2017 10-10 CTP Update and Assessment
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CTP’s Threat Updateseries is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
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2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
2017-09-26 CTP Update and Assessment
The Critical Threats Project releases a weekly update and assessment on the al Qaeda network. Sep 26, 2017
2017 08-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is using military force to secure his power at the expense of political resolution in Libya. Pro-Haftar forces stormed the headquarters of a constitutional drafting body in eastern Libya on July 20 and demanded the abandonment of a draft constitution that barred Haftar from running for president in 2018. Haftar’s rise as a strongman may stabilize Libya in the near term, but it will exacerbate the grievances that drive the civil war and galvanize support for Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
2. The U.S. is attempting to divide the al Houthi-Saleh bloc in order to reduce Iranian influence in Yemen and revive the UN peace process. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller began the diplomatic effort by praising former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s cooperation with a UN plan and criticizing the al Houthi faction for impeding negotiations. Elite-level diplomatic engagement is unlikely to progress, however, as long as the military situation on the ground remains stalemated.
3. Political violence is surging in Kenya before general elections on August 8. Recent incidents include the murder of a senior election official and an attack on the home of the Deputy President, as well as accusations of election rigging. Civil unrest in Kenya will strain Kenyan security forces and provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand in eastern Kenya and southern Somalia, where Kenyan forces play a major role.
2017 10-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Updateseries is a weekly updateand assessment of the al Qaeda networkand its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in an Emirati-backed Yemeni operation to secure populated areas and oil pipelines in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. The operation aims to degrade the ability of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to coordinate external attacks from safe havens in Yemen. AQAP militants withdrew from Shabwah to strongholds in neighboring Abyan governorate in response. The operation is unlikely to affect AQAP’s capabilities in the long term.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) forces in Libya mobilizing outside of Sirte city, the group’s former stronghold on the Mediterranean coast. ISIS retains the capability to recruit and train fighters despite losses inflicted by the U.S.-backed campaign to retake Sirte and subsequent airstrikes.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ransoms hostages to fund its broader efforts to destabilize and replace West African states, as well as expel Western influence from the region. AQIM received at least $4.2 million in exchange for the release of Swedish and South Africa hostages in the past two months. AQIM will likely plan or support additional attacks on sites frequented by Western expatriates, continuing a campaign resumed by an AQIM affiliate in Mali in June.
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
2017 08-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit rising instability in Morocco to conduct more frequent attacks in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan security forces, which have prevented ISIS attacks in the country, are struggling to manage a growing protest movement. This civil unrest, paired with the shifting of migrant flows from Libya toward Morocco, will strain the country’s security resources and reduce pressure on ISIS networks there. Instability in Morocco also increases the risk of attacks in Europe, where Moroccan militants participated in recent ISIS attacks in Spain and a suspected ISIS-linked stabbing in Finland. [Read a recent warning on the implications of instability in Morocco.]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is fracturing. Senior al Houthi leaders accused Saleh of conducting treasonous negotiations with the Gulf States. Saleh denied the accusations and blamed the al Houthis for governance failures in Sana’a. Tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh bloc provide an opportunity for the U.S. to advance a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict. The al Houthi movement lacks the capability to continue the civil war without Saleh’s forces. An elite-brokered peace deal that does not address the grievances driving the war will not end Yemen’s instability, however. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s recommendations for U.S. engagement in Yemen.]
3. U.S. President Donald Trump criticized Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups during a speech announcing a new U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan on August 21. A Pakistani army spokesman dismissed the criticism and stated that Pakistan has taken action against militant groups in its terrain. Pakistan will likely intensify counter-militancy operations near the Afghan border to safeguard its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan may also increase support for militant groups in the disputed Kashmir territory to counteract U.S. engagement with India. [Read Frederick W. Kagan’s “Trump outlines the foundation of a changed approach in Afghanistan.”]
Recommended
2017 10-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
2017-09-26 CTP Update and Assessment
The Critical Threats Project releases a weekly update and assessment on the al Qaeda network. Sep 26, 2017
2017 08-01 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is using military force to secure his power at the expense of political resolution in Libya. Pro-Haftar forces stormed the headquarters of a constitutional drafting body in eastern Libya on July 20 and demanded the abandonment of a draft constitution that barred Haftar from running for president in 2018. Haftar’s rise as a strongman may stabilize Libya in the near term, but it will exacerbate the grievances that drive the civil war and galvanize support for Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
2. The U.S. is attempting to divide the al Houthi-Saleh bloc in order to reduce Iranian influence in Yemen and revive the UN peace process. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller began the diplomatic effort by praising former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s cooperation with a UN plan and criticizing the al Houthi faction for impeding negotiations. Elite-level diplomatic engagement is unlikely to progress, however, as long as the military situation on the ground remains stalemated.
