CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Representatives from the al Houthis and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party (GPC) are refusing to attend UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until the ceasefire is implemented and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh positions stop. Key Yemeni factions would not have had representation at the Kuwait talks and would have been unlikely to accept a negotiated solution. These factions, which include southern secessionists, would probably continue to fight to secure their interests. 2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its explosives capabilities in eastern Libya and will use them to deter action against its stronghold in Sirte. ISIS will likely use these capabilities against the Libyan National Army (LNA), which may be assembling a force to attack Sirte, as well as against civilian populations to undermine the LNA in Benghazi. ISIS is conducting similar attacks on Misratan militia positions in western Libya, likely to deter Misratan operations. ISIS will likely attack Libya’s new unity government, too, especially as it becomes the West’s preferred counterterrorism partner in Libya. 3. ISIS is building a support network in Tunisia to support the establishment of a formal ISIS wilayat in Tunisia. ISIS is attempting to co-opt al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s networks in western Tunisia, where it is developing safe havens from which to conduct attacks in both Tunisia and Algeria. The group is also recruiting heavily in eastern Tunisia’s population centers, where Tunisian security forces recently arrested a deputy mayor for belonging to a pro-ISIS cell, indicating the extent to which ISIS is attempting to infiltrate Tunisian society.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
April 19, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
2
1. Scheduled UN-led Yemen peace talks did not occur in Kuwait because the al Houthi-Saleh
delegation refused to participate until the ceasefire was fully implemented.
2. ISIS is reconstituting its explosives capabilities in eastern Libya and will use them against any
actors that threaten its stronghold in Sirte.
3. ISIS is recruiting heavily and developing safe havens in Tunisia, where it plans to declare a
formal wilayat.
3

3. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UN-led peace talks scheduled for April 18 did not take place because the al Houthi-Saleh delegation refused to participate until
the ceasefire was implemented in full. Representatives from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government
arrived in Kuwait on April 17. Massive demonstrations in Aden for secession indicate the extent of future challenges for the
Yemeni government.
Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh delegation will probably refuse to participate in the Kuwait talks.
Security
Coalition-backed forces and al Houthi-Saleh forces continued to fight along contested frontlines in central Yemen. Al Houthi-
Saleh forces recovered from recent losses in Taiz and coalition-backed forces advanced in Ma’rib and al Jawf. Coalition
airstrikes targeted a missile base west of Sana’a in response to the al Houthi-Saleh forces’ firing of a ballistic missile at
coalition-backed forces in Ma’rib. Coalition airstrikes targeting al Houthi-Saleh positions have decreased, but have not stopped.
Outlook: Clashes along key frontlines will continue, especially in Taiz and Sana’a.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP retains control over al Mukalla, Hadramawt, and has continued to consolidate its positions around the city. It lost control
of al Hawta, Lahij, to coalition-backed forces and may be preparing for an additional coalition-supported offensive against its
positions in Abyan. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan began a series of attacks targeting Yemeni military recruits and the Hadi
government in Aden after a two-week lull in activity.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan will sustain its attack tempo against Yemeni military and government targets in Aden.
3
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

4. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1 4
3
2
1) 15 APR: Coalition-
backed forces cleared
AQAP from al Hawta,
Lahij.
2) 12 APR: An ISIS
SVEST targeted
military recruits in
Aden.
3) 15 APR: ISIS
launched a VBIED
attack targeting the
foreign ministry office
in Aden.
4) 17 APR: Aden
security forces
interdicted two
VBIEDs, likely launched
by ISIS.
5) 14 APR: Coalition
airstrikes targeted an
al Houthi-Saleh missile
base near Sana’a.
5

5. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali Prime Minister met with Russian officials in Moscow to discuss possible Russian aid for Somalia’s security forces.
Russia’s foreign minister said that Russia is open to considering military cooperation with Somalia in the fight against terrorism.
Russia may be challenging Turkish influence in Somalia by increasing its foreign assistance to the Somali Federal Government
(SFG).
Outlook: Russian assistance to the SFG is unlikely to change Turkish-Somali relations.
Security
Somali National Army (SNA) forces cleared al Shabaab from Bur Eyle, a militant stronghold near the Mogadishu-Baidoa
roadway, likely seeking to control that ground line of communication (GLOC). Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security
Agency (NISA) conducted clearing operations following a surge in al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu, but al Shabaab has
proved capable of withstanding such operations in the past.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely capture settlements along the Mogadishu-Baidoa roadway to retain its ability to disrupt SNA
operations along the GLOC.
Al Shabaab
Increased al Shabaab activity in Beled Hawo indicates that al Shabaab maintains a presence in the town, which it can use as a
staging area for attacks into northeastern Kenya. The release of a pro-Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training video
from a cell operating in northern Somalia will present a challenge to al Shabaab. The video confirmed that former al Shabaab
religious leader Abdul Qadir Mumin leads about two dozen militants seeking to join ISIS. The militants reaffirmed their
allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will likely use its support zones in Beled Hawo to resume attacks in northeastern Kenya.
5
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

6. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
6
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
4
3
1
2
1) 12, 14 APR: Al
Shabaab attacked
government officials
in Beled Hawo, Gedo
region.
2) 12 APR: U.S.
airstrikes targeted an
al Shabaab camp
near Yontoy, Lower
Jubba region.
3) 17-18 APR: Al
Shabaab conducted
multiple drive-by
shootings in
Mogadishu.
4) 12 APR: Puntland
security forces
arrested suspected al
Shabaab militants in
Garowe, Nugaal
region.

7. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-backed Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) is consolidating authority in Tripoli and gaining international
support, bolstered by the West’s need for a legitimate counterterrorism partner in Libya. General Khalifa Haftar, who commands
the largest fighting force in eastern Libya, remains a potential spoiler. Haftar’s backers in the House of Representatives (HoR)
have blocked official approval of the GNA to safeguard his position. He gained additional support after the recent takeover of
Benghazi, including the support of the militias that control parts of Libya’s critical oil infrastructure.
Outlook: International pressure will force the HoR to approve the GNA, but the GNA will not be able to take control of Libya’s
armed factions without Haftar’s support.
Security
The Libyan National Army (LNA) is on the verge of clearing the remaining Salafi-jihadi strongholds in Benghazi, which may free
up LNA forces to expand operations against ISIS and Ansar al Sharia-affiliated militants in Derna. Both ISIS and Ansar al
Sharia continue to demonstrate explosives capabilities against the LNA in eastern Libya, despite recent territorial losses.
Outlook: Ansar al Sharia and ISIS will conduct asymmetrical attacks to undermine the LNA’s control of Benghazi.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS Wilayat Tarablus is consolidating control of its stronghold in Sirte. Recent ISIS attacks on Misratan positions in western
Libya are likely meant to spoil or deter a Misratan offensive on Sirte. Similarly, a recent uptick in ISIS’s campaign of explosive
attacks on the LNA in eastern Libya may indicate that ISIS is attempting to thwart the LNA’s plans to launch an attack on Sirte.
ISIS is also cracking down on dissenting tribes within its area of control.
Outlook: ISIS will conduct spoiler attacks on Misratan outposts in western Libya, especially while Misratan forces remain drawn
into Tripoli to support the GNA. ISIS will increase attacks on the LNA and its allies to discourage an offensive on Sirte.
7
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

8. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
4
3
1
2
1) 12 APR: ISIS
militants attacked
Petroleum Facilities
guard forces near
Ben Jawad.
2) 14-18 APR: LNA
forces launched an
offensive against
militant strongholds
in Benghazi.
3) 13 APR: ISIS
militants detonated a
SVBIED and raided a
Misratan base near
Ben Jawad.
4) 17-18 APR: The
Mujahideen Shura
Council of Derna
rebuffed ISIS attacks
in Derna.

9. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM is likely maintaining a support zone in El Oued, eastern Algeria. Algerian security forces have arrested dozens of
suspected terrorists and killed at least 14 individuals with reported links to both AQIM and ISIS in El Oued since March,
alongside the discovery of numerous weapons caches. AQIM eulogized the deceased militants, likely intending to draw on
militants’ al Qaeda loyalties and drive local recruitment. Rumored defections from AQIM’s Sahara Emirate to ISIS give AQIM
further reason to increase its media operations and rally support within its network, especially in critical terrain like Algeria.
Outlook: AQIM will increase its media output, including anti-ISIS rhetoric, in Algeria, Tunisia, and northern Mali.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a remains on the defensive as ISIS continues to build its network inside Tunisia. Tunisian forces dismantled a
pro-ISIS cell responsible for logistical support in Kasserine, western Tunisia, and arrested a deputy mayor in Skhira, eastern
Tunisia, for alleged membership in a pro-ISIS cell. ISIS is attempting to both co-opt Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s networks in western
Algeria and infiltrate Tunisian population centers in order to lay the foundation for a new ISIS wilayat in Tunisia.
Outlook: Uqba Ibn Nafa’a will conduct defensive operations against security forces in western Tunisia. ISIS will continue to
recruit heavily in eastern Tunisia and develop safe havens in western Tunisia.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din carried out a coordinated wave of attacks against local and international security forces which
triggered retaliatory arrests of locals, fueling public resentment toward French and UN forces. UN peacekeepers fired on
demonstrators protesting the arbitrary arrests. These retaliatory actions help frame the fight for local jihadists and give credence
to AQIM’s claims that the West is the true oppressor in Mali, ultimately bolstering recruitment for AQIM-linked groups.
Outlook: Ansar al Din will conduct coordinated attacks on French and UN peacekeeping forces in northeastern Mali.
9
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
10
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
2
3
1
4
1) 12 APR: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a cell
with suspected links
to Ansar al Sharia and
ISIS in Bizerte.
2) 14 APR: Tunisian
security forces
arrested 12 members
of ISIS-linked Jund al
Khalifa in Tunisia in
Kasserine.
3) 15 APR: Militants
killed four Algerian
soldiers in a clash in
Constantine.
4) 17 APR: Tunisian
security forces
arrested six members
of a pro-ISIS cell,
including the mayor
of Skhira, in Sfax.

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
11
SAHELWEST AFRICA
3
4
2
1
1) 12 APR: Ansar al
Din detonated an IED
targeting a French
convoy in Tessalit,
Kidal region.
2) 12 APR: Suspected
Islamist militants
launched mortar
shells at a UN camp
in Ansongo, Gao
region.
3) 13 APR: Macina
Liberation Front
militants attacked a
Malian army
checkpoint in Boni,
Mopti region.
4) 18 APR: UN forces
fired at protesters at
the Kidal airport.

12. ACRONYMS
12
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

13. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
13