The document provides a summary of key events and assessments from the AEI's Critical Threats Project for January 31, 2017. It notes that Al Houthi forces conducted a suicide attack against a Saudi warship, marking a new asymmetric tactic. It also reports that the LNA militia is concluding its fight for Benghazi and will pursue a military solution in Libya's civil war, and that Al Shabaab is gaining momentum against AMISOM in Somalia.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
January 31, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack against a Saudi
warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic.
2. The Libyan National Army militia coalition is concluding the fight for Benghazi
city and will continue to pursue a military solution to Libya’s civil war.
3. Al Shabaab has the momentum against AMISOM. It is regaining territory in
Lower Shabelle region and conducted a mass-casualty attack on Kenyan
AMISOM forces on the Somali-Kenyan border.
3
1
2

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat Fatah al Sham (JFS) is consolidating control over Idlib and western Aleppo provinces in
preparation for the next phase of its campaign against Bashar al Assad’s regime. JFS attacked U.S.-backed opposition
forces, including Jaysh al Mujahideen, on January 23-26. JFS and its allies announced their dissolution and merging into a
new entity, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly.
Al Qaeda seeks to exploit public outcry over recent changes to U.S. policies in order to expand its support base. Pro-al
Qaeda Telegram channels highlighted U.S. President Donald Trump’s temporary travel ban on citizens of seven
predominantly Muslim countries and the reports of civilian casualties sustained during a U.S. raid on an al Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) headquarters in central Yemen as proof of America’s “hatred toward Muslims.” Current al Qaeda
rhetoric is similar to al Qaeda’s responses to U.S. drone strikes under prior administrations.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will be able to consolidate the armed Syrian opposition under its leadership. Al Qaeda will use U.S.
policies as both a recruiting call and justification for violence.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Pakistan reduced its support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in a possible response to U.S. pressure to crack down on militant
organizations. Pakistani authorities placed LeT leader Hafez Saeed under house arrest on January 30. Pakistani security
forces rely on LeT as a proxy to attack Indian military targets in the disputed Kashmir region.
Outlook: Pakistan will allow continued LeT activities in Kashmir despite Western pressure.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Saudi-led coalition and internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government do not
accept current terms for a political settlement and are pursuing military gains on the ground to change the conditions for a
negotiated settlement. The Hadi government rejected the UN Special Envoy’s ceasefire proposal due to a condition
requiring the coalition to lift restrictions on Yemen’s airspace and ambiguity concerning Hadi’s future powers.
Outlook: The Hadi government and the coalition seek to consolidate gains in Taiz and possibly al Hudaydah governorates
before re-engaging seriously in the peace process.
Security
Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a reported suicide boat attack on a Saudi frigate in the Red Sea off the coast of Yemen
that may have intended to target a U.S. vessel. The Saudi-led coalition responded by intensifying airstrikes on targets in al
Hudaydah governorate on the Red Sea coast. The use of suicide attacks marks a shift in tactics by al Houthi-Saleh forces.
Outlook: The coalition may respond more aggressively to small boats in the Red Sea, increasing popular backlash against
the coalition campaign in western Yemen.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
The U.S. conducted a ground raid targeting an AQAP headquarters and senior leadership in central Yemen, which may
denote a shift away from the U.S. reliance on drone strikes to degrade AQAP leadership and disrupt operations. U.S.
Special Operations Forces conducted the raid, which killed women and children, in northwestern al Bayda governorate in
central Yemen. The Pentagon reports that the women were killed in combat. AQAP’s media outlets responded to President
Trump’s immigration restrictions and alleged civilian casualties with numerous propaganda pieces.
Outlook: Public support for AQAP among Yemenis will most likely increase in the aftermath of the U.S. raid.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 24 JAN: AQAP
ambushed an al
Hizam supply truck
in Lawder, Abyan.
2) 26 JAN: AQAP
repelled al Houthi-
Saleh forces in
western Ibb.
3) 29 JAN: U.S. SOF
raided an AQAP HQ
in northwestern al
Bayda.
4) 30 JAN: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces fired
rockets at a UN
building in Dharan al
Janoub, Saudi
Arabia.
5) 30 JAN: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
attacked a Saudi
frigate in the Red
Sea.
2
3
5
4
1

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somalia is preparing for the presidential election scheduled to occur on February 8. International organizations are
monitoring the presidential election for cases of fraud and corruption, which plagued federal parliamentary elections in late
2016. Incumbent presidential candidate Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met with 180 parliamentarians on January 29 to boost his
chances for re-election.
Outlook: President Mohamud will likely win re-election, but adversaries may attempt to challenge his legitimacy.
Security
Tactical failures of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces threaten to undermine security in Somalia. A recent
UN report criticized AMISOM for causing substantial civilian casualties, including 92 casualties in the last four months of
2016. AMISOM forces bombarded suspected al Shabaab positions in residential areas in Bulo Marer district and Qoryooley
town in Lower Shabelle region on January 26 and 29, killing four civilians and wounding 15 others. Al Shabaab militants may
embed militants in populated areas to increase the likelihood of civilian casualties.
Outlook: AMISOM could lose popular support and control of territory to al Shabaab should it continue to kill civilians.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab pursues multiple lines of effort to destabilize Somalia’s government and expel foreign military presence.
Militants conducted a complex attack, which combines explosive capabilities and gunmen, on the Dayah Hotel in
Mogadishu, killing 28 people on January 25. Al Shabaab has increased operational tempo in Mogadishu in recent weeks to
disrupt the current electoral process. Al Shabaab also conducted a complex attack on a Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF)
base in Kolbio town near the Somali-Kenyan border on January 27. Pro-Al Shabaab Telegram channels claimed that al
Shabaab militants killed 57 KDF troops in the attack. Al Shabaab conducted a similar raid on a KDF base at El Adde in
January 2016.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will attack KDF bases to set conditions to recapture territory in Gedo and Lower Jubba regions.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 25 JAN: Al Shabaab
attacked Dayah
Hotel in Mogadishu.
2) 25 JAN: Al Shabaab
recaptured
Badhadhe town,
Lower Jubba region.
3) 27 JAN: Al Shabaab
raided a KDF base
in Kolbio town,
Lower Jubba region.
4) 29 JAN: Somali
SOF killed a senior
al Shabaab
commander in Tulo
Barwaqo area of
Gedo region.
5) 30 JAN: ISIS-linked
militants executed
three Somali
soldiers near
Qandala town in
Puntland.
4
23
1
5

