2015 02-10 CTP Update and Assessment
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CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis. 2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal. 3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
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2015 02-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemeni political actors met in Aden and called for the establishment of an alternative capital to Sana’a in either Aden or Taiz, both former capitals, on February 15. There appears to be growing support for an alternative government or regional autonomy throughout Yemen. Sana’a-based politicians reached an agreement to form a new transitional council composed of underrepresented groups, but could not agree on a way forward for Yemen’s executive branch.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced the concept of Iran’s “Economy of Resistance” in a February 18 speech as a reaction to the West’s continued economic pressure on Iran. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani added that the resistance economy did not imply Iran would close itself off from the global economy.
3. Al Shabaab claimed credit for the bombing of a hotel in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, that killed and injured dozens of people, including Somali government officials, on February 20. Al Shabaab has lost control of some of its strongholds in Somalia, but still maintains its capability to conduct asymmetric attacks.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
2015-08-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated control over the city and its environs. Ferjani tribesmen rose up against ISIS following the death of a prominent sheikh. ISIS responded by killing over 37 people. It now has control of the city.
2. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, continue to roll back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen, but al Houthi leadership is describing their forces’ withdrawals as tactical. The al Houthis will probably respond with a counteroffensive.
3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, calling the deal “still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”
2015 02-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
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2015 02-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemeni political actors met in Aden and called for the establishment of an alternative capital to Sana’a in either Aden or Taiz, both former capitals, on February 15. There appears to be growing support for an alternative government or regional autonomy throughout Yemen. Sana’a-based politicians reached an agreement to form a new transitional council composed of underrepresented groups, but could not agree on a way forward for Yemen’s executive branch.
2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced the concept of Iran’s “Economy of Resistance” in a February 18 speech as a reaction to the West’s continued economic pressure on Iran. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani added that the resistance economy did not imply Iran would close itself off from the global economy.
3. Al Shabaab claimed credit for the bombing of a hotel in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, that killed and injured dozens of people, including Somali government officials, on February 20. Al Shabaab has lost control of some of its strongholds in Somalia, but still maintains its capability to conduct asymmetric attacks.
2016 11-08 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda may resume an attack campaign targeting the U.S. homeland, based on recent intelligence. U.S. intelligence uncovered a possible al Qaeda plot to carry out attacks in New York, Texas, and Virginia on November 7. Al Qaeda maintains external attack planning cells in its safe havens like Syria and Afghanistan, where U.S. airstrikes killed high-level al Qaeda operatives on November 2 and October 23. Al Qaeda seeks to exploit local conflicts to cultivate and facilitate a global insurgency against the West.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may resurge during a pause in U.S.-backed counterterrorism operations in central Libya. The U.S. has not conducted airstrikes in Sirte since October 31, citing the high risk of civilian casualties in ISIS’s final stronghold in the city. ISIS views the Sirte fight as ongoing and has signaled that recruitment networks into Libya are still active. ISIS may seek to exploit the operational pause by deploying explosive capabilities that were previously suppressed by U.S. air support. Escalating competition between rival Libyan factions, including brewing conflicts in Tripoli and Benghazi, will limit Libyan forces’ ability and will to continue the fight against ISIS.
3. Al Shabaab is expanding its territorial control in Somalia as the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition weakens. Al Shabaab has re-occupied a series of strategically significant towns following the withdrawal of Ethiopian AMISOM troops, which are redeploying in response to widespread civil unrest in Ethiopia. Al Shabaab also conducted a series of attacks targeting Burundian AMISOM forces in the Middle Shabelle region that may be designed to both exacerbate the Burundian contingent’s grievances with AMISOM and advance al Shabaab’s encirclement of Mogadishu.
2016 11-29 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
2015-08-19 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. ISIS forces in Sirte, Libya, violently put down local resistance to its presence and consolidated control over the city and its environs. Ferjani tribesmen rose up against ISIS following the death of a prominent sheikh. ISIS responded by killing over 37 people. It now has control of the city.
2. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, continue to roll back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen, but al Houthi leadership is describing their forces’ withdrawals as tactical. The al Houthis will probably respond with a counteroffensive.
3. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continued to hold back from fully endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, calling the deal “still unsettled” as neither the Iranian Parliament nor the U.S. Congress “has adopted it yet.”
2015 02-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
2016 10-18 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran is using the Yemeni civil war to extend its reach and further entangling internal Yemeni conflicts with regional tensions. Missiles fired from al Houthi-Saleh territory targeted the USS Mason just north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9 and October 12. The U.S. Navy destroyed three radar sites in Yemen in response. Senior U.S. administration officials stated that there is “no doubt” of al Houthi involvement in the attacks, which al Houthi-Saleh leaders have repeatedly denied. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has since released two American prisoners to Omani custody and agreed to resume the peace process, likely indicating efforts to de-escalate tensions with the U.S. Operatives from Iran or Lebanese Hezbollah may have conducted or facilitated the attacks on the USS Mason.
2. Security may breakdown in Tripoli, Libya, after an attempted coup against the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). Political leaders from the General National Congress (GNC), a rump Islamist parliament, attempted to seize the headquarters of a pro-GNA governmental body in Libya’s capital with the support of armed groups. The GNA remains in control of Libya’s state institutions, but powerful militias opposed to the GNA and its supporters are now rallying in support of the attempted coup in Tripoli. Competition between rival militias could erupt into open fighting in Tripoli. The collapse of security in Tripoli would further undermine the already weak GNA and draw resources away from the unfinished fight against ISIS in central Libya.
3. American citizens remain a target for Salafi-jihadi groups operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. Militants based in Mali abducted an American aid worker from his home in Niger on October 15. No group has claimed responsibility for the abduction, though the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was likely involved. MUJAO is affiliated with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM is resurgent in the Sahel and will continue to conduct attacks designed to impel the U.S. and its allies to withdraw from the region.
2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2017 01-03 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
2016 10-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
2016 10-11 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
2015-02-03 CTP Update and Assessment
Key takeaways:
- Senior Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials praised Lebanese Hezbollah’s January 28 attack that killed two Israeli soldiers in retaliation for the January 18 Israeli airstrike in Syria. Messaging from IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammed Ali Jafari indicated that this was a “minimum response” to the Israeli strike, indicating that the IRGC may push for additional action against Israel.
