The document assesses the effectiveness of early warning systems during Typhoon Haiyan, which struck the Philippines in November 2013, resulting in over 6,300 deaths, primarily due to storm surge. Key shortcomings identified include inadequate risk knowledge, late storm surge warnings, and communication failures that led to confusion and ineffective evacuations. Recommendations are provided for improving future warnings and evacuation strategies to better protect vulnerable populations from similar disasters.

1. Assessment of Early
Warning for Typhoon Haiyan
in the Philippines
Olaf Neussner
August 2014 Page 1

2. Content
1. Introduction and Background
2. Risk Knowledge
3. Early Detection of Haiyan
4. Communication and Warning
5. Consequences of Shortcomings of Early Warning
6. Recommendations
August 2014 Page 2

3. 1. Introduction and Background
On 8 Nov. 2013 typhoon Haiyan made landfall in the eastern side of the
Philippines. Apart from high wind speeds (~300km/h) it generated a storm
surge of ~6m height.
The storm left at least 6,300 people in the Philippines dead.
5,400 of those were residents of Leyte Province.
Early warning (EW) is not very effective concerning high wind speeds as
people have “nowhere to hide”, but EW can be very successful for storm
surges because people in the danger area simply have to move out of that
area and are safe from the surge.
GIZ interviewed 40 local people one month after the storm and gathered
other available reports and data.
August 2014 Page 3

4. 2. Risk Knowledge
Limited risk knowlegde of professionals dealing with disasters.
Example: Storm surge hazard map underestimated the surge.
Some evac. Centers were located in the inundation area.
August 2014 Page 4

5. 3. Early detection of Haiyan
Different weather agency spotted Haiyan many days before it hit the Philippines.
Track and wind speeds and time of landfall were forecasted quite acurately.
Many official storm warnings were issued by the Philippine weather agency PAGASA,
but the the storm surge warning was added to the warning realtively late (less
than 24h before impact). There was more emphasis on river flood and landslide
warning.
http://alstatr.blogspot.com/2013_11_01_archive.html
Forecast on 3 Nov. 2013
August 2014 Page 5

6. 4. Communication and Warning
GIZ interviewed 40+ residents and DRM professionals in December 2013
Result:
• Everybody was aware of a “super typhoon” coming.
• Still many people did not realize the strength of the storm.
• Many people did not understand the term “storm surge”.
• Many people did not know how far the water could go.
• Some people moved to evacuation centres which turned out to be
in the inundation are – and some people died there.
• Disaster officials consulting the storm surge hazard map
(READY/PAGASA) noticed that the inundation area was only up
to 4m.
• Very few forced evacuations. Many people remained home.
August 2014 Page 6

7. Did people ignore the danger?
Many people:
• Felt safe because their houses were not very close to the
shore or made of “strong” material.
• Did not trust official warnings (thought that Haiyan was a
“normal” typhoon)
• Were afraid of lootings and wanted to protect their
belongings
• Some other reasons (“god will protect us”)
August 2014 Page 7

8. 5. Consequences of Shortcomings of Early Warning
Though no official count of deaths categorized by the four possible hazards (wind,
landslide, flood, storm surge) has been done yet the spatial distribution of the victims
is revealing.
An estimation of the deaths caused by storm surge was conducted by comparing the
death rate (dead in percent of total population) of neighbouring inland LGUs with
coastal LGUs. The landlocked municipalities experienced almost the same wind
speeds as the coastal municipalities.
August 2014 Page 8

9. Geographic location of casualties in Leyte
Percentage of casualties
per municipality
Death rate of inland LGUs:
0.09
Death rate of coastal LGUs:
1.79
This means the death rate at
the coast was 20 times higher
(%) than inland.
2.0-2.7
1.4-1.9
1.0-1.3
0.1-0.9
0.0
Path of the eye
251km/h
290km/h
212km/h
Wind speed
and
direction
290km/h
244km/August 2014 Page 9

10. Geographic location of casualties in Tanauan, Leyte
Casualties in % of
Population
(village/
barangay)
290km/h
270km/h
251km/h
(%)
15.0-17.0
10.0-14.9
2.0-9.9
1.0-1.9
0.1-0.9
0.0
Wind speed and
direction
August 2014 Page 10

11. For three LGUs in Leyte this results in:
Local Government
Unit
Casualties
due to storm
Casualties due
to storm surge
Total
casualties
Palo 56 1,033 1,089
Tacloban 199 2,297 2,496
Tanauan 45 1,207 1,252
Approximately 5,000 people died of storm surge and with a well
working early warning system their lives could have been saved.
August 2014 Page 11

12. 6. Recommendations
Recommendations for Philippine warning agencies
Warnings should use layman's language and emphasise
seriousness of a particular hazard.
A colour coded harmonized multi-hazard early warning
system should be introduced.
Storm surge should be included in the official warning
system (similar to tsunami).
August 2014 Page 12

13. August 2014 Page 13

14. Recommendations
For Disaster Risk Reduction Offices/Committees
• Delineate danger zones (tsunami, storm surge) clearly with signs.
• Mark evacuation routes and evacuation centers with signs.
•
Survey existing evacuation centers and identify those within danger zones.
•
Assign evacuation centres depending on hazard.
•
Re-enforce evacuation centres depending on hazard.
•
Consider strict enforcement of forced evacuation.
August 2014 Page 14

15. Recommendations
For land use planners
• Assign new evacuation centres outside danger zones.
• Consider locally customized no-build zones in high risk areas.
• Consider conditional build
zones (e.g. only buildings
with special re-enforcements;
only business, but no
residence, etc.)
August 2014 Page 15

16. Olaf Neussner (olafneus@gmx.net)
A 64 page report is available at:
http://www.preventionweb.net/files/36860_36860gizassessmentofearlywarningyol.pdf
This activity was funded by:
August 2014 Page 16