2015-05-05 CTP Update and Assessment
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CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Pro-ISIS groups are expanding operations into eastern Yemen, where AQAP has traditionally had a dominant naval presence. 2. IRGC naval forces detained the Maersk Tigris in the Strait of Hormuz on April 28 based on a lawsuit filed by Iranian oil company Pars Talaei against Danish shipping group Maersk. 3. Rebel violence is increasing in northen Mali as Tuareg rebels attacked a town near the Mauritanian border.
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2015 04-28 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia announced the end of Operation Decisive Storm and beginning of Operation Restoring Hope in Yemen. The air campaign in Yemen against the al Houthis and their allies is continuing, though the al Houthis portrayed the end of Operation Decisive Storm as a victory. Iranian regime officials initially praised Iran’s “important role in the ceasefire” following the end of Operation Decisive Storm and later condemned Saudi Arabia’s continued airstrikes in Yemen.
2. A pro-ISIS group, Soldiers of the Caliphate, claimed credit for an attack on Tunisian soldiers in the Kasserine region. The group previously claimed responsibility for the March 18 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis, though the Tunisian government is tying the attack to a separate Islamist group, the Uqba ibn Nafaa Brigade.
3.The Kenyan government announced its intention to close the Dadaab refugee complex, home to an estimated 350,000 Somalis. The announcement came in reaction to the growing threat from al Shabaab in Kenya and the recent attack at Garissa University that killed at least 147 people.
2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. An international coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to restore President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. The coalition includes the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan, and Pakistan and Turkey both voiced support for it. The U.S. is providing logistical and intelligence support for coalition airstrikes. Initial Iranian reactions focused on the blowback to Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni response and include a letter penned by Mohsen Rezaei, Iran's Expediency Discernment Council Secretary and former senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander.
2. The Iranian negotiating team projected cautious optimism that final differences could be resolved as nuclear talks between Tehran and the P5+1 continue up until the March 31 deadline to reach a political framework for a deal. Ali Akbar Salehi, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said Tehran and the P5+1 are working to resolve two remaining technical issues.
3. Tunisian security forces began wide-scale counter-terrorism operations throughout Tunisia following last week’s ISIS-claimed attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis.
2015-05-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthis fired mortars into Najran, Saudi Arabia, leading Saudi Arabia to respond with an escalation in airstrikes on al Houthi territory in Sa'ada.
2. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Somalia on May 5, becoming the first sitting Secretary of State to do so.
3. Supreme Leader Khamenei stated that Iran will not negotiate under the “sword” and warned the U.S. that military action against Iran will not go unpunished.
2016-01-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
2016-01-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
2015-12-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
Recommended
2015 04-28 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia announced the end of Operation Decisive Storm and beginning of Operation Restoring Hope in Yemen. The air campaign in Yemen against the al Houthis and their allies is continuing, though the al Houthis portrayed the end of Operation Decisive Storm as a victory. Iranian regime officials initially praised Iran’s “important role in the ceasefire” following the end of Operation Decisive Storm and later condemned Saudi Arabia’s continued airstrikes in Yemen.
2. A pro-ISIS group, Soldiers of the Caliphate, claimed credit for an attack on Tunisian soldiers in the Kasserine region. The group previously claimed responsibility for the March 18 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis, though the Tunisian government is tying the attack to a separate Islamist group, the Uqba ibn Nafaa Brigade.
3.The Kenyan government announced its intention to close the Dadaab refugee complex, home to an estimated 350,000 Somalis. The announcement came in reaction to the growing threat from al Shabaab in Kenya and the recent attack at Garissa University that killed at least 147 people.
2015 03-31 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. An international coalition led by Saudi Arabia launched Operation Decisive Storm in Yemen to restore President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi to power. The coalition includes the Gulf States, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan, and Pakistan and Turkey both voiced support for it. The U.S. is providing logistical and intelligence support for coalition airstrikes. Initial Iranian reactions focused on the blowback to Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni response and include a letter penned by Mohsen Rezaei, Iran's Expediency Discernment Council Secretary and former senior Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander.
2. The Iranian negotiating team projected cautious optimism that final differences could be resolved as nuclear talks between Tehran and the P5+1 continue up until the March 31 deadline to reach a political framework for a deal. Ali Akbar Salehi, Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, said Tehran and the P5+1 are working to resolve two remaining technical issues.
3. Tunisian security forces began wide-scale counter-terrorism operations throughout Tunisia following last week’s ISIS-claimed attack on the Bardo Museum in Tunis.
2015-05-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthis fired mortars into Najran, Saudi Arabia, leading Saudi Arabia to respond with an escalation in airstrikes on al Houthi territory in Sa'ada.
2. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry visited Somalia on May 5, becoming the first sitting Secretary of State to do so.
3. Supreme Leader Khamenei stated that Iran will not negotiate under the “sword” and warned the U.S. that military action against Iran will not go unpunished.
2016-01-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Saudi Arabia’s execution of 47 “terrorists,” including Shia cleric Nimr al Nimr and al Qaeda members, sparked attacks against the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and consulate in Mashhad, consolidation of the Gulf States behind Saudi Arabia, and vows of vengeance from al Qaeda supporters. The January 2 attacks in Iran will likely impair its attempts to strengthen its role in the international community. Senior Iranian officials condemned both the embassy attacks and the execution itself, with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warning Saudi politicians that they will face “divine retribution” for the execution.
2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Wilayat Barqa may be close to success in its campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. The group advanced eastward from its base in Sirte, seizing Bin Jawad and launching suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attacks on Libya’s two largest oil export ports, al Sidra and Ras Lanuf. If ISIS Wilayat Barqa can effectively consolidate its territorial gains, it will likely continue to advance eastward and seek control of major oil fields.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s (AQAP) public stoning to death of a woman convicted of adultery in al Mukalla, Hadramawt, is an inflection point in how the group is enforcing its interpretation of shari’a law. AQAP has governed al Mukalla since April 2015, but has limited its implementation of shari’a in the city. The group rapidly enforced shari’a judgments in territory it controlled in Abyan in 2011, which fed a popular uprising against the group. The shift may be an indicator of AQAP’s confidence in its control of the population.
