2015 03-24 CTP Update and Assessment
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CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. 1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed credit for simultaneous bombings at two mosques frequented by al Houthis in Sana’a and an attempt at third mosque in the al Houthi stronghold of Sa’ada in Yemen on March 20. The attack, ISIS’s first terrorist attack in Yemen, deliberately targeted al Houthis and was designed to stoke sectarian tensions. 2. ISIS also claimed the attack on Bardo Museum in Tunisia on March 18, signaling its presence in the country. The museum attack, along with a recent uptick in militant activity, shows that the Libyan conflict may be seriously undermining security in Tunisia. 3. The Iranian regime expressed less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. One of the key issues has been sanctions relief, with the Iranians pressing for the immediate lifting of sanctions.
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2015-11-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
2016-04-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
2016-05-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
2016-03-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
2016-05-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be preparing to attack Tunisian targets in conjunction with Ramadan, an Islamic holy month, and the centennial anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Tunisian security forces interdicted a suspected pro-ISIS attack in La Marsa, the site at which Tunisian officials established a French protectorate in 1882. ISIS traditionally surges before or during Ramadan, and the holiday’s juxtaposition with the Sykes-Picot anniversary will probably inspire attacks on symbols of Western colonialism in the near term.
2. An offensive against ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte remains likely, though deep divisions within Libya’s armed forces may limit its effectiveness. Clashes continue between Libyan National Army (LNA) and Misratan forces, forces on opposite sides of Libya’s civil war. ISIS continues to harden Sirte’s defenses and lay the groundwork for a controlled withdrawal from the city, should holding Sirte become untenable. Sirte is not the sole key to defeating ISIS in Libya, however, and ISIS will likely continue to destabilize the region from a base in southwestern Libya.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) may be preparing to withdraw from Zinjibar, Abyan, following reports of local mediation. AQAP just withdrew its forces from al Mukalla, Hadramawt before a Yemeni offensive with Emirati support. The loss of these cities is a temporary setback for AQAP, however. The group derives its strength from popular support, not territorial control, and it has resurged from similar losses in 2012.
2016-06-21 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
2015-06-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
2016-02-09 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
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2015-11-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
2016-04-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
2016-05-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
2016-03-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
2016-05-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be preparing to attack Tunisian targets in conjunction with Ramadan, an Islamic holy month, and the centennial anniversary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Tunisian security forces interdicted a suspected pro-ISIS attack in La Marsa, the site at which Tunisian officials established a French protectorate in 1882. ISIS traditionally surges before or during Ramadan, and the holiday’s juxtaposition with the Sykes-Picot anniversary will probably inspire attacks on symbols of Western colonialism in the near term.
2. An offensive against ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte remains likely, though deep divisions within Libya’s armed forces may limit its effectiveness. Clashes continue between Libyan National Army (LNA) and Misratan forces, forces on opposite sides of Libya’s civil war. ISIS continues to harden Sirte’s defenses and lay the groundwork for a controlled withdrawal from the city, should holding Sirte become untenable. Sirte is not the sole key to defeating ISIS in Libya, however, and ISIS will likely continue to destabilize the region from a base in southwestern Libya.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) may be preparing to withdraw from Zinjibar, Abyan, following reports of local mediation. AQAP just withdrew its forces from al Mukalla, Hadramawt before a Yemeni offensive with Emirati support. The loss of these cities is a temporary setback for AQAP, however. The group derives its strength from popular support, not territorial control, and it has resurged from similar losses in 2012.
2016-06-21 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
2015-06-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) Wilayat Sana’a may have begun a Ramadan vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign targeting the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The group claimed credit for four simultaneous bombings on the first day of Ramadan and has continued VBIED attacks in the capital that ISIS has framed as part of a campaign in its messaging. ISIS is probably seeking to inflame sectarian tensions in Yemen and elicit an overreaction from the al Houthis.
2. The Iranian regime continued to stress that it has not compromised on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s nuclear redlines ahead of the June 30 deadline to reach a final deal with the P5+1. Khamenei highlighted four key red lines for a final nuclear agreement in a June 23 speech: Iran will not accept a “long-term limitation [on enrichment] of 10-12 years;” there will be no limitations “on [nuclear] research, development, and construction” during the period limiting enrichment; the UN Security Council, Congress, and U.S. government economic sanctions must be removed “immediately after the signing of the agreement;” and there will be no inspections of military sites, interviews with Iranian scientists, or other “unconventional” inspections.
3. Al Qaeda-linked groups in West Africa may be attempting to coordinate against the threat of ISIS. There are reports of a recent rapprochement of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun leadership. Al Murabitoun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who is reported to have survived the U.S. airstrike targeting him, initially broke from AQIM in 2012 over disagreements as to the direction of AQIM. Additionally, AQIM’s religious scholars have issued statements chastising ISIS.
2016-02-09 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
2016 11-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
2016-03-01 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
2016-05-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
2016 08-30 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
2016-06-28 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
2016-07-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
2016 09-06 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
2016-06-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
2016 11-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
2017 01-03 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
2016-06-14 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016-05-31 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
2016 07-19 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
2016 10-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
2016 07-12 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
2015-06-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis escalated the conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi Arabian airbase and conducting an attack alongside Yemeni military units against Saudi border forces, which may further impede efforts to reach a negotiated political solution. Both the al Houthis and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government have agreed to participate in UN-led talks in Geneva on June 14, though Hadi’s government signaled it sees the talks as a means to begin implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The resolution calls for the al Houthis to disarm and to withdraw from seized territory.
2. Iranian IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami’s comments on the Yemeni people indicate a rhetorical escalation on the importance of the Yemeni conflict. Salami characterized Yemenis as “more oppressed” than Palestinians, and his comments may mark a shift in the IRGC’s depiction of Yemenis.
3. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit friction points between the Somali federal government and local administrations as the country’s federalization process moves forward. The Sufi group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had allied with the Somali federal government to fight al Shabaab, recently seized control of the Galgudud region capital from Somali federal government forces. ASWJ officials cite their marginalization within the Somali federalization process as a core grievance against the federal government.
