2016 08-23 ctp update and assessment
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CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The failure of Libya’s UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) to achieve legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other enemy groups in Libya. A democratically elected body, whose mandate expired in October 2015, based in eastern Libya voted no-confidence in the GNA and its prime minister on August 22. The vote is contested, but might invalidate prior GNA decisions if upheld. These decisions could include the GNA’s July 2016 request for U.S. airstrikes against ISIS in Sirte. Political turmoil will continue to undermine local and international efforts to defeat ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya. 2. Russia is attempting to use Yemen’s political crisis opportunistically to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. Former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports in an interview with a Russian state news outlet on August 21. Saleh’s statement follows the Russian Charge d’Affaires for Yemen’s vocal support for an al Houthi-Saleh power-sharing body established on August 15. Russia has opposed measures that favor President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government over the al Houthi-Saleh alliance, though it has also taken steps to placate Saudi Arabia and other international supporters of the Hadi government. Russia will continue to maneuver on both sides of the political crisis in order to advance its own interests in the event of a negotiated settlement in Yemen. 3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS’s resurgence in parts of Afghanistan, as well as continuing reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS. Zawahiri’s statement was likely timed to rally support for an ongoing Taliban offensive to control Kunduz city in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, of sowing discord among the mujahideen.
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2016 09-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2016 09-06 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
2016 08-09 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
2016 08-02 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, positioned itself to be part of the leadership of a unified armed Syrian opposition. Jabhat al Nusra leader Abu Mohammed al Joulani announced the end of Jabhat al Nusra’s operations and the formation Jabhat Fatah al Sham, which will not have ties to al Qaeda. This organizational restructuring is a strategic move intended to facilitate the unification of the armed Syrian opposition around a Jabhat al Nusra core. Al Qaeda sanctioned the decision in advance, emphasizing the need for Jabhat al Nusra to preserve unity above organizational relationships. Jabhat Fatah al Sham still holds al Qaeda’s objective of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria.
2. The start of U.S. military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may prolong the ground conditions that permit ISIS and al Qaeda to operate in the country by undermining support for the UN-backed unity government. The U.S. conducted its first airstrikes targeting ISIS in Sirte, Libya, at the request of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Some of the Libyan factions that had backed the GNA and constituted the GNA’s military forces are now protesting its support for Western intervention. These factions may not sustain their military operations against ISIS, prioritizing instead their own objectives. ISIS and al Qaeda expanded operations in Libya during the civil war.
3. Violence is escalating along the Saudi-Yemeni border as the UN-led peace process to negotiate a political resolution to the civil war breaks down. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance launched a series of attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi Arabia to warn that violation of Saudi territory is a “red line.” The al Houthi-Saleh faction may be seeking to induce Saudi Arabia to enter into direct negotiations with it outside of the UN-led negotiations, bypassing Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government. Both the al Houthi-Saleh alliance and Hadi’s government are preparing for the collapse of UN-led peace talks.
2016 08-30 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
2016 08-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The loss of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) stronghold in Sirte may not significantly reduce the group’s threat to European targets. U.S.-backed forces allied with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) seized ISIS’s headquarters in Sirte on August 10. ISIS will survive the loss of Sirte. The group may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy and ties to a cell in Milan, Italy, according to documents recovered in Sirte. CIA director John Brennan assessed in June 2016 that ISIS in Libya has the capability and intent to attack beyond Libya’s borders, including across the Mediterranean Sea.
2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities. The death of Umar, who had suppressed pro-ISIS sentiment in al Shabaab, may facilitate the integration of some al Shabaab factions into ISIS’s network.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term setback that will not weaken the group in the long term. Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition forces drove AQAP from Azzan, Shabwah governorate on August 9 and Zinjibar, Ja’ar, and al Shaqra in Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP withdrew to preserve its capabilities in Abyan governorate in 2012. The group will again maintain its ties to the local population and set conditions to resurge in the future.
2016 07-12 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
2016-07-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
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2016 09-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2016 09-06 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
2016 08-09 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
2016 08-02 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, positioned itself to be part of the leadership of a unified armed Syrian opposition. Jabhat al Nusra leader Abu Mohammed al Joulani announced the end of Jabhat al Nusra’s operations and the formation Jabhat Fatah al Sham, which will not have ties to al Qaeda. This organizational restructuring is a strategic move intended to facilitate the unification of the armed Syrian opposition around a Jabhat al Nusra core. Al Qaeda sanctioned the decision in advance, emphasizing the need for Jabhat al Nusra to preserve unity above organizational relationships. Jabhat Fatah al Sham still holds al Qaeda’s objective of establishing an Islamic emirate in Syria.
2. The start of U.S. military operations against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may prolong the ground conditions that permit ISIS and al Qaeda to operate in the country by undermining support for the UN-backed unity government. The U.S. conducted its first airstrikes targeting ISIS in Sirte, Libya, at the request of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Some of the Libyan factions that had backed the GNA and constituted the GNA’s military forces are now protesting its support for Western intervention. These factions may not sustain their military operations against ISIS, prioritizing instead their own objectives. ISIS and al Qaeda expanded operations in Libya during the civil war.
