CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement. Reuters reported that Iran surged arms shipments to Yemen in recent months and may have sent advisors. An aggressive American policy against the Iranian-backed al Houthis risks driving the group further into Iran’s orbit.
2. The Libyan National Army’s declared offensive to seize strategic locations in southwestern Libya will draw opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda both retain Libyan safe havens. Spiraling conflict would give both al Qaeda and ISIS the opportunity to co-opt factions within the civil war and could erase the recent progress made in degrading ISIS’s strength in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support. The group distributed food aid to more than 200 families in Galgudud region, central Somalia on March 19. Al Shabaab may strengthen in regions where the Somali Federal Government is unable to facilitate the delivery of food aid.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG.
2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017.
3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict.
2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit.
3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight.
2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president.
3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali.
2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert.
3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The U.S. may expand its military operations in Somalia to increase pressure on al Shabaab, which has resurged and is set to make additional gains in 2017. The Pentagon recommended the deployment of additional U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to cooperate with Somali forces for counter-al Shabaab operations. The Pentagon also called for reduced restrictions on U.S. airstrikes targeting al Shabaab. Al Shabaab is attempting to delegitimize the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo, by degrading security in Mogadishu and taking control of towns where counterterrorism forces do not operate. Al Shabaab may also exploit widespread famine that could further challenge the SFG.
2. Russia is attempting to rally U.S. support for its preferred strongman in Libya as part of a broader strategy to push back against the influence of the U.S. and NATO. Moscow’s support for Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar strengthens its ties to Cairo, the LNA’s main backer. Russia is actively working to draw Egypt away from the U.S. sphere of influence. Russia also seeks to leverage its support for Haftar to secure military basing on the Mediterranean, expanding on the strategy it has pursued successfully in Syria. Moscow has also positioned itself as a broker between Libya’s rival factions and will host talks in the coming days. Finally, Russia is pursuing economic interests in Libya, including a large oil deal signed in February 2017.
3. Al Qaeda senior leaders are under increased pressure from U.S. targeting. They relocated to Syria beginning in 2013 to operate from the sanctuary enjoyed by al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, Jabhat al Nusra, and to provide strategic guidance for the global network and for the Syrian war. A U.S. airstrike killed the deputy leader of al Qaeda, Abu al Khayr al Masri, in Idlib Province, Syria, on February 26. Al Qaeda operates alongside Syrian opposition groups within the group, the Tahrir al Sham Assembly. It is actively consolidating the Syrian armed opposition under its leadership.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The fragmenting of the Yemeni state endangers U.S. policy in Yemen. The former governor of Aden, whom President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi ousted in early May, announced the formation of a transitional political council to govern southern Yemen on May 11. Yemeni military forces allied with the southern transitional political council and forces allied with the Hadi government mobilized. The U.S. supports the re-establishment of a unitary Yemeni state under the Hadi government to limit Iran’s influence and continue partnered counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
2. Al Qaeda encourages supporters to conduct fight-in-place attacks in the West. Hamza bin Laden, the son of former al Qaeda emir Osama bin Laden, advised “lone-wolf” attackers to prepare and refer to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)’s “Inspire” magazine for instructions. Bin Laden’s statement echoes a recent statement by AQAP emir Qasim al Raymi calling on individuals to conduct basic attacks in the U.S. and Europe.
3. Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM), an al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb associate operating in Mali, is conducting a campaign to challenge the Malian government and UN peacekeeping forces in northern Mali. The group conducted a series of attacks on military bases in the past two weeks to fix security forces in place. JNIM is also securing freedom of movement in rural areas by intimidating local officials. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM and set conditions for the current campaign in March 2017.
1. A U.S. ground raid targeting an al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) compound signals a sustained shift away from the use of drone strikes alone to counter AQAP. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted an intelligence-gathering raid in Ma’rib governorate, central Yemen. This operation is the first acknowledged U.S. ground raid in Yemen since a similar operation in January 2017 resulted in the death of one U.S. Navy SEAL and several Yemeni civilians.
2. The breakdown of a ceasefire in southwestern Libya threatens recent political progress and sets the stage for the civil war to escalate. A militia coalition that included groups associated with al Qaeda overran the Brak al Shati airbase on May 18, executing dozens of Libyan National Army (LNA) personnel. The LNA retaliated with airstrikes and may resume ground operations in the southwest. Continued conflict in Libya empowers al Qaeda and associated groups that have positioned themselves as the defenders of vulnerable populations in the civil war.
3. Civil unrest is spreading in Tunisia. Protests escalated in the country’s marginalized southern regions after President Beji Caid Essebsi deployed troops to protect industrial sites from demonstrators. Clashes between police and protesters killed at least one civilian. Continued violence by security forces risks generating broad backlash against the state.
1.Russia deployed military personnel to Libya to secure its military and economic interests amid the escalating civil war. U.S. and Egyptian officials reported a Russian Special Operations Forces (SOF) and drones deployment to a military base in western Egypt to support operations in Libya. Russia supports Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar as part of a larger plan to secure additional military basing on the Mediterranean and strengthen ties to Egypt. Russia also has significant economic interests in Libya’s oil industry. An Islamist militia coalition seized two key oil terminals from the LNA on March 3. The LNA reportedly recaptured the terminals on March 14, with likely Egyptian backing and possibly Russian and Emirati support. Hostilities will likely continue to escalate in Libya’s oil crescent. Russia will likely seize the opportunity to increase its diplomatic and military involvement in an effort to shape the outcome of the conflict.
2. The Saudi-led coalition and President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi will not agree to terms for a ceasefire with the al Houthi-Saleh faction while current frontlines hold in Yemen. Hadi refused to discuss ceasefire terms with UN Special Envoy to Yemen Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed on March 9. He refused to pursue negotiations until his forces seize Yemen’s Red Sea ports from the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. Coalition-backed forces control Mokha port in Taiz governorate but are unlikely to advance quickly into al Hudaydah governorate, where the Hadi government lacks popular support. Riyadh is in the midst of a diplomatic push to secure Washington’s support for its objectives in Yemen. U.S. support for a Saudi-led military solution would exacerbate Yemen’s humanitarian crisis and drive the al Houthis further into the Iranian orbit.
3. Al Shabaab is conducting an explosive attack campaign in Mogadishu that threatens to undermine the legitimacy of the Somali Federal Government (SFG), led by newly elected President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo. Al Shabaab detonated two suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs) targeting a military position and a hotel in central Mogadishu on March 13. The militant group has now conducted four VBIED attacks in Mogadishu since President Farmajo took office in February. The SFG struggles to project its power beyond select population centers in Somalia, and al Shabaab is now challenging its ability to secure the hard-won capital city. The SFG’s legitimacy is central to the success of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A coordinated release of strategic guidance across al Qaeda’s affiliates indicates continued centralized direction from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri to the al Qaeda network. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent issued a detailed statement outlining how its followers should interact with other Salafi-jihadi groups and treat Muslim civilians in order to cultivate the support of the masses. The document also listed and prioritized legitimate targets for attacks. Al Shabaab emir Ahmed Umar (Abu Ubaidah) issued guidance for Muslims in East Africa, couching the local objectives in terms of the global fight.
2. Ongoing negotiations between members of the Saudi-led coalition and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s block are occurring outside of the UN-led process. An elite-brokered deal is unlikely to address the core underlying grievances that feed conflict in Yemen’s civil war and therefore may not stabilize the country. Current reports indicate that former Yemeni prime minister Khaled Bahah could replace Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi as president and Saleh’s son, Ahmed Saleh, would take the office of the vice president.
3. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is attacking oil infrastructure in Libya. ISIS in Libya has reconstituted sufficiently to launch a counter-counter-offensive to destabilize Libya further and create space for its forces to regroup. The Misratan counter-ISIS offensive in Libya degraded ISIS significantly, but did not defeat the group.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked a resort near Bamako, the capital of Mali, signaling the possible return of a terror campaign targeting West African sites frequented by Western officials, tourists, and expatriates. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and affiliated groups conducted a series of attacks on hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Ivory Coast in late 2015 and early 2016. Four al Qaeda-linked groups merged to form JNIM in March 2017 and have since escalated an insurgency against Malian, French, and UN forces in northern Mali.
2. The Qatar diplomatic crisis is reverberating in the Horn of Africa region. Qatari peacekeeping troops withdrew from the contested border between Djibouti and Eritrea on June 14 after Eritrea severed diplomatic ties with Qatar. Eritrea deployed troops to the contested border for the first time since the 2008 border war, prompting Djibouti to place its military on alert.
3. Iranian support for the al Houthi-Saleh faction threatens navigational freedom in the Red Sea. Al Houthi-Saleh forces fired a surface-to-ship missile at an Emirati vessel near Mokha port on June 15, wounding one crewmember. The Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) or Lebanese Hezbollah likely provided technical support for past shore-to-ship attacks, including the October 2016 attacks on a U.S. warship near the Bab al Mandab Strait.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Somali parliamentarians elected Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo as the president of Somalia on February 8. President Farmajo must now form a government to address a host of challenges. These challenges include pervasive corruption and an impending food crisis, caused by a region-wide drought. Widespread hunger will tax resources throughout East Africa and may reduce the ability of Somali forces and regional partners to sustain pressure on al Shabaab. Al Shabaab overran two Somali military camps and ambushed a Somali convoy in south-central Somalia on February 12, demonstrating tactical sophistication that will test the new administration.
2. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may escalate operations targeting southern Saudi Arabia. Cross-border attacks by al Houthi-Saleh forces killed approximately twelve Saudi Border Guards in a nine-day period. These casualties far exceed the average rate of deaths reported by Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saudi-led coalition campaign in Yemen in March 2015. The al Houthi-Saleh faction may pursue escalation in the border region as a counter to a Saudi-led coalition-backed campaign on Yemen’s Red Sea coast, which threatens the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s access to the Red Sea. Al Houthi movement leader Abdul Malik al Houthi claimed, likely falsely, to possess ballistic missiles capable of striking Riyadh during a televised address on February 10. The al Houthi movement’s aggressive position toward Saudi Arabia reflects a long-standing conflict over the Saudi-Yemeni border, not necessarily growing ties between the al Houthi movement and Iran. A major faction of the al Houthi movement opposes Iranian control, and the group is not an Iranian proxy.