2016 09-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2016-02-23 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
2015-11-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The claim of responsibility from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) for an attack in Tunis may mark a shift in how ISIS is selecting targets in Tunisia. An ISIS suicide bomber attacked a bus transporting presidential guards on November 24, killing at least 13 people in the center of Tunis, according to Tunisian authorities. The attack occurred near the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, a secure area in Tunis. Previous ISIS attacks focused on the tourism industry.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in Mali. At least two Islamist militants laid siege to an American-owned hotel in the center of Mali’s capital, Bamako, on November 20, temporarily holding 170 hostages and killing at least 19 people, similar to an attack in August. Multiple Islamist jihadist groups are implicated in the attack. Al Murabitoun claimed responsibility with support from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Saharan Brigade. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din’s southern brigade, the Macina Liberation Front, also claimed credit for the attack. The attack was reportedly in retaliation for the French counterterrorism campaign in Mali, Operation Barkhane. AQIM affiliates in Mali will likely build off of the Bamako attack to target UN, French, and Malian security forces, as well as those who cooperate with them.
3. Iran’s decision to join the Syrian peace talks in Vienna does not signal a thawing of relations with the West; the Supreme Leader will not shift his position and authorize direct negotiations with the U.S. on non-nuclear issues.
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2016 11-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
2016-03-01 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
2016-05-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
2016 08-30 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S.-backed campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya may culminate prematurely. Libyan militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) may declare victory over ISIS in Sirte within the coming days, and U.S. air support for GNA-allied militias could end as early as this week. The loss of Sirte has not reduced ISIS’s ability to conduct high-casualty explosive attacks, and the group may be increasingly active in southwestern Libya, according to local security sources. CTP assessed in April 2016 that ISIS would likely withdraw from Sirte and attempt to establish a safe haven in southern Libya. The conditions are set for ISIS to survive and likely resurge in Libya after the U.S. air campaign ends.
2. A political resolution to the civil war in Yemen remains unlikely. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced a revised peace plan on August 25 based on the formation of a national unity government—an al Houthi-Saleh demand excluded from the preliminary stages of prior UN-led negotiations. Secretary Kerry also emphasized the need for al Houthi-Saleh forces to withdraw from Sana’a, Yemen’s capital, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance is unlikely to withdraw from Sana’a, where its recently formed Supreme Political Council has popular support. Al Houthi-Saleh leadership is seeking to legitimize the new governing body as a challenge to the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, which operates from Aden.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called on the Sunni community to unite against American and Iranian intervention. He accused the U.S. and Iran of forming an alliance that aims to exterminate Sunni populations and appealed to Iraqi Sunni, in particular, to fight “occupation” in their country. Zawahiri also called on members of ISIS to renounce their current allegiance and follow in the footsteps of Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the late leader of the former al Qaeda in Iraq. Zawahiri’s statements were likely timed to capitalize on ISIS’s recent territorial losses in Iraq and Syria. Zawahiri called for the formation of a “shari’a judiciary” in Syria, possibly indicating that al Qaeda will take additional measures to unify Salafi-jihadi groups there.
2016-06-28 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1) The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its Ramadan surge in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt detonated four explosive devices in a coordinated attack on multiple Yemeni military locations in al Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate on June 27. The suicide attacks targeted Yemeni security personnel gathering to break their fasts. A June 9 CTP assessment forecast that ISIS would carry out attacks on these targets before the end of Ramadan, an Islamic holy month. Ramadan runs from June 5 to July 5 in 2016. ISIS may attempt another large-scale explosive attack on a government or military target in Aden or al Mukalla before July 5.
2) Al Shabaab continued its Ramadan offensive with a complex attack on the Naso Hablod Hotel in Mogadishu. Militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) to breach the compound before detonating a suicide vest and opening fire on guests. The attack killed 16 people, including a Somali government minister, and wounded at least 24 others. Al Shabaab may attempt an attack on a Somali National Army (SNA) or African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) base before July 5.
3) Libyan factions are using counterterrorism operations as cover to compete for control of terrain in eastern Libya. The Libyan National Army (LNA) and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG), which are allied with two competing political bodies, are converging on Ajdabiya city with the stated intent of fighting an Islamist militia coalition there, but are preparing to fight each other. The PFG’s engagement with the LNA may pull forces away from territory east of Sirte, providing an opportunity for ISIS militants currently besieged in the city.
2016-07-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
2016 09-06 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
2016-06-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Libyan counter-ISIS campaign will likely become a prolonged siege of city. Armed factions that support the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) are advancing on Sirte from the east and west. Some of these forces are shaping their offensive to cut off ISIS’s access to southwest Libya, the most likely route by which ISIS would attempt a tactical withdrawal should holding Sirte become untenable. ISIS is calling for reinforcements and dedicating significant resources to hardening the city’s defenses and delaying its enemies’ advance. The current Libyan forces lack the capability to take Sirte without support, and continued competition between rival Libyan militias and political powerbrokers will likely impede efforts to oust ISIS from its urban stronghold.
2. Al Shabaab attacks against Somali government and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) targets will likely surge during Ramadan month. Al Shabaab conducted a complex attack on Mogadishu’s Ambassador Hotel on June 1 that killed at least 16 people, including two members of the Somali Parliament, following warnings that the group plans to increase its attacks during the Ramadan season. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate resiliency and attack capabilities despite a U.S.-backed campaign targeting its leadership. A U.S. airstrike killed senior al Shabaab military commander and intelligence chief Abdullahi Haji Da’ud on May 27, and U.S. advisers supported a raid that killed senior commander Mohamed Mohamud Kuno, who masterminded the April 2015 attack on Kenya’s Garissa University, on May 31.
3. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) echoed guidance that had been issued by senior al Qaeda leadership. The group’s leader and its spokesman both issued statements that warned against killing Muslim civilians in attacks. AQIS emir Asim Umar encouraged fighters instead to attack “the head of the serpent,” and engage in the far war. AQIS spokesman Usama Mahmoud condemned the January 2016 Bacha Khan University and December 2015 Pakistan National Database and Registration Authority attacks.
