CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Updateseries is a weekly updateand assessment of the al Qaeda networkand its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit rising instability in Morocco to conduct more frequent attacks in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan security forces, which have prevented ISIS attacks in the country, are struggling to manage a growing protest movement. This civil unrest, paired with the shifting of migrant flows from Libya toward Morocco, will strain the country’s security resources and reduce pressure on ISIS networks there. Instability in Morocco also increases the risk of attacks in Europe, where Moroccan militants participated in recent ISIS attacks in Spain and a suspected ISIS-linked stabbing in Finland. [Read a recent warning on the implications of instability in Morocco.]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is fracturing. Senior al Houthi leaders accused Saleh of conducting treasonous negotiations with the Gulf States. Saleh denied the accusations and blamed the al Houthis for governance failures in Sana’a. Tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh bloc provide an opportunity for the U.S. to advance a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict. The al Houthi movement lacks the capability to continue the civil war without Saleh’s forces. An elite-brokered peace deal that does not address the grievances driving the war will not end Yemen’s instability, however. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s recommendations for U.S. engagement in Yemen.]
3. U.S. President Donald Trump criticized Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups during a speech announcing a new U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan on August 21. A Pakistani army spokesman dismissed the criticism and stated that Pakistan has taken action against militant groups in its terrain. Pakistan will likely intensify counter-militancy operations near the Afghan border to safeguard its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan may also increase support for militant groups in the disputed Kashmir territory to counteract U.S. engagement with India. [Read Frederick W. Kagan’s “Trump outlines the foundation of a changed approach in Afghanistan.”]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
MYANMAR: " WE WILL DESTROY EVERYTHING " : MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES ...MYO AUNG Myanmar
MYANMAR: " WE WILL DESTROY EVERYTHING " : MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN RAKHINE STATE
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rohingya-battalions/
The shock troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar
Tip of the Spear A REUTERS INVESTIGATION
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8630/2018/en/
27 June 2018, Index number: ASA 16/8630/2018
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-amnesty/top-myanmar-military-officers-should-be-tried-for-crimes-against-humanity-amnesty-international-idUSKBN1JN089
Top Myanmar military officers should be tried for crimes against humanity: Amnesty International
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-battalions-specialre/the-shock-troops-who-expelled-the-rohingya-from-myanmar-idUSKBN1JM1X7
The shock troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-eu/eu-canada-sanction-myanmar-generals-over-rohingya-myanmar-says-two-are-fired-idUSKBN1JL0SC
EU, Canada sanction Myanmar generals over Rohingya; Myanmar says two are fired
Robin Emmott, Antoni Slodkowski
Keep Your Eyes on the Middle East- Spotlight United Arab Emirates!Beth Frisby
Want to understand Bible prophecy? Then keep your eyes on the Middle East. This presentation will provide the "Cliff" notes for the United Arab Emirates.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement. Reuters reported that Iran surged arms shipments to Yemen in recent months and may have sent advisors. An aggressive American policy against the Iranian-backed al Houthis risks driving the group further into Iran’s orbit.
2. The Libyan National Army’s declared offensive to seize strategic locations in southwestern Libya will draw opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda both retain Libyan safe havens. Spiraling conflict would give both al Qaeda and ISIS the opportunity to co-opt factions within the civil war and could erase the recent progress made in degrading ISIS’s strength in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support. The group distributed food aid to more than 200 families in Galgudud region, central Somalia on March 19. Al Shabaab may strengthen in regions where the Somali Federal Government is unable to facilitate the delivery of food aid.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Updateseries is a weekly updateand assessment of the al Qaeda networkand its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit rising instability in Morocco to conduct more frequent attacks in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan security forces, which have prevented ISIS attacks in the country, are struggling to manage a growing protest movement. This civil unrest, paired with the shifting of migrant flows from Libya toward Morocco, will strain the country’s security resources and reduce pressure on ISIS networks there. Instability in Morocco also increases the risk of attacks in Europe, where Moroccan militants participated in recent ISIS attacks in Spain and a suspected ISIS-linked stabbing in Finland. [Read a recent warning on the implications of instability in Morocco.]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is fracturing. Senior al Houthi leaders accused Saleh of conducting treasonous negotiations with the Gulf States. Saleh denied the accusations and blamed the al Houthis for governance failures in Sana’a. Tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh bloc provide an opportunity for the U.S. to advance a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict. The al Houthi movement lacks the capability to continue the civil war without Saleh’s forces. An elite-brokered peace deal that does not address the grievances driving the war will not end Yemen’s instability, however. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s recommendations for U.S. engagement in Yemen.]