3. Political violence is surging in Kenya before general elections on August 8. Recent incidents include the murder of a senior election official and an attack on the home of the Deputy President, as well as accusations of election rigging. Civil unrest in Kenya will strain Kenyan security forces and provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand in eastern Kenya and southern Somalia, where Kenyan forces play a major role.
2017 10-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Updateseries is a weekly updateand assessment of the al Qaeda networkand its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 10-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network, including its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb, and the Sahel.
2017 08-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. U.S. Special Operations Forces participated in an Emirati-backed Yemeni operation to secure populated areas and oil pipelines in Shabwah governorate, southern Yemen. The operation aims to degrade the ability of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to coordinate external attacks from safe havens in Yemen. AQAP militants withdrew from Shabwah to strongholds in neighboring Abyan governorate in response. The operation is unlikely to affect AQAP’s capabilities in the long term.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) forces in Libya mobilizing outside of Sirte city, the group’s former stronghold on the Mediterranean coast. ISIS retains the capability to recruit and train fighters despite losses inflicted by the U.S.-backed campaign to retake Sirte and subsequent airstrikes.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) ransoms hostages to fund its broader efforts to destabilize and replace West African states, as well as expel Western influence from the region. AQIM received at least $4.2 million in exchange for the release of Swedish and South Africa hostages in the past two months. AQIM will likely plan or support additional attacks on sites frequented by Western expatriates, continuing a campaign resumed by an AQIM affiliate in Mali in June.
2017 06-06 ctp update and assessment (1)
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
2017 08-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit rising instability in Morocco to conduct more frequent attacks in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan security forces, which have prevented ISIS attacks in the country, are struggling to manage a growing protest movement. This civil unrest, paired with the shifting of migrant flows from Libya toward Morocco, will strain the country’s security resources and reduce pressure on ISIS networks there. Instability in Morocco also increases the risk of attacks in Europe, where Moroccan militants participated in recent ISIS attacks in Spain and a suspected ISIS-linked stabbing in Finland. [Read a recent warning on the implications of instability in Morocco.]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is fracturing. Senior al Houthi leaders accused Saleh of conducting treasonous negotiations with the Gulf States. Saleh denied the accusations and blamed the al Houthis for governance failures in Sana’a. Tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh bloc provide an opportunity for the U.S. to advance a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict. The al Houthi movement lacks the capability to continue the civil war without Saleh’s forces. An elite-brokered peace deal that does not address the grievances driving the war will not end Yemen’s instability, however. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s recommendations for U.S. engagement in Yemen.]
3. U.S. President Donald Trump criticized Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups during a speech announcing a new U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan on August 21. A Pakistani army spokesman dismissed the criticism and stated that Pakistan has taken action against militant groups in its terrain. Pakistan will likely intensify counter-militancy operations near the Afghan border to safeguard its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan may also increase support for militant groups in the disputed Kashmir territory to counteract U.S. engagement with India. [Read Frederick W. Kagan’s “Trump outlines the foundation of a changed approach in Afghanistan.”]
2017 09-19 CTP Update and Assessment
The Critical Threats Project releases a weekly update and assessment on the al Qaeda network.
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates.
2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu.
3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.]
3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
2017 11-28 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 12-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 07-11 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration is weighing increased involvement in Libya that may tip the scale further in favor of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The administration might be considering a diplomatic presence of an intelligence coordination center in Benghazi. The reported policy discussion emerged after Haftar declared victory in Benghazi on July 5, ending a three-year effort to clear the city of Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE, seeks to parlay his growing power into a leading role in a national political settlement. The U.S. must tread carefully when engaging with Haftar, whose quest to stabilize eastern Libya and eradicate political Islam has harmed democratic institutions and played in to extremist narratives.
2. Al Shabaab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya in an attempt to turn Kenyan voters against the military intervention in Somalia before general elections in August. Militants beheaded nine civilians in Lamu County on the northern Kenyan coast July 9, four days after nearly 200 al Shabaab militants clashed with police forces in the same region. Kenyan warplanes conducted strikes targeting al Shabaab strongholds in the Boni Forest along the Somali border in response to the attacks.