3. Violence is escalating along the Saudi-Yemeni border as the UN-led peace process to negotiate a political resolution to the civil war breaks down. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance launched a series of attacks in southern Saudi Arabia, prompting Saudi Arabia to warn that violation of Saudi territory is a “red line.” The al Houthi-Saleh faction may be seeking to induce Saudi Arabia to enter into direct negotiations with it outside of the UN-led negotiations, bypassing Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government. Both the al Houthi-Saleh alliance and Hadi’s government are preparing for the collapse of UN-led peace talks.
2016 08-30 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
2016 08-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The loss of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) stronghold in Sirte may not significantly reduce the group’s threat to European targets. U.S.-backed forces allied with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) seized ISIS’s headquarters in Sirte on August 10. ISIS will survive the loss of Sirte. The group may already have plans to conduct attacks in Italy and ties to a cell in Milan, Italy, according to documents recovered in Sirte. CIA director John Brennan assessed in June 2016 that ISIS in Libya has the capability and intent to attack beyond Libya’s borders, including across the Mediterranean Sea.
2. A U.S.-supported Somali special forces raid may have killed al Shabaab emir Ahmad Umar. The pace of operations to degrade al Shabaab’s leadership may not be rapid enough to disrupt al Shabaab’s activities. The death of Umar, who had suppressed pro-ISIS sentiment in al Shabaab, may facilitate the integration of some al Shabaab factions into ISIS’s network.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) withdrawal from population centers in southern Yemen is a short-term setback that will not weaken the group in the long term. Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition forces drove AQAP from Azzan, Shabwah governorate on August 9 and Zinjibar, Ja’ar, and al Shaqra in Abyan governorate on August 14. AQAP withdrew to preserve its capabilities in Abyan governorate in 2012. The group will again maintain its ties to the local population and set conditions to resurge in the future.
2016 07-12 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
2016-07-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
2016 09-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
2016-06-28 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
2016-06-14 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
2015-05-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials said an Iranian cargo ship, which left from Bandar Abbas, Iran, for al Hudaydah, Yemen, and is escorted by the Artesh Navy’s 34th Fleet, will refuse inspections by countries involved in the conflict in Yemen. Iran appears to be testing U.S. redlines in the Gulf of Aden and will probably continue to challenge the U.S. Navy there. Recent incidents of involving the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington, Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk Tigris, and a convoy of seven cargo ships reportedly carrying weapons for the al Houthis demonstrate Iran’s willingness to test the line.
2. A five-day ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s al Houthi movement allowed humanitarian aid to enter Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders did not make progress in political negotiations during the pause in hostilities, and both sides may have used the time to regroup. Clashes between the al Houthi movement and local tribal militias continued in central and southern Yemen during the ceasefire as well.
3. The al Qaeda-linked al Murabitoun group, which operates in the Sahel, may be fracturing. Al Murabitoun was formed in August 2013 by a merger between the AQIM splinters MUJAO and al Mulathamun. A MUJAO leader pledged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the name of al Murabitoun, which was then denied by an al Mulathamun leader. ISIS has had a growing presence in North Africa among smaller militant Islamist groups and may be extending its reach south into the Sahel.
2016-05-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
2016-05-31 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
2016 10-11 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
2017 01-03 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
2016-05-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
2016-06-21 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
2016 11-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
2016 11-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
2016 07-19 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
2016 10-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
2016-06-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016 07-26 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
2016 12-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
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2016 09-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
2016-06-28 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
2016-06-14 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
2015-05-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials said an Iranian cargo ship, which left from Bandar Abbas, Iran, for al Hudaydah, Yemen, and is escorted by the Artesh Navy’s 34th Fleet, will refuse inspections by countries involved in the conflict in Yemen. Iran appears to be testing U.S. redlines in the Gulf of Aden and will probably continue to challenge the U.S. Navy there. Recent incidents of involving the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington, Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk Tigris, and a convoy of seven cargo ships reportedly carrying weapons for the al Houthis demonstrate Iran’s willingness to test the line.
2. A five-day ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s al Houthi movement allowed humanitarian aid to enter Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders did not make progress in political negotiations during the pause in hostilities, and both sides may have used the time to regroup. Clashes between the al Houthi movement and local tribal militias continued in central and southern Yemen during the ceasefire as well.
3. The al Qaeda-linked al Murabitoun group, which operates in the Sahel, may be fracturing. Al Murabitoun was formed in August 2013 by a merger between the AQIM splinters MUJAO and al Mulathamun. A MUJAO leader pledged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the name of al Murabitoun, which was then denied by an al Mulathamun leader. ISIS has had a growing presence in North Africa among smaller militant Islamist groups and may be extending its reach south into the Sahel.
2016-05-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
2016-05-31 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
2016 10-11 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
2017 01-03 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
2016-05-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
2016-06-21 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
2016 11-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
2016 11-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
2016 07-19 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
2016 10-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
2016-06-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016 07-26 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
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2016 12-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
2017 02-14 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
2017 03-14 ctp update and assessment
1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict.
