The assessment outlines ongoing threats from ISIS and al-Qaeda, emphasizing that the loss of ISIS's stronghold in Libya does not diminish its capabilities to execute attacks in Europe. Al-Qaeda leadership, particularly Ayman al-Zawahiri, continues to influence jihadist movements, while regional groups like al-Shabaab and AQAP face operational challenges yet maintain resilience. The document indicates that geopolitical dynamics, including conflicts in Yemen, Somalia, and Libya, will continue to evolve, impacting both local governance and extremist activity.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
August 16, 2016

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. The loss of ISIS’s Libyan stronghold in Sirte will not eliminate the group’s threat
to European targets. ISIS may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy.
2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir
Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may
not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities.
3. AQAP’s withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term
setback that preserves the group’s capabilities.
3
1
2

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called on Muslims to follow al Qaeda’s lead and dismissed efforts to effect change
through the political system. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for participating in
the political process and submitting to the regulation of the Egyptian government in an August 13 statement released by al
Sahab Media Foundation. Zawahiri’s statement follows a series of al Qaeda leadership statements critiquing the Islamic
State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) actions. Zawahiri said that the Arab Spring failed in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen. But that
“victory” is near for jihadists in Syria. Zawahiri’s support for the Syrian jihad indicates that newly announced Syrian group,
Jabhat Fatah al Sham, continues to pursue al Qaeda’s objectives. The leader of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra
announced the end of his group’s operations and the creation of Jabhat Fatah al Sham, which does not have formal ties to
al Qaeda. Zawahiri also noted that Libya’s fate is undetermined, indicating that the al Qaeda network may support Salafi-
jihadi militias currently fighting in eastern Libya.
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is prioritizing its objectives in Pakistan over those in Kashmir. TTP leaders believe that
waging jihad in Kashmir before completing their goals in Pakistan would leave them vulnerable to an “attack from behind”
from Pakistani forces. The TTP published the strategy in an August 10 Telegram post. The statement also eulogized al
Qaeda commander Ilyas Kashmiri, who was killed in June 2011.
Jamatul Ahrar, a TTP splinter group, continued a pattern of attacks outside guidance issued by the TTP and al Qaeda.
Suspected Jamatul Ahrar militants detonated a remote-controlled improvised explosive device targeting a shari’a court judge
in Quetta, western Pakistan, on August 11. ISIS-affiliated al Bayan Radio news claimed on August 12 that ISIS conducted
the attack. Jamatul Ahrar leader Omar Khalid Khorasani denied connections to al Qaeda or ISIS. Khorasani also stated that
Jamatul Ahrar had no interests outside of Pakistan.
Outlook: The al Qaeda network will support the new Syrian group, Jabhat Fatah al Sham, in its fight against the Assad
regime.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is attempting to delegitimize Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government
through unilateral political actions. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance swore in eight members of its newly created Supreme
Political Council. UN-led peace talks remain suspended and are scheduled to resume in September.
Outlook: Peace talks will not resume as scheduled. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance will continue to establish a new
government based in Sana’a.
Security
Hadi government forces are seeking a decisive military victory over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance after peace talks failed to
yield a political agreement. Coalition-backed government forces renewed assaults on Sana’a and Taiz. Hadi-allied fighters
secured positions in Nihm district, northeast of Sana’a, in an effort to secure the main road into the capital. Hadi government
forces seized contested areas in eastern Taiz city. Al Houthi-Saleh forces continue to launch attacks on southern Saudi
Arabia as part of a campaign likely intended to induce the Saudi government into direct negotiations with the alliance.
Outlook: Neither the Sana’a nor the Taiz operation will produce a decisive victory that will end the war.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP is withdrawing from population centers in southern Yemen in the face of coalition-backed counterterrorism operations,
but these losses will be temporary setbacks. AQAP draws its strength from a relationship with local Sunni populations, not
control of territory. Hadi government forces, backed by Saudi-coalition airstrikes, seized Azzan, Shabwah governorate on
August 9, and Zinjibar, al Shaqra and Ja’ar, Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP militants detonated a suicide vehicle-
borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) targeting Hadi government troops in Shaqra on August 15. Police forces
arrested suspected AQAP members in Aden on August 11 and August 15.
Outlook: AQAP may attempt to disrupt counterterrorism operations in Abyan, but will not fight to reclaim the towns. AQAP
will continue to assassinate officials in Aden in an effort to destabilize the Hadi government.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
2
5
4
3
1
1) 09 AUG: The
Saudi-led coalition
resumed airstrikes on
Sana’a city.
2) 11 AUG: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces attacked
Saudi military
positions outside
Najran city.
3) 14 AUG: Hadi
government forces
seized Zinjibar and
Ja’ar from AQAP in
Abyan.
4) 15 AUG: A Saudi-
led coalition airstrike
hit a Doctors Without
Borders-run hospital in
Abs district, Hajjah.
5) 15 AUG: AQAP
detonated a SVBIED
targeting Hadi forces
in Shaqra, Abyan.