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
2016 11-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is conducting a campaign to seize strategic positions vacated by African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces in central and southern Somalia. Ethiopian AMISOM forces are withdrawing from Somalia. The forces are probably re-deploying inside Ethiopia to quell spreading anti-government protests by the Oromo and Amhara people. The Tigray minority dominates the Ethiopian government. Al Shabaab’s recapture of key towns is a setback for AMISOM and Somali forces allied against the group and sets conditions for al Shabaab to resurge in central Somalia.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be developing a relationship with a militant group in the Sahel, signaling ISIS’s intent to continue expanding in Africa. A pro-ISIS media outlet disseminated a pledge of bayat (allegiance) from a former al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) militant leader, Abu Walid al Sahrawi, to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi on October 30. Al Sahrawi had first pledged bayat to al Baghdadi in 2015 but recently claimed responsibility for a series of attacks in Niger and Burkina Faso that may have earned recognition from the ISIS network. ISIS will continue to expand in Africa despite the loss of its regional hub in Sirte, Libya.
3. The combatants in Yemen’s civil war remain focused on military objectives in order to improve their negotiating positions for a political resolution to the conflict. Both President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance rejected a UN-proposed peace plan after alleging that it favored their rivals. The Hadi government and its backer, the Saudi-led coalition, continued efforts to advance on key frontlines and degrade al Houthi-Saleh leadership and military capabilities. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a ballistic missile toward Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on October 28.
2017 01-03 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
2016-06-14 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016-05-31 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
2016 07-19 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
2016 10-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
2016 07-12 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and its military are preparing for an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The offensive, backed by Saudi Arabia, would incite former President Saleh’s base in northwest Yemen to fight against Saudi-backed forces, mobilizing a large segment of the population that has not yet joined the civil war. This mobilization would prolong the civil war and draw attention and resources away from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), creating conditions that AQAP could exploit for growth.
2. Al Qaeda is asserting its position as the vanguard for the global Salafi-jihadi movement over the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri criticized ISIS emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi for failing to submit to authority figures when he was a part of the al Qaeda network. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, threatened revenge against the U.S. for the death of his father. This threat echoes a statement released by al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing on June 30 in which Zawahiri threatened consequences for the U.S. should it execute Boston marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev.
3. African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troop-contributing countries announced the intent to transition security responsibility to Somali forces in 2018 and to withdraw completely from Somalia by 2020. The UN reauthorized the AMISOM coalition at the current maximum force level of 22,126 troops until May 31, 2017. The Somali National Army (SNA) will not be capable of providing adequate security by 2018 and 2020. Current AMISOM troop levels have failed to sufficiently reduce the threat posed by al Shabaab, and a premature drawdown will give the group the opportunity to resurge.
2015-06-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis escalated the conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi Arabian airbase and conducting an attack alongside Yemeni military units against Saudi border forces, which may further impede efforts to reach a negotiated political solution. Both the al Houthis and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government have agreed to participate in UN-led talks in Geneva on June 14, though Hadi’s government signaled it sees the talks as a means to begin implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The resolution calls for the al Houthis to disarm and to withdraw from seized territory.
2. Iranian IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami’s comments on the Yemeni people indicate a rhetorical escalation on the importance of the Yemeni conflict. Salami characterized Yemenis as “more oppressed” than Palestinians, and his comments may mark a shift in the IRGC’s depiction of Yemenis.
3. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit friction points between the Somali federal government and local administrations as the country’s federalization process moves forward. The Sufi group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had allied with the Somali federal government to fight al Shabaab, recently seized control of the Galgudud region capital from Somali federal government forces. ASWJ officials cite their marginalization within the Somali federalization process as a core grievance against the federal government.
2016 09-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The takeover of four eastern Libyan oil ports by a militia coalition may ignite armed conflict between Libya’s rival governments. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition led by General Khalifa Haftar, seized four oil ports in eastern Libya from militias allied with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) on September 11. The seizure scuttled the GNA’s efforts to resume oil exports from eastern Libya, undermining a major effort to secure legitimacy for the fragile unity government. The LNA’s advance threatens the interests of western Libyan militias aligned with the GNA. These militias fought against the LNA in central Libya in the past and may resume hostilities in response to LNA aggression in the oil crescent. Libyan actors will prioritize the unresolved civil war over the fight against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya.
2. Escalating economic protests in Tunisia may incite a government crackdown and draw limited security resources away from counter-terrorism operations. Protests broke out in Fernana, northwestern Tunisia on September 7 after a café worker named Wisam Nisrah set himself on fire. Nisrah’s self-immolation and the subsequent protests mirror the event s that sparked Tunisia’s Arab Spring uprising in December 2010. Similar protests began in Ben Guerdane, eastern Tunisia on September 5. Growing protests could destabilize Tunisia’s new unity government. Civil unrest strains limited security resources and provides opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Tunisian affiliate and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), to conduct attacks.
3. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for Muslims to continue the fight against the U.S. and to reject ISIS’s ideology in a video commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks. Zawahiri emphasized al Qaeda’s role as a defender of the oppressed. He urged black Americans to turn to shari’a and al Qaeda for justice. Zawahiri also emphasized al Qaeda’s power as a unifying “message” rather than a physical group, like ISIS, that imposes its will on Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to reinforce al Qaeda’s position as the leader of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
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2016-02-23 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
2015-11-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The claim of responsibility from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) for an attack in Tunis may mark a shift in how ISIS is selecting targets in Tunisia. An ISIS suicide bomber attacked a bus transporting presidential guards on November 24, killing at least 13 people in the center of Tunis, according to Tunisian authorities. The attack occurred near the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, a secure area in Tunis. Previous ISIS attacks focused on the tourism industry.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in Mali. At least two Islamist militants laid siege to an American-owned hotel in the center of Mali’s capital, Bamako, on November 20, temporarily holding 170 hostages and killing at least 19 people, similar to an attack in August. Multiple Islamist jihadist groups are implicated in the attack. Al Murabitoun claimed responsibility with support from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Saharan Brigade. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din’s southern brigade, the Macina Liberation Front, also claimed credit for the attack. The attack was reportedly in retaliation for the French counterterrorism campaign in Mali, Operation Barkhane. AQIM affiliates in Mali will likely build off of the Bamako attack to target UN, French, and Malian security forces, as well as those who cooperate with them.
3. Iran’s decision to join the Syrian peace talks in Vienna does not signal a thawing of relations with the West; the Supreme Leader will not shift his position and authorize direct negotiations with the U.S. on non-nuclear issues.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
2016-01-26 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
2015 02-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
2015-05-27 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Key Iranian regime players’ meetings with senior Syrian and Iraqi government officials and the Hezbollah Secretary General may signal Iranian efforts to bring more force to bear in defense of Assad and Baghdad against the growing ISIS threat. The Supreme Leader’s senior foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati met with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon before meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria while Iran’s defense minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi in Baghdad, Iraq. IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani also levied criticism directly against the United States for not stopping ISIS.