- Yemen’s al Houthi movement, which has received backing from Iran, remains a key powerbroker in the capital, Sana’a. The al Houthis set a deadline for tribal and political actors to negotiate a resolution to the political crisis brought on by the full resignation of Yemen’s executive branch on January 22. The outlook of an acceptable deal for all parties is not good, though the al Houthis continue to signal that they do not want to govern Yemen.
- Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi, Libya, announced the establishment of an Islamic police there to enforce shari’a law. Pictures of new police vehicles were included in the announcement. The Ansar al Sharia policing force is new and should be taken as an indicator that the group intends to govern its territories in Libya.
2015-08-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Afghan Taliban appointed a new leader after confirming the death of Mullah Omar. The leadership change introduces a new set of challenges for the Taliban, which had already factionalized, and for al Qaeda. Mullah Omar had led the Taliban since its inception and had received a pledge of allegiance from al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
2. Freshly trained Yemeni troops supported by an Emirati brigade and Saudi special forces have led an offensive that has driven back the al Houthi movement in Yemen. The recent victories against the al Houthis may be setting the stage for successful political talks to reach a negotiated solution in the country.
3. The Iranian regime reframed its rhetorical stance on military site inspections into a more mollified assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military or national security-related secrets as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute has set up these pages to help clarify the hyper-complex language of sanctions relief and to provide additional information about some of the entities that will be freed of international restrictions.
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
2015-06-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis escalated the conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi Arabian airbase and conducting an attack alongside Yemeni military units against Saudi border forces, which may further impede efforts to reach a negotiated political solution. Both the al Houthis and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government have agreed to participate in UN-led talks in Geneva on June 14, though Hadi’s government signaled it sees the talks as a means to begin implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The resolution calls for the al Houthis to disarm and to withdraw from seized territory.
2. Iranian IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami’s comments on the Yemeni people indicate a rhetorical escalation on the importance of the Yemeni conflict. Salami characterized Yemenis as “more oppressed” than Palestinians, and his comments may mark a shift in the IRGC’s depiction of Yemenis.
3. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit friction points between the Somali federal government and local administrations as the country’s federalization process moves forward. The Sufi group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had allied with the Somali federal government to fight al Shabaab, recently seized control of the Galgudud region capital from Somali federal government forces. ASWJ officials cite their marginalization within the Somali federalization process as a core grievance against the federal government.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016 12-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2017 02-07 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
2017 02-14 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
2016 09-06 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
2015-07-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
2016 11-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
2016 09-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
2017 05-09 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
2015-09-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Ayman al Zawahiri issued a critique of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Zawahiri, who has remained largely silent on ISIS, dismissed the Caliphate as illegitimate and called for all Muslims to defend themselves against the West. Zawahiri still seeks to unify the global jihad and sees ISIS as a dividing force.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right,” pushing back on President Hassan Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Guardian Council. Khamenei’s public correction of Rouhani may be aimed at ensuring the latter’s influence and politico-economic reforms do not become unmanageable.
3. ISIS consolidated control in Sirte, Libya, and the surrounding areas. ISIS is using methods similar to those seen in Syria and Iraq.
2016-04-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
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2016 11-15 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A ceasefire between the Saudi-led coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh alliance may have limited effects. It will help to de-escalate the national conflict in Yemen, but will not resolve local fights or the conflict between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s alliance. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry announced on November 15 that the coalition and an al Houthi-Saleh delegation agreed to a cessation of hostilities to begin on November 17. The agreement also includes a framework for negotiations. Previous ceasefires have not translated to progress in negotiations. Hadi’s administration did not participate in the talks and has voiced opposition to the agreement. The cessation of hostilities will likely include the coalition’s air campaign and al Houthi-Saleh attacks on southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts, including the battle for Taiz city, will likely continue despite the elite-level agreement. Southern Yemenis lack representation in the peace process and will likely resist it.
2. A brewing fight for control of oil ports in eastern Libya may reignite Libya’s civil war. A coalition of eastern Libyan leaders that opposes Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the dominant military force in eastern Libya, is reportedly rallying forces for an offensive to recapture oil ports controlled by Haftar’s forces. The anti-Haftar forces include Mehdi al Barghathi, the Minister of the Defense in the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA). An offensive lead by Barghathi, who is widely seen as the GNA’s chosen alternative to Haftar in eastern Libya, risks opening a new front in Libya’s dormant civil war. A battle for eastern Libya’s oil would provide an opportunity for the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia, which have suffered recent losses in Sirte and Benghazi, to reconstitute and possibly regain control of terrain.
3. The Sahel region and southwestern Libya will be a critical front in the fight against Salafi-jihadi groups in 2017. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurgent in the Sahel region of West Africa, and there are early indicators that ISIS may develop ties with a militant group in the region. AQIM maintains a safe haven in southwestern Libya, where airstrikes targeted a senior AQIM leader on November 15. ISIS may also be making inroads into southwestern Libya. Salafi-jihadi groups use these regions to support attacks in neighboring states, as well as train recruits and exploit lucrative smuggling and trafficking routes.
2017 01-03 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
2016 10-04 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance may conduct additional attacks against vessels in Yemeni territorial waters, potentially disrupting shipping routes and routine maritime traffic in the Bab al Mandab Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance fired a missile at an Emirati vessel off the coast of Mokha port city in western Yemen on October 1. A video shows the destruction of the vessel. The UAE foreign ministry described the attack as an “act of terror.” Separately, al Houthi-Saleh forces are probably using American citizen Peter Willems as a human shield against Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Sana’a. Al Houthi-Saleh forces detained Willems on September 20 after an airstrike hit an intelligence headquarters in the capital.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is reconstituting its combat capabilities in central Libya despite the imminent loss of its stronghold in Sirte to U.S.-backed Libyan forces. ISIS militants who fled Sirte as the U.S.-backed offensive began have conducted multiple attacks behind the Sirte frontline since mid-September, including an ambush that caused dozens of casualties on October 2. The U.S. air campaign is entering its third month.
3. Political and military tensions escalated between the Indian and Pakistani governments in the contested Kashmir region. Tensions rose when India blamed a Pakistan-based militant group for attacks on Indian security forces. The Indian and Pakistani militaries have since exchanged fire across the Line of Control. India is preparing fortifications for a possible military escalation.