2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit.
3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
2017 02-28 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG.
2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017.
3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.
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2015-08-26 CTP Udate and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Iranian regime asserted that it will continue to grow and preserve its missile program, doing whatever it deems necessary and without permission or resolution, according to President Hassan Rouhani.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is benefitting from the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive against the al Houthis and their allies. It is strengthening its presence in Aden and Abyan governorates in southern Yemen.
3. The Arab League held an emergency meeting to discuss how to counter Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) gains in Libya. ISIS continues to consolidate control over the area surrounding Sirte on the central Libyan coastline.
2016-02-23 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
2015-09-22 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. In what may be a shift in Russian diplomacy in the region, Russia’s ambassador to Yemen, Vladimir Dedushkin, met with Saudi officials and members of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government in Riyadh before meeting with al Houthi representatives in Sana’a. A delegation of al Houthis and members of Yemen’s ruling party, the General People’s Congress, led by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, then traveled to Oman to meet with the UN envoy to Yemen.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) has a “constitutional duty” to protect the Islamic Revolution. Khamenei’s statement was probably in response to President Hassan Rouhani’s September 15 remark that the IRGC is not the “sole guardian” of the Islamic Revolution. This is the latest in the Supreme Leader’s public corrections of President Rouhani, likely in an effort to curb Rouhani’s influence in the wake of the nuclear deal.
3. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) attacked a mosque on a Pakistani Air Force base in Peshawar, Pakistan, in retaliation for Pakistani military operations against the group in the FATA region. Twenty-three of at least twenty-nine casualties were Pakistani Air Force officers.
2015-10-20 CTP Update and Assessment
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
2015-11-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
2015-06-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
2015-11-03 Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for attacks against Western, particularly American, interests. Zawahiri also called on jihadist factions to unify in what he described as a war against a Russian-Iranian-American axis.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei forbade non-nuclear negotiations with the U.S. on November 1, indicating that Iran's participation in the Syria peace talks does not mark a new willingness to negotiate on regional issues. Khamenei also dismissed Western rhetoric regarding shifting foreign policy priorities in Iran.
3. Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham-linked group in Sirte, Libya, continued to consolidate control over the city’s population and the surrounding environs. Warplanes targeted ISIS positions in the vicinity of Sirte, Libya, on October 27.
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
2015-09-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Ayman al Zawahiri issued a critique of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Zawahiri, who has remained largely silent on ISIS, dismissed the Caliphate as illegitimate and called for all Muslims to defend themselves against the West. Zawahiri still seeks to unify the global jihad and sees ISIS as a dividing force.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right,” pushing back on President Hassan Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Guardian Council. Khamenei’s public correction of Rouhani may be aimed at ensuring the latter’s influence and politico-economic reforms do not become unmanageable.
3. ISIS consolidated control in Sirte, Libya, and the surrounding areas. ISIS is using methods similar to those seen in Syria and Iraq.
2015 02-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
2016-04-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
2016-01-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
2015-11-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The claim of responsibility from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) for an attack in Tunis may mark a shift in how ISIS is selecting targets in Tunisia. An ISIS suicide bomber attacked a bus transporting presidential guards on November 24, killing at least 13 people in the center of Tunis, according to Tunisian authorities. The attack occurred near the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, a secure area in Tunis. Previous ISIS attacks focused on the tourism industry.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in Mali. At least two Islamist militants laid siege to an American-owned hotel in the center of Mali’s capital, Bamako, on November 20, temporarily holding 170 hostages and killing at least 19 people, similar to an attack in August. Multiple Islamist jihadist groups are implicated in the attack. Al Murabitoun claimed responsibility with support from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Saharan Brigade. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din’s southern brigade, the Macina Liberation Front, also claimed credit for the attack. The attack was reportedly in retaliation for the French counterterrorism campaign in Mali, Operation Barkhane. AQIM affiliates in Mali will likely build off of the Bamako attack to target UN, French, and Malian security forces, as well as those who cooperate with them.
3. Iran’s decision to join the Syrian peace talks in Vienna does not signal a thawing of relations with the West; the Supreme Leader will not shift his position and authorize direct negotiations with the U.S. on non-nuclear issues.
2016-01-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. and EU revoked nuclear-related sanctions after the IAEA issued its report verifying Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal. The full effects of sanction relief are unlikely to be fully felt before the all-important parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February, however. Iran also released two U.S. Navy vessels and 10 sailors on January 13, following their overnight detention after a purported mechanical error caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters on January 12.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in the Sahel region. At least three Islamist militants attacked a café and a hotel in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, on January 15, temporarily holding about 180 hostages and killing at least 28 people. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed credit for the attack on behalf of its affiliate al Murabitoun, which reunited with AQIM in late 2015 and participated in the November 20 hotel attack in Bamako, Mali. AQIM cited Western presence in the Sahel as justification for the attack. The attack underscores a high level of coordination between AQIM and its affiliates in the Sahel and signals that further attacks on Western targets in regional capitals are likely.
