The document outlines several significant threats and developments regarding terrorist groups and political unrest in the Middle East and North Africa as of March 2015. Key highlights include ISIS claiming responsibility for deadly attacks in Yemen and Tunisia, and a noticeable decline in Iranian officials' confidence concerning a nuclear deal with P5+1. Additionally, Al-Qaeda appears to be seeking to assert relevance against ISIS while facing pressure from Pakistani military operations and fragmentation in the Yemeni state.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
March 24, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. ISIS “Wilayat Sana’a” claimed credit for the mass-casualty bombings in Sana’a.
2. ISIS claimed credit for the attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis.
3. Iranian regime officials seemed less confident in reaching a political framework for a
nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31 following talks in Lausanne, Switzerland.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its
followers in the West. Al Shabaab recently called for supporters to target shopping centers in the West, copying its 2013
Westgate Mall attack in Kenya, for example. Despite competition with ISIS, the al Qaeda network will continue to direct
resources to the Iraq-Syria front to support the Sunni populations.
Al Qaeda continues to emphasize a strategy that attempts to minimize Muslim casualties as compared to the one put forth by
ISIS. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s response to the ISIS-claimed attack in Yemen’s capital underscores AQAP’s
continued commitment to and observance of the protection of “public spaces” from terrorist attacks.
Outlook: Al Qaeda seeks to reassert its relevance in the global jihadist movement and will try to influence the decision-making
of foreign fighters in the Iraq-Syria conflict.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Pakistani Islamist groups, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah, the TTP’s Jamaat-
ul-Ahrar, and Lashkar-e-Islam announced they had merged to form a unified front against the Pakistan government and military.
Jamaat-ul-Ahrar had split from the TTP over Fazlullah’s selection as emir. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar also claimed credit for the Lahore
church bombings.
The Pakistani military (PakMil) continues to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes
in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan, especially in Khyber. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and
Pakistani airstrikes target TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.
Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan
border. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continues media operations and may launch additional spectacular attacks,
possibly in conjunction with TTP.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Yemeni state is fragmented between an al Houthi-run government in Sana’a and a President Hadi-run government in Aden.
A military escalation on March 19 in Aden along with the ISIS attack in Sana’a on March 20 mobilized the international
community to push for a negotiated solution to the political crisis, but the al Houthis are unwilling to join in talks hosted by the
Gulf Cooperation Council. Iranian assistance to the al Houthi-run government is probably lessening the impact of economic and
regional marginalization of the al Houthis.
Outlook: The al Houthis’ continued refusal to participate in talks will progress in reaching a political solution.
Security
The security situation deteriorated rapidly in Yemen. The al Houthis escalated the conflict with Hadi in Aden and both sides are
now deploying forces in order to secure territory. The al Houthis have seized parts of Yemen’s third largest city, Taiz, and are
also massing forces along the Ma’rib-al Bayda border. ISIS claimed responsibility for its first mass-casualty attack in Yemen that
killed over 130 people. ISIS also claimed responsibility for the execution of 29 soldiers in Lahij governorate in south Yemen.
Militants, reported as being members of AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia but possibly ISIS supporters, temporarily seized control of
Hawta, the capital of Lahij, before Yemeni troops secured it under Hadi’s orders.
Outlook: Hadi and the al Houthi movement will both try to solidify military control of their territory in the coming weeks. The
ISIS-claimed attacks targeting al Houthis in mosques are designed to drive sectarian tensions in Yemen. The al Houthis may
use the attacks as an excuse to crack down on dissenters and anti-al Houthi political actors.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
AQAP publicly distanced itself from the March 20 mosque bombings and affirmed its commitment to the strategy put forth by al
Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri that seeks to minimize Muslim casualties in attacks.
Outlook: AQAP will probably seek to challenge ISIS’s arrival in Yemen. It will also continue to expand its popular support by
embedding with local populations aligned against the al Houthis.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN
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1) 19 MAR: Pro-Hadi
popular committees
defeated Special
Security Forces (SSF)
led by an al Houthi
and Saleh-loyalist in
Aden city.