3. Armed groups set conditions that may cause conflict to escalate in central and western Libya. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar dropped out of long-awaited talks with the head of Libya’s UN-backed unity government on February 14, signaling his intent to prioritize a military solution. Anti-Islamist forces under Haftar’s command intensified a campaign against Islamist militants in contested central Libya. More powerful Islamist factions may rally to support these militants, increasing the likelihood that Libya’s most powerful factions will resume active hostilities for control of the country’s oil-rich center. Hardline Islamist militias in Tripoli formed a new coalition to contest control of Libya’s capital and undermine the UN-backed government. An outbreak of fighting in either Tripoli or central Libya would undermine the country’s fragile economic recovery and reduce pressure on the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s network in Libya remains a threat to U.S. national security despite the announced dissolution of Ansar al Sharia, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization that participated in the September 2012 attack on U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. Ansar al Sharia cited leadership attrition and called on Libyan Muslims to fight together to establish a polity governed by shari’a law in its May 27 statement. The al Qaeda human network in Libya was already diffuse and the disbandment of Ansar al Sharia is unlikely to affect al Qaeda’s ability to shape the civil war, operate training camps, benefit from smuggling and trafficking, and recruit in Libya.
2. The resumption of talks to broker a ceasefire in Yemen does not indicate a political breakthrough. Oman hosted representatives from President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an attempt to end hostilities. Both parties continue to insist on incompatible preconditions for a ceasefire, and divisions within each bloc will likely scuttle a deal. The UN Special Envoy to Yemen acknowledged that he is not close to securing a ceasefire.
3. Salafi-jihadi organizations seek to attack passenger airliners by concealing bombs in portable electronic devices. The U.S. is considering the expansion of a “laptop ban” to include inbound flights from Europe. The U.S. prohibited laptops and similar-sized electronics from the cabins of flights originating from ten airports in Muslim-majority countries in March 2017. Al Qaeda affiliates possess advanced explosive capabilities and have transferred expertise within the network. ISIS seeks to develop a similar capability.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks.
2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue.
3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. deployed several dozen troops to Somalia to train and equip Somali and African Union forces fighting against al Shabaab. The arrival of units from the 101st Airborne Division to Mogadishu on April 2 marks the first significant deployment of U.S. ground troops, other than small advisory units, to Somalia since March 1994. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu after Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on the group on April 6. Al Shabaab will surge in Mogadishu to force Somali forces to concentrate in the capital, allowing al Shabaab to control humanitarian aid delivery in other regions.
2. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is setting conditions to launch a major offensive in Yemen after the month of Ramadan, which begins in late May. The offensive aims to seize al Hudaydah port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Yemen’s internationally recognized government requested the recall of the UN Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, who opposes the offensive. The al Hudaydah operation will worsen conditions for a population that already faces a severe humanitarian crisis.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has an opportunity to gain by brokering a ceasefire between warring militias in southwestern Libya. The GNA Ministry of Local Government organized a meeting for mayors from the Fezzan region to discuss military de-escalation. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based primarily in eastern Libya, is attempting to seize military bases and oil sites in the Fezzan. Anti-LNA militias from Libya’s coastal regions deployed to the Fezzan to join the fight, which risks escalating into a larger conflict. The GNA, which was created by a UN agreement, will gain legitimacy if it brokers a deal at the municipal level.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The death of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets. Abdul Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, died of natural causes in prison in North Carolina on February 18. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. The joint statement from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) eulogizing Abdul Rahman and calling for revenge attacks indicates the continued close coordination between the two affiliates. Al Shabaab released a separate statement. Al Qaeda’s al Nafeer bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning and abusing him.
2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration. Al Shabaab militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) in a crowded market in Mogadishu on February 19, killing dozens of people. A senior al Shabaab official threatened a “vicious war” against the new government on February 19. Al Shabaab is also conducting an assassination campaign targeting government officials and elders who supported the electoral process. Former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ceremonially transferred power to new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on February 16 in a ceremony that al Shabaab attempted to disrupt with mortar fire.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base. This faction, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), seeks to attack Western targets throughout West Africa. It has built ties to local populations that allow it to access supplies and deliver aid in the midst of widespread food insecurity. A rival Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau has alienated the local population may lose militants to the better-resourced ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, which will in turn expand the scope and scale of its operations against regional states.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging.
2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts.
3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration is weighing increased involvement in Libya that may tip the scale further in favor of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The administration might be considering a diplomatic presence of an intelligence coordination center in Benghazi. The reported policy discussion emerged after Haftar declared victory in Benghazi on July 5, ending a three-year effort to clear the city of Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE, seeks to parlay his growing power into a leading role in a national political settlement. The U.S. must tread carefully when engaging with Haftar, whose quest to stabilize eastern Libya and eradicate political Islam has harmed democratic institutions and played in to extremist narratives.
2. Al Shabaab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya in an attempt to turn Kenyan voters against the military intervention in Somalia before general elections in August. Militants beheaded nine civilians in Lamu County on the northern Kenyan coast July 9, four days after nearly 200 al Shabaab militants clashed with police forces in the same region. Kenyan warplanes conducted strikes targeting al Shabaab strongholds in the Boni Forest along the Somali border in response to the attacks.
3. The fracturing of the Yemeni state undermines U.S. policy in Yemen, which relies on the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s already weak administration is losing control of southern Yemen. The Transitional Political Council of the South, a rival body that seeks to form an independent governing entity for southern Yemen, announced the formation of a governmental structure on July 9.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates.
2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu.
3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.]
3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration granted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) the authority to conduct offensive airstrikes against al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, in order to increase pressure on the group. AFRICOM commander General Waldhauser testified that support for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) as it addresses the spreading famine is critical. Al Shabaab, which kidnapped four World Health Organization aid workers on April 3, is already taking steps to control the delivery of aid to areas outside of SFG control.
2. The U.S. and its partners in Yemen may miss an opportunity to gain allies against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis reported the U.S. has conducted over 70 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen this year, more than any other year in total. The pace of strikes and potential for collateral damage drove local leaders in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen to meet. The local leaders denounced support for terrorism of any kind, but also condemned civilian casualties and infrastructure.
3. The growing power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who leads the force that controls much of eastern Libya, will lead to increased conflict. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is making concessions to bring Haftar into a political deal that would allow him to control Libya’s military. LNA forces are making a play for control of key oil and military sites in central and southwestern Libya. Haftar’s advance will spark backlash from his opponents throughout western Libya, however, and Haftar lacks the military power to win the resultant war.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is using military force to secure his power at the expense of political resolution in Libya. Pro-Haftar forces stormed the headquarters of a constitutional drafting body in eastern Libya on July 20 and demanded the abandonment of a draft constitution that barred Haftar from running for president in 2018. Haftar’s rise as a strongman may stabilize Libya in the near term, but it will exacerbate the grievances that drive the civil war and galvanize support for Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
2. The U.S. is attempting to divide the al Houthi-Saleh bloc in order to reduce Iranian influence in Yemen and revive the UN peace process. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller began the diplomatic effort by praising former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s cooperation with a UN plan and criticizing the al Houthi faction for impeding negotiations. Elite-level diplomatic engagement is unlikely to progress, however, as long as the military situation on the ground remains stalemated.
3. Political violence is surging in Kenya before general elections on August 8. Recent incidents include the murder of a senior election official and an attack on the home of the Deputy President, as well as accusations of election rigging. Civil unrest in Kenya will strain Kenyan security forces and provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand in eastern Kenya and southern Somalia, where Kenyan forces play a major role.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda’s senior leadership seeks to shape the Syrian battlefield by broadening the scope of the conflict. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri admonished fighters in Syria to avoid nationalism and prepare for a protracted guerrilla war supported by the entire Sunni community. The “Imam Shamil Battalion,” likely a Central Asian group, claimed that Zawahiri ordered it to conduct the April 3 metro bombing in St. Petersburg, Russia, signaling that al Qaeda leadership may seek to shape Russia’s posture in Syria with external attacks.
2. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar’s military expansion may undermine hopes for political reconciliation in Libya. A LNA-aligned political body signaled that it may be willing to participate in the UN-brokered political process and end a boycott of more than a year. Haftar’s forces are preparing to attack a base held by militias aligned with the UN-backed government, however. Haftar’s pursuit of a military solution may interrupt the long-awaited political dialogue.
3. Al Shabaab seeks to gain popular support by establishing itself as a humanitarian aid provider in rural Somalia. The group ambushed two convoys carrying Emirati Red Crescent and World Food Programme personnel near Mogadishu in April in an effort to deter international aid. Al Shabaab simultaneously facilitates aid delivery to vulnerable populations in southern and central Somalia. Al Shabaab aims to exploit Somalia’s catastrophic drought and famine conditions to challenge the authority of the Somali Federal Government, which will struggle to respond to the population’s needs.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Houthi-Saleh forces conducted a small-boat suicide attack on a Saudi warship in the Red Sea, marking the use of a new asymmetric tactic. Al Houthi-Saleh militants attacked a Saudi frigate near al Hudaydah port in the Red Sea on January 30. The attack may have been intended for a U.S. vessel, according to U.S. defense officials. The al Houthi-Saleh faction last threatened U.S. freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, a critical shipping lane, in October 2016, when militants fired missiles at the USS Mason. The use of suicide boats may indicate that al Houthi-Saleh missile capabilities are limited due to U.S. retaliatory actions following USS Mason attacks. Alternately, the suicide boat attack may be intended to generate an American or Saudi response against local traffickers and fisherman, which would increase popular backlash against the Saudi-led coalition campaign in western Yemen. Iranian support for the January 30 attack is possible but not confirmed.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA)’s battle for Benghazi, Libya’s second largest city, is culminating. The LNA is ascendant in eastern and central Libya, lowering the likelihood that LNA commander Field Marshall Haftar will participate in a negotiated settlement to end Libya’s civil war. It is bolstered by control of critical oil infrastructure and alleged Russian military support. The LNA will now prioritize the fight for Derna city, which is controlled by an Islamist coalition that includes al Qaeda associate Ansar al Sharia. The LNA’s military expansion drives moderate Islamist groups to cooperate with or support extremist actors, including Salafi-jihadi groups linked to al Qaeda.
3. Al Shabaab has momentum against the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). It is regaining territory in the Lower Shabelle region. Al Shabaab conducted a multi-phase attack to drive security forces out of Afgoi, a strategic location less than 20 miles away from Mogadishu, between January 19 and 24. Al Shabaab also continued a pattern of mass-casualty attacks targeting AMISOM bases. Militants conducted a high-casualty attack involving multiple vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) on a Kenyan base at Kolbio town near the Kenyan-Somali border on January 27. The Kolbio attack may signal the start of a campaign to raise the cost of Kenya’s involvement in Somalia in advance of Kenyan elections.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. The U.S. deployed several dozen troops to Somalia to train and equip Somali and African Union forces fighting against al Shabaab. The arrival of units from the 101st Airborne Division to Mogadishu on April 2 marks the first significant deployment of U.S. ground troops, other than small advisory units, to Somalia since March 1994. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu after Somali President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo declared war on the group on April 6. Al Shabaab will surge in Mogadishu to force Somali forces to concentrate in the capital, allowing al Shabaab to control humanitarian aid delivery in other regions.
2. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is setting conditions to launch a major offensive in Yemen after the month of Ramadan, which begins in late May. The offensive aims to seize al Hudaydah port on Yemen’s Red Sea coast from the al Houthi-Saleh faction. Yemen’s internationally recognized government requested the recall of the UN Resident Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Yemen, who opposes the offensive. The al Hudaydah operation will worsen conditions for a population that already faces a severe humanitarian crisis.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) has an opportunity to gain by brokering a ceasefire between warring militias in southwestern Libya. The GNA Ministry of Local Government organized a meeting for mayors from the Fezzan region to discuss military de-escalation. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based primarily in eastern Libya, is attempting to seize military bases and oil sites in the Fezzan. Anti-LNA militias from Libya’s coastal regions deployed to the Fezzan to join the fight, which risks escalating into a larger conflict. The GNA, which was created by a UN agreement, will gain legitimacy if it brokers a deal at the municipal level.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The death of the “Blind Sheikh,” Omar Abdul Rahman, may inspire retaliatory attacks against U.S. targets. Abdul Rahman, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, died of natural causes in prison in North Carolina on February 18. Al Qaeda’s General Command called for revenge attacks on Americans and U.S. interests and accused the U.S. of killing Abdul Rahman by withholding his medication in prison. The joint statement from al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) eulogizing Abdul Rahman and calling for revenge attacks indicates the continued close coordination between the two affiliates. Al Shabaab released a separate statement. Al Qaeda’s al Nafeer bulletin released Abdul Rahman’s will, in which he accused the U.S. of poisoning and abusing him.
2. Al Shabaab increased its operational tempo in Mogadishu in an effort to disrupt Somalia’s new administration. Al Shabaab militants detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) in a crowded market in Mogadishu on February 19, killing dozens of people. A senior al Shabaab official threatened a “vicious war” against the new government on February 19. Al Shabaab is also conducting an assassination campaign targeting government officials and elders who supported the electoral process. Former president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud ceremonially transferred power to new President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo on February 16 in a ceremony that al Shabaab attempted to disrupt with mortar fire.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit famine conditions in the Lake Chad Basin to increase recruitment and build a local support base. This faction, also known as ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya (West Africa Province), seeks to attack Western targets throughout West Africa. It has built ties to local populations that allow it to access supplies and deliver aid in the midst of widespread food insecurity. A rival Boko Haram faction led by Abubakr Shekau has alienated the local population may lose militants to the better-resourced ISIS Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyya, which will in turn expand the scope and scale of its operations against regional states.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The rupture between Qatar and several Arab states severs a diplomatic channel in the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, and Bahrain suspended diplomatic relations with Qatar on June 5. The Riyadh-based Yemeni government also cut ties with Qatar, as did an Egyptian- and Emirati-backed Libyan administration. Qatar’s ouster from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen removes an interlocutor between the coalition and the al Houthi-Saleh bloc. An al Houthi-Saleh political body subsequently indicated that it will no longer engage the UN Special Envoy to Yemen, whom it views as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
2. The Libyan National Army (LNA), a militia coalition based in eastern Libya, notched a victory with its takeover of several strategic sites in central Libya. Egyptian and likely Emirati air support proved decisive for the LNA, which is led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The LNA’s advance toward western Libya does not herald a sustainable military or political solution to the Libya conflict, however. Haftar and his regional backers seek to exclude key powerbrokers, including political Islamists, who are critical to a stable political resolution in Libya.
3. Al Shabaab is waging a campaign against Kenyan police and military targets in Somalia and eastern Kenya in an attempt to influence general elections in August. Al Shabaab has killed more than 30 Kenyan troops and security personnel in the past three weeks. It seeks to drive public support for the withdrawal of Kenyan forces from Somalia. The group’s recent operations include an attack on a Kenyan military base at Kolbio, where it previously conducted a high-casualty attack on Kenyan forces in January 2017.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The members of al Qaeda’s affiliate network coordinate closely to produce strategic messaging. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released a joint statement calling for attacks on Jews on July 16. The statement is a response to Israel’s temporary closure of al Aqsa Mosque on July 14 after three Arab Israeli gunmen killed two Israeli policemen in Jerusalem. AQAP and AQIM likely use secure communications or embedded personnel to rapidly coordinate messaging.
2. Country-wide protests are challenging the Moroccan state. Protest movements are coalescing around shared grievances against Morocco’s security forces, as well as unemployment and underdevelopment. Organizers are planning a national protest for July 20. The protests’ focus on security forces, on which the state relies, signals a possible threat to King Mohammed VI’s power as he seeks to meet protesters’ demands after several failed attempts.
3. The UN is pursuing a plan to transfer control of Yemen’s al Hudaydah port from the al Houthi-Saleh faction to a neutral party as a first step to resuming stalled ceasefire talks. Al Hudaydah is the al Houthi-Saleh faction’s only port. The UN effort, mediated by China, is intended to prevent a Saudi-led coalition offensive to seize al Hudaydah, which will have dire humanitarian consequences. The al Houthi-Saleh faction is unlikely to support the transfer of the port through the UN, which it sees as biased toward Saudi Arabia.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda leadership frames local conflicts as part of a global jihad. Al Qaeda senior leader Sami al Oraidi emphasized the importance of Osama bin Laden’s call for jihad in the Arabian Peninsula as part of a general mobilization against Western forces, especially Americans. Oraidi’s statement follows al Qaeda’s dissemination of coordinated guidance to its affiliates.
2. Egypt is brokering a deal to end the Libyan civil war that will preserve conditions favorable to Salafi-jihadi recruitment. Egyptian and Emirati support has given Khalifa Haftar, an anti-Islamist militia commander, the upper hand in the conflict. Talks between Egyptian officials and civilian leaders from Misrata city, a key Haftar opponent, signal the increasing likelihood of a deal that will secure Haftar’s power. The rise of Haftar pressures Libya’s Islamists to cooperate with Salafi-jihadi groups, including al Qaeda associates, rather than marginalize them.
3. Al Qaeda associate Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa al Muslimeen (JNIM) is using hostages to secure its negotiating position and counter the newly established G5 Sahel multinational taskforce. JNIM released a proof-of-life video for six hostages on the same day that French President Emmanuel Macron announced the G5 Sahel force alongside West African heads of state. JNIM is reportedly negotiating with the Malian government, raising tensions between Mali and France. JNIM has escalated an insurgency against French, Malian, and UN forces in northern Mali since its formation in March 2017. JNIM is also responsible for an attack on a resort near Bamako in late June.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration is weighing increased involvement in Libya that may tip the scale further in favor of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the dominant militia force in eastern Libya. The administration might be considering a diplomatic presence of an intelligence coordination center in Benghazi. The reported policy discussion emerged after Haftar declared victory in Benghazi on July 5, ending a three-year effort to clear the city of Islamist militias and Salafi-jihadi groups. Haftar, backed by Egypt and the UAE, seeks to parlay his growing power into a leading role in a national political settlement. The U.S. must tread carefully when engaging with Haftar, whose quest to stabilize eastern Libya and eradicate political Islam has harmed democratic institutions and played in to extremist narratives.
2. Al Shabaab escalated attacks in northeastern Kenya in an attempt to turn Kenyan voters against the military intervention in Somalia before general elections in August. Militants beheaded nine civilians in Lamu County on the northern Kenyan coast July 9, four days after nearly 200 al Shabaab militants clashed with police forces in the same region. Kenyan warplanes conducted strikes targeting al Shabaab strongholds in the Boni Forest along the Somali border in response to the attacks.
3. The fracturing of the Yemeni state undermines U.S. policy in Yemen, which relies on the internationally recognized government led by President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. Hadi’s already weak administration is losing control of southern Yemen. The Transitional Political Council of the South, a rival body that seeks to form an independent governing entity for southern Yemen, announced the formation of a governmental structure on July 9.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. A Libyan militia freed Saif al Islam al Qaddafi, the favored son of deceased Libyan dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, on June 9. Saif al Islam’s release coincides with increasingly visible activity by Qaddafi-era figures, as well as strategic advances by the Libyan National Army led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. These conditions threaten many Libyan stakeholders, especially political Islamists, who fear that Haftar will bring about the return of the regime. This fear strengthens hardline militias and Salafi-jihadi groups, particularly al Qaeda and its associates.
2. The current U.S. counterterrorism strategy in Somalia is unlikely to address the long-term threat posed by al Shabaab. U.S. Africa Command conducted an airstrike on an al Shabaab site in southern Somalia in response to attacks on Somali and African Union peacekeeping troops, which began an operation to degrade al Shabaab’s strongholds in southern Somalia this week. Al Shabaab displayed strength on multiple fronts, however. The group resurged in northern Somalia, where it seized a town, and continued campaigns to counter the Kenyan intervention in Somalia and degrade security in Mogadishu.
3. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri characterized the Muslim world as fighting a single war on many fronts. He called for the unity of the umma, or Muslim community, against external foes, reiterating a theme emphasized by al Qaeda clerics and leadership. Zawahiri’s statement reflects al Qaeda’s efforts to influence Salafi-jihadi groups in Syria, Yemen, and other conflict zones throughout the Muslim-majority world.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) operates cells in Libya that may support external attack networks in Europe. The U.S. conducted airstrikes on ISIS training camps southwest of Sirte city on January 19 that targeted operatives planning attacks in Europe. These operatives may be connected to the ISIS-linked militant who attacked a Christmas market in Berlin on December 19, 2016. The U.S. strikes disrupted ISIS’s efforts to re-establish combat capabilities after the loss of its former stronghold in Sirte in late 2016. Airstrikes alone cannot defeat ISIS in Libya, however. Libyan factions are focused on protecting their interests in the country’s civil war. The resulting security vacuum allows Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, to operate throughout the country. ISIS will continue to use Libya as a support zone for external operations as long as the civil war continues.
2. Al Qaeda affiliates are developing more lethal explosive attack capabilities in Mali. Al Murabitoun, an affiliate of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), conducted a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) attack on a military base in Gao city, central Mali, on January 18. The attack, which killed more than 70 people, signals a step-change in al Murabitoun’s bomb-making capabilities. AQIM is attempting to undermine UN-backed peace accords in northern Mali. The January 18 attack targeted a joint base established under the peace accords in an effort to spark conflict between rival factions. AQIM seeks to co-opt local movements that share its short-term goals, including the desire to expel Western influence from the region.
