4. What is Crossrail?
Risk Management Challenges
Risk and Assurance
Conclusions
Risk and Assurance on Crossrail
5. What is Crossrail?
A new railway for London
and the south east
Over 100 km from east to
west
24 trains per hour in each
direction
More than 200 million
passenger journey per
annum
Adds 10% to London’s rail
capacity
6. £14.8bn funding
38 stations served
9 new stations built
42 km new tunnels
8 million cubic metres of spoil
4300+ Parliamentary
commitments
Europe’s largest infrastructure project
12. Tier 1 Contractors
and others…
Industry Partners
Delivery Partners
Transcend PDP
An industry wide project
Sponsors
13. Construction on staggering scale
Paddington Bond Street Tottenham Court Road Farringdon Liverpool Street
Whitechapel Canary Wharf WoolwichCustom House
15. Extended to Reading
27 station upgrades
2 major structures
61km of track
179 switches & crossings
150 km OLE
Signalling upgrade
Network Rail surface works
16. Risk Management at Crossrail
“Managing risk and uncertainty is critical
to the successful delivery of Crossrail”
Andrew Wolstenholme OBE
Chief Executive of Crossrail Limited
17. Drivers of Risk Management
Delivery
Avoid nasty surprises
Identify opportunities to improve
Head off issues before they impact
Commercial
Ensure that commercial exposure
of the organisation is understood
and managed
Inform allocation of risk between
parties through contracts
Engineering
Monitor the mitigation of risk through
design
Ensure that works are delivered safely
and that output is fit for purpose
Finance
Understand true exposure to risk
and uncertainty
Support investment decisions
through assessment of risk impacts
Risk
Support Delivery : Provide Assurance : Inform Decision Making
RISK MANAGEMENT:
19. Keeping it simple
Identify Assess Respond
Prioritise by assessing
‘Probability’ and ‘Impact’ Terminate
Transfer
Treat
Tolerate
Uncertainty that mattersRisk is:
Risk Management is:
23. Key Questions
How do we make sure that the
tunnels are safe?
How do we deal with ground
conditions and underground
obstructions?
How do we avoid damage to
buildings and services?
25. Tunnelling
Risk Mitigations
Enabling works – diverting and
protecting utilities
Ground treatment
Monitoring
Risk management
(AIB Code of practice for risk
management in underground
construction)
People, process, culture
31. Under Platform Services Area
Station Structure
Track Systems
Traction Power &
Overhead Line
Equipment
Emergency
Walkway
Gravity Drainage
HV Power
LV Power
Tunnel Lighting
Communications
& Control
Radio Systems
Signalling
PlatformDoors
Tunnel Ventilation
Pumped
Drainage
Pump
Smoke Extract
Fire Detection
Station
Ventilation
Station Lighting Signage
Passenger
Information
CCTV
PA / VA
HelpPoint
Fire Main Station Cable
Management
System
Station Systems
Automatic Fare
Collection
Lifts & Escalators
Station
Management
System
Station Heating,
Cooling and Air
Conditioning
Route Wide Railway Infrastructure
Route Control
Centre
Back Up Control
Facility
Bulk Supply
Points
Auto Trans-
former Sites
Depots &
Stabling
Rolling Stock
Paddington
Railway and
Tunnel Systems
Railway Systems
32. Rolling Stock
200m long trains
1,500 seated and
standing passengers
per train at peak times
Regenerates energy
during braking (major
savings in energy and
CO2 emissions)
33. Railway Integration Components
Systems Integration
Railway Integration – Central Section
Railway Integration – end to end
Operator, Maintainer, Infrastructure
Manager Readiness
Testing and Commissioning
Handover
Technical Assurance
8323 Railway fails to perform as intended / required by Sponsors
Critical non performances by key players means Railway fails to perform as intended / required by Sponsors
Howard Smith
6151 Failure to integrate railway [with NR]
Chris Sexton
7851 An integrated railway is not delivered delaying Railway
opening
Chris Sexton
6153 Delayed
acceptance of
stations and
railway systems by
IM and other key
stakeholders
Chris Sexton
6827 Insufficient resilience
of the railway in
operational service.
Programme
Level
Provisionof technical
assurance evidence to
satisfy IMs
Management of handover
872 Failure to manage
Standards Baseline (Rail
Systems)
Failure to execute Trial
Operations successfully
Project
Level
Failure to capture
Operations and Maintenance
requirements in procured
works
Failure to integrate CTOC or
other TOCs
1809 The railway is not delivered for technical reasons (Stages 1 - 5)
“1. Failure to integrate the system”
Simon Wright
Strategic
Level
6923 Operators and
Infrastructure Managers
may not be ready to take
the railway into operation
resulting in delay to the
railway opening.