2) 20 MAR: ISIS
conducted five SVEST
attacks targeting al
Houthis in Sana’a and
Sa’ada.
3) 20 MAR: Militants
temporarily seized al
Hawta city, Lahij, and
executed 29 SSF
soldiers.
4) 19 MAR: Al Houthi
militants arrived in
Taiz city, Taiz from
Sana’a.
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6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Kenyan National Assembly Majority Leader Aden Duale suggested that Kenya should negotiate with al Shabaab to prevent
further attacks the day after an attack targeted the Mandera county governor, although later backed away from these
comments. An al Shabaab spokesman responded that the group would be open to negotiations if the offer came from the
Kenyan government. While the Kenyan government as a whole does not appear willing to negotiate with al Shabaab, it does
seem that some members, such as Duale, would be open to the idea.
Outlook: Duale’s statement indicates the mounting political pressure the Kenyan government has been under as terrorist
attacks in the country have increased.
Security
Al Shabaab has re-focused on Kenya based on Kenya’s role in AMISOM. Al Shabaab carried out two attacks in Kenya, one on
March 15 in Mandera and the second on March 17 in Wajir, both in Kenya’s North Eastern province. It was reported that Kenya
conducted two airstrikes in Somalia, possibly in retaliation for the attacks. The first airstrike occurred on March 16, near
Bardhere and the second on March 17, near Beled Hawo, both in Gedo region.
Outlook: Kenya is still committed to fighting al Shabaab and will likely continue to carry out operations against the group both
in Kenya and Somalia.
Al Shabaab
There may be a divide within al Shabaab between those who favor declaring allegiance to ISIS and those who remain loyal to al
Qaeda. An al Shabaab cleric issued a statement approving of ISIS and stating that he had no objections to al Shabaab joining
the group. He is the first al Shabaab cleric to make such a statement. He also hinted at a divide within the group over the
question of declaring allegiance to ISIS.
Outlook: The statement from the al Shabaab cleric is the most public instance of reported divides within al Shabaab over
staying with al Qaeda or joining ISIS. If these divides cannot be managed by al Shabaab leadership, they may weaken the
group and lead to infighting.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
1) 16 MAR: Kenyan
airstrike targeted al
Shabaab near
Bardhere, Gedo
region.
2) 17 MAR: Al
Shabaab conducted
an attack in Wajir,
North Eastern
province, Kenya.
3) 17 MAR: Kenyan
airstrike targeted al
Shabaab near Beled
Hawo, Gedo region.
4) 19 MAR: SNA and
AMISOM forces
launched operation
to open roads to
Bulo-Burde, Hiraan
region.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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8. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Unconfirmed reports stated that the Algerian military killed several senior AQIM officials in an attack on an AQIM meeting in
Bejaia, near Algiers. Rumors claimed that Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of AQIM, was among those killed, although this
claim could not be verified.
Outlook: If either of the reports on the death of AQIM leadership are true, it would be a significant setback for AQIM. Unrest in
Libya will continue to benefit AQIM and contribute to its overall ability to carry out smuggling operations in the Sahel.
Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia)
ISIS claimed a March 18 attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis, which killed over 20 foreigners. The attack was one of the
deadliest in Tunisia in over a decade. Tunisian counter-terrorism operations continued before, and increased after the attack. In
Libya, Ansar al Sharia Libya (ASL) released a set of pictures showing fighters training at a camp in Benghazi, indicting ASL
maintains a presence in there despite Libyan military gains and reports of defections to ISIS.
Outlook: Militant activity targeting Tunisian security forces and retaliatory counter-terrorism operations will likely continue to
increase, particularly in the aftermath of the Bardo Museum attack.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Thirty assailants attacked a MINUSMA convoy in Deliman, northern Mali. MINUSMA forces and the attackers exchanged
gunfire, resulting in the capture of four assailants. Meanwhile, AQIM militants executed one Malian civilian accused of spying for
French forces in Timbuktu. Suspected former MUJAO militants planted an IED close to Nampala that ultimately killed two
Malian soldiers. Malian security forces also killed one individual and arrested three others in connection to the 07 MAR al
Murabitoun restaurant attack.
