CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging. 2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts. 3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.

1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project
Update and Assessment
July 18, 2017

2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1) AQAP and AQIM demonstrated continued close coordination with a joint
statement calling for attacks on Israel in response to the al Aqsa closure.
2) National protests against security forces may cause instability in Morocco.
3) The UN attempted to reinvigorate stalled ceasefire talks in Yemen with a
plan to transfer the Red Sea port of al Hudaydah to a neutral party.

3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) demonstrated its close coordination with al
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The two groups rapidly produced a joint statement
calling on the Muslim community to resist Israel’s temporary prohibition of prayer at the al
Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.
Al Qaeda militants online promoted the group as a preeminent source of military skill
following the declared defeat of ISIS in Mosul. Al Qaeda also released a video of the late
shari’a scholar Abu Yahya al Libi explicating the benefits of building trenches on July 15.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will maintain strong operational ties between affiliates, as well as
capitalize on ISIS’s military failure in Mosul to draw recruits to its organization.
Tehrik-e-Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates
Pakistani security forces intensified operations against ISIS Wilayat Khorasan and other
militant groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The Pakistani Army
launched Operation Khyber IV on July 16 to clear the Rajgur Valley of Khyber Agency.
Outlook: Militant groups under pressure will increase their pace of operations against
security forces in the FATA.

4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
China is facilitating negotiations to secure the transfer of al Hudaydah port, the primary port
on Yemen’s west coast, from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party. The UN seeks
the port’s transfer as the first step in a comprehensive ceasefire.
Outlook: The al Houthi-Saleh faction will continue to oppose the transfer of al Hudaydah.
Security
The internationally recognized Yemeni government lacks control over the forces with which it
seeks to take control of Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city. Two Hadi government-aligned
militias fought each other over tax revenues in Taiz.
Outlook: The fight for Taiz will remain deadlocked.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP claimed its first attack in Shabwah governorate this year. AQAP conducted a suicide
vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on a base used by Emirati-backed security
forces, which AQAP targets to present itself as the protector of the local population.
Outlook: AQAP will increase its attacks against Emirati-backed security forces in Shabwah.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 14 JUL: AQAP
militants attacked al
Houthi-Saleh forces
in al Bayda.
2) 17 JUL: Al Houthi-
Saleh forces
targeted Hadi
government forces
in al Jawf.
3) 17 JUL: Coalition
warplanes targeted
al Houthi-Saleh
positions in Sana’a.
4) 17 JUL: Hadi
government forces
attacked al Houthi-
Saleh forces in Taiz
governorate.
5) 17 JUL: AQAP
militants attacked
security forces in
Shabwah.
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5
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1
2

6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Al Shabaab’s campaign to obstruct the Somali government’s aid distribution efforts is
exacerbating the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. Al Shabaab abducted seven Somali aid
workers in Bay region to stop aid distribution in drought-impacted villages.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may increase its aid distribution efforts to garner public support.
Security
Kenya intensified operations against al Shabaab in response to increased attacks in eastern
Kenya. Kenyan jets bombed al Shabaab strongholds in Boni Forest, Lamu County. Kenya’s
president ordered police to “kill and bury” militants found in Lamu County.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will conduct retaliatory attacks on police and civilians in Lamu County.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab increased its foreign fighter recruitment effort, releasing four propaganda videos
featuring foreign fighters in eight days. The videos feature militants from Kenya, Uganda,
and Tanzania who urge East Africans to travel to Somalia to join al Shabaab.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may use foreign fighter recruits to conduct suicide attacks in Kenya.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
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1) 12 JUL: Al
Shabaab
conducted seven
attacks in
Mogadishu.
2) 12 JUL: SNA and
AMISOM seized
villages from al
Shabaab in Gedo.
3) 13 JUL: Al
Shabaab abducted
a Kenyan official in
Lamu County.
4) 13 JUL: U.S. SOF
assisted SNA
forces raiding an al
Shabaab base in
Kunya Barrow.
5) 15 JUL: Al
Shabaab abducted
seven aid workers
in Gasarta village.

8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
The head of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez al Serraj,
proposed several changes to the Libyan peace process, including parliamentary and head-
of-state elections in March 2018. Serraj’s political opponents criticized the plan.
Outlook: Egypt, the UAE, and Algeria will reconvene Libyan powerbrokers in pursuit of an
elite deal between Serraj and the bloc led by LNA commander Khalifa Haftar.
Security
The LNA intensified airstrikes in Derna city in an effort to complete its control over eastern
Libya. An al Qaeda-linked militant coalition governs Derna.
Outlook: LNA ground forces will soon attempt to enter Derna city.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
Islamist militias, including al Qaeda-linked groups, are attempting to destabilize the GNA in
Tripoli. Militant leaders are reportedly forming a new group, the “Tripoli Defense Brigades.”
Outlook: Ongoing conflict near Tripoli will allow al Qaeda fighters to retain and strengthen
partnerships with Libyan Islamist militias.
.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA

9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
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1) 11 JUL: Pro-GNA
forces declared
victory over pro-
GNC groups in
Garabulli town,
Tripoli district.
2) 12 JUL: The LNA
conducted
airstrikes in
western Derna city.
3) 12 JUL: Pro-GNC
groups reportedly
moved toward
Tarhouna town,
southern Tripoli
district.
4) 12 JUL: Misratan
militias reportedly
attempted to enter
Tripoli.
4

10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
Moroccan protest movements are uniting against the state’s detainment of activist leaders.
Protesters in Rabat demanded employment opportunities and the release of detained
leaders. Organizers planned a national protest for July 20. Widespread unrest provides
opportunities for militant groups to recruit or conduct attacks.
Outlook: The July 20 protest will challenge security forces and lead to further clashes.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (JNIM, Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
The al Qaeda-linked coalition JNIM increased its operational tempo in central Mali, likely
through its ethnic Fulani component, the Macina Liberation Front. JNIM briefly seized a
police station in central Mali and is likely responsible for several recent attacks in the region.
The Boko Haram faction led by Abubakar Shekau increased its attack tempo against
civilians and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to discourage cooperation with the military
in the Lake Chad region. Suicide bombings in northeastern Nigeria and northern Cameroon
killed more than 40 people.
Outlook: JNIM will use central Mali as a staging ground for attacks on Mali’s capital and
Burkina Faso. Boko Haram attacks will intimidate the CJTF and disrupt security cooperation.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 11 JUL: Suspected
Uqba Ibn Nafa’a
Brigade militants
clashed with
Tunisian security
forces in Kasserine
Governorate.
2) 11 JUL: An
Algerian man
attempted to self-
immolate in Ain
Boucif.
3) 14 JUL: Algerian
security forces
discovered
explosive material
in a militant bunker
in Skikda.
4) 16 JUL: Protesters
demanded the
release of detained
activists in Rabat.
2
3
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4

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| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL
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5
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1) 11 JUL: Boko
Haram-Shekau
suicide bombers
attacked Maiduguri,
Nigeria.
2) 12 JUL: Boko
Haram-Shekau
suicide bombers
attacked Waza,
Cameroon.
3) 13 JUL: Malian
forces killed a
Macina Liberation
Front (MLF) leader
in Mougna, Mali.
4) 13 JUL: MLF
militants attacked
Kouakorou, Mali.
5) 17 JUL: Boko
Haram-Shekau
suicide bombers
attacked a mosque
in Maiduguri.
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4

13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569