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
2016-01-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. Libyan Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cells demonstrated a high level of coordination by conducting a large-scale spectacular attack on security forces in support of an ongoing campaign to seize Libyan oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus detonated a large suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a police training camp in Zliten, Libya on January 7 and described the attack as part of the “Invasion of Abu al Mughira al Qahtani,” which is an operation focused on taking over Libya’s oil infrastructure. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus likely executed the Zliten attack to prevent or deter security forces from responding to ongoing offensive operations at the al Sidra and Ras Lanuf oil terminals, conducted by ISIS Wilayat Barqa. These concurrent actions demonstrate not only significant coordination between ISIS cells in Libya, but also the exportation of military knowledge, explosives expertise, and leadership capabilities from ISIS core to Libya.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is conducting media campaigns meant to both enhance the group’s local legitimacy in Yemen and reaffirm its status in the global jihadist community. The group released a video of operations in Taiz city, where AQAP militants are leveraging the al Houthi fight to build relationships with local militias, including tribal fighters and local Salafi groups. AQAP also released an audio statement from its chief bombmaker, Ibrahim al Asiri, likely in an effort to capitalize on al Asiri’s notoriety and highlight AQAP’s credentials as a leader of jihad against the West.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its associates may be resurging in Mali. An intercepted letter from AQIM-linked Ansar al Din to an associated militant group, the Macina Liberation Front, called for increased attacks against isolated Malian army posts.
2015-12-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
2016-02-09 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
2016-01-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. and EU revoked nuclear-related sanctions after the IAEA issued its report verifying Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal. The full effects of sanction relief are unlikely to be fully felt before the all-important parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February, however. Iran also released two U.S. Navy vessels and 10 sailors on January 13, following their overnight detention after a purported mechanical error caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters on January 12.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in the Sahel region. At least three Islamist militants attacked a café and a hotel in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, on January 15, temporarily holding about 180 hostages and killing at least 28 people. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed credit for the attack on behalf of its affiliate al Murabitoun, which reunited with AQIM in late 2015 and participated in the November 20 hotel attack in Bamako, Mali. AQIM cited Western presence in the Sahel as justification for the attack. The attack underscores a high level of coordination between AQIM and its affiliates in the Sahel and signals that further attacks on Western targets in regional capitals are likely.
3. Al Shabaab continued a military campaign of high-profile raids of AMISOM bases. Al Shabaab militants attacked a Kenyan AMISOM unit based in el Adde, Gedo region, stealing equipment and claiming to have killed over 100 soldiers. Kenyan and AMISOM officials have acknowledged the deaths of soldiers, but have not given a casualty figure. This attack is the third in a series of attacks that began in June 2015 against a Burundian-run base in Lego, Bay region, and a September 2015 attack against a Ugandan-run base in Janale, Lower Shabelle region.
2016-01-26 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
2015-10-06 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis presented a seven-point plan to the UN to resolve the ongoing conflict and have expressed willingness to participate in political negotiations. Both AQAP and ISIS have been able to expand significantly as Yemeni factions fight each other.
2. ISIS-affiliated forces operating out of Sirte, Libya, appear to be positioning themselves to secure Libya’s oil crescent, which would be a step toward securing control of Libyan oil facilities.
3. Senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated calls for fact-finding committees and international management of the Hajj following the September 24 stampede in Mina, Saudi Arabia.
2016 02 16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
2016-03-01 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
2017 02-14 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
2016-02-23 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
2016 03-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
2016-03-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016-02-02 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls the populated areas along the main road from Aden to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. It is reconstituting control over the territory it held in 2011 and 2012 and is further consolidating control in al Mukalla. AQAP seized Azzan city in Shabwah governorate, which served as one of its primary bases of operation in 2011-2012, and stoned a man to death in al Mukalla.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is increasing its territorial control along the central Libyan coast as Western forces prepare to launch airstrikes and possibly special operations to curb the group’s expansion. ISIS seized a village to the west of its stronghold in Sirte and continues to contest control of key infrastructure in the central Libyan oil crescent. The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are preparing to target ISIS in Libya. Current discussions about military action in Libya do not include targeting al Qaeda-linked groups also active in the country.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a Swiss nun taken hostage if demands for the release of AQIM members were not met. Among those AQIM lists is Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, in the custody of the International Criminal Court. AQIM has successfully negotiated previous prisoner exchanges and those who have been released return to operations.
2016-04-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016-04-26 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2016-04-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
2015 02-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in an Emirati-backed Yemeni operation to secure populated areas and oil pipelines in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. The operation aims to degrade the ability of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to coordinate external attacks from safe havens in Yemen. AQAP militants withdrew from Shabwah to strongholds in neighboring Abyan governorate in response. The operation is unlikely to affect AQAP’s capabilities in the long term.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) forces in Libya mobilizing outside of Sirte city, the group’s former stronghold on the Mediterranean coast. ISIS retains the capability to recruit and train fighters despite losses inflicted by the U.S.-backed campaign to retake Sirte and subsequent airstrikes.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ransoms hostages to fund its broader efforts to destabilize and replace West African states, as well as expel Western influence from the region. AQIM received at least $4.2 million in exchange for the release of Swedish and South Africa hostages in the past two months. AQIM will likely plan or support additional attacks on sites frequented by Western expatriates, continuing a campaign resumed by an AQIM affiliate in Mali in June.