3. Al Shabaab continued a military campaign of high-profile raids of AMISOM bases. Al Shabaab militants attacked a Kenyan AMISOM unit based in el Adde, Gedo region, stealing equipment and claiming to have killed over 100 soldiers. Kenyan and AMISOM officials have acknowledged the deaths of soldiers, but have not given a casualty figure. This attack is the third in a series of attacks that began in June 2015 against a Burundian-run base in Lego, Bay region, and a September 2015 attack against a Ugandan-run base in Janale, Lower Shabelle region.
2016-04-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Representatives from the al Houthis and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party (GPC) are refusing to attend UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until the ceasefire is implemented and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh positions stop. Key Yemeni factions would not have had representation at the Kuwait talks and would have been unlikely to accept a negotiated solution. These factions, which include southern secessionists, would probably continue to fight to secure their interests.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its explosives capabilities in eastern Libya and will use them to deter action against its stronghold in Sirte. ISIS will likely use these capabilities against the Libyan National Army (LNA), which may be assembling a force to attack Sirte, as well as against civilian populations to undermine the LNA in Benghazi. ISIS is conducting similar attacks on Misratan militia positions in western Libya, likely to deter Misratan operations. ISIS will likely attack Libya’s new unity government, too, especially as it becomes the West’s preferred counterterrorism partner in Libya.
3. ISIS is building a support network in Tunisia to support the establishment of a formal ISIS wilayat in Tunisia. ISIS is attempting to co-opt al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s networks in western Tunisia, where it is developing safe havens from which to conduct attacks in both Tunisia and Algeria. The group is also recruiting heavily in eastern Tunisia’s population centers, where Tunisian security forces recently arrested a deputy mayor for belonging to a pro-ISIS cell, indicating the extent to which ISIS is attempting to infiltrate Tunisian society.
2016-04-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
2015 02-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemeni political actors met in Aden and called for the establishment of an alternative capital to Sana’a in either Aden or Taiz, both former capitals, on February 15. There appears to be growing support for an alternative government or regional autonomy throughout Yemen. Sana’a-based politicians reached an agreement to form a new transitional council composed of underrepresented groups, but could not agree on a way forward for Yemen’s executive branch.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced the concept of Iran’s “Economy of Resistance” in a February 18 speech as a reaction to the West’s continued economic pressure on Iran. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani added that the resistance economy did not imply Iran would close itself off from the global economy.
3. Al Shabaab claimed credit for the bombing of a hotel in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, that killed and injured dozens of people, including Somali government officials, on February 20. Al Shabaab has lost control of some of its strongholds in Somalia, but still maintains its capability to conduct asymmetric attacks.
2016 02 16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
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Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
2024: The FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 36
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Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale war
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Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
Anarchist Black Cross Moscow