2016 10-11 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Hostilities are escalating in Yemen after Saudi-led coalition airstrikes killed civilians in Sana’a, which scuttled a planned humanitarian ceasefire and provoked a response from al Houthi-Saleh forces. Coalition airstrikes killed approximately 155 civilians and wounded more than 500 others at the funeral for an al Houthi-Saleh military commander on October 8. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired ballistic missiles toward Taif city, Saudi Arabia and Ma’rib governorate, Yemen in retaliation. Al Houthi-Saleh forces may have also fired two missiles toward a U.S. Navy destroyer north of the Bab al Mandab Strait on October 9, six days after an al Houthi-Saleh missile struck an Emirati ship in the same region.
2. Al Qaeda is exploiting the current counterterrorism focus on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to build up a resilient Salafi-jihadi base in Libya. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emir Abdelmalek Droukdel gave an audio speech, titled “Benghazi and the Battle of Patience,” in which he frames jihad as the alternative to foreign invasion and destruction in Benghazi. AQIM, along with al Qaeda-linked groups currently operating in Libya, seeks to exploit conflict between secular forces and Islamist militants in Benghazi to position itself as a defender of the Libyan people and establish strong relationships with local armed groups. International attention remains focused on the U.S.-backed counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte.
3. ISIS may attempt to resume an offensive campaign against the Algerian state. The pro-ISIS Amaq News Agency claimed on October 9 that ISIS Wilayat al Jaza’ir (Algeria) conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an Algerian army convoy near Tamalous in northeastern Algeria. This is ISIS’s first claimed attack in Algeria since August 2016. Counterterrorism operations have limited ISIS’s ability to attack in Algeria, but the return of Algerian fighters from Syria and Libya may allow the group to increase the frequency and impact of its attacks in the country.
2015-02-03 CTP Update and Assessment
Key takeaways:
- Senior Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officials praised Lebanese Hezbollah’s January 28 attack that killed two Israeli soldiers in retaliation for the January 18 Israeli airstrike in Syria. Messaging from IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Mohammed Ali Jafari indicated that this was a “minimum response” to the Israeli strike, indicating that the IRGC may push for additional action against Israel.
- Yemen’s al Houthi movement, which has received backing from Iran, remains a key powerbroker in the capital, Sana’a. The al Houthis set a deadline for tribal and political actors to negotiate a resolution to the political crisis brought on by the full resignation of Yemen’s executive branch on January 22. The outlook of an acceptable deal for all parties is not good, though the al Houthis continue to signal that they do not want to govern Yemen.
- Ansar al Sharia in Benghazi, Libya, announced the establishment of an Islamic police there to enforce shari’a law. Pictures of new police vehicles were included in the announcement. The Ansar al Sharia policing force is new and should be taken as an indicator that the group intends to govern its territories in Libya.
2015-08-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Afghan Taliban appointed a new leader after confirming the death of Mullah Omar. The leadership change introduces a new set of challenges for the Taliban, which had already factionalized, and for al Qaeda. Mullah Omar had led the Taliban since its inception and had received a pledge of allegiance from al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri.
2. Freshly trained Yemeni troops supported by an Emirati brigade and Saudi special forces have led an offensive that has driven back the al Houthi movement in Yemen. The recent victories against the al Houthis may be setting the stage for successful political talks to reach a negotiated solution in the country.
3. The Iranian regime reframed its rhetorical stance on military site inspections into a more mollified assurance to domestic audiences that Iran will not reveal any military or national security-related secrets as a result of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. The Critical Threats Project of the American Enterprise Institute has set up these pages to help clarify the hyper-complex language of sanctions relief and to provide additional information about some of the entities that will be freed of international restrictions.
2017 01-10 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
2017 01-24 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
2015-06-10 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthis escalated the conflict with Saudi Arabia by firing a Scud missile at a Saudi Arabian airbase and conducting an attack alongside Yemeni military units against Saudi border forces, which may further impede efforts to reach a negotiated political solution. Both the al Houthis and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government have agreed to participate in UN-led talks in Geneva on June 14, though Hadi’s government signaled it sees the talks as a means to begin implementing UN Security Council Resolution 2216. The resolution calls for the al Houthis to disarm and to withdraw from seized territory.
2. Iranian IRGC Deputy Commander Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami’s comments on the Yemeni people indicate a rhetorical escalation on the importance of the Yemeni conflict. Salami characterized Yemenis as “more oppressed” than Palestinians, and his comments may mark a shift in the IRGC’s depiction of Yemenis.
3. Al Shabaab may be able to exploit friction points between the Somali federal government and local administrations as the country’s federalization process moves forward. The Sufi group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ), which had allied with the Somali federal government to fight al Shabaab, recently seized control of the Galgudud region capital from Somali federal government forces. ASWJ officials cite their marginalization within the Somali federalization process as a core grievance against the federal government.
2016 12-13 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
2016 12-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2017 02-07 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
2017 02-14 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
2016 09-06 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) group may be growing stronger in Somalia, but its ability to compete with al Shabaab remains limited. The U.S. Department of State designated Abdul Qadir Mumin, a pro-ISIS cleric, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist on August 31. Al Shabaab militants reportedly attacked Mumin’s forces in Bay region, Somalia on September 4. Mumin is an al Shabaab defector, and al Shabaab has eliminated pro-ISIS members from within its ranks. It is also possible that the attack indicates that Mumin’s group has grown stronger and that al Shabaab considers it a threat. ISIS may seek to develop networks in Somalia now that its African hub in Sirte, Libya is under pressure by U.S.-backed militias. ISIS is unlikely to dedicate significant resources to the Horn of Africa at this time, however.
2. The UN-brokered political process in Libya may be breaking down. The collapse of the UN-backed Libyan government, the Government of National Accord (GNA), could have an impact on U.S. counter-terrorism operations against ISIS in Libya. The UN convened an emergency meeting in Tunis on September 5 to address rising tensions between eastern and western factions. The U.S. extended its airstrike mission in Libya for an additional month at the request of the GNA. Rising challenges to the GNA’s legitimacy threatened to undermine future operations against ISIS or other Salafi-jihadi groups in Libya.