3. The Saudi-led coalition renewed efforts to seize territory from the al Houthi-Saleh faction in an effort to reset political negotiations. Hadi government forces, backed by coalition air support, seized Mokha port and attacked two al Houthi-Saleh bases in Taiz governorate on January 23 and 24. These operations aim to disrupt al Houthi-Saleh supply lines into Taiz city and pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction to accept terms that favor the Hadi government and its supporters. The coalition is prioritizing the fight against the al Houthi-Saleh faction in Taiz over operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. AQAP is seizing the opportunity to resurge in its historic safe havens.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab thwarted a Somali-led raid targeting a senior leader in Lower Shabelle region. The group’s attack on the joint U.S.-Somali forces caused the first U.S. military combat death in Somalia since 1993. U.S. Navy SEALs were conducting an advise, assist, and accompany mission. Al Shabaab issued a series of statements claiming the attack.
2. The internationally recognized Yemeni government of Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi is increasingly a figurehead government in its de facto capital, Aden. The Hadi government ceded control of key checkpoints to Southern Movement factions in negotiations. President Hadi had replaced Aden governor and Southern Movement leader Aydarus al Zubaidi, who has close ties to the UAE, with an official based in Riyadh. The move sparked widespread protests. The growing rift within the Hadi government coalition exposes divisions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
3. A Boko Haram faction is reconstituting its leadership, which may improve the group’s operational capacity. The ISIS-recognized Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi negotiated with the Nigerian government to release 82 of the schoolgirls captured in Chibok in April 2014 in exchange for at least five senior Boko Haram militants. Boko Haram-Barnawi is most likely responsible for a recent attempt to attack American and British diplomatic posts in Nigeria in April 2017. The group could be preparing for a surge of attacks during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, which begins on May 26.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
1. U.S. administration officials have signaled that the U.S. may take a more aggressive stance against the al Houthis in Yemen to counter Iranian influence. An aggressive position against the al Houthi movement, which is not an Iranian proxy, would further isolate the al Houthis and drive them further into Iran’s orbit. U.S. intervention against the al Houthis would strengthen the Saudi-led coalition and its preferred government in Yemen, led by internationally recognized President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi. The Hadi government has struggled to gain legitimacy even in territory in southern Yemen under its control. Former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, the al Houthis’ current partner, possesses significant political capital, military capabilities, and public support.
2. Al Shabaab may be expanding terrain under its control, using the sanctuary that it retained in south-central Somalia to support operations. Predicted food shortages may make conditions more permissive for al Shabaab. Somalia is suffering from a severe drought that may cause widespread hunger on par with the 2010-2011 famine, which killed more than 250,000 people. The Somali government is ill-prepared to address a crisis of this magnitude. An insufficient aid response from the government would allow al Shabaab to position itself as a legitimate source of relief and governance. External factors, including the likely expulsion of Somali refugees from Kenya before Kenyan general elections, may exacerbate the crisis in Somalia.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) may be facilitating the growth of a Salafi-jihadi insurgency within the Fulani ethnic group across borders in the Sahel region. The Macina Liberation Front (MLF), an ethnically Fulani AQIM-associated group, is challenging the state in central Mali by forcing secular schools to remain closed in Mopti region. Ansar al Islam, a related Salafi-jihadi Fulani group, is pursuing a similar campaign in Burkina Faso. A Fulani insurgency is also challenging the Nigerian state, though Salafi-jihadi organizations have not yet infiltrated this movement. AQIM and other Salafi-jihadi groups may use ties into the Fulani community to expand their area of operations in the Sahel. AQIM has tapped into Tuareg networks to advance its objectives in West Africa in the past.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda celebrated key members of the September 11 attacks to commemorate the sixteenth anniversary of the attacks. Al Qaeda’s al Sahab media wing released the video will of one of the attackers, the first in five years. Al Sahab also released a letter from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the architect of the September 11 attacks, addressed to President Barack Obama in 2015 claiming the attacks were a defensive measure. These propaganda pieces are part of al Qaeda’s effort to reinforce its role as a leader of the Salafi-jihadi movement. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s landmark report: “America’s Real Enemy: The Salafi-Jihadi Movement.”]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh remains strained. Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) party criticized the al Houthi movement’s attempt to replace Saleh loyalists within the al Houthi-Saleh unity government with al Houthi movement supporters. The al Houthi-Saleh bloc will not fracture while the Saudi-led coalition remains a threat to both groups, though Saleh actively seeks to negotiate terms for a settlement. [Sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Situation Reports.]
3. Kenyan presidential candidates are threatening to escalate civil unrest in the country ahead of the October presidential election. President Uhuru Kenyatta threatened to impeach opposition leader Raila Odinga should Odinga win the presidency after Odinga’s party boycotted the first session of parliament. The current political battle is reminiscent of the 2007 election, which escalated to widespread political unrest. Al Shabaab is conducting an attack campaign against Kenyan forces to sway the election in favor of Odinga, who advocates withdrawing from the counter-al Shabaab mission in Somalia. [Read CTP’s US Counterterrorism Objectives in Somalia: Is Mission Failure Likely?]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri called for jihadists to prioritize the fight against the United States and its allies and rejected the ideology of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in a 14-minute audio message released on January 5. He reiterated major themes from al Qaeda’s strategic doctrine, including the group’s position as a defender of oppressed Muslim populations. Zawahiri’s address continues a series of statements intended to rebut ISIS and reinforce al Qaeda’s role as the vanguard of the global Salafi-jihadi movement.
2. The Saudi-led coalition is supporting an offensive intended to capture key sites in Yemen’s Taiz governorate and increase military pressure on al Houthi-Saleh forces. Internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government launched “Operation Golden Spear” on January 7 in an effort to drive al Houthi-Saleh forces away from the strategic Bab al Mandeb Strait. The coalition-backed forces likely intend to pressure the al Houthi-Saleh faction militarily in an effort to expedite a politically negotiated settlement. They also seek to secure the Bab al Mandab Strait by removing the al Houthi-Saleh presence from southwestern Yemen. A cessation of hostilities is unlikely to hold while local conflicts remain unresolved, however.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups, including ISIS and al Qaeda, are taking advantage of heightened civil conflict in Libya to reset conditions and prepare for attacks. Libyan actors, including U.S. partners, are dedicating limited security resources to political objectives at the expense of counterterrorism operations. ISIS and al Qaeda-linked militants broke out of besieged neighborhoods in Benghazi, raising the risk of attacks on military targets and oil infrastructure throughout Libya. ISIS militants are also gathering in western Libya, where the group is preparing for future operations to disrupt the Libyan state. Al Qaeda-linked militants have also signaled preparations for attacks in the near term.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Trump administration granted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) the authority to conduct offensive airstrikes against al Shabaab, al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, in order to increase pressure on the group. AFRICOM commander General Waldhauser testified that support for the Somali Federal Government (SFG) as it addresses the spreading famine is critical. Al Shabaab, which kidnapped four World Health Organization aid workers on April 3, is already taking steps to control the delivery of aid to areas outside of SFG control.
2. The U.S. and its partners in Yemen may miss an opportunity to gain allies against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern Yemen. Pentagon spokesman Navy Capt. Jeff Davis reported the U.S. has conducted over 70 airstrikes against AQAP in Yemen this year, more than any other year in total. The pace of strikes and potential for collateral damage drove local leaders in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen to meet. The local leaders denounced support for terrorism of any kind, but also condemned civilian casualties and infrastructure.
3. The growing power of Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar, who leads the force that controls much of eastern Libya, will lead to increased conflict. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) is making concessions to bring Haftar into a political deal that would allow him to control Libya’s military. LNA forces are making a play for control of key oil and military sites in central and southwestern Libya. Haftar’s advance will spark backlash from his opponents throughout western Libya, however, and Haftar lacks the military power to win the resultant war.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Libyan National Army (LNA) commander Khalifa Haftar is using military force to secure his power at the expense of political resolution in Libya. Pro-Haftar forces stormed the headquarters of a constitutional drafting body in eastern Libya on July 20 and demanded the abandonment of a draft constitution that barred Haftar from running for president in 2018. Haftar’s rise as a strongman may stabilize Libya in the near term, but it will exacerbate the grievances that drive the civil war and galvanize support for Salafi-jihadi groups like al Qaeda and ISIS.
2. The U.S. is attempting to divide the al Houthi-Saleh bloc in order to reduce Iranian influence in Yemen and revive the UN peace process. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Matthew Tueller began the diplomatic effort by praising former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s cooperation with a UN plan and criticizing the al Houthi faction for impeding negotiations. Elite-level diplomatic engagement is unlikely to progress, however, as long as the military situation on the ground remains stalemated.
3. Political violence is surging in Kenya before general elections on August 8. Recent incidents include the murder of a senior election official and an attack on the home of the Deputy President, as well as accusations of election rigging. Civil unrest in Kenya will strain Kenyan security forces and provide opportunities for al Shabaab to expand in eastern Kenya and southern Somalia, where Kenyan forces play a major role.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Three al Qaeda affiliates—Jabhat al Nusra, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), issued a joint eulogy for Afghan Taliban emir Mullah Akhtar Mansour on May 29. A U.S. airstrike killed Mullah Mansour in Balochistan, Pakistan, on May 21. Al Qaeda affiliates al Shabaab and al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) were not signatories to this joint statement nor to the August 2015 joint eulogy for the late Taliban emir Mullah Omar. AEI’s Critical Threats Project assesses that this is likely because of the weak relationship between Jabhat al Nusra and al Shabaab and AQIS.
2. Islamist militants, likely ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan, planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in at least two mosques in Aden before Friday prayers on May 27. Yemeni security forces found and cleared the bombs. ISIS has carried out mosque attacks in Yemen before, notably in Sana’a, but has generally restricted its targets in Aden to government, military, and security targets. The targeting of mosques, if confirmed, would indicate a new campaign for ISIS in Aden, designed to exacerbate tensions between northern and southern Yemenis and possibly spark sectarian divisions in the city. [See a recent post on AQAP’s loss of al Mukalla and sign up to receive CTP’s Yemen Crisis Situation Reports by email.]
