India does not have a national security architecture that addresses these basics. Everything is ad hoc depending on personal whims and fancies. That is why the incumbent National Security Advisor (NSA) is facing stringent criticism on the Pathankot episode. It could as well turn out to be a blessing in disguise if out of this morass something good emerges.

1. WANTED: A NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE
M.G.Devasahayam
14 January2016
The Pathankotdebacle has triggered serious debate on India’s national security
system, which is a collective term for the defense and foreign relations of a
country.
As a concepta government, along with its parliament, should protectthe state and
its citizens against all kind of ‘national’ crises through a variety of power
projections, such as political clout, diplomacy, economic strength, military might
etc.
India does not have a nationalsecurity architecture that addresses these basics.
Everything is ad hoc depending on personal whimsand fancies.
That is why the incumbentNational SecurityAdvisor(NSA) is facing stringent
criticism on the Pathankotepisode.
It could as well turn out to be a blessing in disguiseif out of this morass
something good emerges.
This ‘good’ should be in the form of a national security doctrine and strategy.
Latter flows from the former, both are inter-related but not interchangeable.
Doctrine is a set of national principles, indeed ‘a statement of Government policy.’
Political Doctrine is “fundamental Government policy especially in international
relations.”
A country’s national securitypolicy is determined bymanyfactors, including
external threats, geography, political culture, military capabilities, economic needs,
elite opinion, popular opinion (in democracies) and its leaders’ perceptions of the
country’s interests.
This conceptual framework manifestsitself as foreign policyor national security
‘doctrine’, whichin turn guidesleadersin conducting the foreign policyof a
country.
At its most effective, a national security doctrine is the organizing principle that
helps statesmen identify and prioritize that country’s geopolitical interests.
India has no such ‘doctrine’.
It is only the Armythat has one and it is anchored on Kautilya’swordsof
wisdom:
“There can be four dangersto a state;

2. That whichis of external origin and of internal abetment;
That whichis of internal originand of external abetment;
That whichis of external origin and of external abetment;
and that whichis of internal origin and ofinternal abetment”.
Accordingly ArmyDoctrine-2004 defines its role in national security.
Primaryrole is to preserve national interests and safeguard sovereignty, territorial
integrity and unity of India against any external threats by deterrence or by waging
war.
Secondary role is to assist Government agencies to copewith ‘proxywar’ and
other internal threats and provide aid to civil authority when requisitioned for the
purpose.
To perform this role Army has a command and control structure with the President
of India as the Supreme Commander.
As in all democracies, Indian Army is controlled by the elected political leadership
of the nation (Government of India).
Executive control is exercised sequentially through the Union Cabinet, the Defence
Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS).
Ministry of Defence handles matters related to personnel, financial and resource
management.
At the nationallevel there is no such structure.
We have Ministries of Home (MHA) and External Affairs (MEA) responsible for
internal security and foreign affairs respectively.
But wehave no geopolitical-basedforeign policyor national security
doctrine/system.
From independencetill the lateninetiessome hard-nosed intelligencesleuths
have functioned as principalsecurity advisorsto the primeministers.
In 1998, during the prime ministership of Atal Behari Vajpayee, the postof
National Security Advisor (NSA) was created.
Brajesh Mishra of the Indian Foreign Service was the first personto occupythis
postwith additional charge of Principal Secretary to PM.
After him JN Dixit of the IFS was NSA for a brief period.
He breathed his last and was succeeded by MK Narayanan of the Indian Police
Service.
He brought in Shiv Shankar Menon of the IFS to take his place.
Now wehave Ajit Doval of the IPS as NSA runningthe PMO where all powers
are concentrated, with the MHA and MEA playing second fiddle!
Over these years our diplomacyhas stumbled andIndiahas ended up alienating
all its neighboursand antagonisingsomelikeNepal and Sri Lanka.
With the Armed Forces being meddled with and marginalisedour national
security is in disarray.