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali officials are attempting to remove clan dynamics from national politics. The National Leadership Forum (NLF), a
body charged with developing rules for the upcoming elections, announced that individuals elected to parliament must join a
political party by October 2018. The system used to assign representation in the upcoming elections relies on clans for
organization.
Outlook: Clan politics will play a significant role in the 2016 elections and will continue to dominate Somali politics despite
structural political changes.
Security
Somali special forces supported by U.S. advisors continued to target al Shabaab leadership. U.S.-backed Somali troops
may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar and spokesman Abdul Aziz Abu Mus’ab in operations near Sakow town in
Middle Jubba region on August 10 and 13. The August 10 operation killed three militants, whose identities remain
unconfirmed. U.S. forces also assisted Somali operators in a successful raid on al Shabaab positions in Awdheegle town in
Lower Shabelle region on July 25.
Outlook: U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations will continue to eliminate al Shabaab leaders, but the pace of the
operations may only generate a limited impact on the larger insurgent network.
Al Shabaab
The death of al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar, if confirmed, would challenge the group’s cohesiveness and coordination in the
short term. Ahmad Umar suppressed pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) sentiment within al Shabaab. Umar also
used harsh tactics to repress dissent, internal divisions, and generational infighting in the group. Umar’s death could lead to
discord and a temporary decrease in al Shabaab’s operational tempo, but it would not degrade al Shabaab in the long term.
Outlook: A senior member of al Shabaab’s Shura Council would replace Umar as emir.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1
2
3
4
HoA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG -15 AUG
1) 10 AUG: Warplanes
struck al Shabaab
positions near Jilib
town, Middle Jubba
region.
2) 10 AUG: U.S. SOF
advised Somali SOF
in a raid targeting al
Shabaab militants in
Sakow town, Middle
Jubba region.
3) 11 AUG: Al
Shabaab militants
ambushed SNA and
AMISOM forces near
Hudur town, Bakool
region.
4) 14 AUG: Somali
security forces
interdicted a SVBIED
bound for Bakara
Market, Mogadishu.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is growing weaker. Protesters throughout Libya demonstrated
against the GNA’s foreign counterterrorism partners and called for the nullification of the December 2015 Libyan Political
Agreement that established the GNA. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Gen. Khalifa Haftar and his international
backers seek to solidify his power against the GNA and its allies by expanding military rule in eastern and southern Libya.
Gen. Haftar replaced the civilian mayor of Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, with a military governor on August 12.
Outlook: Haftar’s consolidation of power will spark conflict with rival factions and prevent the GNA from gaining authority in
eastern Libya.
Security
The LNA is mobilizing against the GNA-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) for control of oil terminals in eastern Libya.
The LNA’s military governor for eastern Libya announced that the LNA intends to seize and protect the Zueitina, al Sidra,
and Ras Lanuf terminals. The PFG currently controls these sites.
Outlook: The LNA will attack Zueitina and may ignite a larger conflict with the PFG over eastern Libya’s oil.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS in Libya retains the capability to attack beyond Libya’s borders despite the imminent loss of Sirte. GNA-allied militias
captured ISIS’s primary remaining stronghold in the city. ISIS in Libya may plan to attack Italy from Libya and may have ties
to a cell in Milan according to documents discovered in Sirte. Tunisian and Algerian forces have increased border security
as ISIS militants flee the failing Sirte into the southern desert and across borders. The United States continued to conduct
airstrikes as parts of its 30-day campaign against ISIS in Sirte that began on August 1.
Outlook: ISIS militants who fled into southwestern Libya will likely establish a safe haven from which they will attack
northern Libya and neighboring countries.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1
2
3
4
LIBYA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG - 15 AUG
1) 14 AUG: The Tripoli
Revolutionaries
Brigade attacked the
GNA’s intelligence
headquarters in
Tripoli.
2) 10 AUG: GNA-
allied Misratan forces
seized ISIS’s
headquarters in Sirte.
3) 13 AUG: The LNA
moved two battalions
into the town of
Zueitina, close to the
PFG-controlled
Zueitina oil terminal.
4) 11 AUG: French
special forces aiding
the LNA withdrew from
Benghazi.