2. Al Houthi attacks on Saudi territory will continue to antagonize Saudi Arabia and will decrease the likelihood that warring factions will participate in political negotiations in the near future. The al Houthis fired rockets at populated locations within Saudi Arabia and raided Saudi Arabian border posts over the past week. An al Houthi-affiliated TV channel ran video footage of al Houthis allegedly firing into Saudi Arabia. UN-sponsored talks in Geneva announced last week have been delayed.
3. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate its capability to conduct attacks within Kenya and carried out multiple attacks, including temporarily seizing territory, in northern Kenyan over the week. Al Shabaab militants took control of a mosque in Garissa county in Kenya and spoke to the congregation, which was held hostage, before fleeing ahead of security forces and also briefly held a town close to the border with Somalia. This the first time the group has carried out such activities in Kenya.
2017 05-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
2015-10-20 CTP Update and Assessment
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
2016-04-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Representatives from the al Houthis and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s General People’s Congress party (GPC) are refusing to attend UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until the ceasefire is implemented and Saudi-led coalition airstrikes against al Houthi-Saleh positions stop. Key Yemeni factions would not have had representation at the Kuwait talks and would have been unlikely to accept a negotiated solution. These factions, which include southern secessionists, would probably continue to fight to secure their interests.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its explosives capabilities in eastern Libya and will use them to deter action against its stronghold in Sirte. ISIS will likely use these capabilities against the Libyan National Army (LNA), which may be assembling a force to attack Sirte, as well as against civilian populations to undermine the LNA in Benghazi. ISIS is conducting similar attacks on Misratan militia positions in western Libya, likely to deter Misratan operations. ISIS will likely attack Libya’s new unity government, too, especially as it becomes the West’s preferred counterterrorism partner in Libya.
3. ISIS is building a support network in Tunisia to support the establishment of a formal ISIS wilayat in Tunisia. ISIS is attempting to co-opt al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s networks in western Tunisia, where it is developing safe havens from which to conduct attacks in both Tunisia and Algeria. The group is also recruiting heavily in eastern Tunisia’s population centers, where Tunisian security forces recently arrested a deputy mayor for belonging to a pro-ISIS cell, indicating the extent to which ISIS is attempting to infiltrate Tunisian society.
2015 02-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
2015-06-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The direct talks between the al Houthis and U.S. officials in Oman may indicate a shift in the al Houthis’ position. The group previously refused to open a direct line of communication with the U.S. and may now be more open to a U.S. role in ongoing Yemeni political negotiations. It is not clear yet whether the U.S.-al Houthi talks are solely focused on the status of three remaining U.S. citizens detained by the group in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, or whether the talks include the ongoing political crisis in the country.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be expanding its presence in Algeria and Tunisia. A Tunisian soldier opened fire on his colleagues in Tunisia, with pro-ISIS fighters claiming to have radicalized the assailant. Local reports from Algerian prisons also indicate that AQIM members are shifting their allegiances to ISIS, while Syria-based ISIS Wilayat Damascus released a message targeting Algerian supporters.
3. Al Shabaab may be attempting to position itself for future operations, indicated by an attack on military bases in Kaxda district on the outskirts of Mogadishu. The group also reportedly controlled a Kenyan border town for two days, continuing a shift in al Shabaab’s activities in northern Kenya from conducting attacks to attempting to control territory.
2016-01-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
2015 02-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemeni political actors met in Aden and called for the establishment of an alternative capital to Sana’a in either Aden or Taiz, both former capitals, on February 15. There appears to be growing support for an alternative government or regional autonomy throughout Yemen. Sana’a-based politicians reached an agreement to form a new transitional council composed of underrepresented groups, but could not agree on a way forward for Yemen’s executive branch.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced the concept of Iran’s “Economy of Resistance” in a February 18 speech as a reaction to the West’s continued economic pressure on Iran. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani added that the resistance economy did not imply Iran would close itself off from the global economy.
3. Al Shabaab claimed credit for the bombing of a hotel in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, that killed and injured dozens of people, including Somali government officials, on February 20. Al Shabaab has lost control of some of its strongholds in Somalia, but still maintains its capability to conduct asymmetric attacks.
2015-12-01 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials continue to voice their opposition to peace plans for regional crises that involve the partitioning of Iraq or Syria. Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei claimed that the reconstitution of borders would be “detrimental to Muslims” and stated, “We have clearly said that absolutely no border must be changed and that no country can be broken apart.” Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, meanwhile, warned of foreign plots to undermine Iraqi national unity during a meeting with Iraqi President Fuad Masum in Tehran.
2. An outright military victory in Yemen grows increasingly unlikely as the Saudi-led coalition shifts from combat to stabilization operations. The UAE is training Colombian mercenaries and Eritrean forces to replace Emirati combat troops in Yemen, and Emirati Special Forces troops are focused on securing only Aden and its immediate environs. The primary frontlines in central Yemen remain fixed along lines of support in the human terrain, and the coalition is focused on maintaining its current positions against al Houthi-Saleh counterattacks.
3. Al Shabaab is taking advantage of Kenyan-Somali tensions to cross the border and expand its operational and recruitment capabilities in Kenya. Militants stormed at least two villages in Kenya this week, raising flags and preaching to residents before evading security forces and crossing back into Somalia. Al Shabaab will likely exploit this freedom of movement to drive recruitment in the border region and conduct attacks within Kenya.
2016-04-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
2017-05-23 CTP Update and Assessment
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
2016-02-02 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls the populated areas along the main road from Aden to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. It is reconstituting control over the territory it held in 2011 and 2012 and is further consolidating control in al Mukalla. AQAP seized Azzan city in Shabwah governorate, which served as one of its primary bases of operation in 2011-2012, and stoned a man to death in al Mukalla.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is increasing its territorial control along the central Libyan coast as Western forces prepare to launch airstrikes and possibly special operations to curb the group’s expansion. ISIS seized a village to the west of its stronghold in Sirte and continues to contest control of key infrastructure in the central Libyan oil crescent. The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are preparing to target ISIS in Libya. Current discussions about military action in Libya do not include targeting al Qaeda-linked groups also active in the country.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a Swiss nun taken hostage if demands for the release of AQIM members were not met. Among those AQIM lists is Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, in the custody of the International Criminal Court. AQIM has successfully negotiated previous prisoner exchanges and those who have been released return to operations.
