CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated control over the city and its environs. Ferjani tribesmen rose up against ISIS following the death of a prominent sheikh. ISIS responded by killing over 37 people. It now has control of the city. 2. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, continue to roll back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen, but al Houthi leadership is describing their forces’ withdrawals as tactical. The al Houthis will probably respond with a counteroffensive. 3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, calling the deal “still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
August 19, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated
control over the city and its environs.
2. Anti-al Houthi forces continued to make gains against the al Houthis in southern and central Yemen,
but the al Houthis have warned that the current retreat is tactical.
3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the
nuclear deal, calling it “still unsettled” since neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress
“has adopted it yet.”
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
The new Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour recognized the bay’a, pledge of allegiance, from al Qaeda leader Ayman al
Zawahiri. The Taliban is now divided over Mansour’s appointment and there is a large shura council convened to make a final
decision. It is not clear how this will play with al Qaeda’s relationship with the Taliban.
Separately, Hamza bin Laden’s return is likely to strengthen the overall al Qaeda movement. Al Sahab, al Qaeda’s media wing,
released an audio statement from Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden on August 14, 2015.
Bin Laden sent his greetings to the leaders of all al Qaeda affiliates and also recognized Mullah Omar. He urged lone wolf
attacks against the the West and talked in length about his father’s vision for jihad against the U.S. The statement featured an
introduction by Zawahiri and is dated approximately between May-June 2015.
Outlook: These statements from al Qaeda show unity and strength in the wake of Mullah Omar’s death.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Jamaat-ul Ahrar militants killed at least 17 people, including Punjab Home Minister Col. Shuja Khanzada, in a suicide attack in
Attock, Punjab. The group, affiliated with Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed that the attack was in retaliation for the death
of Malik Ishaq, the leader of sectarian militant group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Col. Khanzada was the leader of the anti-terror
campaign in Punjab and was seen as one of the most influential anti-terrorism advocates in the country.
The Pakistani military strengthened its offensive against militancy in the tribal areas of the country. Pakistani military launched
multiple air strikes in the tribal areas, killing at least 70 militants. These attacks are a part of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistani
military’s offensive against militancy in the country. The operation is now in its final phase.
Outlook: Pakistani military will continue to strengthen its offensive against militancy in the country as Operation Zarb-e-Azb is
in its final phase.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is attempting to rebuild his government in southern Yemen. He appointed new
governors for Lahij and Abyan. Additionally, a number of cabinet ministers arrived in Aden on August 11. Separately, Iran’s
Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs Hossein Amir Abdollahian announced that Iranian and Gulf Cooperation
Council officials will meet at the end of September to discuss the Syrian and Yemeni crises.
Outlook: Hadi and his government will likely try to shore up support in southern Yemen in order to establish a government
based in Aden, although the presence of southern secessionists among anti-al Houthi forces in southern Yemen may
undermine support for Hadi.
Security
Operation Golden Arrow and allied anti-al Houthi forces have liberated the majority of southern Yemen from the al Houthis.
Tribal forces negotiated an al Houthi withdrawal from Shabwah governorate on August 15. In central Yemen, anti-al Houthi
forces are in control of the majority of Taiz city. An al Houthi leader stated that the withdrawal from Shabwah was a tactical
maneuver in preparation for a strike against Saudi Arabia, indicating the al Houthis may begin reinforcing forces stationed along
the Saudi-Yemeni border.
Outlook: The al Houthis may be planning to respond to their loss of territory in southern Yemen by increasing attacks along the
Saudi Arabian border. A major al Houthi offensive and retaliatory Saudi response could disrupt efforts to negotiate an end to the
conflict.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP continues to exploit Operation Golden Arrow’s success to expand in southern Yemen. AQAP militants fought with al
Houthis for control of Lawder, Abyan, in southern Yemen after the governorate’s liberation. AQAP militants are also operating
with tribal fighters in recently liberated areas in central Yemen to cut off al Houthi supply routes.
Outlook: The continued success of Operation Golden Arrow and tribal forces in seizing territory from the al Houthis will further
empower AQAP to expand its territorial reach in south-central Yemen.
4
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN
1
3 4
2
5
1) 15 AUG: Operation
Golden Arrow
coalition forces
seized Shabwah
governorate from the
al Houthis.
2) 13 AUG: ISIS
Wilayat Sana’a
detonated a VBIED
near an al Houthi-
controlled building in
Sana’a.
3) 11 AUG: Popular
resistance fighters
advanced into Ibb
city.
4) 12 AUG: Reported
U.S. airstrike killed
five AQAP militants in
al Mukalla,
Hadramawt.

