The document details the evolving security landscape in the Middle East and North Africa, highlighting threats from ISIS and al-Qaeda, and their respective campaigns against adversaries in various regions, including Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa. Key events include rising ISIS influence in North Africa evidenced by a major attack in Tunisia, as well as apparent consolidations of al-Qaeda factions. The document assesses political dynamics and ongoing military operations, noting an emphasis on regional alliances and the challenges of achieving a political resolution in conflict areas.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
July 1, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati indicated that an
upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran, Iraq, and Syria will strengthen the "resistance front"
against the U.S. and its regional allies.
2. ISIS’s influence and strength may be growing in North Africa. It claimed the terrorist attack on a
beach resort in Sousse, Tunisia, that killed 38 people.
3. ISIS is conducting a VBIED campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a designed to drive the conflict
toward sectarian war in Yemen.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
There are indicators that al Qaeda groups are attempting to consolidate and unify their efforts in face of the challenge from the
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is now part of an al Qaeda-linked council
composed of representatives from four groups operating in the Sahel and the Maghreb. The council’s establishment follows an
effort to coordinate local activities in Libya and also a rapid expansion of support for ISIS in North Africa. It is not clear whether
al Qaeda will respond to the three ISIS attacks in Tunisia, Kuwait, and France on June 26. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Yemen, al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has not matched ISIS’s spectacular attacks there. Instead, it has focused on embedding within
the population and expanding its influence in Yemen’s east.
Outlook: The al Qaeda network will probably continue to consolidate as it combats the allure of the Islamic State. It is unlikely
that affiliates and core leaders will defect to supporting the Islamic State, though the loss of associate groups will reduce al
Qaeda’s overall network.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
It appears as if both the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and ISIS Wilayat Khorasan are trying to exert their influence in the
troubled Kurram Agency. Both claimed credit for an attack on a checkpoint in Kurram Agency, which killed two soldiers and
injured two others. It is not clear as to which group perpetrated the attack.
Pakistani military continued Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy, with airstrikes in Khyber Agency. The final
phase of the operation is set to launch in Shawal Valley in mid-July.
Outlook: The Pakistani government will continue Operation Zarb-e-Azb with its final phase set to launch in July.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Yemeni stakeholders continue to seek a political solution to the ongoing crisis. UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh
Ahmed has departed for Kuwait and will visit both Riyadh and Sana’a in the coming weeks, but his efforts may only result in
limited success on a preliminary agreement. Yemeni Foreign Minister Riyadh Yassin stated that representatives of Hadi’s
government will be meeting with members of the U.S., British, Belgian, German, and Russian governments to build
international support for the full implementation of UNSCR 2216. The Sultanate of Oman hosted talks between al Houthis and
southern Yemeni leaders to negotiate a local ceasefire in the south.
Outlook: A political solution will not be reached until the al Houthis and Hadi’s government give ground on stated red lines. A
localized ceasefire is more likely, though may be a challenge as groups seek to hold their positions for political negotiations.
Security
The al Houthi movement appears to be struggling to maintain control of territory. Local popular resistance forces retook parts of
Rada’a district in al Bayda on June 27. Additionally, continued clashes have forced the al Houthis to retreat partially to the al
Ajma and al Wathba areas of al Bayda governorate. The al Houthi movement continues to conduct low-level attacks along the
Saudi Arabian-Yemeni border, including an attack in Jizan province, Saudi Arabia, on June 23.
