Presentation to HS2 top management on the lessons learned from the Crossrail project using tunnel ventilation as a case study and with special emphasis on how to avoid costly project overruns in the future.

1. Lessons learned
Quintus Murphy – Lead Tunnel Ventilation Asset Engineer - RFLI
Edward Marston – Tunnel Ventilation Asset Engineer - RFLI
Stephen French – Systecon
Crossrail Tunnel Ventilation

2. Introducing myself
Father =
Rocket Scientist

3. Background - highlights

4. Rail projects - highlights
Transnet - SA
Masdar City - UAE
MRTJ - Jakarta
Follo Line High Speed
Link - Norway

5. Crossrail – The Elizabeth Line

6. Tunnel Ventilation Overview
Tunnel Ventilation System
(TVS)
Cold air in Hot air out
Ventilation Control System
(VCS)
Tunnel
Vent shafts

7. Attenuators
(silencers)
and acoustic
liningFans
What is it?
Dampers 48 Fans
869 Damper modules
Road LevelUp to 130dB
Number and configuration of
dampers is critical for system
performance
ExtractSupply
2 or 3 fans in each
vent shaft

8. What does it provide?
Three primary functions:
Comfort cooling
Extraction of
poisonous fumes
Smoke control

9. Scope: Central Operating Section
Central Operating
Section (Tunnelled)
8 sub-surface stations
2 intermediate shafts
Route Control Centre (RCC)
Romford
Back-up Control
Facility (BUCF)
Ilford

10. Where is it?
STEPNEYGREEN
ELEANORSTREET
All eight sub-surface
stations and two
intermediate shafts

11. Typical arrangement
Shaft serves
both tunnels
Ventilation
shaft
Evacuation
stair

12. Push-pull principle
Desired Ventilation
Direction
Atmosphere
Soil
Push Pull
Push air in Pull air out

13. Bond Street West Ventilation Shaft
My dampers!

14. Why is it important?
No vent = No safety case = No railway
In short:

15. What’s a tunnel fire like?

16. …and modern trains do burn.

17. The three primary interfaces
On interfaces
Ventilation
Control
System (VCS)
SignallingComms.
Stations and
Shafts
• Indirect interface
with OHLE - for
safety during TVS
maintenance
• Indirect interface
with signalling – for
control of train
movements during
TVS maintenance

18. VCS receives from Signalling:
Train position
Headcode
VCS transmits to Signalling:
Availability of ventilation shafts
Signalling interface
Ventilation
Control
System (VCS)
Signalling
ONLY WHEN TRAIN IS COMMUNICATING IN
CBTC MODE – non-responsive trains or yellow
plant in possessions will not register
Important for
human factors
and ESM Must be reflected
in Operator
training scenarios

19. VCS receives from Comms.:
Cross-passage door status
VCS transmits to Comms.:
Request to turn on tunnel lights
Comms. interface
Ventilation
Control
System (VCS)
Comms.
Comms.
TVS modes change when
doors are opened
(historical – now obsolete)

20. VCS receives from Stations and Shafts:
Over Platform Extract (OPE) status
VCS transmits to Stations and Shafts:
Request to turn on OPE
Request to turn on Variable Speed Drive (VSD)
room cooling
Stations and Shafts interface
Ventilation
Control
System (VCS)
Stations and
Shafts
OPE duct
Leaves a safe
environment for
passengers to
evacuate

21. VSD room cooling
VSD room
TVS fans
Variable Speed
Drives
Variable Speed
Drives
Without cooling the room
will heat up rapidly and the
VSDs will shut down
At this point we have a shaft
out of service – possibly
during a fire incident
Vent control system requests
room cooling is activated
before VSDs power up
VSD room cooling is a critical
interface and must be
included in testing and
commissioning
Next
Slide
Required
considerable post-
design rework by the
stations

22. Noise levels in forced vent shafts

23. Noise attenuation measures
Acoustic lining at
Farringdon East
• 1000’s of sq-metres of acoustic lining across the project
• Security rated acoustic doors – double doors – ...
• Expensive: £X,000,000s six figures plus
• Maintenance impact is unquantified

24. Think about neighbours
Don’t put a theatre
next to the fan
room!

25. Protecting passengers
Max 2 trains Max 2 trains
Overrunning
engineering work
Limits the
number of trains
involved in a fire
incident
Max 2 trains
A ventilation
section
Parasite time delay must be design out so far as is
reasonably possible to prevent service disruption
TVS is
maintenance
intensive!
• Scaffold or MEWP?
• Permanent handrail
or temporary?
• Handover/handback
procedure?

