The document updates on various critical threats, including a marked increase in operational attacks by Al-Shabaab in Somalia with recent high-casualty bombings. It also discusses the Libyan National Army's efforts to clear territories of Al-Qaeda and ISIS-linked militants, and the ongoing struggles of the Yemeni government against Houthi forces, compounded by the challenges posed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Overall, the document highlights the persistent instability in these regions and the efforts of various factions to exert influence and maintain control.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
March 1, 2016

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Al Shabaab conducted two double suicide bombings in three days, signaling a significant increase in al
Shabaab’s operational tempo. The attacks were in Mogadishu and Baidoa, a former capital.
2. The Libyan National Army, most probably with French special operations advisers, cleared several
neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but will struggle to control and retain gains.
3. The Saudi-backed Yemeni government under President Hadi presented evidence of Lebanese Hezbollah
activities in support of the al Houthis. The timing indicates this was likely at Saudi Arabia’s request.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
The U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence released an additional 113 documents recovered during the May 2011
raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, that killed Osama bin Laden. The letters show that Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda senior
leadership remained actively engaged in directing local affiliates and providing general strategic guidance. Correspondence with
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) shows attention to local Yemeni dynamics, and AQAP’s late leader briefed on areas
where the group has influence, noting Abyan as the strongest presence, and that the group kept tribal relations secret in order
to prevent military actions against tribes that have supported it. Most of the letters are from 2008-2011, but reveal al Qaeda
leaders’ decision-making and sensitivity to U.S. policies.
Outlook: Al Qaeda-linked groups will continue to conduct their local and regional military campaigns, building strength and
local resilience.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
The Pakistani military carried out multiple operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), as it enters the final
phase of Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Operation Zarb-e-Azb is the Pakistani military’s effort to eradicate militancy from Pakistan’s
troubled tribal areas. The Pakistani Army killed at least 19 militants during a ground operation in Shawal Valley, on February 27.
Separately, the Pakistani Air Force killed at least 15 suspected militants during air strikes in the Datta Khel area of North
Waziristan, on February 27.
Outlook: Pakistani security forces will sustain increased ground and air operations in the FATA, as it enters the final phase of
Operation Zarb-e-Azb.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Yemeni security forces detained two high-level officials at the presidential palace on corruption allegations, indicating that
President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi may be working to sideline Prime Minister Khaled Bahah’s allies and other potential
challengers. Meanwhile, President Hadi sought to bolster the Saudi-led coalition’s support by advancing evidence of
Hezbollah’s presence in Yemen and banning Lebanese travelers, mirroring coalition rhetoric. Hadi also attempted to address
local militias’ grievances by saying he would send wounded fighters to Taiz, but he failed to do so, sparking clashes between
local anti-al Houthi fighters and presidential security forces.
Outlook: Armed groups will continue to pursue their own objectives in Aden and will threaten President Hadi’s weak regime.
Security
Coalition-backed forces continue to clash with al Houthi-Saleh forces along the primary frontlines in northern and central
Yemen. Both sides seek to sway tribes in and around Sana’a to their side as coalition-backed forces push south from Nihm.
Meanwhile, suspected southern secessionists may have seized at least part of Aden International Airport, signaling further
unraveling of the Hadi government’s efforts to stabilize Aden.
Outlook: The coalition will continue to prioritize the fight in north-central Yemen and put pressure on Sana’a as President Hadi
struggles to generate support in Aden.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP may be resuming attacks on Hadi government targets in Aden in reaction to pressure on its operations in southern
Yemen. AQAP may have launched an unclaimed 29 FEB SVBIED in Aden. Meanwhile, AQAP continued to target officials and
security offices in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and al Hawta, Lahij, but encountered tribal resistance in Azzan and al Hawta,
Shabwah. It is possible that the Hadi government or the coalition is incentivizing the tribes’ resistance to AQAP.
Outlook: AQAP will likely avoid openly provoking the coalition while seeking negotiated settlements with local tribes.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
5
YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
5
4
3
1) 28 FEB: Popular
resistance forces
clashed with security
forces in Aden.
2) 27 FEB: Ba Awdah
tribesmen attacked
AQAP checkpoints in
al Hawta and Azzan,
Shabwah.
3) 29 FEB: SVBIED
targeted Hadi
government security
checkpoint in Aden.
4) 29 FEB: AQAP
militants abducted
Hadi security official
in al Mukalla,
Hadramawt.
5) 29 FEB: First
Military District
officials disrupted a
SVBIED attack near al
Qatan, Hadramawt.
2