Outlook: Militant activity targeting MINUSMA forces will continue to be a major problem for Mali. Recent AQIM and MUJAO
activity suggests that these groups will continue to stage more attacks, ultimately bringing more instability to an already divided
nation.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA
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1) 18 MAR: At least
two gunmen killed
over 20 foreign
tourists in the ISIS
attack at the Bardo
Museum in Tunis.
2) 17 MAR: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled four
terrorist cells and
arrested 22 militants
recruiting Tunisians
to fight in Libya, in
Kairouan.
3) 19 MAR: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled four
terrorists cells and
arrested 12 militants
in Gasfa.
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10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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SAHELWEST AFRICA
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1) 13 MAR:
Unidentified
assailants ambushed
a MINUSMA convoy
in Deliman.
2) 18 MAR: Malian
security forces
arrested three
individuals connected
to the 07 MAR
Bamako restaurant
attack.
3) 18 MAR: AQIM
militants executed a
Malian civilian on
charges of spying for
French forces in
Tichift.
4) 19 MAR:
Suspected MUJAO
members planted
IED.

11. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments
Iran’s Arab and African Affairs Deputy to the Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf
bin Alawi bin Abdullah in Muscat, to discuss the ongoing political and security crises in Yemen. Abdollahian reiterated Tehran’s
support for a multiparty coalition government in Sana’a and implored opposing political groups to engage in inclusive dialogue.
Tehran condemned the March 20, suicide bombings that targeted al Houthi mosques in Sana’a and Sa’ada. The Foreign
Ministry said the attacks are part of a seditious plot to exacerbate insecurity and unrest.
Outlook: Iran will continue to voice its support for a balance of power in the government of Sana’a, while reinforcing the al
Houthis as the main power broker in Yemen.
Nuclear Talks
Over the course of six days of bilateral U.S.-Iran talks last week in Lausanne, Switzerland, regime officials expressed gradually
less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. Atomic Energy Agency
Organization of Iran (AEOI) Head Ali Akbar Salehi expressed some hope on March 17 that two “remaining” issues would be
resolved by March 20, but Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated on March 20 that “two notable differences remain to
be negotiated.” The regime remained committed to reaching an agreement, however, as Zarif stated on March 19 that Iran
“would stay as long as it takes” in the talks. Iran and the P5+1 will resume negotiations on March 25.
Outlook: Iran will continue to work towards reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1.
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IRAN

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1214 MAR – 20 MAR 2015
15 MAR: Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati stated that the Islamic
Revolution is transnational, devoid of ethnic and tribal allegiances, and recognizes the entirety of the
Islamic world as one body.
15 MAR: The Guardian Council approved amendments to the 2015 budget.
15 MAR: The number of Parliamentarians who have signed a proposal calling for the removal of all sanctions
rose to 260.
16 MAR: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi
bin Abdullah in Muscat to discuss the political crisis in Yemen.
17 MAR: President Hassan Rouhani inaugurated phase 12 of the South Pars gas project, while Oil Minister
Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said that the South Pars gas project is a clear message to the world that
sanctions will not stop Iran’s oil industry.
17 MAR: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi
stated that a nuclear agreement is more likely now than in the past.
18 MAR: Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani announced that Assyrian Christians
requested training and weapons in a recent visit to Tehran.
18 MAR: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh criticized OPEC policies and said that Iran should work with non-OPEC
countries in reducing oil production.
19 MAR: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif insisted that the nuclear deal must be binding under
Chapter VII of the UN charter, eliciting criticism from Hossein Shariatmadari, Managing Editor of
conservative media outlet Kayhan.
20 MAR: Iran’s nuclear negotiations team returned to Iran to participate in memorial services for President
Rouhani’s mother. Negotiations are set to resume on Wednesday March 25.

13. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State (IS)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,
visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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