3. The al Houthi-Saleh alliance’s September 2 announcement of a new missile in Yemen may be in response to increasing military threats from Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s coalition. The missile, the Borkan-1, is a modified Scud missile. The capability may have been transferred through the Iranian network. A political resolution to Yemen’s civil war remains unlikely despite both sides’ willingness to participate in a U.S.-backed peace plan. Yemeni factions expressed conditional support for U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s plan, but unresolved disagreements over representation in the transitional government will likely continue to hinder talks. Saudi Arabia may pursue talks to de-escalate conflict in the Saudi-Yemeni border region but will continue to support efforts by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government to oust the al Houthi-Saleh alliance from Yemen’s capital, Sana’a.
2015-07-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
2016 11-22 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
2016 09-20 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Competition over Libya’s oil wealth risks reigniting armed conflict between rival governments and distracting from the unfinished counter-ISIS fight. Rival militias clashed over contested oil ports in central Libya as efforts resumed to export oil. Some of these competing militias, backed by the UN-brokered unity government and U.S. airstrikes, are also fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the central Libyan city of Sirte. They may prioritize the fight for control of Libya’s oil wealth over the counter-ISIS fight. Continued conflict would strengthen ISIS and other Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Libya, including al Qaeda.
2. Southern Yemeni officials and powerbrokers renewed a call for a unified voice to represent the region in what may be a fissure between them and the internationally recognized government of Yemen under President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi does not have a strong constituency and has relied on southern leaders for support for his government, currently based in Aden. Southern Yemenis frequently cite political and economic marginalization by the central Yemeni government as a grievance. Calls for secession from the Yemeni state have been growing since late 2007. The frontline of Yemen’s civil war runs generally along the former boundary between North and South Yemen, re-dividing the country.
3. Ongoing civil unrest in Tunisia may weaken the country’s new unity government and create opportunities for Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to strengthen in the country. Popular anti-government demonstrations began spreading after September 5, and Tunisian government concessions briefly held off additional demonstrations. Mass protests resumed in multiple locations, however, and labor strikes are expected to begin within days. The Tunisian government deployed additional security forces to protest sites. Salafi-jihadi militants based in Tunisia and also Libya may be positioned to infiltrate popular demonstrations or conduct attacks in Tunisia if civil unrest grows or protests turn violent.
2017 05-09 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
2015-09-15 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Ayman al Zawahiri issued a critique of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. Zawahiri, who has remained largely silent on ISIS, dismissed the Caliphate as illegitimate and called for all Muslims to defend themselves against the West. Zawahiri still seeks to unify the global jihad and sees ISIS as a dividing force.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei defended the Guardian Council’s supervisory role in elections as its “legal” and “rational right,” pushing back on President Hassan Rouhani’s August 19 critique of the Guardian Council. Khamenei’s public correction of Rouhani may be aimed at ensuring the latter’s influence and politico-economic reforms do not become unmanageable.
3. ISIS consolidated control in Sirte, Libya, and the surrounding areas. ISIS is using methods similar to those seen in Syria and Iraq.
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2016-04-05 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
2016-03-08 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
2016-02-23 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
2016-05-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A U.S. airstrike killed Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan on May 21. The Taliban shura council named Mullah Mansour’s deputy and former Taliban chief justice Haibatullah Akhundzada as the new Taliban emir. Sirajuddin Haqqani, who had been seen as a potential successor to Mullah Mansour, will remain a deputy leader. A second potential successor, Mullah Yaqoob, the son of late Taliban leader Mullah Omar, was named as a deputy leader, which may allow him to position himself as the next leader of the Taliban. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri had pledged bayat, allegiance, to Mullah Mansour. Zawahiri will likely pledge bayat to Akhundzada to preserve continuity within the global Salafi-jihadi movement’s leadership.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is sustaining its campaign of explosive attacks on government targets, including police recruits, in Aden. This campaign coincides with a parallel series of attacks in al Mukalla, Hadramawt and demonstrates a high level of coordination and advanced bomb-making capabilities. ISIS is undermining President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government, which is struggling to secure Aden, its de facto capital, and al Mukalla, which coalition-backed forces recaptured from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in April 2016.
3. ISIS may be taking advantage of the focus on Sirte to reconstitute its cells in northwestern Libya. ISIS moved its attack capabilities from Sabratha after conducting a cross-border attack into Tunisia in March 2016, shortly after a U.S. airstrike on its training camp in the area on February 2016. ISIS militants are now returning to Sabratha and other towns on Libyan’s northwestern coast. It may use these cells to conduct explosive attacks in Tripoli in order to prevent forces allied with Libya’s unity government from attacking Sirte. It may also use northwestern Libya as a support zone for a resumed cross-border campaign into Tunisia, where it may be preparing to intensify its operations during Ramadan.
2016-06-14 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri pledged bayat, an oath of allegiance, to new Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Haibatullah Akhundzada. Zawahiri also eulogized late Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour, who was killed by a U.S. airstrike on May 21. Zawahiri’s pledge was likely meant to preserve continuity within the leadership of the global Salafi-jihadi movement and reinforce the distinction between al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), which Zawahiri implicitly criticized.
2. ISIS is losing the battle for Sirte and will likely withdraw to a new safe haven in southwest Libya as the country’s political conflict resurges. ISIS will continue to fight for the dense urban terrain that it still holds, but it is now fighting to delay the offensive and facilitate its withdrawal from the city. Nearly half of ISIS’s militants, as well as senior leadership, have fled Sirte this month. Meanwhile, two competing armed factions have used the offensive to expand their control of terrain into central Libya. The fall of Sirte is a significant blow to ISIS, but it also threatens to further destabilize Libya and possibly reignite the civil war.
3. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continues to build support among local Sunni populations in Yemen as a political resolution to the civil war grows more elusive. Recent counterterrorism operations have targeted AQAP’s ability to conduct attacks, but they have not harmed its ability to provide a pragmatic line of support to local tribal militias and civilians. AQAP continues to draw its strength from these relationships. ISIS is also active in Yemen and will likely attempt to surge its explosive attacks against Yemeni government and Saudi-led coalition targets during the Ramadan month.