26. Impact of urban realm
New substation
building for OSD by
others
Opening is too
narrow – fans have
to be disassembled
before removal
Tottenham Court
Road
Define urban realm
requirements

27. Proximity to OLE
Tunnel
isolation and
draught relief
dampers
Canary Wharf
Mandatory
safety
procedures
Delayed
access
More system
downtime
Electrical
exclusion zone
Maintainer
25kV Rigid overhead
line equipment (OLE)

28. Operator workload
Time
(hours)
Maintenance window
TM2 Workload
0 1 2 3 4

29. www.systecon.co.uk
OPUS10 Overview
SPARES MODELLING AND MAINTENANCE
PLANNING
SPARES SUPPLY
• Optimised Assortment
• Repair Strategy
• Supply Solutions
Availability is key!
Gung-ho! It’ll work on the
day simply isn’t good
enough!

30. Our use of Opus10
Establish the anticipated system and sub-system
downtime
Game Changes to the Design, More Dampers, Less
Dampers
Faster Response, Slower Response?
Improve Sub-contractor Service Levels?
Tasks per Year, a new company so how many
employees
Changed our thinking to Planning of Maintenance
being a key to success

31. Logistic Support Analysis
Logistic
Support
Analysis
Use study
Equipment
design
Maintenance
policy
Spares
analysis
Resources
Initial
purpose
Informs
planning
Greatest
impact

32. What Opus10 looks like?
Vent
shafts
Depot
Supplier
(Lead-Time)
Logistic
Delay
TimeModel
structure
(BoM)

33. Result C/E Curve
Poorly performing system
(but less expensive to maintain)
Better performing system
(but more expensive to
maintain)
Diminishing returns with higher
expenditure

34. What's unusual in our tables
Redundancy
Multiple Systems embedded with ‘Systems’
Station as a ‘System’, Systems as ‘Stations’
Uneven Fitted Quantities (3 Fans, 2 Fans,
Dampers, Attenuators … Almost no two shafts the
same)
Using ‘Tasks’ and ‘Task Breakdown’ to crosscheck
our PM Time