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2016-02-09 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
2016-01-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. and EU revoked nuclear-related sanctions after the IAEA issued its report verifying Iran’s compliance with its commitments under the nuclear deal. The full effects of sanction relief are unlikely to be fully felt before the all-important parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections in February, however. Iran also released two U.S. Navy vessels and 10 sailors on January 13, following their overnight detention after a purported mechanical error caused the vessels to drift into Iranian territorial waters on January 12.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in the Sahel region. At least three Islamist militants attacked a café and a hotel in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, on January 15, temporarily holding about 180 hostages and killing at least 28 people. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) claimed credit for the attack on behalf of its affiliate al Murabitoun, which reunited with AQIM in late 2015 and participated in the November 20 hotel attack in Bamako, Mali. AQIM cited Western presence in the Sahel as justification for the attack. The attack underscores a high level of coordination between AQIM and its affiliates in the Sahel and signals that further attacks on Western targets in regional capitals are likely.
3. Al Shabaab continued a military campaign of high-profile raids of AMISOM bases. Al Shabaab militants attacked a Kenyan AMISOM unit based in el Adde, Gedo region, stealing equipment and claiming to have killed over 100 soldiers. Kenyan and AMISOM officials have acknowledged the deaths of soldiers, but have not given a casualty figure. This attack is the third in a series of attacks that began in June 2015 against a Burundian-run base in Lego, Bay region, and a September 2015 attack against a Ugandan-run base in Janale, Lower Shabelle region.
2016-01-26 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Rifts over leadership of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) may be evidenced by target selection. A TTP faction attacked a university in Charsadda, Pakistan, killing upwards of 22 people. The TTP's spokesman, Muhammad Khorasani, refuted the claims that this was a TTP attack, indicating it was probably not directed by TTP leader Fazlullah's faction. The head of the TTP Tariq Geedar faction, Umar Mansoor, claimed this attack. Mansoor also claimed the 2014 Peshawar school attack. The TTP supported the 2014 attack, but was heavily criticized by al Qaeda for killing "non-combatants."
2. Al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked groups may benefit from civil unrest in Tunisia. Widespread unemployment protests broke out in Tunisia, mirroring the inciting events of the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. The suicide of a young protester ignited a week of violent clashes between police and demonstrators, accompanied by rioting, looting, and a nationwide curfew. Civil unrest threatens the weak Tunisian state.
3. Conservatives within the Iranian regime continue to block reformist activity by disqualifying many of President Hassan Rouhani’s potential allies from the upcoming parliamentary elections in February. While Rouhani strongly criticized the disqualifications in a televised speech, the secretary of the political body responsible for disqualifying candidates asserted that it “will not be affected by pressure” to revise its vetting process. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also defended the disqualifications, asserting that there is “no country in the world” that does not prevent some candidates from running in elections.
2015-10-06 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis presented a seven-point plan to the UN to resolve the ongoing conflict and have expressed willingness to participate in political negotiations. Both AQAP and ISIS have been able to expand significantly as Yemeni factions fight each other.
2. ISIS-affiliated forces operating out of Sirte, Libya, appear to be positioning themselves to secure Libya’s oil crescent, which would be a step toward securing control of Libyan oil facilities.
3. Senior Iranian officials including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated calls for fact-finding committees and international management of the Hajj following the September 24 stampede in Mina, Saudi Arabia.
2016 02 16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The decision by Iran’s vetting body to uphold its disqualification of prominent Reformist candidates for the Assembly of Experts, the body charged with selecting the supreme leader, will likely mean the conservatives will dominate the February 26 elections. President Hassan Rouhani called for high voter turnout and for various political factions to remain united during a February 11 speech, indicating that he is unlikely to contest the disqualifications publically.
2. Militants linked to al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) launched a second complex attack on UN peacekeeping forces in Mali in as many weeks, which is an uptick in attacks against MINUSMA forces operating on the ground. AQIM and its affiliates have linked these recent attacks to recent spectacular attacks on luxury hotels where UN personnel stayed and will likely attempt more attacks on high-profile civilian targets.
3. Al Shabaab formally claimed responsibility for an in-flight suicide bombing on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu, noting the actual target had been a canceled Turkish flight. The attack signals a significant inflection in the group’s capabilities, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. Al Shabaab targets Turkish interests in Somalia for Turkey’s backing of the Somalia Federal Government.
2016-03-01 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
2017 02-14 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
2016-02-23 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
2016 03-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
2016-03-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016-02-02 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) controls the populated areas along the main road from Aden to al Mukalla, Hadramawt. It is reconstituting control over the territory it held in 2011 and 2012 and is further consolidating control in al Mukalla. AQAP seized Azzan city in Shabwah governorate, which served as one of its primary bases of operation in 2011-2012, and stoned a man to death in al Mukalla.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is increasing its territorial control along the central Libyan coast as Western forces prepare to launch airstrikes and possibly special operations to curb the group’s expansion. ISIS seized a village to the west of its stronghold in Sirte and continues to contest control of key infrastructure in the central Libyan oil crescent. The U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany are preparing to target ISIS in Libya. Current discussions about military action in Libya do not include targeting al Qaeda-linked groups also active in the country.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is threatening to kill a Swiss nun taken hostage if demands for the release of AQIM members were not met. Among those AQIM lists is Ahmad al Faqi al Mahdi, in the custody of the International Criminal Court. AQIM has successfully negotiated previous prisoner exchanges and those who have been released return to operations.
2016-04-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016-04-26 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2016-04-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A UN-brokered ceasefire is holding in Yemen in advance of scheduled talks to resolve the political crisis. There are reports of ongoing fighting along contested frontlines in central Yemen despite the start of the ceasefire on April 10. All major players in the conflict have expressed formal support for the ceasefire agreement, while reserving the right to take defensive action should violations occur. Ongoing high-level meetings indicate that each faction is preparing seriously for UN-led peace talks, which are set to begin in Kuwait on April 18. The formal ceasefire will likely continue to hold, despite clashes on the ground, as Yemen’s powerbrokers pursue their objectives in the political arena.
2. A new Salafi-jihadi organization, “Jabha East Africa” (East Africa Front), released its “bayat” or oath of loyalty to the emir of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The group reported that its members are former al Shabaab members who have returned to their home countries throughout East Africa, paralleling the al Shabaab-affiliated al Muhajiroun. ISIS has not replied to the pledge. Jabha East Africa’s operational strength, as well as any official connections to ISIS, remains unknown.
