CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. The direct talks between the al Houthis and U.S. officials in Oman may indicate a shift in the al Houthis’ position. The group previously refused to open a direct line of communication with the U.S. and may now be more open to a U.S. role in ongoing Yemeni political negotiations. It is not clear yet whether the U.S.-al Houthi talks are solely focused on the status of three remaining U.S. citizens detained by the group in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a, or whether the talks include the ongoing political crisis in the country. 2. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be expanding its presence in Algeria and Tunisia. A Tunisian soldier opened fire on his colleagues in Tunisia, with pro-ISIS fighters claiming to have radicalized the assailant. Local reports from Algerian prisons also indicate that AQIM members are shifting their allegiances to ISIS, while Syria-based ISIS Wilayat Damascus released a message targeting Algerian supporters. 3. Al Shabaab may be attempting to position itself for future operations, indicated by an attack on military bases in Kaxda district on the outskirts of Mogadishu. The group also reportedly controlled a Kenyan border town for two days, continuing a shift in al Shabaab’s activities in northern Kenya from conducting attacks to attempting to control territory.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
June 3, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. The direct talks between the al Houthis and U.S. officials in Oman may indicate a shift in the al
Houthis’ position. The group previously refused to open a direct line of communication with
the U.S. and may now be more open to a U.S. role in ongoing Yemeni political negotiations.
2. ISIS may be expanding its presence in Algeria and Tunisia following an attack in Tunisia and
reports of growing support from former AQIM members in Algerian prisons.
3. Al Shabaab may be attempting to position itself for future operations, indicated by an attack
on military bases in Kaxda district on the outskirts of Mogadishu.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda continues to view the Syrian jihad as its primary effort globally and seeks to secure its gains in Syria through Jabhat
al Nusra. Jabhat al Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al Julani’s assertion in a taped interview that he had orders from al Qaeda
leader Ayman al Zawahiri to focus only on the Syrian front and not on global jihad is al Qaeda preferencing what it calls the
“near war” as part of its overall global jihad strategy. It also shows that Zawahiri still commands the direction of the overall al
Qaeda network and should dismiss notions that Jabhat al Nusra had split from al Qaeda. Al Qaeda also continues to dedicate
key personnel and resources to the Syrian fight. A U.S. coalition airstrike killed veteran al Qaeda operative Said Arif in Syria.
Arif, an Algerian with significant connections to multiple attempted al Qaeda attacks in Europe, joined al Qaeda’s Syria-based
affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, in October 2013 and was reported to lead the jihadist group, Jund al Aqsa, in Syria.
Outlook: Al Qaeda will continue to prioritize its fight in Syria, but will also take advantage of recent gains in Yemen. It is not
clear how it will respond to the growth of ISIS cells in the Maghreb and Sahel. Al Qaeda will also continue to try to inspire low-
scale attacks in the West.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) confirmed its position within the al Qaeda network and publicly rejected the Islamic State in
Iraq and al Sham’s (ISIS) claim to a Caliphate in a 57-page publication. The TTP also praised Afghan Taliban leader Mullah
Omar and al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri. A pro-ISIS group previously splintered from the TTP. Separately, an unverified
media report stated that al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) demanded a ransom payment for the release of the son of
former Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, Haider. Haider was kidnapped in May 2013 and an unknown group, to
whom the TTP denied connections, demanded a ransom payment for his release in April 2014. That group may have been what
would become AQIS or may have transferred custody of Haider to AQIS in the past year.
Pakistan’s military and security forces are continuing a ground operation against militant groups in North Waziristan..
Outlook: Pakistan will continue Operation Zarb-e-Azad against militancy in North Waziristan.
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
U.S. officials are reportedly engaged in direct talks with the al Houthi movement in Muscat, Oman, for the first time. It is unclear
whether the talks are intended to bring the al Houthi movement and Hadi’s government to negotiations or whether they are only