2017 01-31 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
2016-03-01 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, conducted two double suicide bombings in three days. The first targeted a Mogadishu hotel on February 26 and the second targeted a restaurant in Baidoa, the capital of Bay region on February 28. The attacks were directed against military and government officials that frequented the targeted locations. Al Shabaab is increasing the operational tempo of its spectacular attacks and demonstrated the ability to do so across multiple cities.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA) cleared several neighborhoods of al Qaeda- and ISIS-linked militants in Benghazi, but it will struggle to retain its gains and establish control over the city. The LNA’s “Blood of the Martyrs” Operation, reportedly supported by French advisers, is one of its most successful since the start of Operation Dignity in May 2014. However, Salafi-jihadi groups have well-established networks in Benghazi and will resist the LNA’s efforts to regain control over the city.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his government are accusing Lebanese Hezbollah of providing support to the al Houthi movement. The U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Hezbollah operatives in November 2015 for providing materiel support to the al Houthis, and members of the al Houthi leadership have met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Saudi Arabia is a primary backer of the Hadi government. Saudi officials have also been levying accusations against Hezbollah, and Saudi Arabia recently cut assistance to Lebanon. The timing of these indications is likely to be driven by regional developments rather than internal Yemeni developments.
2015-11-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The claim of responsibility from the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) for an attack in Tunis may mark a shift in how ISIS is selecting targets in Tunisia. An ISIS suicide bomber attacked a bus transporting presidential guards on November 24, killing at least 13 people in the center of Tunis, according to Tunisian authorities. The attack occurred near the Tunisian Ministry of Interior, a secure area in Tunis. Previous ISIS attacks focused on the tourism industry.
2. Al Qaeda-linked groups continue to target Westerners in Mali. At least two Islamist militants laid siege to an American-owned hotel in the center of Mali’s capital, Bamako, on November 20, temporarily holding 170 hostages and killing at least 19 people, similar to an attack in August. Multiple Islamist jihadist groups are implicated in the attack. Al Murabitoun claimed responsibility with support from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Saharan Brigade. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din’s southern brigade, the Macina Liberation Front, also claimed credit for the attack. The attack was reportedly in retaliation for the French counterterrorism campaign in Mali, Operation Barkhane. AQIM affiliates in Mali will likely build off of the Bamako attack to target UN, French, and Malian security forces, as well as those who cooperate with them.
3. Iran’s decision to join the Syrian peace talks in Vienna does not signal a thawing of relations with the West; the Supreme Leader will not shift his position and authorize direct negotiations with the U.S. on non-nuclear issues.
2015 03-24 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed credit for simultaneous bombings at two mosques frequented by al Houthis in Sana’a and an attempt at third mosque in the al Houthi stronghold of Sa’ada in Yemen on March 20. The attack, ISIS’s first terrorist attack in Yemen, deliberately targeted al Houthis and was designed to stoke sectarian tensions.
2. ISIS also claimed the attack on Bardo Museum in Tunisia on March 18, signaling its presence in the country. The museum attack, along with a recent uptick in militant activity, shows that the Libyan conflict may be seriously undermining security in Tunisia.
3. The Iranian regime expressed less confidence in reaching a political framework for a nuclear deal with the P5+1 by March 31. One of the key issues has been sanctions relief, with the Iranians pressing for the immediate lifting of sanctions.
2015-10-20 CTP Update and Assessment
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. confirmed that a coalition airstrike killed senior al Qaeda operative Sanafi al Nasr outside of Aleppo, Syria. Sanafi al Nasr was the highest ranking leader of al Qaeda’s Khorasan group, a cell advising Syrian al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al Nusra. His death will deal a blow to al Qaeda operations in Syria, but will not generate lasting effects.
2. National Security and Foreign Policy Parliamentary Commission Chairman Alaeddin Boroujerdi and Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian stated that Iran could expand its military presence in Syria if asked by Damascus or Moscow.
3. The leader of an al Qaeda-linked Malian group Ansar al Din condemned recent steps taken by a Tuareg coalition to reconcile with the Malian government and promised future attacks against the French troops in Mali.
2015 03-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthis reported that they signed an economic deal with Iran to improve Yemen’s power grid as well as al Hudaydah seaport. Iran appears to be bolstering the al Houthi-led government by providing this support. Saudi economic assistance ended in December 2014 and the al Houthis face increasing regional isolation.
2. Iran’s Supreme Leader reacted negatively to the open letter signed by Republican senators citing concern that President Barack Obama will not be able to generate congressional support for a nuclear deal with Iran.
3. Al Murabitoun, an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb splinter group, conducted an attack in Bamako, Mali, that killed five people, including two Westerners. The attacl is the farthest south the group has operated.
2016-05-17 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
2015-08-12 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Anti-al Houthi forces, including Saudi and Emirati troops, have rolled back the al Houthis’ gains in Yemen. The Saudi-led coalition is seeking to reinstall the government led by Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The coalition’s military campaign is focused on the al Houthis, which has permitted al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to expand and the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to establish a foothold in Yemen.
2. The Ethiopian military is operating against al Shabaab outside of the AMISOM mandate in southern Somalia. It has conducted airstrikes against al Shabaab targets in Bay, Galgudud, and Hiraan. The original AMISOM mandate precluded the participation of neighboring states in the Somalia peacekeeping efforts because of the historical conflict between Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia and because of Ethiopia’s gross human rights violations during the 2006 invasion of Somalia.
3. ISIS appears to be strengthening its positions in Sirte, Libya, and maintains a foothold in Derna. ISIS lost full control of Derna in mid June, but it has adapted and has established an area of control from Hun, Libya, north to Sirte. There are also reports that foreign ISIS operatives have traveled to Sirte, which may foreshadow ISIS’s further development of capabilities in Libya.
2017 05-16 ctp update and assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
2016-02-09 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
2015 03-03 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Two rival governments appear to be emerging in Yemen – one based in Sana’a and controlled by the al Houthis and the other based in Aden under former President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. President Hadi, however, will likely have to contend with Southern Movement factions who reject his presence in southern Yemen.
2. The IRGC Great Prophet 9 military exercises reinforced the Supreme Leader’s December 1 call to enhance Iran’s military capabilities “irrespective” of the nuclear negotiations. The operational framework of the military drills, moreover, seemed to be aimed at deterring a potential attack, in the event that Tehran and the P5+1 fail to reach a final deal.
3. Violent clashes between Somali security forces and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) militias in central Somalia risk undermining the Somali government’s ability to combat al Shabaab, potentially allowing the al Qaeda affiliate to regain territory in the region.