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Algerian security forces cleared militant safe havens and interdicted arms caches in eastern Algeria and in southern Algeria
near the Malian border. AQIM maintains support zones in these regions.
Outlook: AQIM may carry out small-scale attacks to defend its safe havens in Algeria.
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia)
Tunisia is cracking down on cross-border smuggling, citing the threat of ISIS militants fleeing Sirte and attempting to enter
Tunisia. Tunisian authorities arrested more than 10 smugglers with suspected links to ISIS this week.
Outlook: Crackdowns on the smuggling trade will limit the mobility of ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Tunisia in the short
term, but they may drive Salafi-jihadi recruitment in the country’s impoverished interior regions in the long term.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The UN peacekeeping force, MINUSMA, has been unable to prevent the outbreak of renewed violence in northern Mali, despite
a recently strengthened mandate. GATIA, a pro-government militia, defended territory north of Kidal from an advance by a
coalition of ex-separatist Tuareg groups. The groups fought three times this month for control of Kidal and its environs. Peace
talks are ongoing in Bamako, Mali’s capital.
Abubakar Shekau’s faction of Boko Haram is using propaganda to underscore its strength in a power struggle against the
former Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi. ISIS named Barnawi as the governor of its West African affiliate in
place of Shekau on August 3. Shekau’s faction released a video showing a number of schoolgirls that Boko Haram kidnapped
from Chibok, Nigeria in April 2014.The video shows the bodies of some girls, allegedly killed by Multinational Joint Task Force
(MNJTF) airstrikes, to rally support for Shekau and incite backlash against the MNJTF and the Nigerian government.
Outlook: GATIA may launch an offensive to retake Kidal after securing the city’s environs this week.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1
4
3 21) 10 AUG: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a
suspected terrorist cell
in Sidi Ali Ben Aoun,
Tunisia.
2) 12 AUG: Tunisian
security forces
arrested a suspected
militant in Tunis,
Tunisia.
3) 15 AUG: The
Algerian army
destroyed a weapons
cache in Sidi Ali
Bounab, Algeria.
4) 15 AUG: Tunisian
security forces
arrested five
smugglers with
suspected Salafi-jihadi
ties in Ben Guerdane,
Tunisia.
MAGHREB SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG - 15 AUG

12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
4
2
1
3
SAHEL SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 09 AUG- 15 AUG
1) 10 AUG: A coalition
of ex-separatist
groups (CMA) clashed
with a pro-government
militia (GATIA) north of
Kidal, Mali.
2) 10 AUG: Ansar al
Din executed five
Malian soldiers near
Tenenkou, Mali.
3) 12 AUG: Algerian
security forces
destroyed an arms
cache in Tamanrasset,
Algeria.
4) 13 AUG: Militants
assassinated a
commander of a pro-
government militia in
Timbuktu, Mali.

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569