focused on the status of three U.S. citizens currently detained by the al Houthi movement in Yemen’s capital, Sana’a. The al
Houthi movement released a fourth U.S. citizen from captivity on June 1, who arrived in Muscat, Oman, on the same day.
Outlook: U.S. involvement with the al Houthi movement could possibly help bring about Yemeni political dialogue, though the
U.S. may only be looking after the interests of U.S. citizens currently detained in Yemen.
Security
Al Houthi militants continued to fire rockets at Saudi Arabian targets in Jizan, Asir, and Najran provinces in Saudi Arabia and
also engaged in several border clashes with Saudi Arabian security forces along the Saudi-Yemeni border. Separately, popular
resistance fighters have continued to battle the al Houthi movement for control of al Houthi-occupied territory, though battle
lines remain fixed.
Outlook: Continued al Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia will further escalate tensions between Saudi Arabia and the al
Houthi movement and may provoke a stronger Saudi response as internal Saudi security is threatened.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Pro-ISIS militants have continued to target Shi’ites in the Arabian Peninsula in an attempt to increase sectarian conflict in the
region. ISIS Wilayat Najd militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device at a Shi’ite mosque in
Dammam, Saudi Arabia, on May 29. Security forces detained an unidentified but suspected pro-ISIS militant attempting to carry
a shoe-bomb into a Shi’ite mosque in the capital, Sana’a, on the same day. It is unclear whether the attacks are related.
Separately, the Sons of Hadramawt, an AQAP-affiliated group based in al Mukalla, reportedly captured an alleged drug dealer
in Ghayl Bawazir on May 26 and confiscated weapons from an alleged al Houthi-sympathizer in al Mukalla on May 29,
indicating that the group is taking an active role in the security of the area.
Outlook: Pro-ISIS groups’ continued targeting of Shi’ite populations in the Arabian Peninsula may increase sectarian conflict.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
3
1
2
4
5
1) 29 MAY: Security
forces detained an
unidentified militant
carrying a shoe bomb
into a Shi’ite mosque
in Sana’a.
2) 26 MAY-01 JUN: Al
Houthi militants
attacked Saudi
positions along the
Saudi-Yemeni border.
3) 29 MAY: Ansar al
Sharia militants
detonated an SVBIED
targeting al Houthis
in Shaqra, Abyan.
4) 26 MAY-01 JUN: Al
Houthi militants
continued to battle
popular resistance
fighters for control of
Yemeni cities.
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Refugee camps in Kenya will likely again cause increased tension between Kenya and its international partners. A report
released on May 31 claimed a Somali refugee had aided the al Shabaab militants who ambushed Kenyan police officers in
North Eastern Province on May 26. The report also alleged that a large number of refugees have been recruited by al Shabaab
to aid their operations in Kenya. The Kenyan commissioner for refugee affairs stated that he would remind Kenya’s international
partners of the need to close the refugee camps in Kenya.
Outlook: The issue of the refugee camps will likely once again prove to be a source of tension between Kenya and its partners
and presents the risk that Kenya will alienate refugees and its Somali and Muslim minorities.
Security
Clashes along Ethiopia’s borders with Somalia and Kenya could strain relations between it and its neighbors. Ethiopian troops
crossed into Kenya on May 26 and again on May 31, with the second incident resulting in the death of a Kenyan guard.
Ethiopian forces claimed that they were pursuing Oromo Liberation Front rebels when they crossed the border. Separately,
clashes between Somali clan militias and forces of the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia broke out on May 26 and continued
through May 31, when the former reportedly attacked two towns in Somalia’s Galgudud region.
Outlook: Ethiopia is an important contributor to AMISOM, and strained relations could prove detrimental to cooperation in the
fight against al Shabaab.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab militants launched an attack on Mogadishu’s Kaxda district on May 28. The group claimed to have seized control of
the neighborhood for a brief period. Kaxda is along a key road connecting Mogadishu to south-central Somalia, and al Shabaab
may be attempting to secure a foothold in the capital for future operations. Al Shabaab continued activity in north Kenya and is
reported to have held a Kenyan border town for two days.
Outlook: Al Shabaab may be seeking to expand areas under its influence in and around Mogadishu in order to protect key
routes into the capital city, which would support future operations there.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
6

