The document reports increased operational activity by U.S.-supported Somali special operations forces against al Shabaab, alongside escalating attacks by ISIS affiliates in Yemen targeting security forces. Political tensions persist in Yemen as negotiations for a transitional unity government stall, while al Houthi and GPC leaders seem poised to leverage international pressure for concessions. In Libya, ISIS is consolidating territorial gains and abetted by international arms dynamics that may exacerbate internal competition among armed factions.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
May 17, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
2
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-supported Somali special operations forces raids against al
Shabaab increased.
2. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt began an explosive attack campaign designed to degrade the Yemeni
security forces in al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate in eastern Yemen.
3. The promise of international arms and training for the anti-ISIS fight in Libya will likely
exacerbate competition between Libyan armed factions and gives Russia an opportunity to
oppose NATO in Libya.
3

3. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Backchannel negotiations continue as the UN-led talks stall. Saudi and al Houthi officials messaged rapprochement, while
international parties reportedly advanced informal proposals for a transitional unity government. President Abdu Rabbu
Mansour Hadi’s insistence on the talks’ current agenda may be driving a rift between his government and its coalition partners.
Currency fluctuations and utility shortages in urban areas create conditions for unrest against local governments.
Outlook: Al Houthi and possibly GPC leaders will seek to leverage international pressure to reach an agreement on a
transitional government. Hadi government and al Houthi officials may cooperate to stabilize the Yemeni riyal.
Security
The Saudi-led coalition continues to frame attacks on al Houthi-Saleh positions as retaliation for ceasefire violations. The
coalition shelled al Houthi-Saleh positions near the Saudi-Yemeni border in Sa’ada and conducted airstrikes in al Hudaydah
and Amran following an al Houthi-Saleh ballistic missile launch toward Saudi Arabia. Al Houthi-Saleh forces are mobilizing
toward al Sabihah, Lahij and Lawder, Abyan in response to pressure from southern militias in al Waziyah, Taiz.
Outlook: Al Houthi-Saleh forces will likely continue to mobilize to the south. Clashes with Saudi-led coalition forces will likely
intensify along the Yemeni-Saudi border while clashes with coalition-backed forces will continue in al Jawf, Taiz and Sana’a.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS continue to contest the reestablishment of government control in Hadramawt. AQAP claimed a suicide vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a senior military official in Wadi Hadramawt. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt
militants conducted SVBIED and suicide belt attacks on Yemeni military targets in al Mukalla, claiming the latter as part of
ISIS’s “Invasion of Sheikh Abu Ali al Anbari” campaign. ISIS affiliates in Iraq, Libya and Egypt have claimed multiple explosive
attacks as part of this campaign since April 30.
Outlook: Both ISIS and AQAP will continue carrying out attacks targeting military and security personnel in Hadramawt.
3
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

4. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
4
3
2
5
1) 15 MAY: ISIS
Wilayat Hadramawt
detonated a SVEST in
al Mukalla.
2) 12 MAY: ISIS
Wilayat Hadramawt
detonated a SVBIED
in al Mukalla.
3) 11 MAY: AQAP
detonated a SVBIED
in al Qatan, Wadi
Hadramawt.
4) 11 MAY: Special
Security Forces
intercepted a SVBIED
near Aden airport.
5) 13 MAY: Security
forces dismantled
two likely VBIEDs in
al Mukalla,
Hadramawt.

5. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali government is opposed to the Kenyan government’s stated plan to close Dadaab refugee complex, noting that it
will increase insecurity in Somalia. Al Shabaab may further use the event to bolster recruitment in northeastern Kenya. An al
Shabaab spokesman denied Kenyan accusations that the group planned attacks from Dadaab and insinuated that the
government is threatening to close the camp in order to secure international counterterrorism funding.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase its recruitment efforts targeting Somali refugees in Kenya.
Security
A series of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab camps and bases signaled a step-
change in the operational tempo against al Shabaab. U.S. advisers are supporting U.S.-trained Somali SOF in a campaign in
south-central Somalia. U.S. advisers and helicopters supported two operations along the Afgoi-Awdheegle road this week and
provided transport helicopters for Somali SOF for a raid at Torotarow. The U.S. is also defending partners in the African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). U.S. forces provided air support to Ugandan AMISOM troops near Barire village this week in an
operation confirmed by the Pentagon.
Outlook: U.S.-backed Somali SOF may not be able to sustain the operational tempo as al Shabaab adapts its force posture to
mitigate against such raids.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is continuing efforts to develop its capability to bomb commercial airliners, a capability that al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula likely attempted to transfer to the group. Somali security forces disrupted a laptop bomb cell in Mogadishu, seizing
seven computers modified to carry explosives as well as unstable chemicals. Al Shabaab detonated a laptop bomb on a Daallo
Airlines flight in February 2016 and attempted to place a printer cartridge bomb on a commercial plane in Beledweyne in March.
The development of laptop bombs makes al Shabaab a threat outside of East Africa.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to pursue a high-profile commercial airline bombing in order to gain global notoriety.
5
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

6. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
4
3
1
2
1) 12, 16 MAY: SNA
and AMISOM forces
cleared al Shabaab
positions in Lower
Shabelle.
2) 12 MAY: SNA SOF
disrupted an al
Shabaab leadership
meeting in
Torotarow, Lower
Shabelle.
3) 11 MAY: SNA SOF
raided al Shabaab
camp near Timire,
Galgudud region.
4) 14 MAY: Al
Shabaab executed
four elders for
espionage near
Adan-Yabaal, Hiraan
region.

7. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The U.S. and twenty other countries are considering arming and training forces for the Libyan Government of National Accord
(GNA), according to a statement signed by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Egypt and the UAE continue to
advocate support for General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), likely with tacit Russian support.
Outlook: Competition for international arms support will exacerbate divisions between Libya’s armed factions.
Security
Misratan forces launched a counteroffensive against ISIS militants aimed at seizing back its easternmost staging ground at
Abugrein. Misratan senior leadership have indicated that their forces require foreign logistical and material support in order to
effectively take on ISIS. The LNA launched an operation to liberate Derna from a local shura council, which has ties to an al
Qaeda associate. The LNA’s operations in Derna may indicate a focus on securing eastern Libya before launching an offensive
on Sirte, though LNA rhetoric continues to focus on combatting ISIS.
Outlook: The Misratans will secure Abugrein before attempting to contest nearby ISIS positions to the south. The LNA will
continue to pressure Derna and attempt to consolidate support for an offensive on Sirte.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS is consolidating new territorial gains west of Sirte. Its newly seized positions will facilitate operations against Bani Walid,
Waddan, and Sebha and secure ISIS’s freedom of movement into southwestern Libya. ISIS is also positioning itself to maintain
positions in the vicinity of Abu Najim and conduct spoiler attacks against vulnerable Misratan positions. ISIS’s Wilayat Gharb
Ifriqiyah, also known as Boko Haram, is likely sending fighters to Libya, according to American officials. ISIS’s territorial control
in Libya provides an opportunity for it to expand in West Africa.
Outlook: ISIS will conduct explosive attacks to disrupt Misratan counterattacks in the vicinity of Abugrein and fix local militias in
Misrata and Tripoli. ISIS may pursue a similar strategy to fix the LNA to the south and east of Sirte.
7
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

8. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
4
3
1
2
5
1) 13 MAY: Pro-GNA
security forces
captured an ISIS cell
in Tripoli.
2) 12-16 MAY:
Misratan forces
initiated Operation
Solid Structure in an
effort to retake
Abugrein from ISIS.
3) 15 MAY: ISIS
militants seized the
Wadi al Lood
agricultural area.
4) 16 MAY: Local
forces repelled an
ISIS convoy near Bani
Walid.
5) 11 MAY: LNA
forces besieged
Derna.

9. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM refrained from offensive operations and likely continues to re-consolidate resources in its North African networks.
Algerian security forces killed seven suspected terrorists during a clearing operation in Bouira, northern Algeria, two of whom
were reportedly early members of Algeria’s Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which later pledged allegiance to al Qaeda. These
early linkages highlight AQIM’s deep roots in Algeria and signal the group’s motivations for contesting ISIS’s growth there.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to reactivate its networks and build capabilities in Algeria, especially in its center and south.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
ISIS is likely preparing to attack in Tunisia in the next few weeks. Tunisian security forces dismantled a number of likely pro-
ISIS cells planning to conduct attacks in cities throughout the country before or during the coming Ramadan season. A pro-ISIS
jihadist acknowledged this tactical weakness and called for militants to conduct lone-wolf attacks in Tunisia via a Dark Web
forum, indicating that ISIS is determined to attack Tunisian sites in the near term. The AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a brigade
continued to lay low while security forces patrol known terrorist hideouts.
Outlook: ISIS will likely attack Jewish sites and symbols of Western colonialism in Tunisia in the near term. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a
will continue to build its support base and defend its safe haven in western Tunisia.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
AQIM-linked groups continued efforts to disrupt the Malian peace process. AQIM militants attacked a Coordination of the
Movements for Azawad (CMA) camp in Farach, Timbuktu region. The CMA is a coalition of ex-rebel groups participating in the
Malian peace process, and competes with jihadist groups for control in northern Mali. Suspected Islamist militants also killed
the military director of health for Kidal region in Gao and attacked a Malian army convoy traveling between Gossi and Hombori,
central Mali. AQIM is likely attacking both participating sides in order to disrupt implementation of the peace deal.
Outlook: AQIM affiliates will launch attacks to weaken pro-government forces and sow discord in northern Mali.
.
9
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
10
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
2
3
1
4
1) 11 MAY: Tunisian
security forces killed
two likely pro-ISIS
terrorists and
arrested 16 in El
Mnihla, Ariana.
2) 11 MAY: A likely
pro-ISIS militant
detonated an SVEST
during clashes with
security forces in
Sammar, Tataouine.
3) 11 MAY: Algerian
security forces killed
seven suspected
terrorists in Bouira.
4) 16 MAY: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a nine-
member cell planning
attacks in Ben
Guerdane.

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
SAHELWEST AFRICA
3
2
1
4
1) 11 MAY: A Malian
army convoy struck a
landmine in Mopti
region.
2) 12 MAY: AQIM
militants attacked a
CMA camp in Farach,
Timbuktu region.
3) 14 MAY: GATIA, a
pro-government
militia, attacked the
Ganda Izo insurgent
movement in
Gourma, Gossi
region.
4) 14 MAY:
Suspected Islamist
militants killed the
Kidal military director
of health in Gao
region.

12. ACRONYMS
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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

13. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
13