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The Somali federalization process continues to collapse as its 2016 deadline approaches. Approximately one third of the Somali
Parliament’s 275 members signed a motion of no confidence against President Hassan Sheikh Mohamed, which Parliament’s
speaker approved. The motion charges President Mohamed with corruption and violating the Provisional Federal Constitution.
Outlook: The Somali federalization process may collapse completely before it reaches its 2016 deadline, potentially causing
international forces to assist in reinstituting an interim federal government or causing an outbreak of violence in the nation.
Security
Somali National Army (SNA) troops continue to accept the surrender of al Shabaab commanders in south-central Somalia. A
group financier surrendered to SNA officials in Bardhere, Gedo region, a former group stronghold, on August 11. The SNA also
reported that three senior members deserted the group in the Gedo region and another financier surrendered in the Bakool
region on August 17.
Outlook: The surrender of al Shabaab fighters may affect the group’s leadership but does not appear to be affecting the
group’s ability to carry out operations.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab militants continue to clash with forces allied with the Somali government in southern and central Somalia. AMISOM
launched a failed operation to retake Awdheegle, Lower Shabelle region, from the militants, and al Shabaab recovered Halgan,
Hiraan region, and Wahbo, Galgudud region, from Ethiopian troops who had seized the towns from the group in early August.
Separately, the group temporarily seized a village in Lamu County, retreating after preaching to local residents for over an hour.
Outlook: Al Shabaab militants are likely to continue to clash with forces friendly with the Somali government in southern and
central Somalia as they attempt to retake towns from the forces and defend their remaining strongholds in the regions.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
6

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
7777
2
4
3
7
1
1) 12 AUG: Al
Shabaab militants
attacked an SNA and
AMISOM base in
Dinsoor, Bay region.
2) 13 AUG: AMISOM
troops failed to
retake Awdheegle,
Lower Shabelle
region, from al
Shabaab militants.
3) 16 JAUG: Al
Shabaab militants
retook Halgan and
Wabho, Hiran region,
after Ethiopian
troops retreated.
4) 16 AUG: Al
Shabaab militants
temporarily seized a
village in Lamu
County.

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UNSMIL hosted delegates from the internationally backed Libyan House of Representatives (HoR), Tripoli’s General National
Congress (GNC), and other independent groups in Geneva. The discussions concluded peacefully and UNSMIL issued a
directive to all participants that the UN would only host these negotiations until the end of August.
Outlook: The GNC, which previously gave mixed signals about its intentions, will be forced to rejoin the diplomatic process in
the aftermath of ISIS’s brutal consolidation of power in Sirte. This course of action will aim to appease the UN’s demand for a
unity government before reopening access to international military aid.
Security
LNA operations to secure Benghazi continue to sap resources from efforts to expand the LNA’s area of operations throughout
Libya. ISIS briefly held the LNA headquarters in Sabri, Benghazi, before LNA forces regained control. In its counterattack, the
LNA killed the leader of the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council and two alleged ISIS commanders. The LNA made few
attempts to support the Ferjani rebels in Sirte, Libya, but the operations were limited to several ineffective airstrikes.
Outlook: Growing frustration over the LNA’s ineffectiveness is testing the HoR’s patience. The large loss of civilian life in Sirte
will force the government to increase public pressure on General Hafter to produce military results.
Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya
ISIS and Ansar al Sharia are suffering from increased attrition rates in Benghazi and Derna, which has forced the two groups to
consolidate their remaining forces and sacrifice insignificant bases.
ISIS’s Sirte forces successfully suppressed the Ferjani clan’s attempt to overthrow ISIS’s hold on power in Sirte, Libya. The
revolt, which received scant internal or external support, was defeated with ease. ISIS followed with indiscriminate punishments
that allowed it to achieve total control over the remaining neighborhoods in the city.
Outlook: ISIS’s 18 AUG announcement of the implementation of Islamic institutions in Sirte indicates that an official
proclamation of the Caliphate’s control over Sirte is imminent. This will force ISIS to strengthen its recruitment efforts in order to
defend its territory against domestic and foreign coalitions.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
AQIM’s resurgence in Algeria continues in the wake of the country’s political instability. AQIM militants ambushed Algerian
forces near Skikda, Algeria, leaving casualties on both sides. This is the third attack on Algerian forces by AQIM in the last
month. Algerian authorities continued their attempts to isolate militants in the north by cutting off weapons flowing from the
Sahel, interdicting two large weapons caches smuggled from Mali.
Outlook: AQIM and other militant groups will likely see Algeria’s political and military instability as an opportunity to increase
attacks and operate without close surveillance.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisia continues to face growing internal threats as security forces arrest suspected terrorists throughout the country. Algerian
and Tunisian intelligence warned of an impending attack by the Uqba Ibn Nafaa brigade. Tunisian authorities discovered a
weapons smuggling route that allowed the militant group to stay heavily armed in the mountains of western Tunisia. Separately,
Tunisian forces dismantled a large ISIS cell in Bizerte, Tunisia.
Outlook: The focus on dismantling urban terrorist cells by Tunisia security forces have likely allowed for the Uqba Ibn Nafaa
brigade and other groups in the western mountains to gain strength and increase operational capacity.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
The breach of the peace accords by CMA rebels and pro-government GATIA militias threaten to plunge Mali into an increasing
state of violence. CMA and GATIA fighters clashed near Kidal on 16 AUG, killing tens of fighters and breaking the peace
agreement. Ansar al Din militants carried out two separate attacks in Servare and Bamako, while their former spokesman
Sanda Bouamama reportedly pledged allegiance to ISIS. Al Murabitoun formerly announced their reconciliation with AQIM,
naming Mokhtar Belmokhtar the group’s emir.
Outlook: The end of the peace accords will mean an increase of violence by jihadist groups in addition to CMA and GATIA
militias.
9
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: LIBYAWEST AFRICA
1 2
3
4
10
1) 11 AUG: Gunmen
assassinated Sheikh
Ferjani in a surprise
attack IVO Sirte,
Libya.
2) 11-14 AUG: Ferjani
tribal militants
launched operations
to oust ISIS IVO Sirte.
3) 14-15 AUG: ISIS
led an attack on the
local LNA
headquarters, seizing
it briefly, IVO Sabri,
Benghazi.
4) 16 AUG: LNA
forces killed Benghazi
Revolutionary Shura
Council leader in
foiled escape attempt
IVO Sabri, Benghazi.