Howard Smith
11497 The railway service
cannot be operated effectively
at opening because of other
rail operator/ regulator issues
Howard Smith
Failure to deliver Requirements
Failure to exploit “smart
stations” / Digital Railway
opportunities
Operational integration with
NR
Management of technical
interfaces between
systems and contracts
Integration with Rolling
Stock
Failure to integrate with
LUL
Failure to execute or
integrate the test and
commissioning plan
Failure to manage the
governance /
relationships with other
parties
Failure to manage
Railway Safety risk
transfer and mitigation
with Operators
5980 (RI) Failure to
implement the
Signalling System
effectively
Chris Sexton
> Development of the
fringe with NR signalling
> Complexity of
integrating ATO/ATP
> Provision of a signalling
system compatible with
the Crossrail train in the
Heathrow Tunnel
> Integration into a single
Driver DMI
> Development required
to chosen signalling
system to integrate with
NR control centres
> Signalling principles
require further
unforeseen development
6826 Failure to meet
Operators requirements
(Operational, Maintenance,
Safety, Performance)
Jeremy Bates
883 Unable to obtain safety
approval for the railway
7984 Comments/Objection
by ORR on the Construction
and Commissioning Rulebook
principles
11739 The testing and
commissioning strategy
may not be effectively
aligned with the planned
permanent and
temporary power
provision
12561 Operational Readiness –
being ready to put the output
from Crossrail delivery and the
RSD into full operational
service
Howard Smith
Currently owned by J Bates –
would need to be re-assigned and
promoted to Programme Risk
Promote to Strategic Level and assign
to Simon Wright or Andrew
Wolstenholme
Promote to Strategic
Level
Currently a
Programme Risk
TBD The railway service
cannot be operated
effectively because regulator
fails to approve Crossrail
Simon Wright
2611, 8395 RCC building
6957 Changes to NR
demarcation at PML
Lack of integration with NR’s
test and commissioning plan
Lack of integration with NR’s
test and commissioning plan
1000, 872, 13286
6135 On Network Works interface
with Network Rail projects
Matt White
14090 NR Interfacing project
to develop and deliver ETCS
may encounter technical,
operational and schedule
challenges
1994 Continuing evolution of NR
signalling
7622 Network Rail/TOC projects
conflict with CRL programme
commissioning requirements
5981 Provision of an ATP system
(ETCS) in the Heathrow Tunnels
14090 NR Interfacing project to
develop and deliver ETCS may
encounter technical, operational
and schedule challenges
GW works integration
South East Section works
integration
Eastern works
integration
Systems works
integration
7489 Platform heights on GE
routes are above standard and
CRL may not be able to satisfy
level-boarding gauge clearance
requirements.
8115 – Constraints of legacy
surface station platforms may
give rise to an inability to install
transmission systems for Driver
Only Operated CCTV
10296 Lack of interface control
between D&B for station fit-
out, MEP, architectural and
systemwide.
5900 Floating slab track
interaction with rolling stock.
10471 PSD Entrapment
13159 Integration of PED and
PES design solution
13159 Integration of PED and
PES design solution
8516 Definition and
coordination of interfaces:
Civils to Systemwide
7490, 6822 Insufficient time
for rolling stock testing
6305 Insufficient resources for
commissioning
9728 Signalling Integration /
Commissioning issues at
interface with national
network
7622 Commissioning of
railway systems at the
interfaces with the national
network.
7982 Delays to station
(systemwide) systems testing
11739 The testing and
commissioning strategy may
not be effectively aligned
with the planned permanent
and temporary power
provision
11473 Inadequacy of temp
power supply
1994 Signalling project delays
7829 CIS not integrated with NR
On Network Stations
2829, 5381 Western works –
integration
9098 Network Rail delivery /
interfaces at OOC
10826 Stage 2: Infrastructure
(including Depot, Heathrow
ETCS, Paddington platform
works) and integration with
GW signalling is not available
10725 Platform heights on GW
routes are above standard and
CRL may not be able to satisfy
level-boarding gauge clearance
requirements.
5758 NR interface at
Plumstead
14024 ICDs may be incomplete,
or out-of-date, leading to
scope gaps delaying
programme
2024 IMs lose confidence in the
CRL Technical Authority and set
up their own independent
assurance system
7459, 5090 Lack of clear safety
assurance documentation from
Crossrail to IM.