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Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
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https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
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YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
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3：凡是获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内将在公安部网内查询个人身份证信息后同步读取人才网入库信息。
4：个人职称评审加20分个人信誉贷款加10分。
5：在国家人才网主办的全国网络招聘大会中纳入资料供国家500强等高端企业选择人才。碌爬起把牛驱到后龙山再从莲塘里采回一蛇皮袋湿漉漉的莲蓬也才点多点半早就吃过早餐玩耍去了山娃的家在闽西山区依山傍水山清水秀门前潺潺流淌的蜿蜒小溪一直都是山娃和小伙伴们盛夏的天然泳场水不深碎石底石缝里总有摸不尽的鱼虾活蹦乱跳的还有乌龟和王八贼头贼脑的倒也逗人喜爱日上三竿时山娃总爱窜进自家瓜棚里跟小伙伴们坐着聊天聊着聊着便忍不住往瓜田里逡巡一番抱起一只硕大的西瓜用石刀劈开抑或用拳头砸开每人抱起一大块就之
一比一原版(Adelaide毕业证)阿德莱德大学毕业证成绩单
Adelaide毕业证【微信95270640】国外文凭购买阿德莱德大学留信认证毕业证书印刷品《Q微信95270640》学历认证怎么做：原版仿制阿德莱德大学电子版成绩单毕业证认证《阿德莱德大学毕业证成绩单》、阿德莱德大学文凭证书成绩单复刻offer录取通知书、购买Adelaide圣力嘉学院本科毕业证、《阿德莱德大学毕业证办理Adelaide毕业证书哪里买》、阿德莱德大学 Offer在线办理Adelaide Offer阿德莱德大学Bachloer Degree。
【实体公司】办阿德莱德大学阿德莱德大学硕士学位证成绩单学历认证学位证文凭认证办留信网认证办留服认证办教育部认证（网上可查实体公司专业可靠）
— — — 留学归国服务中心 — — -
【主营项目】
一.阿德莱德大学毕业证成绩单使馆认证教育部认证成绩单等！
二.真实使馆公证(即留学回国人员证明,不成功不收费)
三.真实教育部学历学位认证（教育部存档！教育部留服网站永久可查）
四.办理各国各大学文凭(一对一专业服务,可全程监控跟踪进度)
国外毕业证学位证成绩单办理流程：
1客户提供阿德莱德大学阿德莱德大学硕士学位证成绩单办理信息：姓名生日专业学位毕业时间等（如信息不确定可以咨询顾问：我们有专业老师帮你查询）；
2开始安排制作毕业证成绩单电子图；
3毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
4毕业证成绩单电子版您确认信息无误之后安排制作成品；
5成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
6快递给客户（国内顺丰国外DHLUPS等快读邮寄）。
专业服务请勿犹豫联系我！本公司是留学创业和海归创业者们的桥梁。一次办理终生受用一步到位高效服务。详情请在线咨询办理,欢迎有诚意办理的客户咨询!洽谈。
招聘代理：本公司诚聘英国加拿大澳洲新西兰美国法国德国新加坡各地代理人员如果你有业余时间有兴趣就请联系我们咨询顾问：+微信:95270640光总是太短太匆忙记得今年正月就在父亲扛起蛇皮袋将要跨出门槛的一刹那山娃突然抱紧父亲的大腿嚎啕大哭父亲吃力地掰开山娃的手哽咽道山娃好好听话好好念书到了暑假爸也接你进城爸的城好远好大好美山娃于是天天扳着手指算计着读书也格外刻苦无奈时间总过得太慢太慢每次父亲往家打电话山娃总抢着接听一个劲地提醒父亲别忘了正月说的话电话那头总会传来父亲嘿嘿的笑连连说记得记得但别忘了拿奖状进城啊考试一结束山娃就迫不及待地给间
Uniform Guidance 3.0 - The New 2 CFR 200
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
如何办理(uoit毕业证书)加拿大安大略理工大学毕业证文凭证书录取通知原版一模一样
原版纸张【微信：741003700 】【(uoit毕业证书)加拿大安大略理工大学毕业证】【微信：741003700 】学位证，留信认证（真实可查，永久存档）offer、雅思、外壳等材料/诚信可靠,可直接看成品样本，帮您解决无法毕业带来的各种难题！外壳，原版制作，诚信可靠，可直接看成品样本。行业标杆！精益求精，诚心合作，真诚制作！多年品质 ,按需精细制作，24小时接单,全套进口原装设备。十五年致力于帮助留学生解决难题，包您满意。
本公司拥有海外各大学样板无数，能完美还原海外各大学 Bachelor Diploma degree, Master Degree Diploma
1:1完美还原海外各大学毕业材料上的工艺：水印，阴影底纹，钢印LOGO烫金烫银，LOGO烫金烫银复合重叠。文字图案浮雕、激光镭射、紫外荧光、温感、复印防伪等防伪工艺。材料咨询办理、认证咨询办理请加学历顾问Q/微741003700
留信网认证的作用:
1:该专业认证可证明留学生真实身份
2:同时对留学生所学专业登记给予评定
3:国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书
4:这个认证书并且可以归档倒地方
5:凡事获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内，将在公安局网内查询个人身份证信息后，同步读取人才网入库信息
6:个人职称评审加20分
7:个人信誉贷款加10分
8:在国家人才网主办的国家网络招聘大会中纳入资料，供国家高端企业选择人才
Many ways to support street children.pptx
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
快速制作(ocad毕业证书)加拿大安大略艺术设计学院毕业证本科学历雅思成绩单原版一模一样
原版纸张【微信：741003700 】【(ocad毕业证书)加拿大安大略艺术设计学院毕业证】【微信：741003700 】学位证，留信认证（真实可查，永久存档）offer、雅思、外壳等材料/诚信可靠,可直接看成品样本，帮您解决无法毕业带来的各种难题！外壳，原版制作，诚信可靠，可直接看成品样本。行业标杆！精益求精，诚心合作，真诚制作！多年品质 ,按需精细制作，24小时接单,全套进口原装设备。十五年致力于帮助留学生解决难题，包您满意。
本公司拥有海外各大学样板无数，能完美还原海外各大学 Bachelor Diploma degree, Master Degree Diploma
1:1完美还原海外各大学毕业材料上的工艺：水印，阴影底纹，钢印LOGO烫金烫银，LOGO烫金烫银复合重叠。文字图案浮雕、激光镭射、紫外荧光、温感、复印防伪等防伪工艺。材料咨询办理、认证咨询办理请加学历顾问Q/微741003700
留信网认证的作用:
1:该专业认证可证明留学生真实身份
2:同时对留学生所学专业登记给予评定
3:国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书
4:这个认证书并且可以归档倒地方
5:凡事获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内，将在公安局网内查询个人身份证信息后，同步读取人才网入库信息
6:个人职称评审加20分
7:个人信誉贷款加10分
8:在国家人才网主办的国家网络招聘大会中纳入资料，供国家高端企业选择人才
一比一原版(UQ毕业证)昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单
UQ毕业证【微信95270640】昆士兰大学没毕业>办理昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单【微信UQ】UQ毕业证成绩单UQ学历证书UQ文凭《UQ毕业套号文凭网认证昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单》《哪里买昆士兰大学毕业证文凭UQ成绩学校快递邮寄信封》《开版昆士兰大学文凭》UQ留信认证本科硕士学历认证
办理国外昆士兰大学毕业证书 #成绩单改成绩 #教育部学历学位认证 #毕业证认证 #留服认证 #使馆认证（留学回国人员证明） #（证）等
真实教育部认证教育部存档中国教育部留学服务中心认证（即教育部留服认证）网站100%可查.