3. Key Libyan factions backed the newly installed and UN-recognized Libyan national unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA). The GNA will probably become a critical counter-terrorism partner as Western powers begin to develop strategies to combat ISIS in Libya. The GNA must still develop local legitimacy, however. It will need to ameliorate Libya’s economic woes. It will also need to gain the official endorsement of the country’s internationally recognized House of Representatives, which is currently split on the issue of ceding power to the GNA.
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2015 02-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in an Emirati-backed Yemeni operation to secure populated areas and oil pipelines in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. The operation aims to degrade the ability of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to coordinate external attacks from safe havens in Yemen. AQAP militants withdrew from Shabwah to strongholds in neighboring Abyan governorate in response. The operation is unlikely to affect AQAP’s capabilities in the long term.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) forces in Libya mobilizing outside of Sirte city, the group’s former stronghold on the Mediterranean coast. ISIS retains the capability to recruit and train fighters despite losses inflicted by the U.S.-backed campaign to retake Sirte and subsequent airstrikes.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ransoms hostages to fund its broader efforts to destabilize and replace West African states, as well as expel Western influence from the region. AQIM received at least $4.2 million in exchange for the release of Swedish and South Africa hostages in the past two months. AQIM will likely plan or support additional attacks on sites frequented by Western expatriates, continuing a campaign resumed by an AQIM affiliate in Mali in June.
2016-05-31 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
2015 04-14 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials endorsed the P5+1 nuclear framework agreement, while Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reiterated his redline of immediate sanctions relief in the event of a final deal.
2. Al Houthis lost ground to anti-al Houthi militias in Aden and Abyan but expanded into Shabwah where they seized the governorate’s capital, Ataq.
3.The Kenyan government continues to target al Shabaab militants both in Kenya and Somalia following the April 2 Garissa University attack.
2017 07-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging.
2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts.
3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2015-02-03 CTP Update and Assessment
Key takeaways:
- Senior Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials praised Lebanese Hezbollah’s January 28 attack that killed two Israeli soldiers in retaliation for the January 18 Israeli airstrike in Syria. Messaging from IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammed Ali Jafari indicated that this was a “minimum response” to the Israeli strike, indicating that the IRGC may push for additional action against Israel.
- Yemen’s al Houthi movement, which has received backing from Iran, remains a key powerbroker in the capital, Sana’a. The al Houthis set a deadline for tribal and political actors to negotiate a resolution to the political crisis brought on by the full resignation of Yemen’s executive branch on January 22. The outlook of an acceptable deal for all parties is not good, though the al Houthis continue to signal that they do not want to govern Yemen.
- Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi, Libya, announced the establishment of an Islamic police there to enforce shari’a law. Pictures of new police vehicles were included in the announcement. The Ansar al Sharia policing force is new and should be taken as an indicator that the group intends to govern its territories in Libya.
2017 05-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
2015-05-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iranian officials said an Iranian cargo ship, which left from Bandar Abbas, Iran, for al Hudaydah, Yemen, and is escorted by the Artesh Navy’s 34th Fleet, will refuse inspections by countries involved in the conflict in Yemen. Iran appears to be testing U.S. redlines in the Gulf of Aden and will probably continue to challenge the U.S. Navy there. Recent incidents of involving the U.S.-flagged Maersk Kensington, Marshall Islands-flagged Maersk Tigris, and a convoy of seven cargo ships reportedly carrying weapons for the al Houthis demonstrate Iran’s willingness to test the line.
2. A five-day ceasefire between Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s al Houthi movement allowed humanitarian aid to enter Yemen. Yemeni stakeholders did not make progress in political negotiations during the pause in hostilities, and both sides may have used the time to regroup. Clashes between the al Houthi movement and local tribal militias continued in central and southern Yemen during the ceasefire as well.
3. The al Qaeda-linked al Murabitoun group, which operates in the Sahel, may be fracturing. Al Murabitoun was formed in August 2013 by a merger between the AQIM splinters MUJAO and al Mulathamun. A MUJAO leader pledged support for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the name of al Murabitoun, which was then denied by an al Mulathamun leader. ISIS has had a growing presence in North Africa among smaller militant Islamist groups and may be extending its reach south into the Sahel.
2016-06-21 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
2015 02-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemeni political actors met in Aden and called for the establishment of an alternative capital to Sana’a in either Aden or Taiz, both former capitals, on February 15. There appears to be growing support for an alternative government or regional autonomy throughout Yemen. Sana’a-based politicians reached an agreement to form a new transitional council composed of underrepresented groups, but could not agree on a way forward for Yemen’s executive branch.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced the concept of Iran’s “Economy of Resistance” in a February 18 speech as a reaction to the West’s continued economic pressure on Iran. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani added that the resistance economy did not imply Iran would close itself off from the global economy.
3. Al Shabaab claimed credit for the bombing of a hotel in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, that killed and injured dozens of people, including Somali government officials, on February 20. Al Shabaab has lost control of some of its strongholds in Somalia, but still maintains its capability to conduct asymmetric attacks.
2017 04-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. deployed several dozen troops to Somalia to train and equip Somali and African Union forces fighting against al Shabaab. The arrival of units from the 101st Airborne Division to Mogadishu on April 2 marks the first significant deployment of U.S. ground troops, other than small advisory units, to Somalia since March 1994. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu after Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on the group on April 6. Al Shabaab will surge in Mogadishu to force Somali forces to concentrate in the capital, allowing al Shabaab to control humanitarian aid delivery in other regions.
2. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is setting conditions to launch a major offensive in Yemen after the month of Ramadan, which begins in late May. The offensive aims to seize al Hudaydah port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Yemen’s internationally recognized government requested the recall of the UN Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, who opposes the offensive. The al Hudaydah operation will worsen conditions for a population that already faces a severe humanitarian crisis.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has an opportunity to gain by brokering a ceasefire between warring militias in southwestern Libya. The GNA Ministry of Local Government organized a meeting for mayors from the Fezzan region to discuss military de-escalation. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based primarily in eastern Libya, is attempting to seize military bases and oil sites in the Fezzan. Anti-LNA militias from Libya’s coastal regions deployed to the Fezzan to join the fight, which risks escalating into a larger conflict. The GNA, which was created by a UN agreement, will gain legitimacy if it brokers a deal at the municipal level.
2015-06-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis escalated the conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi Arabian airbase and conducting an attack alongside Yemeni military units against Saudi border forces, which may further impede efforts to reach a negotiated political solution. Both the al Houthis and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government have agreed to participate in UN-led talks in Geneva on June 14, though Hadi’s government signaled it sees the talks as a means to begin implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The resolution calls for the al Houthis to disarm and to withdraw from seized territory.
2. Iranian IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami’s comments on the Yemeni people indicate a rhetorical escalation on the importance of the Yemeni conflict. Salami characterized Yemenis as “more oppressed” than Palestinians, and his comments may mark a shift in the IRGC’s depiction of Yemenis.
3. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit friction points between the Somali federal government and local administrations as the country’s federalization process moves forward. The Sufi group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had allied with the Somali federal government to fight al Shabaab, recently seized control of the Galgudud region capital from Somali federal government forces. ASWJ officials cite their marginalization within the Somali federalization process as a core grievance against the federal government.
2015-05-27 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Key Iranian regime players’ meetings with senior Syrian and Iraqi government officials and the Hezbollah Secretary General may signal Iranian efforts to bring more force to bear in defense of Assad and Baghdad against the growing ISIS threat. The Supreme Leader’s senior foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati met with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon before meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria while Iran’s defense minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi in Baghdad, Iraq. IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani also levied criticism directly against the United States for not stopping ISIS.
2. Al Houthi attacks on Saudi territory will continue to antagonize Saudi Arabia and will decrease the likelihood that warring factions will participate in political negotiations in the near future. The al Houthis fired rockets at populated locations within Saudi Arabia and raided Saudi Arabian border posts over the past week. An al Houthi-affiliated TV channel ran video footage of al Houthis allegedly firing into Saudi Arabia. UN-sponsored talks in Geneva announced last week have been delayed.
3. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate its capability to conduct attacks within Kenya and carried out multiple attacks, including temporarily seizing territory, in northern Kenyan over the week. Al Shabaab militants took control of a mosque in Garissa county in Kenya and spoke to the congregation, which was held hostage, before fleeing ahead of security forces and also briefly held a town close to the border with Somalia. This the first time the group has carried out such activities in Kenya.
2015-08-26 CTP Udate and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Iranian regime asserted that it will continue to grow and preserve its missile program, doing whatever it deems necessary and without permission or resolution, according to President Hassan Rouhani.
2. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is benefitting from the Saudi-led coalition’s offensive against the al Houthis and their allies. It is strengthening its presence in Aden and Abyan governorates in southern Yemen.
3. The Arab League held an emergency meeting to discuss how to counter Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) gains in Libya. ISIS continues to consolidate control over the area surrounding Sirte on the central Libyan coastline.
2015 03-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed credit for simultaneous bombings at two mosques frequented by al Houthis in Sana’a and an attempt at third mosque in the al Houthi stronghold of Sa’ada in Yemen on March 20. The attack, ISIS’s first terrorist attack in Yemen, deliberately targeted al Houthis and was designed to stoke sectarian tensions.
2. ISIS also claimed the attack on Bardo Museum in Tunisia on March 18, signaling its presence in the country. The museum attack, along with a recent uptick in militant activity, shows that the Libyan conflict may be seriously undermining security in Tunisia.
3. The Iranian regime expressed less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. One of the key issues has been sanctions relief, with the Iranians pressing for the immediate lifting of sanctions.
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
2015-07-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
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Up the Ratios is a non-profit organization dedicated to bridging the gap in STEM education for underprivileged students by providing free, high-quality learning opportunities in robotics and other STEM fields. Our mission is to empower the next generation of innovators, thinkers, and problem-solvers by offering a range of educational programs that foster curiosity, creativity, and critical thinking.
At Up the Ratios, we believe that every student, regardless of their socio-economic background, should have access to the tools and knowledge needed to succeed in today's technology-driven world. To achieve this, we host a variety of free classes, workshops, summer camps, and live lectures tailored to students from underserved communities. Our programs are designed to be engaging and hands-on, allowing students to explore the exciting world of robotics and STEM through practical, real-world applications.
Our free classes cover fundamental concepts in robotics, coding, and engineering, providing students with a strong foundation in these critical areas. Through our interactive workshops, students can dive deeper into specific topics, working on projects that challenge them to apply what they've learned and think creatively. Our summer camps offer an immersive experience where students can collaborate on larger projects, develop their teamwork skills, and gain confidence in their abilities.
In addition to our local programs, Up the Ratios is committed to making a global impact. We take donations of new and gently used robotics parts, which we then distribute to students and educational institutions in other countries. These donations help ensure that young learners worldwide have the resources they need to explore and excel in STEM fields. By supporting education in this way, we aim to nurture a global community of future leaders and innovators.
Our live lectures feature guest speakers from various STEM disciplines, including engineers, scientists, and industry professionals who share their knowledge and experiences with our students. These lectures provide valuable insights into potential career paths and inspire students to pursue their passions in STEM.
Up the Ratios relies on the generosity of donors and volunteers to continue our work. Contributions of time, expertise, and financial support are crucial to sustaining our programs and expanding our reach. Whether you're an individual passionate about education, a professional in the STEM field, or a company looking to give back to the community, there are many ways to get involved and make a difference.