4547 Inefficient submission and
review procedures
7981 RIR CSM does not deliver
sufficient safety justification
evidence to provide safety
assurance
5957 Crossrail 3D design model
may not be kept updated
11039 Late mobilisation of IM
resources
CRL fails to provide adequate
evidence as part of handover
process
CRL fails to provide adequate
evidence as part of handover
process
6990 Failure to fulfil PDA
Requirements in relation to
Handover
6286 Failure to provide adequate
test & commissioning evidence
Failure to demonstrate
achievement of Substantial
Completion Criteria as defined in
PDA to Sponsors.
Failure to demonstrate
achievement of Substantial
Completion Criteria as defined in
PDA to Sponsors.
10471 Potential entrapment
issue
8115 DOO CCTV
7489, 10725 Level boarding,
stepping distances & Gauge
clearance – NR stations
7985 Impact of energisation on
neighbouring systems - EMC
2002 Integrated Station
Management Systems at LU
interchange stations (Stations
Ops Rooms)
CRL CIS not integrated with
existing LU CIS
CRL CIS not integrated with
existing LU CIS
9548 Maintenance support
services, spares and specialist
plant not procured on time.
Track access / maintenance
assumptions not aligned to 95%
PPM
Track access / maintenance
assumptions not aligned to 95%
PPM
Remote condition Monitoring
strategy
Remote condition Monitoring
strategy
3049, 6297, 1032, 10391 LUL /
CRL relationships
RfL Relationship risk?RfL Relationship risk?
13395 Lack of clarity of Urban
Realm/OSD design and
delivery
1008 Mismatch between RfL/LU
requirements and CRL design
1146 Customer Service is not
perceived as being world class.
10544 Timetable not produced in
time
1061 Performance Modelling
inadequate (PPM target not
achieved)
6471 Sponsors, TfL, IPs: Late or
unexpected changes in requirements
integration with NR control centresintegration with NR control centres
10021 Train Operators do not accept
NR Network Change
9290 Insufficient driver resources to
support staged opening of Crossrail
9624 Timing and performance
of Rolling Stock and Depot
could delay opening of
Crossrail
1156 Overrun on Trial Operations
Lack of Operational Readiness
(including Trial Operations and Staff
Training & Familiarisation)
Lack of Operational Readiness
(including Trial Operations and Staff
Training & Familiarisation)
13253 TransitiontoOperations
Martin Buck 11941 Trial operations are insufficient
to demonstrate agreed objectives.
13253 Transition into operations
Management of Asset
information
11838 Lack of clarity over the
approach to specification,
handover and use of Crossrail
Asset Information could delay
asset acceptance
Chris Sexton
Currently a
Programme Risk
2033 Delivery of design (and its
design assumptions) is not
accepted by IMs (NR, RfL and LUL)
Maintenance plan is incorrectMaintenance plan is incorrect
RAM outputs not aligned with
maintenance assumptions
RAM outputs not aligned with
maintenance assumptions
Signalling contingenciesSignalling contingencies
Insufficient timetable flexibility /
recovery time
Insufficient timetable flexibility /
recovery time
Power / Comms resiliencePower / Comms resilience
7622 Commissioning of railway
systems at the interfaces with the
national network.
Paddington OSDPaddington OSD
8089 HS2 interface
Matt White
5960 HS2 interchange station at Old
Oak Common causes change/delay
5960 External interfaces adversely impact the ability to
deliver and subsequently the operation of the railway.