http://Avtonom.org/abc
Solidarity Zone
https://t.me/solidarity_zone
Memorial
https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
OVD-Info
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RosUznik
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Uznik Online
http://uznikonline.tilda.ws/
Russian Reader
https://therussianreader.com/
ABC Irkutsk
https://abc38.noblogs.org/
Send mail to prisoners from abroad:
http://Prisonmail.online
YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
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2开始安排制作毕业证成绩单电子图；
3毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
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5成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
6快递给客户（国内顺丰国外DHLUPS等快读邮寄）
— — — — 我们是挂科和未毕业同学们的福音我们是实体公司精益求精的工艺！ — — — -
一真实留信认证的作用(私企外企荣誉的见证):
1：该专业认证可证明留学生真实留学身份同时对留学生所学专业等级给予评定。
2：国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书这个入网证书并且可以归档到地方。
3：凡是获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内将在公安部网内查询个人身份证信息后同步读取人才网入库信息。
4：个人职称评审加20分个人信誉贷款加10分。
5：在国家人才网主办的全国网络招聘大会中纳入资料供国家500强等高端企业选择人才。咋的叫声是否就是这最后的点睛之笔悠然走在林间的小路上宁静与清香一丝丝的盛夏气息吸入身体昔日生活里的繁忙与焦躁早已淡然无存心中满是悠然清淡的芳菲身体不由的轻松脚步也感到无比的轻快走出这盘栾交错的小道眼前是连绵不绝的山峦浩荡天地间大自然毫无吝啬的展现它的磅礴与绚美淡淡熏香细腻游滑的飘荡在鼻尖茂密的树木遍布起立在漫山遍野绿幽幽的景色这是盛夏才有的芳菲啊宁静之中悠然的心情多了些许阔达想起那些曾经环绕心头睡
Many ways to support street children.pptx
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
快速制作(ocad毕业证书)加拿大安大略艺术设计学院毕业证本科学历雅思成绩单原版一模一样
原版纸张【微信：741003700 】【(ocad毕业证书)加拿大安大略艺术设计学院毕业证】【微信：741003700 】学位证，留信认证（真实可查，永久存档）offer、雅思、外壳等材料/诚信可靠,可直接看成品样本，帮您解决无法毕业带来的各种难题！外壳，原版制作，诚信可靠，可直接看成品样本。行业标杆！精益求精，诚心合作，真诚制作！多年品质 ,按需精细制作，24小时接单,全套进口原装设备。十五年致力于帮助留学生解决难题，包您满意。
本公司拥有海外各大学样板无数，能完美还原海外各大学 Bachelor Diploma degree, Master Degree Diploma
1:1完美还原海外各大学毕业材料上的工艺：水印，阴影底纹，钢印LOGO烫金烫银，LOGO烫金烫银复合重叠。文字图案浮雕、激光镭射、紫外荧光、温感、复印防伪等防伪工艺。材料咨询办理、认证咨询办理请加学历顾问Q/微741003700
留信网认证的作用:
1:该专业认证可证明留学生真实身份
2:同时对留学生所学专业登记给予评定
3:国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书
4:这个认证书并且可以归档倒地方
5:凡事获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内，将在公安局网内查询个人身份证信息后，同步读取人才网入库信息
6:个人职称评审加20分
7:个人信誉贷款加10分
8:在国家人才网主办的国家网络招聘大会中纳入资料，供国家高端企业选择人才
Uniform Guidance 3.0 - The New 2 CFR 200
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
一比一原版(Adelaide毕业证)阿德莱德大学毕业证成绩单
Adelaide毕业证【微信95270640】国外文凭购买阿德莱德大学留信认证毕业证书印刷品《Q微信95270640》学历认证怎么做：原版仿制阿德莱德大学电子版成绩单毕业证认证《阿德莱德大学毕业证成绩单》、阿德莱德大学文凭证书成绩单复刻offer录取通知书、购买Adelaide圣力嘉学院本科毕业证、《阿德莱德大学毕业证办理Adelaide毕业证书哪里买》、阿德莱德大学 Offer在线办理Adelaide Offer阿德莱德大学Bachloer Degree。
【实体公司】办阿德莱德大学阿德莱德大学硕士学位证成绩单学历认证学位证文凭认证办留信网认证办留服认证办教育部认证（网上可查实体公司专业可靠）
— — — 留学归国服务中心 — — -
【主营项目】
一.阿德莱德大学毕业证成绩单使馆认证教育部认证成绩单等！
二.真实使馆公证(即留学回国人员证明,不成功不收费)
三.真实教育部学历学位认证（教育部存档！教育部留服网站永久可查）
四.办理各国各大学文凭(一对一专业服务,可全程监控跟踪进度)
国外毕业证学位证成绩单办理流程：
1客户提供阿德莱德大学阿德莱德大学硕士学位证成绩单办理信息：姓名生日专业学位毕业时间等（如信息不确定可以咨询顾问：我们有专业老师帮你查询）；
2开始安排制作毕业证成绩单电子图；
3毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
4毕业证成绩单电子版您确认信息无误之后安排制作成品；
5成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
6快递给客户（国内顺丰国外DHLUPS等快读邮寄）。
专业服务请勿犹豫联系我！本公司是留学创业和海归创业者们的桥梁。一次办理终生受用一步到位高效服务。详情请在线咨询办理,欢迎有诚意办理的客户咨询!洽谈。
招聘代理：本公司诚聘英国加拿大澳洲新西兰美国法国德国新加坡各地代理人员如果你有业余时间有兴趣就请联系我们咨询顾问：+微信:95270640光总是太短太匆忙记得今年正月就在父亲扛起蛇皮袋将要跨出门槛的一刹那山娃突然抱紧父亲的大腿嚎啕大哭父亲吃力地掰开山娃的手哽咽道山娃好好听话好好念书到了暑假爸也接你进城爸的城好远好大好美山娃于是天天扳着手指算计着读书也格外刻苦无奈时间总过得太慢太慢每次父亲往家打电话山娃总抢着接听一个劲地提醒父亲别忘了正月说的话电话那头总会传来父亲嘿嘿的笑连连说记得记得但别忘了拿奖状进城啊考试一结束山娃就迫不及待地给间
Opinions on EVs: Metro Atlanta Speaks 2023
Presents in chart form results of questions related to electric vehicles from 2023 Metro Atlanta Speaks survey of the Atlanta Regional Commission
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdf
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
一比一原版(QUT毕业证)昆士兰科技大学毕业证成绩单
QUT毕业证【微信95270640】☀️原版仿制昆士兰科技大学毕业证书扫描件本科学位证书【办证Q微信95270640】QUT毕业证书扫描件原版仿制毕业成绩单，能完美还原海外各大学QUTBachelor Diploma degree, Master Diploma（本科/硕士昆士兰科技大学毕业证书、成绩单）QUT大学Offer录取通知书、雅思成绩单、托福成绩单、雅思托福代考、语言证书、学生卡、高仿留服认证书等毕业/入学/在读材料。1:1完美还原海外各大学毕业材料上的昆士兰科技大学毕业证书扫描件本科学位证书QUT毕业证书扫描件原版仿制毕业成绩单工艺：水印，阴影底纹，钢印LOGO烫金烫银，LOGO烫金烫银复合重叠。文字图案浮雕，激光镭射，紫外荧光，温感，复印防伪。
(诚招代理)办理国外高校毕业证成绩单文凭学位证,真实使馆公证（留学回国人员证明）真实留信网认证国外学历学位认证雅思代考国外学校代申请名校保录开请假条改GPA改成绩ID卡
1.高仿业务:【本科硕士】毕业证,成绩单（GPA修改）,学历认证（教育部认证）,大学Offer,,ID,留信认证,使馆认证,雅思,语言证书等高仿类证书；