3. ISIS is consolidating its forces in Sirte as Libyan armed groups advance into its control zone from the east and west. These offensives will likely stop before they reach ISIS’s stronghold, however. ISIS will conduct explosive attack campaigns in an effort to slow or halt the offensives. Competition between rival Libyan militias will also compromise counter-ISIS operations as they converge on Sirte. [See CTP’s backgrounder on forces in Libya and a forecast of ISIS’s courses of actions in Libya.]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is preparing to begin a new attack campaign in Libya to disrupt security and set conditions to regain territorial control. U.S.-backed forces announced victory over ISIS in Sirte, the group’s former Libyan stronghold, in December 2016. The loss of Sirte was not sufficient to defeat ISIS in Libya, however. ISIS militants are now regrouping at training camps in western Libya and have begun to establish supply lines for future operations. The Libyan forces that recaptured Sirte are resuming hostilities in Libya’s civil war. They will prioritize protecting their core political interests over continuing the counter-ISIS fight. The resumption of Libya’s civil war will set conditions for ISIS to resurge, preserving Libya as a key regional hub and bolstering ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
2. The delay of Somalia’s electoral process may detract from efforts to counter al Shabaab. Repeated postponements, corruption, violence, and at least one constitutional breach risk causing a political crisis in Somalia’s young federal government. Al Shabaab has sought to further compromise the elections by kidnapping and assassinating delegates. A political crisis in Somalia could undermine ongoing counterterrorism efforts against al Shabaab, including U.S. support for Somali special forces and Somali cooperation with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) coalition.
3. An al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate may be preparing to resume an attack campaign in Tunisia’s coastal population centers. High-profile attacks by either al Qaeda or ISIS would hinder Tunisia’s economic recovery and could destabilize a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Tunisian security forces arrested AQIM-affiliated Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade militants who were reportedly planning an attack in Sousse governorate, eastern Tunisia, on December 29. Salafi-jihadi groups operating in Tunisia, including the Uqba Ibn Nafa’a Brigade, may attempt to exploit the return of thousands of Tunisian foreign fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Libya, which will tax Tunisia’s security resources. AQIM media outlets emphasized Uqba Ibn Nafa’a’s continued presence in Tunisia in late 2016, possibly indicating renewed operational support for an affiliate that has suffered from leadership attrition and inadequate resources.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The al Houthi movement’s reaction to a recent Iranian statement indicates that the group seeks to maintain its autonomy from Iran. The head of Iran’s Armed Forces General Staff Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Major General Mohammad Bagheri said that Iran would seek naval bases in Yemen and Syria in the future. An al Houthi official responded directly stating that Yemen’s land and sea would not be forfeit to foreign powers. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh, currently allied with the al Houthis, offered Russia access to Yemeni military bases in August 2016 to cooperate in combating terrorism.
2. Russia may directly support Libyan factions in counterterrorism operations in order to expand its influence in North Africa and on the Mediterranean Sea. Libyan Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar, who commands the Libyan National Army, met with Russian defense and military officials in Moscow to discuss Russian land, sea, and air support for his operations. The Libyan National Army is not subordinate to the UN-backed Government of National Accord. The UN’s arms embargo remains in place for Libya.
3. French and U.S. officials have expressed moderate confidence that a November 14 French airstrike killed senior al Qaeda leader in the Sahara Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The airstrike occurred in southwest Libya and officials are still seeking to confirm his death. Belmokhtar’s removal from the battlespace would have a significant, though probably temporary, impact on the al Qaeda network in the Sahel and the Maghreb. He had been an emir in al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb before breaking off and founding what would come to be known as al Murabitoun, the al Qaeda group behind major attacks in West Africa. Belmokhtar was a core al Qaeda leader operating in the region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Clashes over oil may define the next stage of Libya’s civil war, giving the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) the opportunity to resurge after the loss of its stronghold in Sirte. A militia coalition that opposes the Libyan National Army (LNA) attempted to seize key oil terminals from the LNA on December 7. The Minister of Defense of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) participated in the anti-LNA coalition, indicating that GNA leadership is fracturing over military objectives. Civil conflict over control of Libya’s hydrocarbon resources will allow ISIS to solidify new safe havens in Libya’s interior. ISIS will likely resume an attack campaign against state and civilian targets in Libya and neighboring states. [See CTP’s laydown of forces in Libya for background.]
2. ISIS may be resuming an explosive attack campaign intended to deter Yemenis from joining local security forces. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a suicide vest attack on security forces at Sawlaban military base near Aden city on December 10. The attack, which targeted soldiers gathered to collect their salaries, killed 50 troops and wounded 70 others. ISIS last conducted a high-casualty explosive attack in Aden in August 2016. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) supports ISIS’s efforts to degrade security forces in Aden. [Read the latest in-depth Yemen Crisis Situation Report.]
3. Boko Haram’s competing factions are pursuing independent strategies that pose serious threats to the Nigerian state. The faction led by Abu Bakr Shekau is conducting a campaign of mass-casualty explosive attacks on civilian targets. The group used two teams of suicide bombers, all school-aged girls, to attack markets in Madagali town, Adamawa State, Nigeria on December 9 and in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria on December 11. These attacks counter the Nigerian government’s claim that Boko Haram is close to defeat. The Boko Haram faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, may be conducting a campaign to degrade Nigeria’s military leadership. Militants conducted an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on a military convoy on December 13 that killed the fourth Nigerian lieutenant colonel in two months.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, military capabilities, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) increased the tempo of high-casualty explosive attacks targeting security forces in Aden, Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan suicide bombers attacked security personnel gathering to receive salaries at al Sawlaban base in Aden city on December 10 and December 18, killing more than 50 people each time. The uptick in spectacular attacks advances ISIS’s objective to elevate its global standing and may deter recruits from joining Aden’s security forces. The attacks may hamper ISIS’s ability to compete with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, however. AQAP condemned ISIS’s December 10 attack in an effort to reinforce its relationships with southern Yemeni tribes and position itself as moderate compared to ISIS.
2. Libya’s most powerful military factions may be pursuing a negotiated settlement, but renewed conflict remains possible. Political leaders have signaled a willingness to modify the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), which entered its second year on December 17, in an effort to bring key powerbrokers to the negotiating table. Libyan National Army Commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar attended high-level talks in Algeria, while Haftar’s rivals from the western Libya city of Misrata worked to de-escalate tensions over oil and control of Tripoli. Tensions remain high, however, as rival forces vie for control of the central Libyan coast after the official end of the counter-ISIS campaign in Sirte. Controversial issues, including the security of Libya’s capital and Field Marshal Haftar’s role in a future Libyan government, remain unresolved.
3. A Boko Haram faction affiliated with ISIS may control territory in northeastern Nigeria. The faction led by Abu Musab al Barnawi, the recognized leader of ISIS’s affiliate in West Africa, published a photoset showing members of the organization’s religious police enforcing shari’a law in a village on the shores of Lake Chad. The enforcement of shari’a law may indicate that the group controls a town, signaling growing strength. The group may also be conducting information operations designed to support its military efforts. Publicizing the control of terrain supports ISIS’s narrative of global expansion.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Peace negotiations are unlikely to advance in Yemen despite an agreement on a roadmap for talks. Combatants did not allow the delivery of humanitarian aid during a 48-hour cessation of hostilities that ended on November 21. Significant roadblocks that will impede the peace process include the selection of consensus leadership for a transitional government, disarmament, and control of terrain, including the capital city, Sana’a. Forces aligned with internationally recognized Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government are attempting to advance in northern Yemen and contest al Houthi-Saleh control of terrain in Taiz city and near the Bab al Mandeb Strait. The al Houthi-Saleh faction has continued to target Saudi-led coalition positions in central Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia. Local conflicts will likely continue even if national-level actors begin to make progress toward a negotiated settlement.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may be prepared to use its safe havens in central and southern Libya to conduct asymmetrical attacks against U.S.-backed forces as they prepare to seize the final neighborhood of ISIS’s former stronghold in Sirte. ISIS militants operating as “desert brigades” south of Sirte have demonstrated the capability to ambush Libyan military positions, disrupt supply lines with explosive attacks, and establish checkpoints on key roads. ISIS is recruiting foreign fighters into southern Libya and is likely relying on the same safe havens used by al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). ISIS may disrupt efforts to secure Sirte city and return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes.
3. Salafi-jihadi groups are delegitimizing municipal elections in Mali and may threaten a fragile peace accord in the country’s north. AQIM affiliate Ansar al Din is likely responsible for coordinated attacks on municipal elections, including the targeting of convoys carrying ballot boxes and the kidnapping of an electoral candidates in northern and central Mali. Unknown groups also attacked polling stations and burned election materials in multiple locations. A former separatist group based in northern Mali, where Ansar al Din and other Salafi-jihadi groups are active, refused to recognize the outcome of local elections due to the absence of promised UN intermediaries. Disputed elections may damage the fragile peace accord in northern Mali, raising the risk of a renewed secessionist movement that Salafi-jihadi actors could co-opt.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) continued its controlled withdrawal of personnel and leadership from Sirte, on Libya’s central coastline. The tactical withdrawal is intended to preserve ISIS in Libya’s capabilities and will enable the group to relocate for continued operations in the Maghreb region. It is unlikely that the Libyan armed factions involved in the counter-ISIS fight will prioritize the pursuit of ISIS over their own objectives.
2. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted Somali government sites in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab launched a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that Somali security forces intercepted and cleared on July 14. The assessed target was a gathering of Somali politicians at the Makka al Mukarama Hotel. Somali security forces seized a second VBIED outside of Mogadishu on July 13.
3. CENTCOM Commander General Joseph Votel indicated that the U.S. military may expand its counter-terrorism presence in Yemen to combat al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) on July 15. AQAP has strengthened over the course of the Yemeni civil war, and a recent Emirati-led operation to roll back its territorial gains will not weaken the group for the long term. AQAP claimed three VBIED attacks in Aden and al Mukalla port cities, targeting Yemeni security forces.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) may exploit rising instability in Morocco to conduct more frequent attacks in Europe and North Africa. Moroccan security forces, which have prevented ISIS attacks in the country, are struggling to manage a growing protest movement. This civil unrest, paired with the shifting of migrant flows from Libya toward Morocco, will strain the country’s security resources and reduce pressure on ISIS networks there. Instability in Morocco also increases the risk of attacks in Europe, where Moroccan militants participated in recent ISIS attacks in Spain and a suspected ISIS-linked stabbing in Finland. [Read a recent warning on the implications of instability in Morocco.]
2. The partnership between the al Houthi movement and former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh is fracturing. Senior al Houthi leaders accused Saleh of conducting treasonous negotiations with the Gulf States. Saleh denied the accusations and blamed the al Houthis for governance failures in Sana’a. Tensions within the al Houthi-Saleh bloc provide an opportunity for the U.S. to advance a political settlement to the Yemeni conflict. The al Houthi movement lacks the capability to continue the civil war without Saleh’s forces. An elite-brokered peace deal that does not address the grievances driving the war will not end Yemen’s instability, however. [Read Katherine Zimmerman’s recommendations for U.S. engagement in Yemen.]