3. U.S. President Donald Trump criticized Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups during a speech announcing a new U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan on August 21. A Pakistani army spokesman dismissed the criticism and stated that Pakistan has taken action against militant groups in its terrain. Pakistan will likely intensify counter-militancy operations near the Afghan border to safeguard its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan may also increase support for militant groups in the disputed Kashmir territory to counteract U.S. engagement with India. [Read Frederick W. Kagan’s “Trump outlines the foundation of a changed approach in Afghanistan.”]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Kenyan intelligence reports that al Shabaab's Lower Jubba regional commander, Mohamed Mohamud Kuno “Dulyadeyn,” defected to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in late November, bringing with him approximately 1,200 militants. If true, Dulyadeyn’s defection is a significant inflection for al Qaeda-ISIS competition in East Africa, as well as a major internal schism for al Shabaab. He is an ethnic Kenyan with connections to radical pro-ISIS figures in that country, so his defection would likely lead to an uptick in pro-ISIS militant activity in Kenya.
2. The Saudi-led coalition initiated a seven-day ceasefire in support of UN-led peace talks that aim to end hostilities in Yemen. The ceasefire remains tenuous following an al Houthi-Saleh Tochka (SS-21) rocket attack on a coalition base that killed the commander of Saudi Special Forces in Yemen. Pro-coalition media have accused al Houthi forces of violating the truce in several locations, and the coalition may choose to respond to alleged violations by resuming military operations in Yemen.
3. Iranian officials condemned the clashes between the Nigerian army and Shia Muslims in northern Nigeria. The Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Nigerian chargé d'affaires on December 14 after soldiers besieged the house of Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky, the leader of the Islamic Movement in Nigeria (IMN), a pro-Iranian opposition group. The Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy (NSFP) Commission also released a statement claiming that “Iran considers it its duty to defend the people of Nigeria and that country’s Muslim scholars, particularly Sheikh Ibraheem Zakzaky.” Tehran will likely use these clashes as an opportunity to champion its role as the defender of the global Shia population.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. UN-led Yemeni peace talks collapsed as both sides continued to take offensive actions on the ground. Coalition-aligned forces seized key territory in northern Yemen and al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a Tochka missile at a coalition camp in Taiz, killing a Saudi officer.