Outlook: Strong local resistance may continue to push back the al Houthis from some territory in south-central Yemen.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP is fighting the al Houthis along the front lines in al Bayda, Shabwah, and Ma’rib governorates. Its insurgent force, Ansar
al Sharia, claimed multiple attacks in Rada’a district in al Bayda and in the Bayhan area of Shabwah, where there are also
active popular resistance forces. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a is conducting a VBIED campaign against the al Houthis in Sana’a. ISIS
claimed a June 29 VBIED attack in the city as part of this campaign. ISIS Wilayat Sana’a also claimed a June 24 IED targeting
the al Houthi-controlled Saba News headquarters and a June 28 IED targeting an al Houthi convoy in Aya area of Sana’a.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a will continue to use VBIEDs to hit al Houthi targets in Yemen’s capital. AQAP’s main effort in
Yemen will continue to be supporting the local fights against the al Houthis, particularly in al Bayda and Shabwah.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN
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1) 22 JUN: ISIS
Wilayat Sana’a
militants detonated a
VBIED in front of al
Houthi controlled
Saba News
headquarters in
Sana’a.
2) 27 JUN: Popular
Resistance fighters
liberate al Zawb area
from al Houthis in
Rada’a, al Bayda.
3) 28 JUN: Popular
Resistance repelled
an al Houthi attack in
Sirwah, Ma’rib.
4) 29 JUN: ISIS
Wilayat Sana’a
militants detonated a
VBIED near a military
hospital in Sana’a.
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6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) remains unlikely to sign an agreement for the new state of
Galmudug, despite attempts by federal and local officials to reconcile with the group. ASWJ announced that it would soon
introduce an Islamic court to Dhusamareb, which it has held since June 7, and that they would hold their own version of the
central state building conference the group left on June 10.
Outlook: Tensions between the newly formed Galmudug Parliament and outlying groups in the central state region will
continue to escalate, especially as ASWJ institutes Islamic law in Dhusamareb. Al Shabaab is likely to use these tensions to the
group’s advantage as it advances on Mogadishu.
Security
National security forces have continued to increase their presence throughout the Horn of Africa in hopes of retaining the status
quo as it remains likely that al Shabaab will attempt additional high-profile attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
Ugandan police warned residents of intelligence pointing to a possible attack by the group in Kampala. Somali police launched
an operation in Afgoi, Lower Shabelle region, which led to the arrests of dozens of suspected al Shabaab militants.
Outlook: Regional security forces will continue to be on high alert as al Shabaab continues to conduct large-scale attacks and
high-profile assassinations during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is likely attempting to force foreign support for the Somali Federal Government to withdraw as the 2016 deadline for
federalization approaches. Al Shabaab claimed two high-profile attacks in Somalia and is believed to be behind multiple
shootings throughout the country as part of the group’s Ramadan campaign. The group detonated an SVBIED targeting Emirati
officials in Mogadishu and attacked an African Union Mission in Somalia base in the Lower Shabelle region, both of which
resulted in heavy causalities.
Outlook: Al Shabaab’s campaign of high profile attacks within close proximity to Mogadishu is likely to proceed as Ramadan
continues, especially as security forces increase their presence in the region.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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1) 24 JUN: Al Shabaab
detonated an SBVIED
targeting Emirati
officials in
Mogadishu.
2) 26 JUN: Al Shabaab
attacked an AMISOM
base in Lego, Lower
Shabelle region,
resulting in the
deaths of 50 Burundi
troops.
3) 26 JUN: Al Shabaab
beheaded a Somali
official kidnapped
during the group’s
Lego attack.
4) 28 JUN: Al Shabaab
executed three
accused of being CIA
spies in Sakow,
Middle Jubba region.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Internal diplomatic efforts, under the stewardship of the UN and UNSMIL Envoy Bernardino Leon, have made marginal
progress in resolving the Libyan political crisis. Representatives from the Libyan General National Congress (GNC) and
internationally-backed House of Representatives (HoR) agreed to sign draft 5 of the Libyan Political Accord, despite
disagreements.
Outlook: The hyper-partisan atmosphere in the talks in Sakhirat, Morocco has made negotiations difficult, resulting in a brief
suspension of activity this week . An inclusive reconciliation agreement would enable Libya’s partisan armed forces to combine
their dwindling resources in order to stabilize and rebuild with a focus on tackling ISIS’ s proxy forces on the coast.