3. U.S. President Donald Trump criticized Pakistan for harboring terrorist groups during a speech announcing a new U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan on August 21. A Pakistani army spokesman dismissed the criticism and stated that Pakistan has taken action against militant groups in its terrain. Pakistan will likely intensify counter-militancy operations near the Afghan border to safeguard its relationship with the U.S. Pakistan may also increase support for militant groups in the disputed Kashmir territory to counteract U.S. engagement with India. [Read Frederick W. Kagan’s “Trump outlines the foundation of a changed approach in Afghanistan.”]
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Prominent Iranian Reformists’ mobilization of votes for more centrist candidates in the Assembly of Experts and parliamentary elections on February 26 could help centrist politicians win the additional seats they need in both bodies to sideline their hardliner opponents. Many reformist candidates had sought to run in both elections until the Guardian Council, or the body charged with vetting electoral candidates, disproportionally disqualified them.
2. U.S. airstrikes targeted an Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) training camp near Sabratha in northwestern Libya. The strikes killed over 40 militants, including a Tunisian ISIS operative linked to the March 2015 Bardo Museum attack in Tunis. Targeted strikes may temporarily disrupt ISIS’s ability to plan and launch spectacular attacks in the region, but the group maintains an experienced leadership cell in Libya and will be able to regenerate capabilities.
3. Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi appointed General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar as deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces. Ali Mohsen, the former commander of Yemen’s powerful First Armored Division, is a powerbroker whose support of Hadi requires contesting the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen. Ali Mohsen’s appointment probably indicates the coalition will prioritize actions to further isolate the al Houthi-Saleh alliance in northern Yemen and to apply pressure directly on the capital, Sana’a.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The operational tempo of U.S.-backed Somali special operations forces (SOF) raids against al Shabaab spiked as the Somali SOF conducted a series of raids in central Somalia. The American military’s role in the recent raids has been limited to an advise-and-assist capacity, as well as possibly providing air assault capabilities. The raids have targeted al Shabaab military positions and a high-level leadership meeting. The U.S. has been training Somali SOF forces to build a counterterrorism capability within the Somali security forces. These elite units have countered al Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu and are increasingly deploying into central Somalia for raids targeting al Shabaab leadership and key ground positions.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) are attempting to degrade the Yemeni security forces and government in southeastern Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt launched an explosive attack campaign in al Mukalla, Hadramawt that resembles the ongoing ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan campaign in Aden city. ISIS Wilayat Hadramawt conducted at least two suicide attacks on military and security targets in al Mukalla between May 12 and May 15, with reports that security forces found and cleared additional explosives-laden vehicles. AQAP preserved its military strength by withdrawing from populated centers, but is resuming its campaign of assassinations, targeting high-ranking military commanders and government officials.
3. The U.S. and international partners agreed to consider arming and training forces for Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) to fight ISIS. Libyan armed factions, including the GNA, will continue to prioritize securing their own objectives over the counter-ISIS fight. The GNA is also far from uniting Libya’s divided armed factions, and competition for international support will likely exacerbate tensions between armed groups. The rush to secure counterterrorism partners in Libya also gives anti-Western actors, including Russia, the opportunity to back factions that could ultimately undermine the GNA and subvert American and European interests in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. There is an inflection in Iranian support for the al Houthis in Yemen. The U.S. Navy interdicted a dhow carrying AK-47s, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and .50 caliber machine guns in the Arabian Sea on March 28. French and Australian vessels seized similar shipments on March 20 and February 27, respectively. Increased Iranian involvement in Yemen may exacerbate regional tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It may also threaten ongoing direct talks between the al Houthis and Saudi Arabia, as well as the UN-brokered talks set to begin in Kuwait on April 18.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed al Shabaab senior leader and military planner Hassan Ali Dhore in southern Somalia. Dhore was a member of al Qaeda and al Shabaab’s Amniyat brigade, which conducts the group’s security, intelligence, and assassination operations. Dhore planned the December 25, 2014, attack on Mogadishu International Airport and the March 27, 2015, attack on Mogadishu’s Makka al Mukarrama Hotel, which killed U.S. citizens. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook stated that Dhore was planning attacks on U.S. citizens in Mogadishu.
3. The UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) entered Tripoli and now controls the capital with support from international backers and some western Libyan militias. Members of the revolutionary Islamist government fled Tripoli, but the GNA still faces opposition from armed militias in the Libyan capital and its environs. The GNA lacks support from both the Libyan House of Representatives and any major political or military powerbrokers in eastern Libya. ISIS is likely resuming a campaign of attacks on Libya’s oil infrastructure that may inhibit the GNA’s ability to take control of this resource and deter armed groups from pledging support to the GNA. The international community is treating the GNA’s move to Tripoli as a major victory, but a significant number of actors remain capable of derailing the unity government.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Tensions are escalating between the UN-backed Libyan government and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), increasing the likelihood of resumed conflict. The HoR declared a state of emergency and created a military zone from Tobruk in southeastern Libya to Ben Jawad, east of Sirte on the northern Libyan coastline. HoR-aligned Libyan National Army forces also attacked a position held by the Libyan government-aligned Petroleum Facilities Guard, whose leader swore retaliation.
2. The Pentagon confirmed the extension of a U.S. special forces counterterrorism mission in Yemen to provide support to Emirati forces against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). The small team, about a dozen Special Operations advisers, deployed in April for a short-term operation. A second Special Operations team had recently been deployed to assess the security situation in Yemen and determine whether there were local powerbrokers with whom the U.S. might partner in the future. The Pentagon announced it had conducted three airstrikes in Yemen from June 8 to June 12 targeting AQAP.
3. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) released a statement asserting that though IMU leadership had pledged to ISIS, a significant faction remained loyal to al Qaeda. The announcement was issued in English- and Arabic-language statements that were released on Twitter and Telegram. The statements revealed that the IMU had split when its leader had pledged to ISIS.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Jamatul Ahrar, a splinter group of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, conducted a suicide bombing targeting Pakistani Christians at a park in Lahore, Pakistan, on Easter Sunday. The attack killed at least 72 people and wounded more than 300 others. Jamatul Ahrar has expressed leanings in support of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), but has not formally affiliated with the group. It has targeted Christians before and will likely continue to attack non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan.
2. The imposition of the UN-backed Libyan unity government, the Government of National Accord (GNA) is widening the divisions between Libya’s factions and hindering both local and international counter-ISIS efforts. Militias aligned with Libya’s self-declared Islamist government in Tripoli prevented the GNA from moving to the capital from its exile in Tunis. Anti-GNA militias suspended flights at Tripoli’s Mitiga airport and fired anti-aircraft munitions in the area as clashes between anti- and pro-GNA groups raged in the city. Armed groups from nearby Misrata pledged support to the GNA, further fracturing the tenuous Tripolitan-Misratan alliance that is instrumental for blocking ISIS’s westward expansion from Sirte. The unity government still lacks support from the internationally recognized parliament and powerful military factions in eastern Libya.
3. The U.S. and the Saudi-led coalition intensified their air campaigns against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Hadramawt, Lahij, and Abyan in Yemen. U.S. airstrikes on March 22 targeted a training camp. Breaking reports indicate AQAP leader Qasim al Raymi, previously the group’s military commander, may have been killed in the airstrike. The air campaigns may limit AQAP’s ability to consolidate new gains, but they are unlikely to expel AQAP from its strongholds. AQAP is exploiting the civil war in Yemen to expand. Planned UN-sponsored talks between the al Houthi-Saleh government and Yemeni President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s government may be more productive than a previous round of talks based on recent direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials. These national-level talks are unlikely to stabilize Yemen, however.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Murabitoun confirmed their rumored re-unification, citing their combined November 20 attack on the Radisson Blu hotel in Bamako, Mali as proof. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the leader of al Murabitoun, split from AQIM in December 2012. This reconciliation of al Qaeda affiliates, which likely stems from their desire to counter ISIS’s influence in the region, increases the security threat to northern Mali as the groups integrate their resources, personal networks, and lines of communication.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) assassinated its first high-profile target in Yemen. ISIS Wilayat Aden-Abyan claimed responsibility for a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack that killed the Governor of Aden and threatened to launch additional attacks on Yemeni government officials. ISIS will likely attempt to leverage this spectacular attack to drive recruitment in the region, possibly in competition with AQAP elements regenerating in neighboring Abyan governorate. ISIS's growing strength in Aden will threaten the Saudi-led coalition's efforts to secure the city and restore President Hadi's government there.
3. The International Atomic Energy Agency is likely to close its investigation into the possible military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program following the release of its report on December 2. The report assesses that while Iran made a “coordinated effort” to develop a “nuclear explosive device” before the end of 2003, there are no “credible indications of activities in Iran relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device after 2009.” Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi claimed that the report proves “the peaceful nature” of Iran’s nuclear program and called upon the P5+1 to close Iran’s PMD file at the IAEA Board of Governors in December.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. It is currently posting analysis of the Iran elections and how to understand the outcome.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1.The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) is maintaining a cell near Sabratha, Libya to conduct attacks in Tunisia. Militants, likely from this cell, crossed the Tunisian-Libyan border and attacked security targets in Ben Guerdane, Tunisia on March 7, signaling the first significant ground assault by ISIS in Tunisia if the militants’ affiliation is confirmed. This cell, which is linked to last year’s attacks in Bardo and Sousse, will continue to generate attacks on both civilian and security targets in Tunisia.
2. Al Qaeda’s Somalia-based affiliate, al Shabaab, continues to test explosive devices targeting commercial planes. Militants attempted to move multiple explosive devices onto a plane leaving Beledweyne Airport in Hiraan region on March 7, but one of the devices exploded prematurely and the others were found and cleared by security forces. The first attempt by al Shabaab occurred on February 3, when an al Shabaab suicide bomber detonated an explosive device on a Daallo Airlines flight leaving Mogadishu. Separately, a Pentagon official confirmed that U.S. airstrikes targeted al Shabaab fighters at a camp who “posed an imminent threat” to U.S. and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) personnel in Somalia.
3. The start of direct talks between al Houthi representatives and Saudi officials is a significant inflection for the ongoing negotiations to end Yemen’s current crisis. The ground fight is effectively stalemated with trends developing in support of the Saudi-led coalition. Recent outreach by General Ali Mohsen al Ahmar, a former ally of Ali Abdullah Saleh now serving as the deputy commander of Yemen’s Armed Forces, among northern tribes may have had success, which would influence the al Houthis’ negotiating positions. It is unlikely, however, that any solution from these talks will restore stability and security to Yemen because none of the primary negotiators control key factions operating on the ground.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country.