2. The December 17 signing Libyan Government of National Accord agreement and establishment of a new unity government is unlikely to unite factions on the ground and will probably further fracture the state. Delegates from Libya’s two rival governments, the Tripoli-based General National Congress and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, signed the accord, but did not represent their constituencies. Some Libyan armed groups may re-align themselves with the new government in order to increase their legitimacy among international observers.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) media arm countered the emergence of an Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham presence in Algeria with propaganda showing AQIM militants proselytizing to locals. Al Qaeda affiliates continue to build a base within populations through local outreach campaigns.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
MYANMAR: " WE WILL DESTROY EVERYTHING " : MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES ...MYO AUNG Myanmar
MYANMAR: " WE WILL DESTROY EVERYTHING " : MILITARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN RAKHINE STATE
https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-rohingya-battalions/
The shock troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar
Tip of the Spear A REUTERS INVESTIGATION
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa16/8630/2018/en/
27 June 2018, Index number: ASA 16/8630/2018
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-amnesty/top-myanmar-military-officers-should-be-tried-for-crimes-against-humanity-amnesty-international-idUSKBN1JN089
Top Myanmar military officers should be tried for crimes against humanity: Amnesty International
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-battalions-specialre/the-shock-troops-who-expelled-the-rohingya-from-myanmar-idUSKBN1JM1X7
The shock troops who expelled the Rohingya from Myanmar
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-eu/eu-canada-sanction-myanmar-generals-over-rohingya-myanmar-says-two-are-fired-idUSKBN1JL0SC
EU, Canada sanction Myanmar generals over Rohingya; Myanmar says two are fired
Robin Emmott, Antoni Slodkowski
Keep Your Eyes on the Middle East- Spotlight United Arab Emirates!Beth Frisby
Want to understand Bible prophecy? Then keep your eyes on the Middle East. This presentation will provide the "Cliff" notes for the United Arab Emirates.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement. Reuters reported that Iran surged arms shipments to Yemen in recent months and may have sent advisors. An aggressive American policy against the Iranian-backed al Houthis risks driving the group further into Iran’s orbit.
2. The Libyan National Army’s declared offensive to seize strategic locations in southwestern Libya will draw opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda both retain Libyan safe havens. Spiraling conflict would give both al Qaeda and ISIS the opportunity to co-opt factions within the civil war and could erase the recent progress made in degrading ISIS’s strength in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support. The group distributed food aid to more than 200 families in Galgudud region, central Somalia on March 19. Al Shabaab may strengthen in regions where the Somali Federal Government is unable to facilitate the delivery of food aid.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali.
2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert.
3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks.
2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue.
3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. An international coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to restore President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. The coalition includes the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan, and Pakistan and Turkey both voiced support for it. The U.S. is providing logistical and intelligence support for coalition airstrikes. Initial Iranian reactions focused on the blowback to Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni response and include a letter penned by Mohsen Rezaei, Iran's Expediency Discernment Council Secretary and former senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander.
2. The Iranian negotiating team projected cautious optimism that final differences could be resolved as nuclear talks between Tehran and the P5+1 continue up until the March 31 deadline to reach a political framework for a deal. Ali Akbar Salehi, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said Tehran and the P5+1 are working to resolve two remaining technical issues.
3. Tunisian security forces began wide-scale counter-terrorism operations throughout Tunisia following last week’s ISIS-claimed attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Similar to 2018 05-22 CTP Update and Assessment (20)
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
What is the point of small housing associations.pptxPaul Smith
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale warAntti Rautiainen
Anarchist group ANA Regensburg hosted my online-presentation on 16th of May 2024, in which I discussed tactics of anti-war activism in Russia, and reasons why the anti-war movement has not been able to make an impact to change the course of events yet. Cases of anarchists repressed for anti-war activities are presented, as well as strategies of support for political prisoners, and modest successes in supporting their struggles.
Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
Anarchist Black Cross Moscow
http://Avtonom.org/abc
Solidarity Zone
https://t.me/solidarity_zone
Memorial
https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
OVD-Info
https://en.ovdinfo.org/antiwar-ovd-info-guide
RosUznik
https://rosuznik.org/
Uznik Online
http://uznikonline.tilda.ws/
Russian Reader
https://therussianreader.com/
ABC Irkutsk
https://abc38.noblogs.org/
Send mail to prisoners from abroad:
http://Prisonmail.online
YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale war
2018 05-22 CTP Update and Assessment
1. 1
Threat Update: May 22, 2018
Iranian officials will likely ignore U.S. Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo’s May 21 demands of Iran to cease its ballistic missile
proliferation and destabilizing regional behavior. The regime considers
its regional proxy network and missile program to be key tenants of its
national security doctrine. Senior Iranian officials have noted that Iran’s
missile program is “non-negotiable.”