3. The fracturing of the Yemeni state undermines U.S. policy in Yemen, which relies on the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s already weak administration is losing control of southern Yemen. The Transitional Political Council of the South, a rival body that seeks to form an independent governing entity for southern Yemen, announced the formation of a governmental structure on July 9.
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
2017 05-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
2017 11-14 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 07-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging.
2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts.
3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2017 12-12 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 04-25 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks.
2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue.
3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
2017 05-09 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
2017-05-23 CTP Update and Assessment
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
2017 12-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-06-20 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali.
2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert.
3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
2017 04-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration granted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) the authority to conduct offensive airstrikes against al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, in order to increase pressure on the group. AFRICOM commander General Waldhauser testified that support for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) as it addresses the spreading famine is critical. Al Shabaab, which kidnapped four World Health Organization aid workers on April 3, is already taking steps to control the delivery of aid to areas outside of SFG control.
2. The U.S. and its partners in Yemen may miss an opportunity to gain allies against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis reported the U.S. has conducted over 70 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen this year, more than any other year in total. The pace of strikes and potential for collateral damage drove local leaders in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen to meet. The local leaders denounced support for terrorism of any kind, but also condemned civilian casualties and infrastructure.
3. The growing power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who leads the force that controls much of eastern Libya, will lead to increased conflict. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is making concessions to bring Haftar into a political deal that would allow him to control Libya’s military. LNA forces are making a play for control of key oil and military sites in central and southwestern Libya. Haftar’s advance will spark backlash from his opponents throughout western Libya, however, and Haftar lacks the military power to win the resultant war.
2015-11-03 Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for attacks against Western, particularly American, interests. Zawahiri also called on jihadist factions to unify in what he described as a war against a Russian-Iranian-American axis.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei forbade non-nuclear negotiations with the U.S. on November 1, indicating that Iran's participation in the Syria peace talks does not mark a new willingness to negotiate on regional issues. Khamenei also dismissed Western rhetoric regarding shifting foreign policy priorities in Iran.
3. Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham-linked group in Sirte, Libya, continued to consolidate control over the city’s population and the surrounding environs. Warplanes targeted ISIS positions in the vicinity of Sirte, Libya, on October 27.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
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2017 09-19 CTP Update and Assessment
The Critical Threats Project releases a weekly update and assessment on the al Qaeda network.
2017 06-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates.
2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu.
3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
2017-11-07 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-09-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.]
3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
2017 11-28 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 12-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 07-11 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration is weighing increased involvement in Libya that may tip the scale further in favor of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The administration might be considering a diplomatic presence of an intelligence coordination center in Benghazi. The reported policy discussion emerged after Haftar declared victory in Benghazi on July 5, ending a three-year effort to clear the city of Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE, seeks to parlay his growing power into a leading role in a national political settlement. The U.S. must tread carefully when engaging with Haftar, whose quest to stabilize eastern Libya and eradicate political Islam has harmed democratic institutions and played in to extremist narratives.
2. Al Shabaab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya in an attempt to turn Kenyan voters against the military intervention in Somalia before general elections in August. Militants beheaded nine civilians in Lamu County on the northern Kenyan coast July 9, four days after nearly 200 al Shabaab militants clashed with police forces in the same region. Kenyan warplanes conducted strikes targeting al Shabaab strongholds in the Boni Forest along the Somali border in response to the attacks.
3. The fracturing of the Yemeni state undermines U.S. policy in Yemen, which relies on the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s already weak administration is losing control of southern Yemen. The Transitional Political Council of the South, a rival body that seeks to form an independent governing entity for southern Yemen, announced the formation of a governmental structure on July 9.
2017 07-05 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
2017 05-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
2017 11-14 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 07-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging.
2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts.
3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2017 12-12 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017 04-25 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks.
2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue.
3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
2017 05-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
2017 05-09 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
2017-05-23 CTP Update and Assessment
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
2017 12-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2017-06-20 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali.
2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert.
3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
2017 04-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration granted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) the authority to conduct offensive airstrikes against al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, in order to increase pressure on the group. AFRICOM commander General Waldhauser testified that support for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) as it addresses the spreading famine is critical. Al Shabaab, which kidnapped four World Health Organization aid workers on April 3, is already taking steps to control the delivery of aid to areas outside of SFG control.