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is prioritizing a military solution over political dialogue.
Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria attempted to organize a meeting between Haftar, Government of National Accord (GNA) Prime
Minister Fayez al Serraj, and House of Representatives (HoR) President Ageela Saleh. Haftar has not confirmed his
attendance, despite close cooperation with Egypt. The LNA’s impending victory in Benghazi reinforces Haftar’s position as
the most powerful military leader in Libya and reduces his incentive to negotiate. Haftar-aligned HoR leadership continues to
block UN-backed efforts to modify and legitimize the GNA.
Outlook: Haftar will pursue agreements to bolster his military power, including an alleged arms deal with Russia.
Security
The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi is culminating. The LNA seized Qanfouda district in southern
Benghazi from the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate
Ansar al Sharia, after months of fighting. Militants detonated a VBIED targeting the LNA in Benghazi on January 25. The
LNA intensified its attacks on Derna city, controlled by the al Qaeda-linked Mujahideen Shura Council of Derna (MSCD).
Outlook: A Salafi-jihadi insurgency will continue in LNA-controlled areas in eastern Libya. The LNA will escalate operations
intended to seize Derna city from the MSCD.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS likely aims to secure safe havens in western Libya. Suspected ISIS militants established a checkpoint near the key
crossroads of Abugrein, west of Sirte, according to an unconfirmed report. The position would support ISIS’s efforts to
rebuild its capabilities in northwestern Libya following U.S. airstrikes on training camps southwest of Sirte on January 19.
Outlook: ISIS may seek to move capabilities and personnel to southwestern Libya, a long-established militant safe haven,
as well as maintain positions in northwestern Libya.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 25, 28 JAN: The
LNA conducted
airstrikes targeting
Islamist militants in
Derna.
2) 25 JAN: The LNA
seized Qanfouda
district, Benghazi
from Islamist
militants.
3) 25 JAN: A militant
detonated a VBIED
targeting the LNA in
Benghazi.
4) 26 JAN: Suspected
ISIS militants
established a
checkpoint near
Abugrein.
4
2
3
1

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
ISIS in Libya may have funded and armed an attack cell in Morocco. Moroccan security forces arrested the self-proclaimed
emir of ISIS in Morocco, along with six other militants preparing to conduct an attack, on January 27. The alleged support
from ISIS in Libya may indicate that ISIS coordination nodes in Libya continue to function after the loss of the group’s
headquarters in Sirte city in late 2016.
The Algerian state remains the primary target of AQIM’s senior leadership. AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel released an
audio speech calling on Algerians to join jihad against the Algerian regime.
Outlook: ISIS will pursue a spectacular attack in Morocco. AQIM will release intermittent statements focused on the
grievances of the Algerian people in an effort to generate popular support.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The Malian Army’s disregard for civilian rights is compromising its counterterrorism mission. The Macina Liberation Front
(MLF), a Fulani militant group affiliated with AQIM’s Ansar al Din, is positioned to benefit from widespread Fulani anger
against the Malian government. MLF raids and landmines in Mopti region, central Mali, threaten the Malian Army’s supply
lines. Malian and coalition forces operating in northern Mali increased their operational tempo in response to a large-scale al
Murabitoun bombing in Gao city on January 18.
The Boko Haram faction recognized as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (Boko Haram-Barnawi) is staging operations out of two
distinct safe havens in Nigeria. Boko Haram-Barnawi claimed responsibility for a complex attack that overran a Nigerian
Army base in southern Borno State, Nigeria on January 27. Its militants are carrying out successful operations targeting
multinational forces near the Ajingin Forest in southern Borno State. Boko Haram-Barnawi may consolidate its recent
battlefield gains into territorial control in a new area outside of its stronghold in northern Borno State.
Outlook: Fulani discontent with the Malian government will increase popular support for the MLF. Boko Haram-Barnawi will
increase operations on the southern border region of Yobe and Borno States, Nigeria.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 27 JAN: Moroccan
security forces
dismantled an ISIS
cell in al Jadida
province and
arrested the self-
proclaimed emir of
ISIS in Morocco.
2) 27 JAN: The
Algerian People’s
National Armed
Forces (ANP)
dismantled two five-
member militant
cells in Setif
province and
Boumerdes
province, Algeria
3) 31 JAN: The ANP
discovered an arms
cache in Bordj Badji
Mokhtar, Algeria.
2
3
1

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 24-25 JAN: French
forces arrested 13
AQIM militants in
Gao city, Mali, in
connection to the 18
JAN attack on a
base in Gao.
2) 25 JAN: Malian
soldiers executed
three Fulani men in
Yirma, Mopti, Mali.
3) 26 JAN: Boko
Haram-Barnawi
seized a Nigerian
military base near
Kamuya, Borno
State, Nigeria.
4) 28 JAN: Boko
Haram-Shekau
ambushed an aid
convoy near
Bulabulin, Borno
State, Nigeria.
2
3
1
4

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569