September 24 stampede that
killed at least 769 pilgrims, which Head of Iran’s Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization Saeed Ohadi said included at least 169
Iranians. The Supreme Leader criticized Saudi authorities again on September 27 for “shifting blame” rather than “apologizing”
to the Muslim world. President Hassan Rouhani, meanwhile, claimed on September 27 that Riyadh’s “interference” in regional
countries distracted it from proper planning for the Hajj and caused the stampede. Supreme National Security Council (SNSC)
Secretary Ali Shamkhani also accused Saudi officials of “focusing on the invasion of Yemen” rather than ensuring the safety of
Hajj pilgrims. IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami echoed allegations of incompetence against Riyadh and
accused Saudi officials of neglect due to their “war” with Yemen and “displacement” of Syrians. Assembly of Experts Chairman
Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi called for the formation of a “fact-finding group” to investigate the stampede, and Judiciary Head
Ayatollah Sadegh Amoli Larijani said that the Ministry of Justice must do so as well “with the cooperation of the Foreign Ministry
and Islamic countries.”
Outlook: Senior Iranian officials will continue to leverage the Hajj stampede to criticize Saudi Arabia’s regional policies.
Iranian officials increasingly voiced their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad last week ahead of an announcement of
a joint Russian, Syrian, Iranian, and Iraqi “information center” to coordinate the war against ISIS in Baghdad. Deputy Foreign
Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stressed that President Assad must “be part of the solution” in Syria during a press
conference in Moscow on September 22. Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Fathali reiterated Tehran’s support for
President Assad, claiming that he is the “only option” that can protect the Middle East from terrorist groups. In another press
conference on September 23, Abdollahian stated that Iran will strive to solve the Syrian crisis “with the cooperation of Russia”
and emphasized Iran’s support for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to restore stability in Syria. The Supreme Leader’s
Senior Military Advisor and IRGC Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi stated on September 24 that “Russian-Iranian coordination” in
the region has begun.
Outlook: In tandem with Russian cooperation, Iran will continue to advocate a political solution to the Syrian crisis that includes
President Assad.
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IRAN

13. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
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22 SEP: President Hassan Rouhani praised the country’s nuclear achievement, stating that “6,000 centrifuges” are active when
the P5+1 ordered that there only be “100” last year.
22 SEP: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif led Iran’s nuclear negotiations team to New York to attend the 70th session
of the United Nations General Assembly.
22 SEP: Special Parliamentary Commission to Review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) member Abbas Ali
Mansouri Arani stated that two reports will be submitted to Parliament if no consensus is reached.
22 SEP: Foreign Minister Zarif ordered the creation of a “JCPOA follow-up committee” in the Foreign Ministry.
22 SEP: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian asserted that Syrian President Bashar al Assad must be “part of a
solution” in solving the Syrian conflict.
22 SEP: Iran’s Ambassador to Lebanon Mohammad Fathali reiterated that President Assad is the “only option” in protecting the
region from terrorist groups.
23 SEP: Deputy Foreign Minister Abdollahian reaffirmed Iran’s goals in solving the Syrian conflict “with the cooperation of
Russia.”
24 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for Saudi Arabia to “accept responsibility” for the Hajj stampede that
killed at least 769 pilgrims, including 169 Iranians.
24 SEP: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Military Advisor IRGC Maj. Gen. Yahya Rahim Safavi stated that “Russian-Iranian
coordination” in dealing with regional terrorist groups had “been launched.”
25 SEP: President Rouhani stated that he does “not see a coalition between Iran and Russia for fighting terrorism in Syria.”
27 SEP: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that Saudi Arabia is “shifting blame” on the Hajj stampede rather than
“apologizing.”
27 SEP: President Rouhani claimed that Saudi Arabia’s “focus… [was] on interference” in Yemen and Syria, which prevented
the country from ensuring the safety of Hajj pilgrims.
27 SEP: Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani stated that Saudi Arabia has been “focusing on
the invasion of Yemen” rather than on a safe Hajj.
28 SEP: Assembly of Experts Chairman Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi called for the formation of a “fact-finding group” to
investigate the Hajj stampede.
28 SEP: Judiciary Head Ayatollah Sadeghi Amoli Larijani called on the Ministry of Justice to investigate the Hajj stampede.
22 SEP – 28 SEP

14. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

15. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
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