35. Systems, LRU, Redundancy and MPID
ROOT, Fictive root
PAD-W, Paddington Station (West)
PAD-E, Padd ington Sta tion (East)
BOS-W, Bond Street Station (West)
BOS-E, Bond Stree t Station (West)
TCR-W, TCR Station (West)
TCR-E, TCR Station (East)
FAR-W, Farringdon Station (West)
FAR-E, Farringdon Station (East)
LIS-W, Liverpool Street Station (West)
LIS-E, Liverpool Street Station (East)
WHI-W, Whitechapel Station (West)
DRD-E 1621,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
9
RCEL015 , ACTUATOR
RCEL028 , ACTUATOR
4
MPID DRD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONL Y
DRD-E 1621 MODULES, Redun dancy link DRD-E 1 621 MODULES8/9
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
DRD-W 1622,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
9
RCEL015 , ACTUATOR
RCEL028 , ACTUATOR
4
MPID DRD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONL Y
DRD-W 1622 MODULES, Re dundancy link DRD-W 1622 MODULES8/9
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
TID-E 1611,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
9
RCEL015 , ACTUATOR
RCEL028 , ACTUATOR
4
MPID TID, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
TID-E 1611 MODULES, Re dundancy link TID-E 1611 MODULES8/9
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
TID-W 1612,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
6
RCEL038 , ACTUATOR
3
MPID TID, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
TID-W 1612 MODULES, Redundancylink TID-W 1612 MODULES5/6
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
TVF-A 1 601, ASSEMBL Y FAN ISOLATION DAMPER + TVF
FID-A 1631,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
6
RCEL028 , ACTUATOR
6
MPID FID, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
FID-A 1631 MODULES, Redundancylink FID-A 1 631 MODULES5/6
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
TVF-A 1 601 COMPONENTS, COMPONENTS OF TVF INCLUDING FAN, DUCTS
ASA-A 1681, ATMOSPHERE SIDE ATTENUATOR
ATD-A 1691, ATMOSPHERE SIDE DUCT
FAN (GENERIC), FAN
MPID TVF, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID FPP, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID VSD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
DR_FAN (GENERIC), Direct repair of FAN
TSA-A 1671A, TUNNEL SIDE ATTENUATOR
TTD-A 1694, TUNNEL SIDE DUCT
TVF-B 1602, ASSEMBLY FAN ISOLATION DAMPER + TVF
FID-B 1632,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
6
RCEL028 , ACTUATOR
6
MPID FID, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
FID-B 1632 MODULES, Re dundancy link FID-B 1632 MODULES5/6
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
TVF-B 1602 COMPONENTS, COMPONENTS OF TVF INCLUDING FAN, DUCTS
ATD-B 1692, ATMOSPHERE SIDE DUCT
FAN (GENERIC), FAN
MPID TVF, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID FPP, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID VSD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
DR_FAN (GENERIC), Direct repair of FAN
TSA-A 1671B, TUNNEL SIDE ATTENUATOR
TTD-B 1695, TUNNEL SIDE DUCT
UPD-E 1641,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
2
RCEL015 , ACTUATOR
2
MPID UPD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
UPD-E 1641 MODULES, Redundancy link UPD-E 1641 MODULES1/2
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
UPD-W 1642,
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
2
RCEL015 , ACTUATOR
2
MPID UPD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
UPD-W 1642 MODULES, Redundancylink UPD-W 16 42 MODULES1/2
A
DAMPER MODULE (GENERIC), MODULE (DAMPER)
WHI-W COMMON,
MPID MCC, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONL Y
MPID AUXDB, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID ACTDB, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID IS, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID UPEG, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID TSA, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID ASA, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID TTD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID ATD, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
MPID TAG, DUMMY ITEM FOR PM ASSOCIATION ONLY
WHI-E, Whitechapel Station (East)
STG, Stepney Gree n Shaft
ELS, Eleanor Stree t Shaft
CWS-W, Canary Wharf Station (West)CWS-W, Canary Wharf Station (West)
CWS-E, CanaryWh arf Station (East)
WOO-W, Woolwich Statio n (West)
WOO-E, Woolwich Station (East)
• Preventive maintenance is normally linked to a system or
an item.
• Can also be linked to an explicit material position.
• This makes it possible for us to define different preventive
maintenance and difference maintenance activities for the
same type of item depending on its position in the system.
• In our case preventive maintenance tasks are linked to
systems as the same item has different characteristics,
such as frequency or replacement data, in different
positions of a system.