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
1
3
2
11
41) 17 AUG: A mine
explosion in Jebel
Mghila injured
Tunisian soldiers.
2) 16 AUG: Tunisian
security forces
dismantled a six-
member ISIS cell in
Bizerte.
3) 12 AUG/14 AUG:
Algerian security
forces arrested
smugglers along Mali
and Nigerien borders.
4) 16 AUG: AQIM-
linked militants
ambushed Algerian
soldiers near Skikda.

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
12
SAHELWEST AFRICA
2
1
3
4
1) 13 AUG:
Unidentified militants
attacked a bus station
in Bamako, killing two
Malian police
officers.
2) 14 AUG: Islamist
militants killed a local
imam in Barkerou,
Mali.
3) 17 AUG: Tuareg
rebels attacked pro-
government militias
in Amassine and
Anefis, Mali.
4) 17 AUG: Armed
militants attacked an
aid convoy in
Goundam, Mali.

13. ASSESSMENT:
Regional Developments
Iranian officials reiterated their support for Syrian President Bashar al Assad amidst the ongoing debate over the crisis in Syria.
Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati called the demand for Assad to step aside “irrational,”
while Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated on August 15, “The Islamic Republic will continue its current
strategy in Syria…” Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, meanwhile, met with Assad in Damascus on August 12, and
described their talks as “constructive” and “good conversations on solving the Syrian crisis.”
Outlook: The Iranian regime will prioritize the preservation of the Syrian state during the forthcoming talks with the Gulf
Cooperation Council in September.
Nuclear Talks
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in a speech on August 17 that the West wanted to reach a nuclear deal with Iran
in order to “infiltrate” it. He stated that Iran will resist, with all its power, any American effort to make economic, political, or
cultural advances into the country. Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action, or JCPOA, as he stated that the deal “is still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has
adopted it yet.”
Outlook: Khamenei will resist expanding diplomatic cooperation on Iran’s nuclear program into other areas, including regional
issues and cultural dialogue.
13
IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
14
11 AUG: Head of the Passive Defense Organization IRGC Brig. Gen. Gholam Reza Jalali announced a new “command
and control system for monitoring threats.”
11 AUG: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei stated that the Supreme National Security Council
(SNSC) is reviewing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and should conclude its investigation “in the
next couple of sessions.”
11 AUG: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that “the JCPOA does not require Parliament’s resolution.”
11 AUG: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif met with Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in
Beirut. Zarif also met with Lebanese Prime Minister Tamam Salam.
11 AUG: The Party of Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), a Kurdish separatist group, attacked a group of Basij militia
members in Kurdistan province, located in northwestern Iran.
12 AUG: IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari stressed that domestic “deviation from the path of the
[Islamic] Revolution” is Iran’s “main risk.”
12 AUG: Foreign Minister Zarif discussed regional developments and security with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in
Damascus.
13 AUG: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei stated, “The JCPOA is the beginning of our new era
with America.”
14 AUG: Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian announced that Iran will hold talks on Syria and Yemen with
the GCC in September.
15 AUG: President Hassan Rouhani stated that the Islamic Revolution catalyzed the spread of Islam, but that Iran’s
“scientific, spiritual, and political authority and power” will not be used against any neighbor.
15 AUG: Deputy Foreign Minister Abdollahian stated that Iran “will continue its current strategy in Syria.”
16 AUG: Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to the Supreme Leader Ali Akbar Velayati called the demand for Syrian President
Bashar al Assad to step aside “irrational.”
17 AUG: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that the West wants a nuclear deal in order to “infiltrate” Iran. He
also indicated the deal “is still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”
11 AUG – 17 AUG 2015

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16