We are proud of the positive impact we've had on the lives of countless students, many of whom have gone on to pursue higher education and careers in STEM. By providing these young minds with the tools and opportunities they need to succeed, we are not only changing their futures but also contributing to the advancement of technology and innovation on a broader scale.
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如何办理(uoit毕业证书)加拿大安大略理工大学毕业证文凭证书录取通知原版一模一样
原版纸张【微信：741003700 】【(uoit毕业证书)加拿大安大略理工大学毕业证】【微信：741003700 】学位证，留信认证（真实可查，永久存档）offer、雅思、外壳等材料/诚信可靠,可直接看成品样本，帮您解决无法毕业带来的各种难题！外壳，原版制作，诚信可靠，可直接看成品样本。行业标杆！精益求精，诚心合作，真诚制作！多年品质 ,按需精细制作，24小时接单,全套进口原装设备。十五年致力于帮助留学生解决难题，包您满意。
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留信网认证的作用:
1:该专业认证可证明留学生真实身份
2:同时对留学生所学专业登记给予评定
3:国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书
4:这个认证书并且可以归档倒地方
5:凡事获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内，将在公安局网内查询个人身份证信息后，同步读取人才网入库信息
6:个人职称评审加20分
7:个人信誉贷款加10分
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一比一原版(ANU毕业证)澳大利亚国立大学毕业证成绩单
ANU毕业证【微信95270640】《澳大利亚国立大学学位证书》【Q微信95270640】《ANU研究生文凭证书》【澳大利亚国立大学毕业证书成绩单找工作】办理硕士毕业证成绩单在校证明【Q微信95270640】《澳大利亚国立大学硕士学位证书购买》《ANU学士学历文凭证书办理》《澳大利亚国立大学学位证书本科学历》【Q微信95270640】伪造《ANU学士毕业证成绩单》 历认证 学习时间毕业证在线【Q微信95270640】毕业证『做ANU毕业证成绩单仿制』毕业证留信网认证包过学历认证【Q微信95270640】做学费单《毕业证明信-推荐信》成绩单，录取通知书，Offer，在读证明，【Q微信95270640】雅思托福成绩单，真实大使馆教育部认证，回国人员证明，留信网认证。网上存档永久可查！◆办理真实使馆认证（即留学回国人员证明，不成功不收费！！！）
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多年留学服务公司,拥有海外样板无数能完美1:1还原海外各国大学degreeDiplomaTranscripts等毕业材料。海外大学毕业材料都有哪些工艺呢？工艺难度主要由：烫金.钢印.底纹.水印.防伪光标.热敏防伪等等组成。而且我们每天都在更新海外文凭的样板以求所有同学都能享受到完美的品质服务。
国外毕业证学位证成绩单办理方法：
1客户提供办理澳大利亚国立大学澳大利亚国立大学毕业证假文凭信息：姓名生日专业学位毕业时间等（如信息不确定可以咨询顾问：我们有专业老师帮你查询）；
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3毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
4毕业证成绩单电子版您确认信息无误之后安排制作成品；
5成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
6快递给客户（国内顺丰国外DHLUPS等快读邮寄）
— — — — 我们是挂科和未毕业同学们的福音我们是实体公司精益求精的工艺！ — — — -
一真实留信认证的作用(私企外企荣誉的见证):
1：该专业认证可证明留学生真实留学身份同时对留学生所学专业等级给予评定。
2：国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书这个入网证书并且可以归档到地方。
3：凡是获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内将在公安部网内查询个人身份证信息后同步读取人才网入库信息。
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2024: The FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulations, Part 37
Jennifer Schaus and Associates hosts a complimentary webinar series on The FAR in 2024. Join the webinars on Wednesdays and Fridays at noon, eastern.
Recordings are on YouTube and the company website.
https://www.youtube.com/@jenniferschaus/videos
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一比一原版(UOW毕业证)伍伦贡大学毕业证成绩单
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文凭办理流程：
1客户提供办理信息：姓名生日专业学位毕业时间等（如信息不确定可以咨询顾问：微信95270640我们有专业老师帮你查询）；
2开始安排制作毕业证成绩单电子图；
3毕业证成绩单电子版做好以后发送给您确认；
4毕业证成绩单电子版您确认信息无误之后安排制作成品；
5成品做好拍照或者视频给您确认；
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A.为什么留学生需要操作留信认证?
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B.为什么我们提供的毕业证成绩单具有使用价值？
查询留服认证是国内鉴别留学生海外学历的唯一途径但认证只是个体行为不是所有留学生都操作所以没有办理认证的留学生的学历在国内也是查询不到的他们也仅仅只有一张文凭。所以这时候我们提供的和学校颁发的一模一样的毕业证成绩单就有了使用价值。着冒着层层蒸气的包子铺打转你争我抢的吵闹确是为这清淡的早晨增添了一副滑稽与乐趣伴着淡淡的心情褪下往日的繁忙在这残酷的世界中寻一份恬静适淡得一份娴静祥和实乃众心所愿可虽是心有此愿可奈何人生由不得远离尘世喧嚣盛夏初放安然树林乡间多为古代文人雅士吟诗作词之处茂盛的树林遮挡住清晨后炎炎烈日的光芒幽静曲折的小道在山间盘旋几缕从盘杂枝叶间透进的光柱照射在地上茂密的绿油清草上散发着一抹抹的光晕而这每处自然形成头
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Highlights
Permanent Residents decrease along with percentage of TR2PR decline to 52 percent of all Permanent Residents.
March asylum claim data not issued as of May 27 (unusually late). Irregular arrivals remain very small.
Study permit applications experiencing sharp decrease as a result of announced caps over 50 percent compared to February.
Citizenship numbers remain stable.
Slide 3 has the overall numbers and change.