2. The U.S. and its partners in Yemen may miss an opportunity to gain allies against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis reported the U.S. has conducted over 70 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen this year, more than any other year in total. The pace of strikes and potential for collateral damage drove local leaders in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen to meet. The local leaders denounced support for terrorism of any kind, but also condemned civilian casualties and infrastructure.
3. The growing power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who leads the force that controls much of eastern Libya, will lead to increased conflict. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is making concessions to bring Haftar into a political deal that would allow him to control Libya’s military. LNA forces are making a play for control of key oil and military sites in central and southwestern Libya. Haftar’s advance will spark backlash from his opponents throughout western Libya, however, and Haftar lacks the military power to win the resultant war.
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Similar to 2017 10-10 CTP Update and Assessment
2015-11-03 Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri called for attacks against Western, particularly American, interests. Zawahiri also called on jihadist factions to unify in what he described as a war against a Russian-Iranian-American axis.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei forbade non-nuclear negotiations with the U.S. on November 1, indicating that Iran's participation in the Syria peace talks does not mark a new willingness to negotiate on regional issues. Khamenei also dismissed Western rhetoric regarding shifting foreign policy priorities in Iran.
3. Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham-linked group in Sirte, Libya, continued to consolidate control over the city’s population and the surrounding environs. Warplanes targeted ISIS positions in the vicinity of Sirte, Libya, on October 27.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
2016 08-09 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Yemeni government launched an offensive to seize Sana’a from the al Houthis and forces loyal to former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh on August 6. CTP assessed in July 2016 that forces allied with President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government were preparing to pursue a military victory in the absence of a negotiated settlement. The Saudi-led coalition resumed airstrikes on Sana’a in support of the offensive, which followed the suspension of UN-led peace talks. This offensive will prolong the war and distract from the fight against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), allowing AQAP to recoup recent losses and grow stronger in Yemen.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) replaced Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau as the governor of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa. ISIS replaced Shekau, whose leadership deterred both ISIS and al Qaeda from close coordination with his group, with a more responsive leader. This reshuffle gives ISIS the opportunity to fully integrate its Nigerian affiliate into its global network and establish a new foothold in Africa.
3. Jamatul Ahrar (JuA), a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing that killed more than 70 people at a hospital in Quetta, Pakistan on August 8. The attack targeted lawyers mourning the regional bar association president, whom JuA assassinated earlier that day. JuA has expressed pro-ISIS leanings, but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted the judiciary before and will likely continue to attack courts, lawyers, and related targets throughout Pakistan. JuA is responsible for the Easter Sunday bombing that targeted Pakistani Christians in Lahore on March 27, 2016.
2016 10-11 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
2016-02-23 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
2016-04-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
2015-11-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Senior Iranian officials censured President Hassan Rouhani for criticizing the IRGC’s arrests of individuals suspected of promoting foreign influence, indicating that disagreements over how to block foreign influence will continue alongside greater crackdowns.
2. Tensions between Somalia and Kenya are high due to border disputes and allegations that Kenyan military figures participated in al Shabaab’s illegal smuggling operations. The Somali parliament passed a motion to expel both regular Kenyan Defense Force (KDF) units and the KDF’s African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) contingent from Somalia. A breakdown in cooperation among security forces will provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand.
3. Malian forces under Operation Seno conducted successful clearing operations in central Mali, with particular success against the Macina Liberation Front (MLF), associated with the AQIM-affiliated Ansar al Din. The MLF will continue to retaliate against Malian and UN security forces.
2015-07-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
2017 02-28 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG.
2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017.
3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.
2017 03-21 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement. Reuters reported that Iran surged arms shipments to Yemen in recent months and may have sent advisors. An aggressive American policy against the Iranian-backed al Houthis risks driving the group further into Iran’s orbit.
2. The Libyan National Army’s declared offensive to seize strategic locations in southwestern Libya will draw opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda both retain Libyan safe havens. Spiraling conflict would give both al Qaeda and ISIS the opportunity to co-opt factions within the civil war and could erase the recent progress made in degrading ISIS’s strength in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support. The group distributed food aid to more than 200 families in Galgudud region, central Somalia on March 19. Al Shabaab may strengthen in regions where the Somali Federal Government is unable to facilitate the delivery of food aid.