(HS2, BAA, Ilford, OOC)
Howard Smith
CRL Regulatory Approval
8093 There is a risk that the NoBo and
DeBo identify further non compliances
which require derogations and the
developement of NNTRs
10739 Rail Regulator – failure to gain
regulatory consents by NR
CRL submissions to ORR not managedCRL submissions to ORR not managed
RfL Regulatory Approval
RfL submissions to ORR not managedRfL submissions to ORR not managed
Interfaces with other operators
e.g. Freight, First Great
Western
, Abellio Greater Anglia,
Heathrow Express, DLR
Promote from project to
strategic
14395 Ilford speed restrictions14395 Ilford speed restrictions
Demote from strategic
to programme
5981 Provision of ATP system
in Heathrow Tunnel
Header here max 30 characters2014 Effort…
Rolling Stock Programme
Stations Programme
Systemwide Programme
ONW Programme
Installation – Phase 2.1 Commissioning – Phase 2.2-2.3
NR/Railway Systems
Integration
Railway/Tunnel M&E
Systems Integration
Station Systems/LU
Systems Integration
Railway/Station Systems
Integration
System Integration – Phase 3
Station Comms – Precom
& Com
NR Systems – Precom &
Com
Railway Systems –
Precom & Com
Tunnel M&E Systems –
Precom & Com
Station Systems – Precom
& Com
LU Systems – Precom &
Com
NR Systems – Install &
Static Tests
Railway Systems – Install
& Static Tests
Tunnel M&E Systems –
Install & Static Tests
Station Comms – Install &
Static Tests
Station Systems – Install &
Static Tests
LU Systems – Install &
Static Tests
NR/Station Comms
Systems Integration
Station Comms Integration
Tunnel M&E/Station
Systems Integration
Tunnel M&E Systems
Integration
Railway/Station Comms
Systems Integration
Railway Systems
Integration
NR Systems Integration
Station Comms/Station
Systems Integration
Dynamic Testing – Phase 4 Trial Running – Phase 5
Dynamic Testing Trial Running
Station Systems
Integration
Station Comms/LU
Systems Integration
Integration Test
Complete - Milestones
Rolling Stock Fitout
Rolling Stock Proving GE
& GW
Rolling Stock/NR Systems
Integration (GE/GW)
Rolling Stock/Railway
Systems Integration (TT)
Area of greatest
T&C/ Integration
risk
Immediate area
of focus
34. Key Questions
How can we coordinate testing, commissioning
and handover activities across the Central Section?
How can we integrate Central and Outer sections?
How can we provide high levels of service from day
one?
35. Phased opening
2018201720162012
1
2013
2
2014
3
2015
4 5 6
Q1
Stage 5
2019
Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Stage 4Stage 3Stage 2Stage 1
7 8 9 10
Stage 1: Liverpool St (mainline) to Shenfield (May 2017)
Stage 3: Paddington (Crossrail platforms) to Abbey Wood (Dec 2018)
Stage 2: Heathrow to Paddington (mainline platforms) (May 2018)
Stage 4: Paddington (Crossrail platforms) to Shenfield (May 2019)
Stage 5: Full through service (Dec 2019)
37. This phase of the works brings a new set
of challenges
Interfaces
Organisations
Collaborative working
Programme Management
Assurance
Risk Management is changing to support the work:
Definition of common goals and RACI for Risks
Bringing teams together through facilitation and joint
working
Focus on schedule and interdependencies
38. What is Crossrail?
Risk Management Challenges
Risk and Assurance
Conclusions
Risk and Assurance on Crossrail
39. Crossrail’s Programme Assurance Strategy describes an Assurance
Chain linking Sponsors, Crossrail Limited and its Supply Chain
AssuranceRequirements
AssuranceEvidence
Project
Sponsors
Infrastructure
Managers
Regulators
Tier 1 Contractors Industry Partners
Tier 2 Contractors
Crossrail
Delivery
Independent
Assurance
Robust Reporting
Assured Delivery
40. Crossrail: ‘Three Lines of Defence’
1st Line: Delivery Teams
Embedded risk management and controls
3rd Line: Independent Assurance
Independent challenge and assurance
Internal Audit, External Audit, Sponsors Rep
CIAG (Crossrail Integrated Assurance Group)
2nd Line: Oversight Functions
Set policy and procedure and provide functional oversight
Quality, Finance, Controls, Technical, Risk Management
CrossrailLimitedBoard,ExComandAuditCommitee
41. Risk Management Assurance
Report to Joint Sponsor Team
Aggregate risk information against COST and SCHEDULE forecasts (QRA)
Inform Audit Plan with high risk areas
Engage with Sponsors Representative
Work with Insurance (Joint Code of Practice for Tunnelling Projects)
Embed risk management into the organisation: set Policy, Plan and Procedure
We measure and monitor that it is happening (ARM Metrics) and that it is working (Key Risks)
We extend this to our supply chain and measure using performance assurance
Report to ExComm
Report to Audit Cttee
Report to Board
2nd Line: Oversight Functions
Set policy and procedure and provide functional oversight
Quality, Finance, Controls, Technical, Risk Management
42. What is Crossrail?
Risk Management Challenges
Risk and Assurance
Conclusions
Risk and Assurance on Crossrail
43. Conclusions
Risk management is a key part of our overall assurance framework
It is built on good engagement with Delivery
Provides assurance that Crossrail is delivering the right outputs
on time and to budget
Informs key decisions
Crossrail is still on target to open in December 2018