2015-07-22 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said that the nuclear deal will not change Iran’s policy towards the United States. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a resolution endorsing the nuclear agreement on July 20. Shortly before the UNSC vote, IRGC Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari said that Iran will never accept provisions in the resolution regarding Iran’s “armament capabilities.”
2. Yemen’s exiled government may be attempting to re-establish a foothold in the country, which would serve to counter the al Houthi-run government in Sana’a. Yemeni government officials began returning to Aden after fighters retook the city under “Operation Golden Arrow,” backed by the Saudi Arabian-led coalition.
3. AQIM may be looking to reemerge in the North African region after a period of lessened activity. Militants carried out the group's deadliest attack in over a year in Algeria, killing nine soldiers. AQIM may also be seeking to increase its activity in light of the recent rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham’s popularity in the region.
2015-05-27 CTP Update and Assessment
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Key Iranian regime players’ meetings with senior Syrian and Iraqi government officials and the Hezbollah Secretary General may signal Iranian efforts to bring more force to bear in defense of Assad and Baghdad against the growing ISIS threat. The Supreme Leader’s senior foreign policy advisor Ali Akbar Velayati met with Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon before meeting with Syrian President Bashar al Assad in Damascus, Syria while Iran’s defense minister IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Dehghan met with Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al Abadi in Baghdad, Iraq. IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani also levied criticism directly against the United States for not stopping ISIS.
2. Al Houthi attacks on Saudi territory will continue to antagonize Saudi Arabia and will decrease the likelihood that warring factions will participate in political negotiations in the near future. The al Houthis fired rockets at populated locations within Saudi Arabia and raided Saudi Arabian border posts over the past week. An al Houthi-affiliated TV channel ran video footage of al Houthis allegedly firing into Saudi Arabia. UN-sponsored talks in Geneva announced last week have been delayed.
3. Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate its capability to conduct attacks within Kenya and carried out multiple attacks, including temporarily seizing territory, in northern Kenyan over the week. Al Shabaab militants took control of a mosque in Garissa county in Kenya and spoke to the congregation, which was held hostage, before fleeing ahead of security forces and also briefly held a town close to the border with Somalia. This the first time the group has carried out such activities in Kenya.
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四.办理各国各大学文凭(一对一专业服务,可全程监控跟踪进度)
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招聘代理：本公司诚聘英国加拿大澳洲新西兰美国法国德国新加坡各地代理人员如果你有业余时间有兴趣就请联系我们咨询顾问：+微信:95270640光总是太短太匆忙记得今年正月就在父亲扛起蛇皮袋将要跨出门槛的一刹那山娃突然抱紧父亲的大腿嚎啕大哭父亲吃力地掰开山娃的手哽咽道山娃好好听话好好念书到了暑假爸也接你进城爸的城好远好大好美山娃于是天天扳着手指算计着读书也格外刻苦无奈时间总过得太慢太慢每次父亲往家打电话山娃总抢着接听一个劲地提醒父亲别忘了正月说的话电话那头总会传来父亲嘿嘿的笑连连说记得记得但别忘了拿奖状进城啊考试一结束山娃就迫不及待地给间
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Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
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一真实留信认证的作用(私企外企荣誉的见证):
1：该专业认证可证明留学生真实留学身份同时对留学生所学专业等级给予评定。
2：国家专业人才认证中心颁发入库证书这个入网证书并且可以归档到地方。
3：凡是获得留信网入网的信息将会逐步更新到个人身份内将在公安部网内查询个人身份证信息后同步读取人才网入库信息。
4：个人职称评审加20分个人信誉贷款加10分。
5：在国家人才网主办的全国网络招聘大会中纳入资料供国家500强等高端企业选择人才。碌爬起把牛驱到后龙山再从莲塘里采回一蛇皮袋湿漉漉的莲蓬也才点多点半早就吃过早餐玩耍去了山娃的家在闽西山区依山傍水山清水秀门前潺潺流淌的蜿蜒小溪一直都是山娃和小伙伴们盛夏的天然泳场水不深碎石底石缝里总有摸不尽的鱼虾活蹦乱跳的还有乌龟和王八贼头贼脑的倒也逗人喜爱日上三竿时山娃总爱窜进自家瓜棚里跟小伙伴们坐着聊天聊着聊着便忍不住往瓜田里逡巡一番抱起一只硕大的西瓜用石刀劈开抑或用拳头砸开每人抱起一大块就之
Canadian Immigration Tracker March 2024 - Key Slides
Highlights
Permanent Residents decrease along with percentage of TR2PR decline to 52 percent of all Permanent Residents.
March asylum claim data not issued as of May 27 (unusually late). Irregular arrivals remain very small.
Study permit applications experiencing sharp decrease as a result of announced caps over 50 percent compared to February.
Citizenship numbers remain stable.
Slide 3 has the overall numbers and change.