2018 07-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2016 09-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
2016-07-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Russia is attempting to broker a resolution to the Libyan crisis that likely circumvents the UN framework and aims to expand Russia’s sphere of influence in the Middle East and North Africa. Russia supports the Libyan House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), based in eastern Libya, which are actively contesting the legitimacy of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. The GNA is struggling to project authority into eastern Libya as it becomes increasingly associated with western Libyan factions. Russia seeks to contest American and European influence in the region, and its increasing involvement threatens to undermine the UN peace process and the GNA’s viability as a partner against the Islamist State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
2. The Yemeni delegations suspended UN-led peace talks in Kuwait until July 15. Hostilities will likely increase during this period as both coalition-backed government forces and the al Houthis and their allies intensify operations in Taiz, and government and coalition forces prepare to launch an offensive on Sana’a. The UN-led talks may not resume as conditions on the ground deteriorate, though negotiations will continue via direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia.
3. The United Nations Security Council approved a French-drafted resolution that added an additional 2,500 troops to Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to move the peacekeeping force to a “more proactive and robust posture.” The MINUSMA mission is the deadliest UN peacekeeping mission, and there has been a surge in attacks against MINUSMA troops. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) cooperates and coordinates directly with multiple Salafi-jihadi groups operating within Mali, including Ansar al Din and al Murabitoun.
2015-11-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. An Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Intelligence Organization representative released details on the recent arrest of several media professionals in a probable effort to contain President Hassan Rouhani's domestic influence after the nuclear deal.
2. An American contractor died in custody in Sana’a, Yemen. Details surrounding the circumstances of his death are still forthcoming. A second American contractor and an American teacher remain in al Houthi custody in Yemen’s capital.
3. A second small group of al Shabaab militants pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). The first major defection from al Shabaab occurred at the end of October and prompted al Shabaab senior leadership to crack down on potential defectors.
2017 04-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. deployed several dozen troops to Somalia to train and equip Somali and African Union forces fighting against al Shabaab. The arrival of units from the 101st Airborne Division to Mogadishu on April 2 marks the first significant deployment of U.S. ground troops, other than small advisory units, to Somalia since March 1994. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu after Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on the group on April 6. Al Shabaab will surge in Mogadishu to force Somali forces to concentrate in the capital, allowing al Shabaab to control humanitarian aid delivery in other regions.
2. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is setting conditions to launch a major offensive in Yemen after the month of Ramadan, which begins in late May. The offensive aims to seize al Hudaydah port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Yemen’s internationally recognized government requested the recall of the UN Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, who opposes the offensive. The al Hudaydah operation will worsen conditions for a population that already faces a severe humanitarian crisis.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has an opportunity to gain by brokering a ceasefire between warring militias in southwestern Libya. The GNA Ministry of Local Government organized a meeting for mayors from the Fezzan region to discuss military de-escalation. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based primarily in eastern Libya, is attempting to seize military bases and oil sites in the Fezzan. Anti-LNA militias from Libya’s coastal regions deployed to the Fezzan to join the fight, which risks escalating into a larger conflict. The GNA, which was created by a UN agreement, will gain legitimacy if it brokers a deal at the municipal level.
2016-06-21 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
2015-11-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The claim of responsibility from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) for an attack in Tunis may mark a shift in how ISIS is selecting targets in Tunisia. An ISIS suicide bomber attacked a bus transporting presidential guards on November 24, killing at least 13 people in the center of Tunis, according to Tunisian authorities. The attack occurred near the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, a secure area in Tunis. Previous ISIS attacks focused on the tourism industry.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in Mali. At least two Islamist militants laid siege to an American-owned hotel in the center of Mali’s capital, Bamako, on November 20, temporarily holding 170 hostages and killing at least 19 people, similar to an attack in August. Multiple Islamist jihadist groups are implicated in the attack. Al Murabitoun claimed responsibility with support from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Saharan Brigade. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din’s southern brigade, the Macina Liberation Front, also claimed credit for the attack. The attack was reportedly in retaliation for the French counterterrorism campaign in Mali, Operation Barkhane. AQIM affiliates in Mali will likely build off of the Bamako attack to target UN, French, and Malian security forces, as well as those who cooperate with them.
3. Iran’s decision to join the Syrian peace talks in Vienna does not signal a thawing of relations with the West; the Supreme Leader will not shift his position and authorize direct negotiations with the U.S. on non-nuclear issues.