2.认证服务: 学历认证（教育部认证）,大使馆认证（回国人员证明）,留信认证（可查有编号证书）,大学保录取,雅思保分成绩单。
3.技术服务：钢印水印烫金激光防伪凹凸版设计印刷激凸温感光标底纹镭射速度快。
办理昆士兰科技大学昆士兰科技大学硕士毕业证成绩单流程：
1客户提供办理信息：姓名生日专业学位毕业时间等（如信息不确定可以咨询顾问：我们有专业老师帮你查询）；
2开始安排制作毕业证成绩单电子图；
3毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
4毕业证成绩单电子版您确认信息无误之后安排制作成品；
5成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
6快递给客户（国内顺丰国外DHLUPS等快读邮寄）
-办理真实使馆公证（即留学回国人员证明）
-办理各国各大学文凭（世界名校一对一专业服务,可全程监控跟踪进度）
-全套服务：毕业证成绩单真实使馆公证真实教育部认证。让您回国发展信心十足！
（详情请加一下 文凭顾问+微信:95270640）欢迎咨询！小便处山娃很想笑却怎么也笑不出来山娃很迷惑父亲的家除了一扇小铁门连窗户也没有墓穴一般阴森森有些骇人父亲的城也便成了山娃的城父亲的家也便成了山娃的家父亲让山娃呆在屋里做作业看电视最多只能在门口透透气不能跟陌生人搭腔更不能乱跑一怕迷路二怕拐子拐人山娃很惊惧去年村里的田鸡就因为跟父亲进城一不小心被人拐跑了至今不见踪影害得田鸡娘天天哭得死去活来疯了一般那情那景无不令人摧肝裂肺山娃很听话天天呆在小屋里除了地
PPT Item # 9 - 2024 Street Maintenance Program(SMP) Amendment
Powerpoint 2024 Street Maintenance Program Admendment
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Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale war
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale war
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdf
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdf
PD-1602-as-amended-by-RA-9287-Anti-Illegal-Gambling-Law.pptx
PD-1602-as-amended-by-RA-9287-Anti-Illegal-Gambling-Law.pptx
MHM Roundtable Slide Deck WHA Side-event May 28 2024.pptx
MHM Roundtable Slide Deck WHA Side-event May 28 2024.pptx
PPT Item # 9 - 2024 Street Maintenance Program(SMP) Amendment
PPT Item # 9 - 2024 Street Maintenance Program(SMP) Amendment
2016 08-23 ctp update and assessment
- 1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project Update and Assessment August 23, 2016
- 2. 2 TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 1. The Libyan unity government’s lack of legitimacy may impede U.S. efforts to partner with it for future operations against ISIS and enemy groups in Libya. 2. Russia is opportunistically supporting both sides in Yemen’s political crisis to expand its sphere of influence in the Arabian Peninsula. 3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for fighters to unify in their support for the Afghan Taliban and to reject and ignore ISIS. 2 1 3
- 3. 3 | ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA al Qaeda Network Al Qaeda leadership continues to maintain a close relationship with the Afghan Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri incited fighters to rally in support of the Afghan Taliban and to reject the call to join the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in an August 21 statement. Zawahiri’s call was probably a reaction to ISIS resurging in parts of Afghanistan as reports of Taliban militants switching allegiance to ISIS continued and timed with a Taliban offensive to control Kunduz City in northern Afghanistan. Zawahiri accused ISIS and its leader of dividing the ranks of the mujahideen. Osama bin Laden’s son, Hamza bin Laden, continues to appear in al Qaeda’s media campaigns, as he assumes a leading public role for the group. He called on Saudi Arabian citizens to train with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in order to overthrow the Saudi government and end American influence in the Kingdom. Al Sahab Media Foundation posted bin Laden’s statement on Telegram on August 17. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates The Pakistani Army continues to target militant strongholds in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It launched an operation in the Khyber Agency in western Pakistan on August 16. Pakistani fighter jets conducted airstrikes targeting Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan– (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Islam–affiliated militants in Khyber Agency on August 18. Pakistani security forces continue to target the TTP splinter group Jamatul Ahrar. Pakistani security forces raided Jamatul Ahrar positions in Balochistan Province after Jamatul Ahrar bombed a hospital in Quetta, Balochistan on August 8. They arrested 27 militants allegedly linked to the August 8 bombing in Balochistan on August 19. Outlook: Al Qaeda leadership will maintain close ties with the Afghan Taliban.
