The AEI's Critical Threats Project update highlights the rebuilding of ISIS combat capabilities in Libya and the potential for renewed attacks in early 2017. It also discusses the challenges facing Somalia's electoral process and the threats posed by Al Shabaab amid increased violence and opposition to the government. Additionally, the report notes the cooperation between AQAP and ISIS in Yemen and rising Al Qaeda influence in North Africa, particularly in Tunisia.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
January 3, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1. ISIS is rebuilding its combat capabilities in Libya and will likely begin a new
attack campaign in early 2017.
2. The failure of Somalia’s electoral process may compromise the regional and
international cooperation required to counter al Shabaab.
3. AQIM’s affiliate in Tunisia may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in
coastal population centers.
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3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
The U.S. continues to degrade al Qaeda leadership in Syria. Coalition airstrikes killed senior Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS)
leader Abu Omar al Turkistani on January 1. A U.S. airstrike also hit a JFS command building on January 3, killing at least
20 militants. JFS is the successor of al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. Al Qaeda affiliates continued to use the fall
of Aleppo, Syria, as a call to jihad. Al Qaeda-affiliated Telegram channels also disseminated several announcements in
Arabic, English, French, and Russian calling on Muslims worldwide to attack the West during the holiday season.
Outlook: JFS will replace attrited leadership and continue to pursue al Qaeda’s objectives in Syria.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The U.S. is attempting to constrain Pakistani government support for Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). LeT is an al Qaeda-linked
militant group that Pakistan has allegedly used as a proxy to attack Indian forces. The U.S. Department of State modified
LeT’s designation to include LeT’s student wing, al Muhammadia Students, which LeT had used to evade sanctions. The
U.S. Department of the Treasury also designated LeT’s emirs in Lahore and Karachi as specially designated terrorists.
Outlook: LeT may increase its reliance on illicit networks, including the al Qaeda network, to mitigate the effect of
sanctions.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
Political
The al Houthi-Saleh faction is seeking a political settlement in order to preserve its current influence in a future Yemeni
state. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh denounced parts of the UN’s October 2016 roadmap for peace talks on
December 31, but his statement likely indicates posturing to improve his negotiating position. The al Houthi-Saleh faction
previously agreed to the proposed roadmap on November 16. President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government is under
international pressure to join talks but is pursuing a military victory over the al Houthi-Saleh faction on the ground.
Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh faction and the Hadi government will agree to participate in preliminary talks in early 2017.
Security
Hadi government and allied forces are attempting to consolidate control of strategic locations on multiple fronts. Hadi
government forces seized the al Houthi-Saleh 101st Brigade’s headquarters in northern Sa’ada on January 1. Hadi
government and popular resistance forces also seized multiple positions in northwestern Shabwah governorate in an effort
to secure major roadways connecting to neighboring Ma’rib and al Bayda governorates. Resource constraints may slow
Hadi government forces’ progress on these high-conflict fronts.
Outlook: Hadi government forces will seek to reinforce recent gains and cut al Houthi-Saleh supply lines.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP and ISIS may be cooperating on a tactical level in central Yemen, where both groups are fighting alongside tribal
forces against the al Houthi-Saleh faction. AQAP and ISIS Wilayat al Bayda both claimed the same IED attack in western al
Bayda governorate on December 27. AQAP continues to produce propaganda for local and global audiences. AQAP-
affiliated media disseminated propaganda promoting lone-wolf attacks in America, France, and Russia in late 2016.
Outlook: AQAP will focus its military resources on local objectives in Abyan and al Bayda governorates while leveraging its
media capabilities to promote global Salafi-jihadi objectives.

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 27 DEC: Hadi
government forces
seized territory in
western Shabwah.
2) 27 DEC: ISIS and
AQAP claimed an IED
attack targeting al
Houthi-Saleh forces in
western al Bayda.
3) 29 DEC: A reported
U.S. airstrike killed
AQAP militants in
eastern al Bayda.