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招聘代理：本公司诚聘英国加拿大澳洲新西兰美国法国德国新加坡各地代理人员如果你有业余时间有兴趣就请联系我们咨询顾问：+微信:95270640光总是太短太匆忙记得今年正月就在父亲扛起蛇皮袋将要跨出门槛的一刹那山娃突然抱紧父亲的大腿嚎啕大哭父亲吃力地掰开山娃的手哽咽道山娃好好听话好好念书到了暑假爸也接你进城爸的城好远好大好美山娃于是天天扳着手指算计着读书也格外刻苦无奈时间总过得太慢太慢每次父亲往家打电话山娃总抢着接听一个劲地提醒父亲别忘了正月说的话电话那头总会传来父亲嘿嘿的笑连连说记得记得但别忘了拿奖状进城啊考试一结束山娃就迫不及待地给间
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2015-05-05 CTP Update and Assessment
- 1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT May 5, 2015
- 2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 2 1 3 1. Pro-ISIS groups are expanding operations into eastern Yemen, where AQAP has traditionally had a dominant presence. 2. IRGC Naval forces detained the Maersk Tigris in the Strait of Hormuz on April 28 based on a lawsuit filed by Iranian oil company Pars Talaei against Danish shipping group Maersk. 3. Rebel violence is increasing in northern Mali as Tuareg rebels attacked a town near the Mauritanian border. 2
- 3. ASSESSMENT: Political International actors and warring Yemeni factions continued to call for political dialogue but remained unable to agree on preconditions for talks to begin. Separately, U.S. officials reported that Iranian ships allegedly carrying weapons to resupply the al Houthi movement in Yemen turned away from the Gulf of Aden on April 24. Iran continued to try to deliver supplies to Yemen, as an Iranian plane violated the Saudi-implemented no-fly zone over Yemen on April 28, causing Saudi aircraft to bomb the runway of Sana’a airport to prevent the Iranian plane from landing. Outlook: It is likely that Iran will continue to try to resupply the al Houthi movement in Yemen despite U.N. sanctions. It is unlikely that all actors involved in the Yemen conflict will agree on preconditions for political dialogue in the near future. Security Al Houthi expansion in Yemen appears to have stalled. The al Houthis continued aggressive campaigns in Aden city and Ma’rib but did not make any significant territorial gains. Anti-al Houthi fighters continued to attack al Houthi-controlled areas in Taiz, Shabwah, al Dhaleh, Abyan, and Ibb governorates but have not impeded the al Houthis’ ability to operate in southern Yemen. Separately, al Houthi militants attacked Saudi border guards in Najran, Saudi Arabia, on April 30 killing three soldiers. Outlook: Popular resistance will continue to attack the al Houthis across Yemen, but will likely remain largely ineffective. The success of the al Houthi campaign in Ma’rib could be a major inflection point in the Yemen conflict in coming weeks. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Pro-ISIS accounts released a video depicting the execution of 14 Yemeni soldiers. Separately, ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt claimed credit for a complex attack in Tarim, Hadramawt, the first reported pro-ISIS activity in Hadramawt. Ansar al Sharia maintained distance from ISIS attacks and released a statement denying responsibility for the attack in Tarim. Ansar al Sharia continues to maintain control of territory around al Mukalla, Hadramawt. Outlook: ISIS supporters have continued to expand their areas of operation in Yemen. AQAP will continue to control and expand its influence over al Mukalla. 3 YEMENGULF OF ADEN
- 4. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 4 YEMENGULF OF ADEN 1) 25 APR-1 MAY: Al Houthis clashed with popular resistance forces in Sirwah, Ma’rib. 2) 30 APR: Al Houthis attacked Saudi Border Guards in Najran, Saudi Arabia. 3) 25 APR-1 May: Al Houthis clashed with popular resistance forces in Taiz city, Taiz. 4) 30 APR: Pro-ISIS militants attacked military in Tarim, Hadramawt. 5) 25-27 APR: Saudi airstrikes targeted al Houthis throughout Yemen. 3 1 2 4 5 Saudi-airstrike data ends
- 5. ASSESSMENT: Political Kenya has stepped back from its previous position on closing the Dadaab refugee camps. The head of Kenya’s Refugee Affairs Commission stated on April 29 that while Kenya would still attempt to close the camps, it would not forcibly repatriate its inhabitants. This is a shift from the government’s previous statements, which held that if the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) did not close the camp, Kenya would. Outlook: Relenting on the Dadaab camps will help Kenya avoid alienating Somali refugees, who otherwise may turn to supporting al Shabaab. Security SNA and AMISOM forces increased pressure on al Shabaab by capturing two villages in Bakool region from the group. Al Shabaab’s control of the countryside in southern Somalia has given them a launching pad from which to carry out attacks throughout Somalia. Separately, a mass grave with at least 11 bodies was discovered in the vicinity of Wajir, North Eastern Province, Kenya. The discovery raised the fear of extra-judicial killings targeting terror suspects among Kenya’s Somali and Muslim minorities. Outlook: If extra-judicial killings are being carried out, it could alienate Kenya’s Somali and Muslim minorities, which would play into al Shabaab’s narrative of combating Kenyan oppression. Al Shabaab Kenya’s offer of amnesty to al Shabaab members who surrender has resulted in limited defections from the group. Kenyan officials revealed on April 25 that six militants had surrendered in Mombasa, Coast Province, and on April 30 that a militant had surrendered in Kirinyaga county, Central Province. A similar amnesty offer was previously implemented by the Somali government and has resulted in some high-level defections. Outlook: A continued offer of amnesty from the Kenyan government could prove effective in producing defections from Kenyan al Shabaab members as well as help foster positive relations between the Kenyan government and Muslim and Somali communities in Kenya. HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 5
- 6. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 1) 25-26 APR: Al Shabaab assassinated four government officials in separate attacks in Mogadishu. 2) 28 APR: Al Shabaab detonated an IED targeting a former UN employee in Galkayo, Mudug region. 3) 29 APR: SNA and AMISOM forces captured the villages of Lagaley and Ceelahelay in Bakool region. 4) 30 APR: Suspected al Shabaab militants detonated two IEDs in Janale, Lower Shabelle region. 6 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 6 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 6 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 6 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 66 1 2 3 4
- 7. ASSESSMENT: AQIM Abu Obeida al Annabi, head of AQIM’s council of dignitaries, delivered a video message to Tunisian fighters about the difference between the jihadists and the “deceitful” secularists. In the video, al Annabi states that the secularists in the government ended the Tunisian revolution before it could succeed. The video urges Tunisians to wage Jihad and to fight their government. Outlook: AQIM continues to show its presence, even if it is only through social media. AQIM could be attempting to recruit fighters to its ranks from the Tunisian population. Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia) Tunisian security forces continue to conduct interdiction operations, particularly in the mountainous region of Kasserine near the Algerian border. Special security units discovered and cleared 11 landmines from Mount Salloum, the site of last week’s clashes between the army and militants. Outlook: Although Tunisia has increased its counter-terrorism operations since the Bardo Museum attack, militant activity will likely continue to target Tunisian security forces. Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) Various Malian militant organizations continue to fight security forces and each other. Tuareg rebels attacked the towns of Lere, western Mali, and Goundam, central northern Mali. Pro-government organizations GATIA and the MAA attacked the rebel-held town of Menaka, eastern Mali, and regained control from the rebels. Outlook: The situation in northern Mali continues to deteriorate despite regional and international efforts to have all rebel factions sign a peace and reconciliation agreement by May 15. 7 MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA
- 8. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA 1 3 2 8 1) 25 APR: Tunisian army units repulsed a terrorist attack in Mount Mghilla, Kasserine, western Tunisia. 2) 28 APR: Algerian army forces killed six terrorists belonging to AQIM’s al Nour Brigade, in Tizi Ouzou, northern Algeria. 3) 29 APR: Tunisian security units found and cleared 11 landmines in Mount Salloum, Kasserine, western Tunisia.