- 4. 4 | ASSESSMENT: Political Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking public and international support to legitimize the Supreme Political Committee (SPC), a newly formed power-sharing government body in Sana’a, Yemen’s capital. The SPC describes itself as the legitimate government of Yemen and has support within the al Houthi-Saleh base, though the UN recognizes the government under Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh offered Russia access to Yemen’s bases, airports, and ports on August 21, citing shared interests in “combating terrorism.” The Russian charge d’affaires in Yemen had praised the establishment of the SPC, calling it a “realistic authority” in mid August. Outlook: The Supreme Political Council will probably announce economic and political measures to solidify its position. Security Hadi-allied forces may be seeking a decisive victory against the al Houthi-Saleh alliance. Hadi-allied forces continued shaping operations around Sana’a in preparation for a major offensive on the capital city. They resisted al Houthi-Saleh attempts to disrupt supply lines in Nihm district, northeast of Sana’a city, and in nearby al Jawf governorate. Hadi forces established a foothold in western Taiz city and continue to advance on al Houthi-Saleh–held areas in Taiz. Outlook: Hadi-allied forces are unlikely to retain gains made in and around Taiz city. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen AQAP continues to undermine security in southern Yemen despite recent clearing operations by Hadi-allied forces. AQAP militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) targeting Hadi-allied forces in Lawder district, Abyan governorate on August 18. Hadi-allied forces reportedly cleared Lawder city of AQAP militants on August 17. This attack demonstrates AQAP’s continued ability to carry out explosive attacks following territorial losses. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan militants assassinated a police investigator in Aden on August 22. ISIS last claimed an attack in Yemen in late July 2016. Outlook: AQAP will sustain its assassination campaign against Hadi-allied officials and local powerbrokers. GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
- 5. 5 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN 2 5 4 3 1 1) 17 AUG: Hadi-allied forces cleared AQAP militants from Lawder city, Abyan. 2) 18 AUG: Saudi-led coalition airstrikes targeted al Houthi- Saleh positions in Sana’a city. 3) 19 AUG: Hadi-allied forces advanced in western Taiz city. 4) 20 AUG: Al Houthi- Saleh forces shelled areas in Najran city, Saudi Arabia. 5) 22 AUG: ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan assassinated a police investigator in Sheikh Othman, Aden city.
- 6. 6 | ASSESSMENT: Political Kenya reversed its decision to close the Dadaab refugee camp on August 21. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced $146 million in aid for the Dadaab refugees in Nairobi on August 22, possibly as part of a deal with Kenya to delay the camp’s closure. A forced repatriation of 300,000 ethnic Somalis would worsen the already tenuous security and humanitarian situation in Somalia. Outlook: The U.S. government will continue pressuring Kenya to avoid a forced closure of the Dadaab refugee camp. Security Somali, Kenyan, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) security forces are increasing defensive measures in southern and central Somalia. AMISOM asked the Somali citizens to assist professional forces in providing security in the lead up to the parliamentary and presidential elections, scheduled for September and October 2016. Kenyan Defense Forces also deployed additional troops to counter al Shabaab activity along the Kenyan-Somali border. Outlook: Security forces will probably increase operations around key population centers ahead of the 2016 elections. Al Shabaab Al Shabaab maintains an attack cell in north-central Somalia. Militants conducted a double SVBIED attack on an administrative building in Galkayo in Mudug region that killed at least 20 people. Al Shabaab has concentrated SVBIED attacks against targets in Mogadishu and in southern Somalia, though it has conducted a few mass-casualty attacks in north-central Somalia. Outlook: Al Shabaab will probably continue to have support zones from which to operate attack cells in central and northern regions of Somalia. GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
- 7. 7 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA 1 2 3 4 HoA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 16 AUG -22 AUG 1) 17 AUG: U.S.- backed Somali SOF raid killed three al Shabaab militants near Kismayo, Lower Jubba region. 2) 18 AUG: Al Shabaab militants detonated an SVBIED at a checkpoint in Mogadishu. 3) 20 AUG: Al Shabaab attacked a Kenyan border patrol camp near Lafey town in Mandera County. 4) 21 AUG: Al Shabaab militants conducted a double SVBIED attack on a government facility in Galkayo town, Mudug region.