4) 03 JAN: AQAP
attacked Emirati-
backed counterrorism
forces in southern
Abyan.
5) 03 JAN: Hadi
government forces
seized strategic
mountains in eastern
Sa’ada.
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6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Somali presidential candidates are attempting to influence the elections. Election officials delayed the presidential contest
for the fourth time due to alleged fraud and voter intimidation. Somalia’s National Leadership Forum (NLF), a body aligned
with the incumbent president, is pursuing an unconstitutional expansion of the legislature that would increase its power. New
parliamentarians took office on December 28, but five seats remain unfilled due to insecurity and electoral disputes.
Outlook: Incumbent President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud will likely win re-election.
Security
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries (TCCs) are threatening to withdraw from the
coalition, risking AMISOM’s ability to counter al Shabaab. The EU delayed reimbursement to Kenya due to a payment
verification issue. Kenya has threatened to withdraw from AMISOM in an attempt to secure more EU funding. The
Burundian government is threatening an immediate withdrawal from AMISOM due to a payment dispute with the EU. The
EU seeks to pay Burundian soldiers directly rather than allow the sanctioned Burundian government to facilitate payments.
Outlook: Kenya will remain in AMISOM. Burundi may use the EU dispute to justify withdrawing from AMISOM and
redeploying troops to quell domestic protests.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab is disrupting security in Mogadishu and its environs. Militants attacked security forces in strategic Afgoi town,
located 15 miles from Mogadishu, on December 29. Al Shabaab suicide bombers also targeted a security checkpoint near
AMISOM’s headquarters in Mogadishu on January 2. Al Shabaab is attempting to disrupt Somalia’s elections. Militants
assassinated a parliamentary elector in Mogadishu on December 29 and kidnapped seven delegates in Galmudug State on
December 22. Al Shabaab also continued a campaign targeting communications infrastructure in eastern Kenya.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will increase the tempo of explosive attacks in Mogadishu as the election season continues.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
1) 23 DEC: Al
Shabaab temporarily
seized Haluqa town,
Garissa County.
2) 28 DEC: Al
Shabaab seized
Moqokori town in
Hiraan region.
3) 29 DEC: Al
Shabaab kiled a
parliamentary elector
in Mogadishu.
4) 29 DEC: Al
Shabaab attacked a
checkpoint in Afgoi
town, Lower Shabelle
region.
5) 02 JAN: Al
Shabaab detonated
two SVBIEDs at a
security checkpoint
near AMISOM’s HQ in
Mogadishu.
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8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is rapidly losing legitimacy due to internal divisions and the growing
political power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, whose supporters now control the
bulk of Libya’s oil. A member of the GNA’s Presidency Council resigned due to the body’s ineffectiveness. The GNA
reached a temporary funding agreement with Libya’s central bank but remains hampered by its lack of legislative authority.
Pro-Qaddafi sentiment, as demonstrated by the hijacking of a Libyan commercial by Qaddafi supporters on December 23, is
marginal but rising in response to governance failures.
Outlook: Haftar’s political allies will attempt to re-negotiate a political settlement that preserves Haftar’s power.
Security
Libya’s most powerful militia coalitions are resuming open civil conflict. The return of hostilities between the LNA and
Misratan militias signals a shift away from both groups’ prioritization of the fight against ISIS and al Qaeda. LNA airstrikes
struck a Misratan base and military plane in al Jufra district on December 26 and January 3. Misratan militias, including
GNA-allied forces that fought ISIS in Sirte, are partnering with Salafi Islamist militants to counter the LNA’s expansion into
central Libya. The LNA is also attempting to seize Misratan military sites in the southwestern Fezzan region.
Outlook: Hostilities between the LNA and Misrata will continue to escalate, risking the return of full-fledged civil conflict and
setting the conditions for Salafi-jihadi groups to gain support.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya. U.S.-backed Libyan forces drove ISIS out of its former stronghold
in Sirte city in summer and fall 2016. ISIS militants who left Sirte city are now gathering in new safe havens in western
Libya, where the group has established training camps. Suspected ISIS militants stole several vehicles likely intended for
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks.