3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Iran continues to provide sanctuary to senior al Qaeda operatives. The U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on three senior al Qaeda members operating from Iran, describing one of the operatives, al Qaeda military committee chief Faisal Jassim Mohammed al Amri al Khalidi, as “part of a new generation of al Qaeda operatives,” in the press release. Yisra Muhammad Ibrahim Bayumi served as a mediator between al Qaeda and Iranian authorities, and Abu Bakr Muhammad Muhammad Ghumayn held financial, communications, and logistical roles in the group. Iran has facilitated al Qaeda activities in the Middle East since 2005 and al Qaeda is able to move money, facilitators, and operatives through Iran.
2. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate al Murabitoun, denounced French intervention in Libya and called for Libyan Muslims to fight against the West. The release of the written statement by al Murabitoun’s media arm strengthens CTP’s assessment that Belmokhtar survived the June 2015 U.S. airstrike targeting a meeting of Islamist leaders in Ajdabiya, Libya. France confirmed its military presence in Libya on July 20 after three French soldiers died during a counterterrorism operation in Benghazi. [See CTP’s “Backgrounder: Fighting Forces in Libya” and “GNA-Allied Forces Seize Momentum against ISIS in Sirte” for more.]
3. Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Somalia, al Shabaab, targeted the primary African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeeping base in Mogadishu on July 26. A militant detonated a suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (SVBIED) near the entrance of Halane Base Camp, killing at least 13 security contractors and civilians, before a second suicide bomber attempted to storm the compound. The assessed target was UN and African Union personnel. Al Shabaab attempted an SVBIED attack targeting a gathering of Somali politicians at a Mogadishu hotel on July 14, and Somali security forces disrupted an SVBIED attack on July 24.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. The United States intervened militarily in Somalia twice in three days, signaling a step-change in the U.S. response to the al Shabaab threat reflective of inflections in al Shabaab’s own capabilities and tactics. Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook described the March 5 U.S. airstrikes against an al Shabaab training camp as targeting a group of fighters who “posed an imminent threat to the U.S.” and peacekeeping forces in Somalia. U.S. special operations troops provided helicopter transports and acted as advisers during a Somali special operations raid on an al Shabaab camp at Awdheegle town in the Lower Shabelle region that targeted at least one high-value target.
2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is continuing a calibrated campaign to impose costs for Western presence in the region and provoke a reduction in French force posture while avoiding Western retaliation. AQIM gunmen stormed three resort hotels in Grand Bassam, Ivory Coast, killing at least 16 people. French military resources are already stretched, and it is unlikely that France will be able to devote more resources to counter AQIM’s growth. The Grand Bassam attack and the January 2016 attack in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso indicate that AQIM and its affiliates have expanded their operational zones to the south by a significant measure.
3. Coalition-backed forces broke through the western frontline in Taiz city, the first major gain in the fight for control of Yemen’s third-largest city. Taiz, the heart of Yemen’s 2011 revolution, is critical terrain in the country and its population is split between the al Houthi-Saleh faction and the coalition-backed faction. An al Houthi-Saleh defeat in Taiz would be a significant blow, but it is not clear that it would be the decisive victory needed to bring all parties to the table to negotiate a settlement to the conflict.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) withdrew from al Mukalla, the capital of Hadramawt governorate, as coalition-backed Yemeni forces advanced on the port city. AQAP had controlled al Mukalla since April 2015, using the city as a base to support operations against the al Houthi-Saleh forces in western Yemen. AQAP likely seeks to retain its military capabilities and has redeployed forces to support zones in Abyan, Ma’rib, and possibly al Bayda. The loss of al Mukalla is a setback for the group, but AQAP has resurged from similar setbacks previously.
2. The Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) claimed responsibility for an improvised explosive device (IED) attack on an African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) vehicle in a suburb of Mogadishu. This is the first ISIS-claimed attack in Somalia, though the attack was not listed in the English editions of ISIS’s al Bayan provincial news bulletin and did not kill any AMISOM troops. It is possible that an al Shabaab cell in Mogadishu defected to ISIS. CTP assesses that there is a small pro-ISIS group in northern Somalia and a possible Mogadishu-based cell.
3. ISIS Wilayat Barqa withdrew the majority of its forces from Derna in eastern Libya. This is a significant loss for ISIS, which first established its Libyan affiliate in Derna and has been fighting to reclaim the city since June 2015. ISIS may be preparing to move its military assets to southwestern Libya, where it has been establishing lines of communication in recent weeks, especially as multiple Libyan armed groups and international actors prepare to attack ISIS’s stronghold in Sirte. There is mounting evidence that ISIS is using southwestern Libya to coordinate with Boko Haram, AKA Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyah, and extend its influence in the Sahel region.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s al Houthi movement declared plans to form a new central government overseen by its “Revolutionary Committee.” The al Houthis, who receive Iranian support, announced the new government after political negotiations collapsed. Nearly all political factions in Yemen rejected the al Houthis’ plan, and the Gulf Cooperation Council called it a “coup.” The political crisis is ongoing, and regional factions appear to be taking actions to distance themselves from the central government and the al Houthis.
2. Iran asserted the regime’s missiles are non-negotiable and that it will install new centrifuges if the P5+1 nuclear negotiating team returns to its previous position. Iranian officials continue to push for sanctions relief as a non-negotiable condition for a nuclear deal.
3. There appears to be increasing cooperation between Pakistani and Afghan forces in the fight against the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The head of the TTP’s Jamatul Ahrar splinter group, Omar Khalid Khorasani, was severely injured in fighting with Afghan security forces in Nangarhar province.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Shabaab is very likely behind the suicide bomb attack on a Daallo Airlines flight in Mogadishu. The attack signals a major inflection in the group’s capabilities and intent, and al Shabaab will probably attempt a similar attack in the near future. The group is also strengthening on the ground, capitalizing on the redeployment of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops after the January 15 el Adde attack.
2. A U.S. airstrike killed a top al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander in Abyan, Jalal Bal’idi al Marqishi, and sparked local clashes over his succession. However, AQAP has already demonstrated the ability to recover from leadership attrition, and the group seized two key towns in the days after the strike. AQAP continues to consolidate control of the populated areas along the main road from Aden, through Abyan and Shabwah, and to its stronghold in al Mukalla, Hadramawt.
3. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Sahara Emirate conducted a complex attack on a UN police base housed in a hotel in Timbuktu. The group’s claim linked the attack to recent sieges on civilian targets in Ouagadougou and Bamako, indicating that AQIM intends to continue high-profile attacks on Western targets in the region, especially those that support the pending peace deal in northern Mali.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Yemen’s warring factions continued efforts to secure gains on the ground despite Yemeni officials’ announcement of a one- or two-week ceasefire in the country ahead of the next round of UN-led political negotiations. Al Houthi-Saleh forces counter-attacked in western Taiz city, which was recently seized by coalition-backed forces, and Yemeni army units loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi began an offensive in southern Ma’rib and northwestern Shabwah governorates. The al Houthis reportedly agreed to the full implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 2216, which calls for al Houthi forces to disarm and withdraw from seized territory. The timing and phasing of the al Houthi withdrawal has been a stumbling block for previous attempts at a negotiated settlement.
2. Al Shabaab’s announcement of a new fighting unit bearing the name of its late Kenyan leader, Aboud Rogo, indicates the group’s sustained prioritization of its Kenyan operations. A similar unit named for al Shabaab’s late emir, Abu Zubayr, is prosecuting a campaign of mass-casualty attacks against African Union Mission in Somalia bases in Somalia. This group was probably behind the recent attack against a Somali National Army base outside of Mogadishu that reportedly killed over 70 soldiers. It is likely that the new unit will pursue a similar campaign in Kenya.
3. The al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) attack against the In Salah gas plant in central Algeria was probably part of AQIM’s effort to compete with the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in the Maghreb region. AQIM described the March 18 rocket attack as a message for the Algerian regime and to Western companies. AQIM likened the attack to the January 2013 In Amenas hostage crisis, but the more recent attack appeared to be less sophisticated and may not have been planned by veteran al Qaeda operative Mokhtar Belmokhtar. AQIM has increased its media production and is directly countering ISIS’s message in the region as ISIS expands in Libya.
CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of the al Qaeda network. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely.
Below are the top three takeaways from the week:
1. Al Qaeda issued a call for Muslims to mobilize to fight in
al Sham. Al Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri urged Muslims to fight in Syria and for the factions in Syria to unify. Zawahiri described the Syrian uprising as the only one from the Arab Spring to have continued along the right path. He sought for Muslims to defend the gains made in Syria against other actors like Russia, Iran, and the West, and stated the objective of a governing entity establishing itself in the territory. Hamza bin Laden, Osama bin Laden’s son, echoed the call for mobilization. He also called on Muslims to unify in Iraq and Syria and for those who cannot travel to conduct lone-wolf attacks.
2. A pro-Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) cell attempted to weaponize anthrax and plan a mass-casualty attack similar to the 2013 Westgate Mall attack, according to Kenyan and Ugandan authorities. The cell’s ringleader may have communicated with ISIS militants in Libya and Syria, indicating an expansion of ISIS’s influence in East Africa. Governments seeking counterterrorism funding may also exaggerate ISIS’s presence, however.
3. ISIS resumed a territorial growth strategy in Libya after planned offensives on its stronghold in Sirte stalled. ISIS militants seized strategically located towns from Misratan militias to the west of Sirte as part of efforts to expand its contiguous zone of control in central Libya. ISIS is also bolstered by the support of tribal leaders and elders, representing factions of a large tribal federation that has suffered since the fall of Qaddafi. These tribal leaders are aligning with ISIS against opponents in both the Libyan National Army bloc in the east and the Misratan bloc in the west in order to protect their political and economic interests.
Similar to 2017 03-21 ctp update and assessment (17)
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
CTP's Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network and its affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel.
Understanding the Challenges of Street ChildrenSERUDS INDIA
By raising awareness, providing support, advocating for change, and offering assistance to children in need, individuals can play a crucial role in improving the lives of street children and helping them realize their full potential
Donate Us
https://serudsindia.org/how-individuals-can-support-street-children-in-india/
#donatefororphan, #donateforhomelesschildren, #childeducation, #ngochildeducation, #donateforeducation, #donationforchildeducation, #sponsorforpoorchild, #sponsororphanage #sponsororphanchild, #donation, #education, #charity, #educationforchild, #seruds, #kurnool, #joyhome
Russian anarchist and anti-war movement in the third year of full-scale warAntti Rautiainen
Anarchist group ANA Regensburg hosted my online-presentation on 16th of May 2024, in which I discussed tactics of anti-war activism in Russia, and reasons why the anti-war movement has not been able to make an impact to change the course of events yet. Cases of anarchists repressed for anti-war activities are presented, as well as strategies of support for political prisoners, and modest successes in supporting their struggles.