Security
LNA forces established a foothold outside of Derna in preparation to reintegrate Derna into the HoR sphere of influence.
However, the unexpected détente with the Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD) ended with the MSCD’s June 28
ambush of auxiliary LNA forces at Ain Mara. Misrata initiated a new air campaign on Sirte, potentially without the permission of
Libya Dawn coalition leaders.
Outlook: The LNA will forego attempts at soft-power negotiation with Derna and will open a new front of combat to eliminate all
Islamist resistance forces under the influence of the MSCD.
Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya
Ansar al Sharia forces remained relatively inactive in Derna and Benghazi, following the June 14 USAF airstrike and the June
10 MSCD offensive against both ISIS and Ansar al Sharia forces. Ansar al Sharia has restricted its activities to IEDs and
indirect engagements in both Derna and Benghazi. ISIS also retreated from its offensive posture following the failed LNA
outpost raid in Fatahia on 20 JUN and refocused on asymmetric warfare in Derna using mortar fire.
Outlook: ISIS and Ansar al Sharia will struggle to regain their positions in Derna, Libya, after their ousting. Both groups will
focus on acquiring territory instead of direct engagements with the LNA or Libya Dawn as they reorganize and rebuild their
force strength.
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM appears to be adopting new strategies in order to combat ISIS’s expanding influence in West Africa. The newly
established “Shura Council of al Qaeda Africa,” which will probably help coordinate activities, is comprised of four groups:
AQIM, al Murabitoun, al Qaeda Sirte, and the Qaqaa ibn ‘Amr battalion. This consolidation is likely an attempt to balance ISIS
gains in the region. AQIM also released a high-quality, English-language video of two hostages, a style similar to ISIS
multimedia and divergent from AQIM’s traditional formatting.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to consolidate against ISIS in order to compete for support. It may seek to conduct attacks against
government or military targets to prove its continued relevance and to compete for recruits.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
ISIS demonstrated its strength in the region by conducting the deadliest terrorist attack in Tunisia’s history at a resort in Sousse,
Tunisia. The attack left 38 dead and 37 wounded, most of whom were foreign tourists. ISIS previously made threats against
foreigners in Tunisia. The terrorist was radicalized through the internet and in frequent visits to a Salafi mosque, two popular
ISIS recruiting grounds due to a relative lack of surveillance by state authorities.
Outlook: The Sousse attack may signal the beginning of an ISIS Ramadan campaign to create instability. Tunisia's tourism
sector will suffer significantly, especially after the March Bardo attack. A security crackdown may also invite retaliation.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Groups related to Ansar al Din continue to escalate attacks in Mali. Ansar al Din claimed an attack on a military camp in Nara,
Mali and the Ansar al Din-linked Massina Liberation Movement may be behind an attack on Fakola, Mali. Militants held the town
for several hours before the Malian army secured it. This is the second attack linked to Massina militants in the past two weeks.
Outlook: Ansar al Din and related groups are likely to continue attacks in southern Mali, launching raids from bordering
countries. The Massina Liberation Movement is becoming a more prominent subgroup of Ansar al Din and is likely to continue
regular attacks in order to solidify its position.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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LIBYAWEST AFRICA
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1) 24 JUN: ISIS-
affiliated forces in
Sirte advanced into
Zamzam, Libya, and
occupied it without
any resistance.
2) 24 JUN: An
unidentified UAV
targeted and
destroyed an Ansar al
Sharia ammunition
warehouse IVO
Ajdabiyah, Libya.
3) 28 JUN: MSCD
militants ambushed
LNA support forces
IVO Ain Mara, Ras al
Hilal, Libya, killing an
estimated 30 LNA
soldiers.

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
1) 23-24 JUN:
Tunisian authorities
dismantled two
terrorists cells in Kef,
Tunisia.
2) 25-28 JUN:
Algerian forces killed
3 militants during a
three-day operation
near Ain Defla, west
of Algiers.