Outlook: ISIS will conduct explosive attacks on military and government targets in western Libya.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 21 DEC: Militants
detonated two bombs
in Benghazi Medical
Center.
2) 25 DEC: Rival
militias clashed in Ain
Zara and Abu Saleem,
Tripoli.
3) 28 DEC: ISIS
raided a water plant
near al Shwayrif.
4) 28 DEC: LNA
airstrikes hit Chadian
rebels near Sukna.
5) 02 JAN: Misratan
forces clashed with
LNA forces at a
checkpoint near
Sebha.
06) 03 JAN: An LNA
airstrike destroyed a
Misratan C-130 in
Jufra district.
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| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
AQIM’s affiliate in Tunisia may be attempting to resume attacks in coastal population centers. Tunisian security forces
arrested ten Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia on December 29. AQIM media
outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in fall 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational
support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in
North Africa may be using Niger as a safe haven or transit zone. Nigerien security forces captured Winas al Faqih, a
Tunisian cleric with reported ties to both ISIS and al Qaeda in Tunisia and Libya, in Niger in November 2016.
Outlook: AQIM-affiliated militants may conduct an attack in a Tunisian coastal city in early 2017.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The potential breakdown of peace accords in Gao, Mali is setting conditions that Salafi-jihadi groups may exploit. The
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA), a Tuareg separatist coalition, withdrew from an implementation
committee for the peace accords in response to a ceasefire breach by rival forces and chaotic municipal elections. Armed
protesters prevented CMA members from participating in required joint patrols in Gao city on December 30, causing the
CMA to issue an ultimatum to UN and Malian forces demanding the CMA’s re-entry. Salafi-jihadi groups are active in Gao,
which is a regional smuggling hub, and will likely seek to exacerbate and exploit the unrest. AQIM-linked al Murabitoun may
be responsible for the kidnapping of a French aid worker in Gao city on December 25.
Ansaru, a Boko Haram splinter group with ties to AQIM, may intend to use Nigeria as a safe haven to plan an attack on the
U.S. homeland. A Nigerian intelligence official leaked to a local news source that internal security services thwarted an
Ansaru attack targeting the U.S. in September 2016. Ansaru broke with Boko Haram in 2012 in order to conduct operations
focusing on the West instead of the Nigerian state. Abu Musab Barnawi, the ISIS-recognized leader of Boko Haram, has
ties to Ansaru leader Mamman Nur, who tutored Barnawi as a child.
Outlook: Joint patrols may resume in Gao but tensions will remain high. Ansaru militants may use territory controlled by
Barnawi’s Boko Haram faction as a safe haven to plan attacks on the West.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 01 JAN: Algerian
soldiers arrested an
arms smuggler and two
militants in In
Guezzam,Tamanrasset
Province, Algeria.
2) 03 JAN: Algerian
soldiers killed two
militants in Laghouat
city, Laghouat
Province, Algeria.
3) 02 JAN: A bomb
exploded in Mouzaia,
Blida Province, Algeria,
killing two people and
injuring six children.
4) 02 JAN: Protesters
clashed with riot police
during strikes in Bejaia,
Algeria.
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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
1) 19 DEC: Malian
soldiers captured
three Ansar al Din
commanders in
Diafarabe, Mopti
Region.
2) 24 DEC: The
Nigerian Army claimed
to clear the Sambisa
Forest of Boko Haram
militants.
3) 25 DEC: A Boko
Haram suicide bomber
targeted a Christmas
market in Mora,
Cameroon.
4) 25 DEC: Suspected
al Murabitoun militants
kidnapped a French
aid worker in Gao city.
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13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

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Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Caitlin Pendleton
Iran analyst
caitlin.pendleton@aei.org
(202) 888-6577
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569