2016-05-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
2016-05-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
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2018 05-22 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 05-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 05-01 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 04-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 04-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 04-10 ctp update and assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 04-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 03-27 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 03-20 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 03 13 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
2018 03-06 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
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2017 10-10 CTP Update and Assessment
- 1. AEI’s Critical Threats Project Update and Assessment October 10, 2017
- 2. 2 TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 1 2 3 1) Salafi-jihadi militants killed four U.S. service members in an ambush. U.S. Special Forces were assisting Nigerien counterterrorism forces in the field. 2) ISIS in Libya’s first suicide attack since 2016 may signal the start of a new attack campaign in Libyan cities. 3) The withdrawal of the opposition candidate derails re-run presidential elections in Kenya.
- 3. 3 | ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA Al Qaeda Network Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri reaffirmed the need for the Salafi-jihadi movement to unite and remain steadfast in jihad in an October 4 video statement. Zawahiri criticized ISIS for breaking rank and its bayat, oath, to him. He messaged Syrians particularly, criticizing groups that compromised on principles of jihad in order to alleviate suffering. Zawahiri noted that despite increased military investment from the West, the tide of jihad is rising. Outlook: Al Qaeda could draw defectors from ISIS as ISIS suffers losses in Iraq and Syria. Tehrik-e-Taliban, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda Associates The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased its attack tempo in Pakistan. The group claimed four attacks in Pakistan in one month, which is still not on par with other regional branches. This increased operational tempo may indicate an effort to establish a firm foothold in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas to compensate for losses in Iraq and Syria. Outlook: Pakistani security forces will continue limited counter-ISIS operations but will deny any increase in the group’s presence in Pakistan.
- 4. 4 | ASSESSMENT: Political Russian President Putin announced his willingness to facilitate a settlement of the Yemeni civil war, which may have been posturing before he met with Saudi King Salman to negotiate oil production and output. Putin could seek to intervene diplomatically in the Yemeni civil war to gain influence. Saudi Arabia announced an MoU to purchase Russian S-400 air defense systems, shifting away from U.S. and UK purchases. Outlook: Russia and Saudi Arabia will coordinate output to drive oil prices up. Security Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed at least 38 civilians in one week in al Houthi-Saleh strongholds amid heightened international scrutiny of the bombing campaign. Outlook: The coalition will sustain its current air campaign. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen AQAP is conducting an explosive attack campaign to expel Emirati-backed counterterrorism forces from Abyan governorate, southern Yemen. Outlook: AQAP’s attacks will compel security forces to withdraw from parts of Abyan. GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
- 5. 5 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN 1) 04 OCT: Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed 12 civilians in Baqim district, Sa’ada. 2) 05 OCT: A reported U.S. airstrike killed an AQAP militant in Yakla, al Bayda. 3) 06 OCT: AQAP militants detonated an SVBIED in southern Abyan. 4) 06 OCT: Lahij security forces seized an AQAP weapons cache in Hawta city, Lahij. 5) 08 OCT: A reported U.S. airstrike killed five AQAP militants in Ma'rib. 3 5 4 1 2
- 6. 6 | ASSESSMENT: Political Kenyan presidential candidate Raila Odinga’s withdrawal from the Kenyan election is politically destabilizing. Odinga called for a credible election according to a prior Supreme Court ruling that requires new elections if a candidate withdraws. Outlook: The Supreme Court will call for a new election to avoid a constitutional crisis. Security Somali National Army (SNA) forces maintained a high operational tempo against al Shabaab in response to an uptick in attacks in Mogadishu. SNA forces detained over fifty suspected al Shabaab militants in Mogadishu for the second time in a week. Outlook: The raids will not disrupt al Shabaab’s primary strongholds in southern Somalia. Al Shabaab Al Shabaab is degrading security forces in Puntland. Al Shabaab militants attacked a police checkpoint in Boosaaso and assassinated the chief of airport security in Galkayo. Outlook: Al Shabaab will gain increased freedom of movement in Puntland. GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