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
7
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
7777
1
2
3 4
7
1) 26 MAY: Al
Shabaab militants
ambushed Kenyan
police in Garissa
County, North
Eastern Province,
Kenya.
2) 28 MAY: Al
Shabaab attacked
Kaxda district,
Mogadishu.
3) 31 MAY: Ethiopian
forces killed a Kenyan
guard in Mandera
county, Eastern
Province, Kenya.
4) 1 June: Al Shabaab
captured a town in
Mandera county,
North Eastern
Province, Kenya.

8. ASSESSMENT:
AQIM
Pro-ISIS groups appear to be gaining a foothold among former AQIM members, as rumors report mass shifts of allegiance in
Algerian prisons. ISIS Wilayat Damascus, based in Syria, released a special message directed toward its Algerian supporters.
Separately, AQIM claimed responsibility for an IED in Mali that targeted the MINUSMA commander’s convoy and for the
shelling of a MINUSMA camp.
Outlook: The Algerian army will attempt to disrupt movement and interdict weapons smuggling routes along its borders. ISIS
may put more resources toward Algeria as support for the group grows along Algeria’s unstable borders.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Both al Qaeda and ISIS continue to target Tunisia. A Tunisian soldier opened fire upon his colleagues in Tunis on May 25th.
Pro-ISIS fighters claim to have radicalized the shooter in the previous weeks, but the Tunisian government denies any ISIS
involvement at this stage. Threats targeting Tunisia were released this week by AQIM and ISIS, including a warning from the
pro-ISIS media group Ifriqiyah to those traveling on Tunisian Airlines after June 2nd.
Outlook: Tunisia will likely commit more resources toward addressing the ISIS threat by tightening security and increasing
counter-terrorism measures.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Malian Islamist groups will benefit from the continued delay of a solution to Mali’s Tuareg question. The Malian government
resumed peace talks with the Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA). Both leaders of the CMA and Mali’s foreign
minister have expressed hope that these talks will be successful. Mali’s foreign minister, however, also announced that the
current terms of the peace agreement are final and that the government is not willing to negotiate with the CMA.
Outlook: Both Islamist and Tuareg groups are likely to increase their attacks on pro-Malian government forces in the north,
creating an opportunity similar to the one in 2012 for both al Qaeda and ISIS to exploit.
8
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
1) 25 MAY: A Tunisian
soldier opened fire
on fellow soldiers,
killing 8. ISIS claimed
credit for the attack,
saying it had
radicalized the soldier
in the previous
weeks.
2) 29 MAY: Algerian
army units captured a
large cache of
weapons along its
border with Niger.
3) 31 MAY: Algerian
Army units captured
30 militants
attempting to cross
into Tebessa province
from Tunisia.
1
3
2
9
MAGHREBWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA
1) 28 MAY: An IED
targeting the
MINUSMA
commander’s convoy
injured three UN
peacekeepers in
Timbuktu, Mali.
AQIM claimed credit
for the attack on 01
JUN.
2) 29 MAY: A rocket
hit a MINUSMA camp
in Gao, Mali.
2
1
10
SAHEL

11. ASSESSMENT:
Economy
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani introduced the concept of “creative economy” during a cabinet meeting on May 27. Rouhani
described the concept as a major “step” towards the “resistance economy,” or Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s plan to
strengthen the Iranian economy and make it resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises. Rouhani likely means for
the “creative economy” to implement, rather than challenge, the doctrine of “resistance economy.”
Outlook: President Rouhani will use “creative economy” to implement the Supreme Leader’s “resistance economy” doctrine.
Regional Developments
Iran’s Supreme Leader’s Representative to the Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili stated that the Islamic Revolution
has served as “a model” for “people’s resistance in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.” Jalili’s comments reflect the regime’s perception of
its success in exporting the values of the Islamic Revolution, which has been a central goal of the Islamic Republic since its
inception.
Outlook: The Iranian regime will continue to praise Islamic Revolutionary values as the inspiration for rebel movements in
Yemen.
Nuclear Talks
Iran and members of the P5+1 held a series of deputy-level negotiations from May 26-29 in Vienna, Austria. Both sides remained
far apart on the implementation of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA’s safeguards agreements, requiring Iran to grant
international inspectors access to its military sites and nuclear scientists for interviews. Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif,
meanwhile, stated that interviewing Iranian nuclear scientists is a “peripheral issue,” suggesting that the Supreme Leader
accepted a compromise on his own red lines. The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati, however,
reinforced the red lines by stating that these issues are non-negotiable in the nuclear talks.
Outlook: Foreign Minister Zarif’s remarks regarding IAEA-led inspections will continue to be the focus of the domestic debate in
Iran, providing regime hardliners an opportunity to undermine the negotiations.
11
IRAN

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1226 MAY – 02 JUNE 2015
26 MAY: President Hassan Rouhani implicitly criticized domestic critics of the nuclear negotiations as the minority opposed
to the “government’s…interactive foreign policy.”
26 MAY: Deputy-level nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 resumed on May 26 in Vienna.
26 MAY: Head of Iran’s Cyber Police IRGC Brig. Gen. Kamal Hadianfar announced that Iran had thwarted a U.S cyberattack
against the Oil Ministry.
27 MAY: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei urged Parliament to continue implementing resistance economy policies.
27 MAY: President Rouhani stated that the “creative economy” is a key “step” in implementing the resistance economy.
28 MAY: Jassem Nouri, likely an IRGC member, was killed in Ramadi, Iraq; Saeed Qarloqi, also likely an IRGC member, was
killed “in Iraq” on May 27.
29 MAY: Cargo plane carrying humanitarian aid for the people of Yemen landed in Djibouti.
29 MAY: Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Tehran rejected the P5+1’s proposal of “managed access” to
military sites and nuclear scientists as nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 concluded.
30 MAY: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and U.S Secretary of State John Kerry discussed nuclear negotiations in
Geneva.
31 MAY: The Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) captured a terrorist leader named Abu Hafs in Sistan va
Baluchistan province.
31 MAY: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh stated Iran will continue to develop its oil fields irrespective of the West’s sanctions.
01 JUN: Supreme Leader Khamenei’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Velayati enumerated three “non-negotiable” conditions
for the P5+1 nuclear talks.
01 JUN: A passenger plane carrying supplies for Yemen is purportedly followed by a Saudi jet until it returns back to Tehran.

13. ACRONYMS
13
Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State (IS)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,
visit www.criticalthreats.org.
14