Thumbnail picture is by MediaZona, you may read their report on anti-war arson attacks in Russia here: https://en.zona.media/article/2022/10/13/burn-map
Links:
Autonomous Action
http://Avtonom.org
Anarchist Black Cross Moscow
http://Avtonom.org/abc
Solidarity Zone
https://t.me/solidarity_zone
Memorial
https://memopzk.org/, https://t.me/pzk_memorial
OVD-Info
https://en.ovdinfo.org/antiwar-ovd-info-guide
RosUznik
https://rosuznik.org/
Uznik Online
http://uznikonline.tilda.ws/
Russian Reader
https://therussianreader.com/
ABC Irkutsk
https://abc38.noblogs.org/
Send mail to prisoners from abroad:
http://Prisonmail.online
YouTube: https://youtu.be/c5nSOdU48O8
Spotify: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/libertarianlifecoach/episodes/Russian-anarchist-and-anti-war-movement-in-the-third-year-of-full-scale-war-e2k8ai4
This session provides a comprehensive overview of the latest updates to the Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards (commonly known as the Uniform Guidance) outlined in the 2 CFR 200.
With a focus on the 2024 revisions issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), participants will gain insight into the key changes affecting federal grant recipients. The session will delve into critical regulatory updates, providing attendees with the knowledge and tools necessary to navigate and comply with the evolving landscape of federal grant management.
Learning Objectives:
- Understand the rationale behind the 2024 updates to the Uniform Guidance outlined in 2 CFR 200, and their implications for federal grant recipients.
- Identify the key changes and revisions introduced by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in the 2024 edition of 2 CFR 200.
- Gain proficiency in applying the updated regulations to ensure compliance with federal grant requirements and avoid potential audit findings.
- Develop strategies for effectively implementing the new guidelines within the grant management processes of their respective organizations, fostering efficiency and accountability in federal grant administration.
ZGB - The Role of Generative AI in Government transformation.pdfSaeed Al Dhaheri
This keynote was presented during the the 7th edition of the UAE Hackathon 2024. It highlights the role of AI and Generative AI in addressing government transformation to achieve zero government bureaucracy
What is the point of small housing associations.pptxPaul Smith
Given the small scale of housing associations and their relative high cost per home what is the point of them and how do we justify their continued existance
A process server is a authorized person for delivering legal documents, such as summons, complaints, subpoenas, and other court papers, to peoples involved in legal proceedings.
2. 2
TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
1
2
3
1. The expected increase in U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen
prompted Iran to bolster support for the al Houthi movement.
2. The Libyan National Army’s advance into central and southern Libya will draw
opposing forces back into the ongoing contest for Libya’s resources.
3. Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance to famine-stricken
populations extends its shadow governance and builds popular support.
3. 3
| ASSESSMENTAL QAEDA
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda seeks to inspire Muslims to attack Americans by promoting its narrative that the
U.S. is intentionally killing Sunni civilians. A bulletin from al Qaeda’s al Sahab media
foundation called for such attacks during a condemnation of the March 16 U.S. airstrikes in
Aleppo, Syria, that allegedly killed dozens at a mosque.
Outlook: U.S. airstrikes will not degrade al Qaeda’s global operations in the long term.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda
associates
Pakistan reopened its border with Afghanistan to permit regular trade to flow, though the
security situation remains tense. Tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan could
compromise U.S. lines of communication through Pakistan to Afghanistan.
Outlook: Pakistani militants will return to Pakistan after the current crackdown. The TTP will
not relocate to Afghanistan.
4. 4
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
A helicopter attack on a boat of Somali refugees off of Yemen’s western coast sparked
international outrage. Somalia blamed the Saudi-led coalition for the attack.
Outlook: The Saudi blockade on al Hudaydah port will exacerbate the humanitarian crisis.
Security
Iran may be increasing its military support to the al Houthi-Saleh faction to pre-empt
increased U.S. support to the Saudi-led coalition. Iran intensified arms shipments in recent
months. It has also supported the al Houthi-Saleh ballistic missile campaign and provided
explosively formed penetrators (EFPs).
Outlook:The al Houthi-Saleh missile campaign will reinforce Saudi opposition to a ceasefire.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
AQAP warned tribes in Hadramawt in eastern Yemen against supporting the U.S. or the
UAE and conducted two attacks against security forces in the area. AQAP resumed
operations in central Yemen after the U.S. conducted dozens of airstrikes on March 2-6.
Outlook: AQAP will escalate an attack campaign in Hadramawt governorate.
GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
5. 5
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN YEMEN
1) 14 MAR: A
reported U.S.
airstrike targeted
AQAP militants in
Hadramawt.
2) 15 MAR: AQAP
militants attacked
Emirati-backed
forces in
Hadramawt.
3) 17 MAR: A Saudi-
led coalition
helicopter killed at
least 40 Somali
refugees near al
Hudaydah port.
4) 20 MAR: Saudi air
defense systems
intercepted an al
Houthi-Saleh
ballistic missile
over Jazan region.
5) 20 MAR: AQAP
attacked al Houthi-
Saleh forces in
A’arfaf area, al
Dhaleh.
3
5
4
1
2
6. 6
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Relations between the Somali Federal Government (SFG) and the Gulf states are strained
after the SFG blamed the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen for an attack on a refugee
vessel in the Red Sea. The helicopter attack killed at least 42 Somalis.
Outlook: SFG-Gulf tensions may hamper investment and economic growth in Somalia.
Security
Turkey continues to exert influence in Somalia through humanitarian, infrastructure, and
military assistance. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will visit Mogadishu in April to
oversee the opening of a $50 million Turkish military base in the capital.
Outlook: Turkey will likely maintain a limited train, advise, and assist role in Somalia.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab’s provision of humanitarian assistance in central and southern Somalia may help
build popular support for the group or enable it to extend a form of shadow governance.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will divert aid distribution to Galgudud and Mudug regions in central
Somalia before expanding territorial control and governance in these regions.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
7. 7
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA
4
2
3
1
1) 16 MAR: A
helicopter attack
killed 42 Somali
refugees aboard a
vessel in the Red
Sea.
2) 19 MAR: Al
Shabaab distributed
food aid to 230
families in El Bur
town, Galgudud
region.
3) 20 MAR: Al
Shabaab militants
attacked the Somali
Ministry of Defense
headquarters in
Mogadishu.
4) 21 MAR: Al
Shabaab detonated
a VBIED less than a
mile from the Somali
presidential palace.
8. 8
| ASSESSMENT:
Political
Tensions are rising between rival factions in Tripoli. A ceasefire brokered by the UN-backed
GNA decreased conflict but is unlikely to hold. A demonstration in favor of the Libyan
National Army (LNA) sparked backlash from rival factions against the GNA, which they
accused of permitting the protest. The GNA lacks sufficient forces to secure the capital.
Outlook: Clashes between rival groups may break out in western or central Libya.
Security
The LNA began an offensive to seize strategic sites from rival Misratan forces in
southwestern Libya. The LNA also recaptured Qanfouda district in Benghazi from an Islamist
militant coalition. Qanfouda was one of three remaining militant strongholds in the city.
Outlook: Militants will conduct explosive attacks to degrade security in LNA-held areas.
Ansar al Sharia and Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Libya
ISIS seeks to rebuild its capabilities in northwestern Libya. A GNA-aligned militia imposed a
curfew in Sirte in response to the rumored movement of ISIS militants south of the city.
Outlook: ISIS may exploit inadequate security to re-establish a presence in Sirte.
WEST AFRICA LIBYA
9. 9
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA LIBYA
1) 15 MAR: Islamist
militias may have
clashed with the
LNA in the vicinity
of Hun, Jufra.
2) 17 MAR: Attackers
looted several GNA
ministries and the
National Anti-
Corruption
Commission in
Tripoli.
3) 17 MAR: Misratan
militias opened fire
during a pro-LNA
demonstration in
Tripoli.
4) 18 MAR: The LNA
recaptured the
Qanfouda district of
Benghazi from
Islamist militants.
2 3
1
4
10. 10
| ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and ISIS in the Maghreb
ISIS may activate attack networks in the Maghreb region. Militants attacked a police station
and killed one officer in Kebili, Tunisia, near AQIM and ISIS safe havens. Moroccan security
forces dismantled a fifteen-member ISIS-affiliated cell that planned attacks in Morocco.
Outlook: ISIS and AQIM militants will attack security targets in Tunisia’s interior regions.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun, Boko Haram)
AQIM and al Qaeda’s General Command praised the formation of Jama’a Nusrat al Islam wa
al Muslimeen (JNIM), which united several Salafi-jihadi groups. JNIM seeks to challenge the
government in northern Mali. Retaliatory assassinations by rival militias indicate that the
peace accords in northern Mali are at risk.
Boko Haram-Barnawi, the faction of Boko Haram recognized by ISIS, is securing its food
supply in the midst of a famine in northern Nigeria. Likely Boko Haram-Barnawi militants
seized food and destroyed a police station in Magumeri, a town on a road that connects the
group’s safe zone to a regional capital.
Outlook: JNIM will attack security patrols to undermine the peace accords. Boko Haram-
Barnawi may attempt to secure popular support by seizing and delivering food aid.
WEST AFRICA MAGHREB AND SAHEL
11. 11
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA MAGHREB
1) 15-16 MAR:
Moroccan police
dismantled a fifteen-
member ISIS-
affiliated cell in
multiple cities
across Morocco.
2) 16 MAR: Algerian
forces killed two
suspected AQIM
militants in El Milia,
Jijel province.
3) 17 MAR: The
Algerian authorities
arrested nine
suspected ISIS
militants in
Mostaganem city,
Algeria.
2
3
1
12. 12
| SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:WEST AFRICA
SAHEL
2
3
1
SAHEL
4
1) 15 MAR: Ansar al
Islam burned a
school in
Baraboule, Soum
Province, Burkina
Faso.
2) 15 MAR: Boko
Haram-Barnawi
attacked Magumeri,
Borno State,
Nigeria.
3) 18 MAR: A
Platforme coalition
affiliate killed a
CMA commander in
Kidal Region, Mali.
4) 19 MAR: Boko
Haram-Shekau
suicide bombers
killed four people in
Maiduguri, Borno
State, Nigeria.
13. 13
ACRONYMS
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Benghazi Defense Brigades (BDB)
Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council (BRSC)
Congress for Justice in Azawad (CJA)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Group for the Aid of Islam and the Muslims (JNIM)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
Mujahideen Shura Council in Derna (MSCD)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
14. 14
Katherine Zimmerman
research manager
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Emily Estelle
al Qaeda analyst
emily.estelle@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569