真实使馆认证（即留学人员回国证明）使馆存档可通过大使馆查询确认.
留信网认证国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书留信网永久存档可查.
昆士兰大学昆士兰大学毕业证假文凭毕业证 #成绩单等全套材料从防伪到印刷从水印到钢印烫金跟学校原版100%相同.
国际留学归国服务中心：实体公司注册经营行业标杆精益求精！
国外毕业证学位证成绩单办理流程：
1客户提供办理昆士兰大学昆士兰大学毕业证假文凭信息：姓名生日专业学位毕业时间等（如信息不确定可以咨询顾问：我们有专业老师帮你查询）；
2开始安排制作昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单电子图；
3昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
4昆士兰大学毕业证成绩单电子版您确认信息无误之后安排制作成品；
5昆士兰大学成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
6快递给客户（国内顺丰国外DHLUPS等快递邮寄昆士兰大学昆士兰大学毕业证假文凭）。逛夜市流光溢彩人潮涌动的都市夜生活总让山娃目不暇接惊叹不已父亲老问山娃想买什么想吃什么山娃知道父亲赚钱很辛苦除了书籍和文具山娃啥也不要能牵着父亲的手满城闲逛他已心满意足了父亲连挑了三套童装叫山娃试穿山娃有点不想父亲说城里不比乡下要穿得漂漂亮亮爸怎么不穿得漂亮望着父亲山娃反问道父亲听了并不回答只是吃吃地笑山娃很精神越逛越起劲父亲却越逛越疲倦望着父亲呵欠连天的样子山娃也说困了累了回家吧小屋闷罐一般头彻
PPT Item # 9 - 2024 Street Maintenance Program(SMP) Amendment
Powerpoint 2024 Street Maintenance Program Admendment
Counting Class for Micro Observers 2024.pptx
Duties of Micro Observers during election counting to Parliament / Assembly Constituency
Understanding the Challenges of Street Children
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
一比一原版(UOW毕业证)伍伦贡大学毕业证成绩单
UOW毕业证【微信95270640】留学办理UOW文凭伍伦贡大学毕业证【Q微信95270640】办理全套留学文凭材料（伍伦贡大学毕业证/成绩单（GPA成绩修改）/UOW文凭学历证书)；（真实可查）教育部学历认证、留信网认证、使馆认证留学人员回国证明、文凭认证、UOW diploma、UOW certificate、UOW Degree（实体公司，专业可靠）。
文凭办理流程：
1客户提供办理信息：姓名生日专业学位毕业时间等（如信息不确定可以咨询顾问：微信95270640我们有专业老师帮你查询）；
2开始安排制作毕业证成绩单电子图；
3毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
4毕业证成绩单电子版您确认信息无误之后安排制作成品；
5成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
6快递给客户（国内顺丰国外DHLUPS等快读邮寄）。
7完成交易删除客户资料
高精端提供以下服务：
一：伍伦贡大学伍伦贡大学本科学位证成绩单全套材料从防伪到印刷水印底纹到钢印烫金
二：真实使馆认证（留学人员回国证明）使馆存档
三：真实教育部认证教育部存档教育部留服网站可查
四：留信认证留学生信息网站可查
五：与学校颁发的相关证件1:1纸质尺寸制定（定期向各大院校毕业生购买最新版本毕,业证成绩单保证您拿到的是鲁昂大学内部最新版本毕业证成绩单微信95270640）
A.为什么留学生需要操作留信认证?
留信认证全称全国留学生信息服务网认证,隶属于北京中科院。①留信认证门槛条件更低,费用更美丽,并且包过,完单周期短,效率高②留信认证虽然不能去国企,但是一般的公司都没有问题,因为国内很多公司连基本的留学生学历认证都不了解。这对于留学生来说,这就比自己光拿一个证书更有说服力,因为留学学历可以在留信网站上进行查询!