- 7. 7 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA 3 4 2 1) 06 OCT: Al Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting AMISOM forces in Bulo Marer, Lower Shabelle. 2) 07 OCT: Al Shabaab militants detonated an IED targeting Ethiopian AMISOM troops near Wajid town, Bakool region. 3) 09 OCT: Al Shabaab militants attacked a police checkpoint near Boosaaso, Puntland. 4) 10 OCT: Suspected al Shabaab militants attacked a university in Mombasa, Kwale county, Kenya 1
- 8. 8 | ASSESSMENT: Political Revived UN-led talks on Libya achieved a first step with face-to-face meetings between rival legislators. Members of a consultative body in Tripoli and a parliament in eastern Libya completed initial talks about amending the Libyan Political Agreement. Outlook: Progress will slow in the second round of talks, which raise more divisive issues. Security A counter-migration force aligned with the UN-backed government took control of Sabratha city in northwestern Libya, ending weeks of clashes. The victorious militia also has ties to the Libyan National Army, which is capitalizing on opposition to illegal migration to gain power in western Libya and court European support. Outlook: The LNA will use its foothold in Sabratha to increase its influence in the northwest. Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya ISIS Wilayat Tarablus conducted a revenge suicide attack at a courthouse as militants faced trial in Misrata, northwestern Libya. Misratan forces ousted ISIS from Sirte, Libya in 2016. Outlook: ISIS will conduct intermittent suicide attacks to degrade security in Libyan cities. WEST AFRICA LIBYA
- 9. 9 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 4 WEST AFRICA LIBYA 1) 04 OCT : Islamist Tripoli security forces clashed with Qaddafi loyalists in Tripoli. 2) 04 OCT: ISIS Wilayat Tarablus conducted revenge attack on a court building in Misrata. 3) 06 OCT : An anti- ISIS fighting force took full control of Sabratha after three weeks of clashes with an Islamist militia involved in migration. 4) 07 OCT: LNA forces stopped five ISIS vehicles in Tiji. 1 2 3
- 10. 10 | ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb The Tunisian government took steps to redress civilians’ grievances. President Beji Caid Essebsi announced development measures for Sousse governorate. Tunisian election officials also announced a new date for postponed municipal elections. Outlook: Anti-government sentiment and protests will decrease in the near term. Associated Movements in the Sahel (JNIM, Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram) Salafi-jihadi militants demonstrated increased attack capabilities against U.S. troops in the Sahel. Militants ambushed a joint American-Nigerien patrol near the Malian border on October 4, killing four U.S. special operators. The attack remains unclaimed. Groups affiliated with both ISIS and AQIM operate with similar capabilities in this region. Both Boko Haram factions sustained insurgencies against Nigerian security forces. ISIS West Africa released photos of an ambush. The Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau clashed with local forces in Bama, Borno state, Nigeria. Outlook: The success of the October 4 attack will lead to an increase in attempted attacks on U.S. troops advising and assisting Nigerien counterterrorism forces. WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
- 11. 11 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB 1) 04 OCT: Tunisian security forces arrested a militant in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia. 2) 04 OCT: Tunisian security forces arrested two ISIS- affiliated Ansar Al- Sharia Tunisia supporters in Ben Arous, Tunisia. 3) 04 OCT: Algerian National People’s Army arrested three militants in Skikda, Algeria. 4) 05 OCT: A militant surrendered to Algerian forces in Tamanarasset, Algeria. 1 23 4
- 12. 12 | SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA SAHEL 1) 04 OCT: Salafi- jihadi militants killed four U.S. special operators in Tongo Tongo, Niger. 2) 04 OCT: Suspected JNIM militants killed a Tuareg leader in Menaka region, Mali. 3) 04 OCT: Nigerian security forces clashed with Boko Haram-Shekau militants in Pulka, Bama, Borno State. 4) 05 OCT: Suspected Ansar al Islam militants attacked a Gendarmerie post in Mentao, Soum, Burkina Faso. 2 4
- 13. 13 ACRONYMS African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB) Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC) Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA) Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA) Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA) Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) Libyan National Army (LNA) Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) Somalia National Army (SNA) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- 14. 14 Katherine Zimmerman research manager katherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576 Marie Donovan senior Iran analyst marie.donovan@aei.org (202) 888-6572 Maher Farrukh al Qaeda analyst maher.farrukh@aei.org (202) 888-6574 Caroline Goodson program assistant caroline.goodson@aei.org (202) 888-6575 Emily Estelle al Qaeda analyst emily.estelle@aei.org (202) 888-6570 Mike Saidi Iran analyst mike.saidi@aei.org (202) 888-6573 For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org. Frederick W. Kagan director fkagan@aei.org (202) 888-6569