36. Support Structure
System IDQuantity
1 BOS-E
1 BOS-W
1 CWS-E
1 CWS-W
1 ELS
1 FAR-E
1 FAR-W
1 LIS-E
1 LIS-W
1 PAD-E
1 PAD-W
1 STG
1 TCR-E
1 TCR-W
1 WHI-E
1 WHI-W
1 WOO-E
1 WOO-W
DEPOT
MAXST =0
PA.. .
STORE
PLUMSTEAD
DEPOT
TVS SUPPLIER
DEPOT
MAXST =0
PA.. .
DEPOT
MAXST =0
BO...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
BO...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
TC...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
TC...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
FA. ..
DEPOT
MAXST =0
FA. ..
DEPOT
MAXST =0
LI S-...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
LI S-...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
WH...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
WH...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
ST...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
ELS ...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
CW...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
CW...
DEPOT
MAXST =0
WO. ..
DEPOT
MAXST =0
WO. ..
U168.0hD168.0hFAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h
D24.0h
FAST
U
24.0h
D
24.0h
FAST
U24.0hD24.0hFAST
U24.0hD24.0hFAST
U
24.0h
D
24.0h
FAST
U24.0h
D24.0h
FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
U24.0h D24.0h FAST
1 PA D-W (... 1 PA D-E (1. ... 1 BO S-W (.. . 1 BO S-E (1.... 1 TCR-W (.. . 1 TCR-E (1... 1 FA R-W (... 1 FA R-E (1. ... 1 LIS-W ( 1.. .. 1 LIS-E (1.0... 1 W HI-W (.. . 1 W HI-E (1.... 1 STG (1. 00... 1 ELS (1.000) 1 CW S-W (. .. 1 CW S-E (.. . 1 W OO-W ... 1 W OO-E (1.0. ..
Support strategy for CWS-W

37. Downtime and its influence on Design
C/E-Curve Diagram
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
[GBP]
Life Support Cost *
0
200
400
600
[Hours]
Annual Down Time
12Jul17: WHI-E
12Jul17: WHI-W
12Jul17: LIS-E
12Jul17: LIS-W
12Jul17: FAR-E
12Jul17: FAR-W
12Jul17: TCR-E
12Jul17: TCR-W
12Jul17: BOS-E
12Jul17: BOS-W
12Jul17: PAD-E
12Jul17: PAD-W
1987 *1987 *
546.84546.84
Case: 12Jul17
Point: 1
Subset: PAD-W
LSC=1987 GBP *
ADT=546.84
Case: 12Jul17
Point: 1
Subset: PAD-W
LSC=1987 GBP *
ADT=546.84
* Note: Cost for all systems/stations

38. The So What for Crossrail
Modified Support Contracts
Changes from Calendar to Operating Hours
Lean Activity to reduce Maintenance Downtime
Associated to Inspection and Cleaning
Future … Perhaps some “Spares Selection”
Wider selection of “assets” to study

39. How Opus 10 helped us reduce the Delta
Saves time and cost on
construction.
Graphical user interface makes it easy to convey complex ideas to a
diverse audience.
…and better
quality result!
Enabled us to direct investment to the areas which
would have the greatest impact on the
performance of the operational railway.
This was not necessarily the intuitive area.

40. How could it be better?

41. Thought for the day

42. Lessons to be learned
Crossrail TVS is
very complex!

43. A risk Masterclass – the 3min version
Project ‘Utopia’Risk
Time
Residual risk
Start Finish
Very
good!
Project ‘Reality’
Close to
end
𝜹
𝜹 = 𝒖𝒏𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒏 𝒖𝒏𝒌𝒏𝒐𝒘𝒏𝒔
Residual risk
Still OK!

44. How to manage risk better next time
Move client from risk gatekeeper to risk partner
Take responsibility for risk earlier the programme
Remove inefficiency by bringing risk back to basics
Who owns the risk?
Who controls the risk?
Be the race winner
Use technology and people to see risk coming, contain
it early and adapt quickly

45. How to manage risk better next time
A holistic risk strategy
Broaden the scope of risk to include less traditional
construction risks like operational impact and ILS
A more connected view of risk across the business
RACI: Engineering – Operations – Maintenance –
Business
Clear lines of communication
Understand what you are trying to achieve

46. Thought for the day: integration
Engineering
Operations
Business
Maintenance CRL
SIRP
Etc.
MIRP
Integrate amongst
ourselves - first
Present CRL with a
single target model
Help CRL to help
us

47. Thought for the day: role of client
RfL
CRL
Contractors
Experts in
designing and
building
Experts in
managing
contractors
Experts in
OPERATING A
RAILWAY!
Provide Leadership!