- 9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA 1) 27 APR: GATIA and MAA fighters seized the town of Menaka, eastern Mali, from Tuareg rebels. 2) 29 APR: Rebels attacked the town of Lere, near the Mauritanian border, killing nine soldiers. 3) 29 APR: Rebels attacked the town of Goundam, north central Mali, killing two soldiers and a civilian. 4) 30 APR: A minibus traveling near Gao triggered a landmine, which left three civilians dead and 28 others wounded. 2 1 3 4 9
- 10. ASSESSMENT: Regional Developments and Diplomacy Iranian naval forces seized Marshall Islands-flagged cargo ship Maersk Tigris in the Strait of Hormuz on April 28. Iran’s Port and Maritime Organization later released a statement that the detention of the Maersk Tigris was based on a lawsuit filed last year against Danish shipping organization Maersk by a private Iranian oil production company named Pars Talaei. Meanwhile, Iranian officials promoted Iranian naval activity in the Gulf of Aden as that of a safekeeping force, stressing the Navy’s routine and historic presence in the region after an Iranian convoy of ships purportedly carrying arms for the al Houthis altered its course following the arrival of the USS Roosevelt aircraft carrier strike group in the Gulf of Aden. Outlook: The Iranian Navy will continue to highlight its presence as a safe-keeping force in the Gulf of Aden. Nuclear Talks Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on the sidelines of the NPT Review Conference in New York. The two agreed that Iran and the P5+1 would continue to work on drafting the text for a final nuclear agreement. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, meanwhile, stated that the key to solving Iran’s economic problems is not a nuclear deal; rather, the solution requires strengthening the “backbone of the resistance economy,” through increased manufacturing and production. President Hassan Rouhani, however, stressed the need for foreign investment in order for Iran’s economy to grow and prosper. Rouhani said, “without the presence of foreign capital and technology” Iran will have difficulty in finishing large-scale projects that are necessary for economic growth and prosperity. Outlook: The Supreme Leader will continue to voice his mistrust of the U.S., while reinforcing the “resistance economy” strategy to downplay Iran’s need for a nuclear deal. 10 IRAN
- 11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN 1119 APR – 24 APR 2015 APR 26: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei criticized American police forces during the 20th General Congress of Law Enforcement Forces (LEF) Commanders and Staff. APR 26: SCNS Secretary Ali Shamkhani called for a “review [of] the strategies” of the LEF. APR 27: IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari called on Iranian officials to adopt a tougher stance against Saudi Arabia regarding its airstrikes in Yemen. APR 27: The Iranian nuclear negotiating team arrived in New York City for the NPT Review Conference. APR 28: President Hassan Rouhani expressed confidence that sanctions would soon be removed. APR 28: SCNS Secretary Ali Shamkhani characterized Iranian maritime presence in the Gulf of Aden as routine and “based on a timetable.” APR 28: IRGC Qods Forces Commander Major General Qassem Soleimani addressed an assembly of Parliamentarians on regional developments. APR 29: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stressed that the solution to Iran’s economic problems lies in the implementation of the ‘resistance economy,’ not in the nuclear negotiations. APR 29: Iran’s Port and Maritime Organization released a statement indicating that the detention of the Maersk Tigris was based on a lawsuit filed by Iranian oil production company Pars Talaei against Danish shipping group Maersk. APR 29: Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari highlights Iranian naval presence in the Gulf of Aden is “not a new issue.” APR 30: Iranian negotiators hold talks regarding the nuclear negotiations with EU representatives on the sidelines of the NPT Review Conference. MAY 01: President Hassan Rouhani stressed the need for foreign investment. 26 APR – 01 MAY
- 12. ACRONYMS 12 Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI) African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T) Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Islamic State (IS) Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) Libyan National Army (LNA) Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) North Waziristan (NWA) Pakistani Military (PakMil) Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS) Somalia National Army (SNA) South Waziristan (SWA) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- 13. CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS Katherine Zimmerman senior al Qaeda analyst katherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576 Alexis Knutsen al Qaeda analyst alexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570 Marie Donovan Iran analyst marie.donovan@aei.org (202) 888-6572 Mehrdad Moarefian Iran analyst mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org (202) 888-6574 For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org. 13