- 8. 8 | ASSESSMENT: Political The Tobruk-based Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) continues to undermine the Government of National Accord (GNA). The HoR met in a quorum for the first time since January 2016 and voted no-confidence in the GNA and its Prime Minister Fayez al Serraj. Pro-GNA HoR members complained they were “tricked” into attending after the meeting agenda changed abruptly. The no-confidence vote strikes a significant blow against the GNA and its partners, including the U.S., UN, and EU. The GNA’s lack of legitimacy may hamper international counterterrorism efforts in Libya. Outlook: HoR leadership may attempt to hold a second no-confidence vote to force the reformation of the GNA’s cabinet in its favor. This action would provoke backlash from powerful factions from western Libya that support current GNA members. Security The Libyan National Army (LNA) is struggling to degrade militant groups’ explosive attack capabilities in order to take complete control of Benghazi. Both ISIS and the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council (BRSC), an Islamist coalition with ties to al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, conducted IED attacks targeting LNA soldiers in the city’s south and west. Outlook: Salafi-jihadi groups will probably maintain safe havens in western Benghazi despite LNA offensives. Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya ISIS militants are using waves of explosive attacks to maximize casualties against the GNA-allied forces advancing into ISIS-held territory in Sirte. ISIS conducted nine SVBIED and three SVEST attacks in two days targeting GNA-allied forces. ISIS maintains a network that facilitates explosive attacks in Sirte. ISIS conducted attacks behind the front line, indicating GNA-allied forces are not capable of securing cleared territory. U.S. airstrikes destroyed four additional SVBIEDs. The U.S. has conducted 77 airstrikes on ISIS targets in Sirte since the beginning of the 30-day air campaign on August 1. Outlook: ISIS will likely attempt to inflict high casualties on GNA forces to shape the narrative of its defeat in Sirte. WEST AFRICA LIBYA
- 9. 9 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA 1 2 3 4 LIBYA SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 16 AUG - 22 AUG 1) 16 AUG - 22 AUG: The U.S. conducted airstrikes targeting ISIS sniper positions and vehicles in Sirte. 2) 17 AUG: ISIS militants detonated six SVBIEDs and three SVESTs targeting GNA-allied forces in Sirte. 3) 22 AUG: ISIS militants detonated an IED that killed four LNA soldiers in Qanfouda, Benghazi. 4) 20 AUG: Militants attempted to assassinate an LNA pilot with a sticky bomb in Tocra.
- 10. 10 | ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Algerian security forces dismantled terrorist cells and interdicted arms caches in eastern Algeria and in southern Algeria near the Malian border. AQIM maintains support zones in these regions. Outlook: AQIM may carry out small-scale attacks to defend its safe havens in Algeria. Uqba Ibn Nafa’a (Tunisia) Tunisia continues to crack down on cross-border smuggling. Authorities cited the threat of ISIS militants fleeing Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, and attempting to enter Tunisia. Tunisian authorities dismantled an ISIS-linked cell in Ben Guerdane, the easternmost town in Tunisia and a hotbed for Salafi-jihadi activity. A political transition of power is also underway in Tunisia. Prospective Tunisian Prime Minister Youssef Shahed released the plan for his proposed cabinet. Shahed retained the Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Interior in order to avoid disruptions in the security sector, which prevented major Salafi-jihadi attacks in Tunisia this summer. Outlook: Tunisia will most likely continue to crack down on smuggling to counter Salafi-jihadi activity in the near term. Corruption and economic stagnation may drive Salafi-jihadi recruitment in the long term. Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram) French forces escalated security operations in reaction to continued instability in Mali. French troops are conducting search operations and aerial reconnaissance in the Kidal region of northern Mali. Violence between the Self Defense Group of Imghad Tuareg and Allies (GATIA), a pro-government militia, and the Coordination for the Movement of Azawad (CMA), a coalition of Tuareg ex-separatist groups, threatens the fragile Algiers Accord, which ended formal hostilities in Mali in 2015. GATIA seized the town of Anefis in the Kidal region from the CMA and released a message claiming that it would capture all of Kidal within the next month. AQIM-affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for six attacks in Mali this week, signaling a possible increase in operational tempo. Outlook: GATIA may launch an offensive to retake Kidal after seizing surrounding towns this week. WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
- 11. 11 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB 4 2 1 3 MAGHREB SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 16 AUG - 22 AUG 1) 16 AUG: Moroccan security forces dismantled a Salafi- jihadi cell in Mograne, Morocco. 2) 20 AUG: Tunisian security forces arrested seven suspected militants in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia. 3) 22 AUG: The Algerian army destroyed a weapons cache in El Khroub, Algeria. 4) 22 AUG: The Tunisian army conducted counterterrorism operations in Jebel Mghila, Tunisia.
- 12. 12 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL 1 3 4 2 SAHEL SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY 16 AUG- 22 AUG 1) 18 AUG: A pro- government militia (GATIA) seized Anefis, Mali from a coalition of ex-separatist groups (CMA). 2) 20 AUG: Ansar al Din conducted a raid on a Malian Army outpost in Mopti, Mali. 3) 21 AUG: Ansar al Din fired rockets at a French military base in Tessalit, Mali. 4) 22 AUG: French forces arrested a member of an ex- separatist group (MNLA) with suspected links to Salafi-jihadi organizations in Kidal, Mali.
- 13. 13 ACRONYMS African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA) Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA) Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Libyan National Army (LNA) Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) Pakistani Military (PakMil) Possible military dimensions (PMD) Somalia National Army (SNA) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- 14. 14 Katherine Zimmerman research manager katherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576 Paul Bucala Iran analyst paul.bucala@aei.org (202) 888-6573 Marie Donovan Iran analyst marie.donovan@aei.org (202) 888-6572 Heather Malacaria program manager heather.malacaria@aei.org (202) 888-6575 Emily Estelle al Qaeda analyst emily.estelle@aei.org (202) 888-6570 Caitlin Pendleton Iran analyst caitlin.pendleton@aei.org (202) 888-6577 For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org. Frederick W. Kagan director fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569