48. Mind map – lessons learned
Some themes to look out for:
Urban
realm
Noise
Maintenance
planning
Operator
Contractor
management
Risk
Leadership
Integration
RACI
Downtime
Yellow
plant
Workload
Operating
strategy

49. But TVS is still the best part!

50. Over to you…
TVS drives Mega success!

51. Tea time teasers
Tea time teasers

52. Coffee time conundrum #1
Wide high-
level walkway
Narrow low-
level walkway
Cable trays,
lights etc.
Where do you put the fire
main?
Guiderail

53. Coffee time conundrum #2
Train on
fire
Clean air to protect
passengers and
firefighters
Station – and safety
How do you get
passengers past
here safely?

54. Coffee time conundrum #3
Train on
fire
Stepney
Green
Eleanor
Street
How do you manage fire
fighter ingress and passenger
egress through the same
intervention only shaft?
• Lock the door?
• Use signage?
• What about stairway pressurisation?

55. Thoughts – on spares

56. Blockage of the air path
Services
Acoustic attenuation
Single stage fans
Duty range too close to
stall
Lessons to be learned - Performance
Design fan speeds not being
achieved at higher
performance sites

57. Recommend blocking
out the air path in
the 3D CAD model
Forced vent
Draught relief
Under platform
extract
Recommend two
stage fans not single
stage
Better performance
at higher duty points
Lessons to be learned - Performance

58. Forced Vent – Train Fire at STG
• Scenario: Train fire with train straddling Stepney Green Shaft
• Largest vol flow rate through STG required for this scenario (of all possible train incidents)
• All shown shafts duty fans operating at 100%
• Air velocity through dampers at STG ~ 9m/s during this scenario (~1312.2 Pa)
• Method used to divert airflow during TTV removal should be designed to account for this
magnitude of air velocity

59. Inspecting fan blades – no locking pin!

60. Thought for the day
Critical path from design to operation
Design
Operation
SIL
ESM
CDM
Performance
Operability
Maintainability
Downtime
Audit
#1: SIL
• Equipment Schedule
• ESJ
• System Safety Assessment
• Software Safety Assessment
• RAM
#2: ESM
• Operability
#3: CDM
• Maintainability
Audit
Downtime
Downtime
Audit
TVS is the
“Alternative
Technical Solution”
for Safety

61. Anything else…
Don’t use blockwork walls
– they leak!
Telephones vs. radios
Yellow plant - emissions
Rule book
Earthing and bonding

62. An Introduction to
Opus Suite
Why use the tools?

63. © Systecon 2018, Slide 68
INTELLIGENT SOLUTIONS FOR
ENHANCED PERFORMANCE
• Combination of expert consultancy and a strong
software suite for resource optimisation and
financial analysis
• Founded in 1970, an independent, partner
owned company
• Serving multinational industry leaders
worldwide
• Offices in Sweden and the UK
• International network of representatives

64. © Systecon 2018, Slide 69
GLOBAL PRESENCE
Worldwide distribution and support
Over 600 software licenses installed (dark grey)
Support contract renewal rate of over 95%
• -> Representatives

65. © Systecon 2018, Slide 70
CUSTOMERS
• ADD Naval and Land Systems
• Agusta Westland
• Airbus Defence and Space
• Airbus Helicopters
• Alenia Aermacchi
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• BAE Systems
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• Banverket (Rail infrastructure)
• Belgian Army
• Bell Textron
• Beechcraft
• Boeing Australia
• Boeing US
• Bombardier Transportation
• Brazilian Air Force
• CAE
• CEPREI
• Chengdu Aircraft Design & Res. Inst
• Navy Furnishm. Tech. Res. Inst
• CSIST
• Danish Aquisition And Logistics Org.
• Dassault Aviation
• DCN Log
• DCN Services
• DSB (Danish Rail)
• DSO National Laboratories
• DSTA/ Singapore MOD
• EADS IW
• Electric Science Res Academy
• Elettronica
• E.ON (Nuclear Power)
• FFG
• Finmeccanica
• FLO (Norwegian MOD)
• FMV (Swedish MOD)
• German Air Force
• GKN Aero Engines
• Heli-One
• IAI/MBT
• Italian Navy
• Kockums AB
• Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace
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• Krauss-Maffei Wegmann
• LKAB
• LIG NEX1
• Lockheed Martin UK
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• Luleå University of Technology
• Maersk (Offshore)
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• Odfjell Drilling (Offshore)
• OCCAR
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• RLM Management Pty Ltd
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• Vattenfall (Windpower)