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2015 02-10 CTP Update and Assessment
- 1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT February 10, 2015
- 2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS 2 1 2 1. Yemen’s al Houthis announced plan to form a central government. 2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 returns to its previous negotiating position. 3. Chief of TTP Jamatul Ahrar severely injured in clashes in Nangarhar province. 3
- 3. ASSESSMENT: Al Qaeda Network Al Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its followers in the West. The Charlie Hebdo attack, claimed by AQAP, may provide both momentum to the movement and propaganda for al Qaeda to push for such attacks. Despite competition with ISIS, the al Qaeda network will continue to direct resources to the Iraq-Syria front to support the Sunni populations there. The loss of AQAP senior leader Harith bin Ghazi al Nadhari will affect al Qaeda’s ability to message to potential fighters, since he regularly spoke to the issue, especially that fighters in Iraq-Syria should avoid adopting ISIS’s practice of killing Muslims who do not subscribe to its version of Islam. Jordanian officials released al Qaeda-aligned ideologue Abu Muhammad al Maqdisi from prison. Maqdisi is expected to denounce ISIS in an exclusive interview. Outlook: Al Qaeda seeks to reassert its relevance in the global jihadist movement and will try to influence the decision-making of foreign fighters in the Iraq-Syria conflict. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates The Pakistani military continues to consistently target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and Pakistani airstrikes target TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Chief of TTP Jamatul Ahrar, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in clashes with Afghan security forces in the Nangarhar province, signaling increased cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces on targeting TTP militants. Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan border. The tempo of militant attacks may falter in response to intensified anti-TTP operations. AQIS continues media operations and may launch additional spectacular attacks, possibly in conjunction with TTP. 3 AL QAEDA
- 4. ASSESSMENT: Political Yemen’s political crisis remains unresolved as the al Houthis announced the creation of a presidential council and interim assembly under al Houthi guidance on February 6. The al Houthis made the announcement after UN-led peace talks among the country’s political groups failed to produce any agreement to end the political crisis. The Southern Movement and the Ma’rib Tribal Alliance both announced that they would not submit to the new government’s leadership. Outlook: The al Houthis’ formation of a new government will lead to strong political divisions in the country. Al Houthi attempts to enforce the interim government’s policies in dissenting regions could lead to large-scale fighting. Security Southern Movement militants significantly increased activity against security forces in Lahij and Aden. Ansar al Sharia continued attacks against security forces in Hadramawt, launching a large-scale attack in al Qatan. Ansar al Sharia also launched attacks against the al Houthis and military forces reportedly allied with the al Houthis in al Bayda and Ibb. Tribes in Ma’rib erected road blocks throughout the governorate in preparation for al Houthi attacks. Outlook: Ansar al Sharia continues its attacks on both security forces and the al Houthis. Al Houthi attempts to increase control in Ma’rib could drive tribal support to AQAP. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) AQAP released a statement saying that a U.S. airstrike killed four AQAP members, including senior leader Harith bin Ghazi al Nadhari. The statement also claimed that the airstrikes were part of America’s plot to help the al Houthis take over Yemen. Outlook: AQAP will try to use the increased number of alleged U.S. airstrikes in Yemen in combination with the al Houthi takeover of the government as a recruiting mechanism. As southern governorates begin to distance themselves from Sana’a, AQAP may try to take a more active role in controlling areas currently under its influence. 4 YEMENGULF OF ADEN
- 5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 5 YEMENGULF OF ADEN 1 2 4 1) 02-03 FEB: Ansar al Sharia engaged in heavy fighting with security forces in Qatan, Hadramawt. 2) 01-03 FEB: Ansar al Sharia assassinated al Houthi targets in Ibb city. 3) 01-04 FEB: Ansar al Sharia targeted al Houthi and security forces in Rada’a, al Bayda. 4) 02 FEB: Southern Movement militants and Ansar al Sharia militants clashed with security forces in Lahij. 3
- 6. ASSESSMENT: Political Political fallout from Somaliland’s January 30 seizure of arms continues. Somaliland returned the weapons it had seized in Berbera to Sudan; Somaliland also denied that it was violating the 1992 arms embargo or supporting al Shabaab fighters. On February 4, the Presidents of Puntland and the interim Jubba Administration arrived in Mogadishu for talks with Somali Federal Government officials. The Somali Federal Parliament is expected to vote on a new proposed cabinet next week. Outlook: Despite Somaliland returning the weapons to Sudan, relations between Puntland and Somaliland are likely to remain tense, particularly due to accusations that Somaliland supports al Shabaab fighters in Puntland. The cabinet proposal is likely to pass during a vote in Parliament. Security A U.S. airstrike killed a number of al Shabaab fighters on January 31 in Dugule and Dinsor. The casualties included Yusuf Dheeq who was al Shabaab’s head of external operations and reportedly the head of al Shabaab’s intelligence organization, Amniyat. Kenyan AMISOM forces also carried out airstrikes in five villages around Kismayo, Lower Jubba region. Outlook: U.S. airstrikes may affect al Shabaab’s capabilities as its senior leadership is eliminated. AMISOM operations in Kismayo will also affect al Shabaab operations. Al Shabaab Al Shabaab carried out a successful attack on a Boosaaso police station on February 3, an area that has seen sporadic al Shabaab activity. Al Shabaab also stole livestock and kidnapped herders in Lower Jubba region on January 5, which may indicate the group’s loss of control in the area. Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue to conduct asymmetric attacks in areas under government control such as Boosaaso, Puntland and Mogadishu, Somalia. These will likely increase as Somali Government and AMISOM forces continue to pressure al Shabaab in the areas it still controls. The loss of resources is probably affecting al Shabaab’s supplies, prompting recent incidents to secure livestock and finances. HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 6
- 7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 1) 31 JAN: Al Shabaab leader Yusuf Dheeq killed in U.S. airstrike in Dinsor, Bay region. 2) 03 FEB: Five AMISOM airstrikes targeted al Shabaab in villages around Kismayo, Lower Jubba region. 3) 03 FEB: Al Shabaab militants attacked police station in Boosaaso, Bari region. 4) 04 FEB: Al Shabaab stole livestock and kidnapped herders near Badhade, Lower Jubba region. 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 7 HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN 77 1 2 3 4