Iran
Governance and security breakdowns on multiple fronts are
destabilizing Libya as the international community pushes for elections
in the country. Active fighting in Sebha and Derna has heightened
longstanding grievances. Poor or absent governance is emboldening
militias in Tripoli, threatening to derail oil production, and setting conditions
for the return of ISIS to coastal Libya. Spoilers will likely resort to armed
conflict to secure their interests if elections occur under current conditions.
Libya
2. 2
Threat Update: May 22, 2018
ISIS in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) may gain recruits and popular
support from a cycle of communal violence in the Malian-Nigerien
border region. A Tuareg coalition fighting ISGS has broadly targeted the
Fulani ethnic group, allowing ISGS to bolster its credentials as a defender
of the Fulani community. ISGS has retaliated against Tuareg civilians. The
violence is escalating despite French efforts to prevent retaliatory attacks.
Yemen
Lingering divisions between the Hadi government and the UAE may
threaten cohesion within anti-al Houthi forces during a new Saudi-led
coalition push towards al Hudaydah port. Hadi government officials
accused the UAE of occupying Yemen following Emirati troop
deployments to Socotra Island. Prolonged tensions may hinder
cooperation between Emirati-backed forces and Hadi government forces
and undermine the coalition’s offensive on the Red Sea coast.
Sahel
3. Libya
3
Governance and security breakdowns cause
escalating violence across Libya
Wiam Aimade & Emily Estelle
20 MAY: The GNA expanded the mandate of
a Salafi militia on which it relies to secure key
parts of Tripoli. The militia, which is accused
of human rights violations, cracked down on
alleged Qaddafi loyalists in the capital.
20 MAY: A youth movement threatened
to shut down the Marada oilfields due to
insufficient government services.
17 MAY: Security sources reported the
presence of ISIS militants in Sirte city.
Sirte remains largely ungoverned and
unsecured since U.S.-backed forces
ousted ISIS in late 2017.
18 MAY: The LNA continued airstrikes
on Derna that have stoked local and
national backlash.
16 MAY: The GNA announced the creation
of a military brigade to secure Sebha after
the tribal forces fighting to control the city
rejected the GNA’s mediation efforts.
Sebha
Marada
Sirte
4. Yemen
4Tomás Padgett Perez
Divisions persist between the Hadi government
and the UAE
05 MAY: Hadi government Prime
Minister Ahmed Bin Daghir’s cabinet
denounced Emirati troop deployments to
Socotra Island as unjustified.
1
20 MAY: UAE Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash rejected
claims of Emirati occupation and
emphasized the UAE’s commitment to
defeating the al Houthi movement and
supporting the Hadi government.
17 MAY: Hadi government
Interior Minister Ahmed al Misri
suggested that parts of Yemen
are under Emirati occupation.
2
3
Present
Key
Hadi government Announcement
Protest
UAE Announcement
UAE Troop Movement
6. Acronym List
AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia
AQAP: al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM: al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AQIS: al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
BDB: Benghazi Defense Brigades
BRSC: Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council
CJA: Congress for Justice in Azawad
CMA: Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad
GATIA: Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group
ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham
JNIM: Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen
GNA: Libyan Government of National Accord
LNA: Libyan National Army
MAA: Arab Movement of Azawad
MINUSMA: United National Multidimensional
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MNLA: National Movement for the Liberation of the
Azawad
MSCD: Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna
MUJAO: Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
SNA: Somalia National Army
TTP: Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
6
7. For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Contact us at criticalthreats@aei.org or (202) 888-6575.
Frederick W. Kagan
Director
Critical Threats Project Team
Katherine Zimmerman
Research Manager
Caroline Goodson
Program Manager
7
al Qaeda Analysts
Emily Estelle
Maher Farrukh
Iran Analysts
Marie Donovan
Mike Saidi
Nicholas Carl
Digital Content
Associate
Katie Donnelly