B.为什么我们提供的毕业证成绩单具有使用价值？
查询留服认证是国内鉴别留学生海外学历的唯一途径但认证只是个体行为不是所有留学生都操作所以没有办理认证的留学生的学历在国内也是查询不到的他们也仅仅只有一张文凭。所以这时候我们提供的和学校颁发的一模一样的毕业证成绩单就有了使用价值。着冒着层层蒸气的包子铺打转你争我抢的吵闹确是为这清淡的早晨增添了一副滑稽与乐趣伴着淡淡的心情褪下往日的繁忙在这残酷的世界中寻一份恬静适淡得一份娴静祥和实乃众心所愿可虽是心有此愿可奈何人生由不得远离尘世喧嚣盛夏初放安然树林乡间多为古代文人雅士吟诗作词之处茂盛的树林遮挡住清晨后炎炎烈日的光芒幽静曲折的小道在山间盘旋几缕从盘杂枝叶间透进的光柱照射在地上茂密的绿油清草上散发着一抹抹的光晕而这每处自然形成头
2024: The FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 37
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
2024: The FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 36
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
The Role of a Process Server in real estate
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
What is the point of small housing associations.pptx
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
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PPT Item # 9 - 2024 Street Maintenance Program(SMP) Amendment
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2015 03-24 CTP Update and Assessment
- 1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT March 24, 2015
- 2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 2 1 2 1. ISIS “Wilayat Sana’a” claimed credit for the mass-casualty bombings in Sana’a. 2. ISIS claimed credit for the attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis. 3. Iranian regime officials seemed less confident in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31 following talks in Lausanne, Switzerland. 3
- 3. ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda Network Al Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its followers in the West. Al Shabaab recently called for supporters to target shopping centers in the West, copying its 2013 Westgate Mall attack in Kenya, for example. Despite competition with ISIS, the al Qaeda network will continue to direct resources to the Iraq-Syria front to support the Sunni populations. Al Qaeda continues to emphasize a strategy that attempts to minimize Muslim casualties as compared to the one put forth by ISIS. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s response to the ISIS-claimed attack in Yemen’s capital underscores AQAP’s continued commitment to and observance of the protection of “public spaces” from terrorist attacks. Outlook: Al Qaeda seeks to reassert its relevance in the global jihadist movement and will try to influence the decision-making of foreign fighters in the Iraq-Syria conflict. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates Pakistani Islamist groups, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under TTP leader Mullah Fazlullah, the TTP’s Jamaat- ul-Ahrar, and Lashkar-e-Islam announced they had merged to form a unified front against the Pakistan government and military. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar had split from the TTP over Fazlullah’s selection as emir. Jamaat-ul-Ahrar also claimed credit for the Lahore church bombings. The Pakistani military (PakMil) continues to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan, especially in Khyber. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and Pakistani airstrikes target TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan border. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continues media operations and may launch additional spectacular attacks, possibly in conjunction with TTP. 3 AL QAEDA
- 4. ASSESSMENT: Political The Yemeni state is fragmented between an al Houthi-run government in Sana’a and a President Hadi-run government in Aden. A military escalation on March 19 in Aden along with the ISIS attack in Sana’a on March 20 mobilized the international community to push for a negotiated solution to the political crisis, but the al Houthis are unwilling to join in talks hosted by the Gulf Cooperation Council. Iranian assistance to the al Houthi-run government is probably lessening the impact of economic and regional marginalization of the al Houthis. Outlook: The al Houthis’ continued refusal to participate in talks will progress in reaching a political solution. Security The security situation deteriorated rapidly in Yemen. The al Houthis escalated the conflict with Hadi in Aden and both sides are now deploying forces in order to secure territory. The al Houthis have seized parts of Yemen’s third largest city, Taiz, and are also massing forces along the Ma’rib-al Bayda border. ISIS claimed responsibility for its first mass-casualty attack in Yemen that killed over 130 people. ISIS also claimed responsibility for the execution of 29 soldiers in Lahij governorate in south Yemen. Militants, reported as being members of AQAP’s Ansar al Sharia but possibly ISIS supporters, temporarily seized control of Hawta, the capital of Lahij, before Yemeni troops secured it under Hadi’s orders. Outlook: Hadi and the al Houthi movement will both try to solidify military control of their territory in the coming weeks. The ISIS-claimed attacks targeting al Houthis in mosques are designed to drive sectarian tensions in Yemen. The al Houthis may use the attacks as an excuse to crack down on dissenters and anti-al Houthi political actors. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) AQAP publicly distanced itself from the March 20 mosque bombings and affirmed its commitment to the strategy put forth by al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri that seeks to minimize Muslim casualties in attacks. Outlook: AQAP will probably seek to challenge ISIS’s arrival in Yemen. It will also continue to expand its popular support by embedding with local populations aligned against the al Houthis. 4 YEMENGULF OF ADEN
- 5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 5 YEMENGULF OF ADEN 1 4 1) 19 MAR: Pro-Hadi popular committees defeated Special Security Forces (SSF) led by an al Houthi and Saleh-loyalist in Aden city. 2) 20 MAR: ISIS conducted five SVEST attacks targeting al Houthis in Sana’a and Sa’ada. 3) 20 MAR: Militants temporarily seized al Hawta city, Lahij, and executed 29 SSF soldiers. 4) 19 MAR: Al Houthi militants arrived in Taiz city, Taiz from Sana’a. 2 3
- 6. ASSESSMENT: Political The Kenyan National Assembly Majority Leader Aden Duale suggested that Kenya should negotiate with al Shabaab to prevent further attacks the day after an attack targeted the Mandera county governor, although later backed away from these comments. An al Shabaab spokesman responded that the group would be open to negotiations if the offer came from the Kenyan government. While the Kenyan government as a whole does not appear willing to negotiate with al Shabaab, it does seem that some members, such as Duale, would be open to the idea. Outlook: Duale’s statement indicates the mounting political pressure the Kenyan government has been under as terrorist attacks in the country have increased. Security Al Shabaab has re-focused on Kenya based on Kenya’s role in AMISOM. Al Shabaab carried out two attacks in Kenya, one on March 15 in Mandera and the second on March 17 in Wajir, both in Kenya’s North Eastern province. It was reported that Kenya conducted two airstrikes in Somalia, possibly in retaliation for the attacks. The first airstrike occurred on March 16, near Bardhere and the second on March 17, near Beled Hawo, both in Gedo region. Outlook: Kenya is still committed to fighting al Shabaab and will likely continue to carry out operations against the group both in Kenya and Somalia. Al Shabaab There may be a divide within al Shabaab between those who favor declaring allegiance to ISIS and those who remain loyal to al Qaeda. An al Shabaab cleric issued a statement approving of ISIS and stating that he had no objections to al Shabaab joining the group. He is the first al Shabaab cleric to make such a statement. He also hinted at a divide within the group over the question of declaring allegiance to ISIS. Outlook: The statement from the al Shabaab cleric is the most public instance of reported divides within al Shabaab over staying with al Qaeda or joining ISIS. If these divides cannot be managed by al Shabaab leadership, they may weaken the group and lead to infighting. HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 6