66. © Systecon 2018, Slide 71
TOOLS FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND
DECISION SUPPORT IN SYSTEM LOGISTICS
PERFORMANCE
• Operational Availability
• Resource Utilisation
• Dynamic Scenario Assessment
SPARES SUPPLY
• Optimised Assortment
• Repair Strategy
• Supply Solutions
COST & REVENUE
• Life Cycle Cost
• Budget & Forecasting
• Cost Driver Identification
OPUS10SIMLOX CATLOC

67. © Systecon 2018, Slide 72
WHAT IS YOUR MAIN OBJECTIVE?
• Probably to be able to supply a service at the time the
service is demanded
– Make sure your trains are running according to the time table
– Etc.

68. © Systecon 2018, Slide 73
WHAT STANDS IN THE WAY?
• Everything breaks down
– Failures are a part of life
• How do you minimise the impact of a failure?
– Make sure the system is up and running as soon as possible
– Have a lot of systems (trains, etc.)
– Have a lot of technicians, spare parts etc., i.e. a vast support
organisation

69. © Systecon 2018, Slide 74
PROBLEM SOLVED?
• Systems are expensive!
• Spare parts are expensive!
– Can be 5-15% of the total budget
– >100 M$
• Resources are expensive!
 Buy the right spares and resources!
– HOW?

70. © Systecon 2018, Slide 75
WHAT CAN WE DO? WHEN ARE WE READY TO DO IT?
QUALITY OF SERVICE
UNDERSTANDING THE OBJECTIVES
QUALITY OF SERVICE
AVAILABILITY
PERFORMANCE
TECHNICAL
PERFORMANCE

71. © Systecon 2018, Slide 76
TECHNICAL SYSTEM SUPPORT SYSTEM
RAMS
RELIABILITY, AVAILABILITY, MAINTAINABILITY, SUPPORTABILITY
• RAMS is a collective term for a number of properties that influence
the availability performance of a system
AVAILABILITY
PERFORMANCE
MAINTAINABILITY SUPPORTABILITYRELIABILITY

72. © Systecon 2018, Slide 77
“DEFINITIONS”
• Reliability
– “once the system is operational, it shall take a long time before the
system fails or needs to be shut down for service or overhaul”
• Maintainability
– “the time to perform a required maintenance task shall be short”
• Supportability
– “the waiting time for resources required to perform a maintenance task
shall be short”

73. © Systecon 2018, Slide 78
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
TECHNICAL
PERFORMANCE
AVAILABILITY
PERFORMANCE
SYSTEMS & LOGISTICS ENGINEERING
THE BASICS – ALL IN ONE PICTURE
TECHNICAL
SYSTEM DESIGN
technical
properties
support demand/reqs
(RAMS, MTBM, MTTM)
SUPPORT
SYSTEM DESIGN
supportability
(MLDT)
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
LAC LOC
LSC
(CN)
LSC
(CI)
LIFE CYCLE COST

74. © Systecon 2018, Slide 79
SUPPORT SOLUTION
OPERATION
TECHNICAL SYSTEM
DEPOT DEPOT
WORKSHOP WORKSHOP WORKSHOP
STORE
OP-BASE OP-BASE OP-BASE
COST
EFFICIENCY
COST/EFFECTIVENESS
MAXIMAL OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS AT MINIMAL COST

75. © Systecon 2018, Slide 80
Strategy
Business value
Plans
Process
Acceptance
Analysis
Methods
Models
Tools
Information
Supply
Quality
Validity
Integrity
Control
Clarity
Confidence
No Predictions
No Impact
No Relevance
Optimum
Life Cycle Management