3) 26 JUN: Terrorists
carried out a deadly
attack in Sousse,
Tunisia, killing 38 and
wounding 37. The
majority of the
victims were foreign
tourists. ISIS later
claimed credit for the
operation.
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12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA
1) 25 JUN: French
soldiers discovered
two militant camps
outside of Gao, Mali,
on the Nigerien
border.
2) 27 JUN: Ansar al
Din militants killed 3
soldiers in an attack
on a military camp in
Nara, Mali.
3) 28 JUN: Massina
Liberation Movement
militants took control
of the town of
Fakola, Mali for
several hours.
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13. ASSESSMENT:
Nuclear Talks
Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif claimed that if the nuclear talks do not produce a final deal “it won’t be the end of the
world.” On June 24, Planning and Strategic Supervision Deputy to the President Mohammad Bagher Nobakht stated that Iran
would accept an extension to the negotiation deadline if it led to a “good deal.” Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani and Head of the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi warned that excessive demands would prevent a deal, and Salehi
added that a “good deal” would not terminate or slow nuclear activities. On June 29, Zarif returned to Tehran as part of a
“planned” visit. Zarif stated that he would be back in Vienna for the June 30 deadline.
Outlook: These statements suggest that the regime is preparing its domestic audience for an extension of the June 30 deadline.
Regional Developments and Diplomacy
Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) Commander Hossein Ashtari announced that the LEF is prepared to increase cooperation with
Syria during a June 22 meeting with Syrian Interior Minister Mohammad Ibrahim al Shaar. While meeting with al Shaar on June
23, the Supreme Leader’s Foreign Policy Advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, referred to the upcoming trilateral meeting between Iran,
Iraq, and Syria in Baghdad as a “major development.” Iranian Interior Minister Abdolreza Rahmani Fazli announced that these
“three countries, which are alongside one another in the ‘resistance front against Israel,’…are fighting terrorism, violence, and
extremism.”
Outlook: The upcoming meeting is likely about a regional strategy vis-à-vis ISIS. Iran will continue to support Iraq and Syria as a
means to protect its own borders against ISIS.
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IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1423 JUNE – 30 JUNE 2015
23 JUN: Supreme Leader Khamenei discussed the resistance economy and outlined several red lines in the nuclear
negotiations.
23 JUN: Expert-level nuclear talks continued in Vienna, Austria.
23 JUN: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif told The New Yorker that if the nuclear talks do not produce a final deal, "it
won't be the end of the world."
23 JUN: Malta Freeport, a large international port on the island of Malta, “has renewed its contracts” with Hafiz Darya Shipping
Company (HDS) in anticipation that sanctions against Iran will be lifted “later this year.”
23 JUN: Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Ashtari announced that the LEF is prepared to
increase cooperation with Syria.
23 JUN: President Rouhani stated that Iran’s “approach to foreign policy is constructive engagement,” during a meeting with the
Supreme Leader and senior government officials.
24 JUN: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi reaffirmed Tehran’s
support for Syria “both in times of hardship and success.”
24 JUN: Ambassador to Russia Mehdi Sanaei met with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov in Moscow to discuss
preparations for the BRICS and SCO summits.
24 JUN: Funeral processions were held in Mashhad for five Iranian fighters killed in Syria.
24 JUN: Iraqi Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi al Modarresi reportedly traveled to Iran in order to meet with Supreme Leader
Khamenei.
25 JUN: President Rouhani stressed the need for moderation in Iran and the region during an iftar (fast breaking) with clerics.
25 JUN: Defense Minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan announced the appointment of several individuals to senior
positions in the Defense Ministry.
27 JUN: President Rouhani praised the armed forces and declared that Iran will continue to support oppressed people in the
region.
28 JUN: Supreme Leader Khamenei called for “independence and non-impressionability” in the judicial system.
28 JUN: IRGC Brig. Gen. Gholam Reza Jalali claimed that Saudi Arabia has evolved from a “regional rival” to a “proxy threat.”

15. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
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