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The heads of state from the troop-contributing AMISOM countries (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda) and the Somali
president met in Djibouti on 27 FEB to discuss the Mission’s strategy against al Shabaab. Somali President Hassan Sheikh
Mohamud suggested on-call deployable task forces to support AMISOM and SNA forces across the country.
Outlook: A new AMISOM strategy could have positive effects on the fight against al Shabaab provided it is implemented.
Security
SNA and AMISOM forces continued clearing operations in the Middle Shabelle region, focused on Mahaday district. The
clearing operations are likely responsible for a decrease in al Shabaab attacks on villages in the region. Meanwhile, the Kenyan
government reportedly purchased a ScanEagle unmanned aircraft system from the U.S. for $9.86 million. The system will
provide battlefield surveillance for KDF forces in Somalia when it arrives in September 2016.
Outlook: Improved security in central Somalia will enable progress on the regional government merger between Middle
Shabelle and Hiraan regions.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab conducted two high-casualty complex suicide attacks in quick succession. A group of militants detonated two
SVBIEDs and launched a direct fire attack on a hotel housing government officials in Mogadishu. A separate cell detonated a
SVBIED and a suicide vest at a restaurant in Baidoa, Bay region. Al Shabaab claimed that both attacks targeted government
officials, though most of the casualties were civilians. These attacks signal an increase in operational tempo for the group.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to launch attacks in Bay and Lower Shabelle regions in an attempt to destabilize both
regional and federal government entities and hinder the formation of the regional Southwest State.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
4
3
1
2
1) 26 FEB: Al Shabaab
launched a complex
SVBIED raid on SYL
Hotel, Mogadishu.
2) 28 FEB: Al Shabaab
conducted double
suicide bombings in
Baidoa, Bay region.
3) 24,28 FEB:
Government forces
retook several small
villages in Middle
Shabelle region.
4) 24 FEB: Al Shabaab
beheaded a qat
salesmen near Hajub,
Beledweyne, Middle
Shabelle region.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) has failed to reach a verdict on the cabinet for the Government of National
Accord and has delayed the vote due to internal divisions.
Outlook: The political unity process will continue to flounder due to conflicting political interests within the HoR.
Security
The LNA seized several key districts in Benghazi during a weeklong offensive and continues to gain ground. The remaining
militants are concentrated in the al Sabri district as well as the western periphery of the city. The LNA continues to fight isolated
militants in al Hawari district, where ISIS militants detonated an SVBIED targeting LNA soldiers. French advisers may be
assisting the LNA in Benghazi. Meanwhile, British and American advisors are training militia forces in Misrata to fight ISIS.
Outlook: The LNA will continue to clear Benghazi neighborhoods but will struggle to control and retain its gains.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
Local backlash against ISIS’s presence near Sabratha may temporarily curtail its ability to plan and execute attacks in
neighboring Tunisia. A Tripoli-based militia arrested an ISIS militant who was reportedly sent from Sirte to lead the group’s
Sabratha cell after the 19 FEB U.S. airstrike, indicating the cell’s importance to the group’s regional operations. ISIS continues
to consolidate control in Sirte, where it is preparing for both an international airstrike campaign and possible clashes with
Misratan militias to the west. Foreign aircraft bombed four ISIS targets in the vicinity of Bani Walid and Sirte, killing several
militants. Local sources believe that the aircraft were French.
Outlook: The international community will continue to provide limited support to local forces and conduct targeted airstrikes
against ISIS personnel. Surgical strikes remain unlikely to drive ISIS from population centers.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
9
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
4
3
1
2
1)22-29 FEB:
Sabrathan militias
conducted raids
against ISIS militants.
2)22-29 FEB: LNA
forces seized
territory in Benghazi.
3)24 FEB: Tripoli-
based Rada Special
Deterrence Forces
captured the newly
appointed Sabrathan
ISIS leader.
4) 28 FEB: Suspected
international aircraft
bombed four ISIS
positions in western
Libya.

10. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
A French special forces operation targeted senior AQIM leaders in response to a recent uptick in militant activity. The operation
killed two AQIM commanders in Timbuktu region, northern Mali, while the spokesperson for AQIM affiliate al Murabitoun evaded
capture in Gao, northeastern Mali. French operations frequently target senior AQIM leaders, who oppose the Malian peace deal
and Western influence in the region. Algeria, a key advocate of the peace deal, conducted a number of routine operations in
northern Algeria, likely in reaction to the 18 FEB ISIS-linked attack that killed three Algerian soldiers in Bouira, northern Algeria.
Outlook: AQIM and its affiliates will continue to oppose Western influence by recruiting and conducting attacks in the region.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Tunisian security forces killed four suspected terrorists in clashes in the mountains of Ain Jeffal, Sidi Bouzid province, Tunisia.
The area is typically an Uqba Ibn Nafa’a enclave, but it is unlikely that any terrorist group will take credit for losses attributed to
the clash. Additionally, a terrorist food supplier captured in Kef, western Tunisia, reported infighting within terror groups split
between ISIS and AQIM loyalties that killed three militants. This aligns with Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s silence in recent months.
Outlook: If confirmed, infighting and competition within Uqba Ibn Nafa’a may lead to increased clashes between militants and
security forces.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Militants targeted international and local security forces in northern Mali using simpler attacks than seen in previous weeks.
Militants detonated multiple IEDs targeting security force vehicles in Gao and Kidal Regions of northeastern Mali. Militants also
attacked a Malian army post in Lere, Timbuktu Region, northern Mali. A UN soldier shot his commanding officer and another
soldier during a dispute over living conditions at the UN camp in Kidal, signifying growing unrest among some peacekeepers.
Outlook: AQIM-linked groups will continue to target local and international security forces in order to dissuade regional
participation in the peacekeeping mission and to expand their area of operations.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
2
3
1
4
1) 23 FEB: Algerian
forces arrested Zahir
Mehdaoui, an ISIS
militant linked to the
13 NOV Paris attacks.
2) 26 FEB: Tunisian
forces arrested a
terrorist food
supplier in Kef and
exploited him for
information.
3) 26 FEB: Algerian
forces arrested over
100 activists from a
minority Berber
resistance group.
4) 29 FEB: Tunisian
security forces
arrested three
women planning to
join ISIS in Libya.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
2
3
1
4
1) 23 FEB: Gunmen
attacked a Malian
army post in Lere,
Timbuktu Region,
northern Mali.
2) 25 FEB: A UN
soldier shot and
killed two other
soldiers in Kidal,
northeastern Mali.
3) 29 FEB: French
forces killed two
AQIM militants in
Timbuktu region,
northern Mali.
4) 29 FEB: Militants
detonated an IED
targeting a UN
vehicle in Taghlit,
Kidal Region,
northeastern Mali.

13. ACRONYMS
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African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
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