- 8. ASSESSMENT: AQIM Algeria continued its counter-smuggling operations against AQIM near Algiers and Algeria’s southern border. Outlook: Unrest in Libya will continue to contribute to AQIM’s overall ability to carry out smuggling operations in the Sahel. AQIM may seek to support Ansar al Din and associates in Mali and will probably continue its relationships with Ansar al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia. Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia) Operation Dignity and Libyan military forces continued to advance against Ansar al Sharia Libya and allied forces for control of Benghazi, seizing the Benghazi Port and other areas. Ansar al Sharia militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near a Libyan military checkpoint in the Laithi neighborhood of Benghazi, an Ansar al Sharia stronghold, in response to recent military loses. In Tunisia, security forces conducted multiple raids and arrests against unidentified Islamist militants for the second week in a row. Outlook: Despite recent Operation Dignity gains, the conflict in Libya is likely to continue unabated as Ansar al Sharia holds territory in Derna and Benghazi. Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun) The MNLA and pro-government fighters continue to clash in northern Mali, culminating in an MNLA kidnapping of 20 residents of Kano. Meanwhile, inter-Malian peace talks are scheduled to take place this week in Algiers. Outlook: Inter-Malian peace talks are unlikely to solve the current crisis as waves of violence continue to sweep through northern Mali. MINUSMA’s efforts will do little to stabilize the region, while the Malian government appears to be incapable of creating political progress. The security situation may create conditions in which AQIM and Ansar al Din can expand in Mali. 8 MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA
- 9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 12 3 1. 19 DEC: Tunisian army begins ground operations targeting AAS-T and Uqbah Ibn Nafaa Brigade in Jebel Chaambi. 2. 16 DEC: Moroccan and Spanish authorities dismantle ISIS recruiting cell in Melilla. 3. 17-19 DEC: Fighting between Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn for control of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider oil ports intensifies. 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 1. 21 JAN: Libyan military forces seize the Libyan Central Bank branch in Benghazi during clashes with Ansar al Sharia 2. 20-22 JAN: The Algerian military interdicts and arrests 58 smugglers in the Tamanrasset province 3. 21 JAN: The Algerian military arrests a wanted terrorist working with groups abroad and two smugglers 3 2 1 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 12 3 1. 19 DEC: Tunisian army begins ground operations targeting AAS-T and Uqbah Ibn Nafaa Brigade in Jebel Chaambi. 2. 16 DEC: Moroccan and Spanish authorities dismantle ISIS recruiting cell in Melilla. 3. 17-19 DEC: Fighting between Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn for control of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider oil ports intensifies. 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 1) 24 JAN: Algerian military arrests 62 people in anti- smuggling operations in Tamanrasset. 2) 25-27 JAN: Operation Dignity attacks Ansar al Sharia forces, including launching airstrikes, in Benghazi. 3) 30 JAN: Tunisia National Guard arrests 11 militants suspected of plotting terrorist attacks in southern Tunisia. 3 2 1 1 2 3 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 1. 19 DEC: Tunisian army begins ground operations targeting AAS-T and Uqbah Ibn Nafaa Brigade in Jebel Chaambi. 2. 16 DEC: Moroccan and Spanish authorities dismantle ISIS recruiting cell in Melilla. 3. 17-19 DEC: Fighting between Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn for control of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider oil ports intensifies. 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 1. 21 JAN: Libyan military forces seize the Libyan Central Bank branch in Benghazi during clashes with Ansar al Sharia 2. 20-22 JAN: The Algerian military interdicts and arrests 58 smugglers in the Tamanrasset province 3. 21 JAN: The Algerian military arrests a wanted terrorist working with groups abroad and two smugglers 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 1 2 1. 19 DEC: Tunisian army begins ground operations targeting AAS-T and Uqbah Ibn Nafaa Brigade in Jebel Chaambi. 2. 16 DEC: Moroccan and Spanish authorities dismantle ISIS recruiting cell in Melilla. 3. 17-19 DEC: Fighting between Operation Dignity and Libya Dawn for control of Ras Lanuf and Es Sider oil ports intensifies. 9 NORTH AFRICAWEST AFRICA 1) 05 FEB: Operation Dignity forces advanced against Ansar al Sharia in several areas of Benghazi, including seizing the Benghazi Port. 2) 06 FEB: Ansar al Sharia detonated an SVBIED near a Libyan military checkpoint in Laithi neighborhood of Benghazi, killing two and wounding 20 people. 3) 02 FEB: Unknown gunmen killed two Algerian police officers in café in Boura. 3
- 10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: 10 SAHELWEST AFRICA 2 1 1 2 1) 03 FEB: French troops kill a dozen Islamist militants in the region of the Adrar des Ifoghas Mountains . 2) 01 FEB: MNLA exchanges gunfire with pro-government fighters in Kano and kidnaps 20 Kano residents.
- 11. ASSESSMENT: Nuclear Talks The Foreign Ministry reiterated that the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable, echoing previous statements made by the Supreme Leader. Tehran, meanwhile, stated that it will continue to advance its nuclear program and install more centrifuges if the P5+1 returns to its previous position regarding Iran. Outlook: Senior regime officials have coalesced around Khamenei’s policy of compartmentalized negotiations. A nuclear deal that does not tie-in other issues, i.e. Iran’s missiles, thus constitutes an acceptable accord for Tehran. Military and Security Iran launched its fourth domestically produced satellite named Fajr last week, making it the first successful launch since the Navid Elm-o Sanat in February 2012. It is probable there have been at least two failed launches of the Fajr in the last several years, along with multiple delays in its launch schedule. It is unclear whether the Fajr is successfully in orbit, despite state-run Iranian media confirmation. Outlook: Iran will continue to work toward improving its space program despite economic and sanctions-related impediments. 11 IRAN
- 12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN 1231 JAN – 06 FEB 2015 01 FEB: Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani cited President Obama’s tensions with Congress over sanctions as a reason for the inability for Obama to make a “prudent decision” 02 FEB: 220 parliamentarians signed a legislative plan to “protect Iran’s nuclear rights” 02 FEB: Iran’s National Gas Company announced the start of new pipeline to southern Iraq 02 FEB: Iran successfully launched its fourth domestically made satellite into orbit 02 FEB: Foreign Ministry denies claims by Parliamentarian Alaeddin Boroujerdi that Israel sent a private message expressing its disinterest in escalation after January 18 Hezbollah attack in Syria 03 FEB: Judiciary held the 5th session of the heads of government; Judiciary Head Sadegh Amoli Larijani urges government not to change judiciary budget 04 FEB: IRGC Brig. Gen. Hossein Salami reiterated the Supreme Leader’s message that enemies seek to destroy unity among Muslims 04 FEB: Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia claimed that Iran-Saudi relations remain cold and criticized Saudi Arabia’s contribution to plunging oil prices 04 FEB: MP Boroujerdi meets with Syria’s Deputy Foreign Minister 04 FEB: Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh outlines diversification of Iran’s economy 04 FEB: Director for Political and International Affairs Hamid Baeidnejad says that Iran will continue to develop its nuclear program if new sanctions are imposed 04 FEB: Iran and Afghanistan sign border security agreement 05 FEB: President Hassan Rouhani announced the formation of committees to avoid loan defaults 06 FEB: Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and Secretary of State John Kerry met on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference
- 13. ACRONYMS 13 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T) Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH) Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Islamic State (IS) Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) North Waziristan (NWA) Pakistani Military (PakMil) Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) Somalia National Army (SNA) South Waziristan (SWA) Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
- 14. CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS Katherine Zimmerman senior al Qaeda analyst katherine.zimmerman@aei.org (202) 888-6576 Alexis Knutsen al Qaeda analyst alexis.knutsen@aei.org (202) 888-6570 Marie Donovan Iran analyst marie.donovan@aei.org (202) 888-6572 Mehrdad Moarefian Iran analyst mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org (202) 888-6574 For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org. 14