- 7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 1) 16 MAR: Kenyan airstrike targeted al Shabaab near Bardhere, Gedo region. 2) 17 MAR: Al Shabaab conducted an attack in Wajir, North Eastern province, Kenya. 3) 17 MAR: Kenyan airstrike targeted al Shabaab near Beled Hawo, Gedo region. 4) 19 MAR: SNA and AMISOM forces launched operation to open roads to Bulo-Burde, Hiraan region. 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 77 1 2 3 4
- 8. ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Unconfirmed reports stated that the Algerian military killed several senior AQIM officials in an attack on an AQIM meeting in Bejaia, near Algiers. Rumors claimed that Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of AQIM, was among those killed, although this claim could not be verified. Outlook: If either of the reports on the death of AQIM leadership are true, it would be a significant setback for AQIM. Unrest in Libya will continue to benefit AQIM and contribute to its overall ability to carry out smuggling operations in the Sahel. Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia) ISIS claimed a March 18 attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis, which killed over 20 foreigners. The attack was one of the deadliest in Tunisia in over a decade. Tunisian counter-terrorism operations continued before, and increased after the attack. In Libya, Ansar al Sharia Libya (ASL) released a set of pictures showing fighters training at a camp in Benghazi, indicting ASL maintains a presence in there despite Libyan military gains and reports of defections to ISIS. Outlook: Militant activity targeting Tunisian security forces and retaliatory counter-terrorism operations will likely continue to increase, particularly in the aftermath of the Bardo Museum attack. Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Thirty assailants attacked a MINUSMA convoy in Deliman, northern Mali. MINUSMA forces and the attackers exchanged gunfire, resulting in the capture of four assailants. Meanwhile, AQIM militants executed one Malian civilian accused of spying for French forces in Timbuktu. Suspected former MUJAO militants planted an IED close to Nampala that ultimately killed two Malian soldiers. Malian security forces also killed one individual and arrested three others in connection to the 07 MAR al Murabitoun restaurant attack. Outlook: Militant activity targeting MINUSMA forces will continue to be a major problem for Mali. Recent AQIM and MUJAO activity suggests that these groups will continue to stage more attacks, ultimately bringing more instability to an already divided nation. 8 MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA
- 9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 9999999 1) 18 MAR: At least two gunmen killed over 20 foreign tourists in the ISIS attack at the Bardo Museum in Tunis. 2) 17 MAR: Tunisian security forces dismantled four terrorist cells and arrested 22 militants recruiting Tunisians to fight in Libya, in Kairouan. 3) 19 MAR: Tunisian security forces dismantled four terrorists cells and arrested 12 militants in Gasfa. 99999999 1 2 3
- 10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 10 SAHELWEST AFRICA 1 3 2 4 1) 13 MAR: Unidentified assailants ambushed a MINUSMA convoy in Deliman. 2) 18 MAR: Malian security forces arrested three individuals connected to the 07 MAR Bamako restaurant attack. 3) 18 MAR: AQIM militants executed a Malian civilian on charges of spying for French forces in Tichift. 4) 19 MAR: Suspected MUJAO members planted IED.
- 11. ASSESSMENT: Regional Developments Iran’s Arab and African Affairs Deputy to the Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah in Muscat, to discuss the ongoing political and security crises in Yemen. Abdollahian reiterated Tehran’s support for a multiparty coalition government in Sana’a and implored opposing political groups to engage in inclusive dialogue. Tehran condemned the March 20, suicide bombings that targeted al Houthi mosques in Sana’a and Sa’ada. The Foreign Ministry said the attacks are part of a seditious plot to exacerbate insecurity and unrest. Outlook: Iran will continue to voice its support for a balance of power in the government of Sana’a, while reinforcing the al Houthis as the main power broker in Yemen. Nuclear Talks Over the course of six days of bilateral U.S.-Iran talks last week in Lausanne, Switzerland, regime officials expressed gradually less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. Atomic Energy Agency Organization of Iran (AEOI) Head Ali Akbar Salehi expressed some hope on March 17 that two “remaining” issues would be resolved by March 20, but Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated on March 20 that “two notable differences remain to be negotiated.” The regime remained committed to reaching an agreement, however, as Zarif stated on March 19 that Iran “would stay as long as it takes” in the talks. Iran and the P5+1 will resume negotiations on March 25. Outlook: Iran will continue to work towards reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1. 11 IRAN
- 12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN 1214 MAR – 20 MAR 2015 15 MAR: Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati stated that the Islamic Revolution is transnational, devoid of ethnic and tribal allegiances, and recognizes the entirety of the Islamic world as one body. 15 MAR: The Guardian Council approved amendments to the 2015 budget. 15 MAR: The number of Parliamentarians who have signed a proposal calling for the removal of all sanctions rose to 260. 16 MAR: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian met with Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah in Muscat to discuss the political crisis in Yemen. 17 MAR: President Hassan Rouhani inaugurated phase 12 of the South Pars gas project, while Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said that the South Pars gas project is a clear message to the world that sanctions will not stop Iran’s oil industry. 17 MAR: National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi stated that a nuclear agreement is more likely now than in the past. 18 MAR: Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani announced that Assyrian Christians requested training and weapons in a recent visit to Tehran. 18 MAR: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh criticized OPEC policies and said that Iran should work with non-OPEC countries in reducing oil production. 19 MAR: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif insisted that the nuclear deal must be binding under Chapter VII of the UN charter, eliciting criticism from Hossein Shariatmadari, Managing Editor of conservative media outlet Kayhan. 20 MAR: Iran’s nuclear negotiations team returned to Iran to participate in memorial services for President Rouhani’s mother. Negotiations are set to resume on Wednesday March 25.
- 13. ACRONYMS 13 Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI) African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T) Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Islamic State (IS) Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) North Waziristan (NWA) Pakistani Military (PakMil) Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Somalia National Army (SNA) South Waziristan (SWA) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- 14. CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS Katherine Zimmerman senior al Qaeda analyst katherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576 Alexis Knutsen al Qaeda analyst alexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570 Marie Donovan Iran analyst marie.donovan@aei.org (202) 888-6572 Mehrdad Moarefian Iran analyst mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org (202) 888-6574 For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org. 14