3. NSA is the productof the spoilssystem and not part of the institutionalstructure
of governance.
In the US where the spoils system prevails in the upper echelons of government,
the NSA postfits in. Butnot in India where governanceis a combinationof
elected leadersand professional civil servantsand the armed forces.
Besides we have a fairly well structured Foreign Service and persons of
outstanding merit can be laterally inducted if need be.
The rationale offered for the position of NSA was that
(a) a nuclear power needed a professional adviser who would synthesise
intelligence inputs and advise the PM and
(b) the proliferating intelligence agencies needed a coordinating head who would
provide inputs to PM on a continuous basis.
SinceNSAs have a critical position and enjoy completeconfidence of the prime
minister, they tend to acquirea great deal of informal authority.
This is at the cost of institutionalheads, particularlythe foreign, defence and
home ministersand cabinetsecretary.
The NSA office is not backed by anylegislativeprovisionsnor has parliamentary
accountability. So there is a lot of powerbeing exercised by this office without
any responsibility.
Our system does not providefor any formal forum in whichthe NSA can express
his opinion andwhichcan be challenged bythe civil serviceinstitutions.
Thus his viewsdonot appearin anyfile whichcan be the subject of
Parliamentaryscrutiny.
It is only the Ministers and Secretaries who remain responsible and answerable to
Parliament either in Committees (Secretaries) or the House (Ministers).
Because of this structural defect and the concomitantdeclineof formal
arrangementslikethe CrisisManagementGroup the system can never deliver
results and willalwayscreate unforeseen problems.
This is precisely whathappened in Pathankot.
Undersuch chaos nationalsecurity has become a sort of plaything for the Delhi
Durbar comprisingof vested interests from across politicaland business
spectrum enjoying great camaraderie. ……
Nothing has been done in the last over two years, even 18 months into the BJP led
NDA regimewhichis supposed to be nationalisticand patriotic .Corruption,
perfidy and treason are the worst forms of threat to national securitythat have
caused countries and governmentsto crumbleand fall asunder.
When these go hand-in-hand itis the deadliestof combinationsthat could
destroy anynation or people.
Such combinehas been in placein India for long withthe blessingsof the
powers-that-be.

4. Pathankot, whichis a mix of corruption, perfidy and treachery, is proof enough.
Be that as it may, the immediaterequirementisto put together a National
Security Doctrine that should have political consensus, publiclytransparentand
should reflect the complex challengesfacing the country.
The doctrine mustbe accompanied bya nationalsecurity strategy that spellsout
the commandand control structures for meeting eventualitiessuch as terror
strikes, so that Pathankot-likesituationneverhappensagain.
Such a strategy should be in tune withthe Army Doctrine and the role of Armed
Forces whichis the lastbastion for safeguardingthe nation’ssecurity,
sovereignty and integrity.
MEA also should playits rightful role in shaping a foreign policybased on
India’sgeopoliticalconcerns.
These are the basics that need to be addressed withoutany further loss of time.
Security demands strategy before action
The National Security Adviser owes accountability to his appointing authority, the
Prime Minister.
National Security Adviser (NSA)’s most onerous responsibility is his duty as
Secretary to the Political Council of India’s Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and
as Chair of its executive council. NSA is at the fulcrum of India’s nuclear command
and control.
India’s National Security Council (NSC) system has been created through an
executive order in 1998.
The NSA serves as link between the Political Council of the NCA that comprises the
Prime Minister and principal ministers, and the Executive Council, comprising of the
significant officials, military chiefs and scientific heads. Even this responsibility of
the NSA has no legislative authority underwriting it. The press release of January 3,
2003, from the Cabinet Committee on Security that met to operationalise India’s
nuclear deterrence policy at best serves to inform.
The insertion of the NSA in the nuclear command loop is such as to act as a buffer
between the political head and the military chiefs. To fulfil this function, the NSA has
the support of the NSC Secretariat (NSCS), which is under the Deputy NSA and part
of the PMO. The strategy programme staff that informs decision-making and
implements nuclear deterrence and employment strategy is, however, not under him
directly, but is in the NSCS.
The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) commands the Strategic Forces
Command (SFC) that is in charge of India’s crown jewels, its nuclear arsenal. The
staff support of the Chairman COSC is the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff.
Further, the Chairman COSC receives his marching orders not from the Prime

5. Minister or Defence Minister, but the NSA. Since the Chairman COSC is himself
double-hatted, also serving as head of his service, the NSA’s role assumes a greater
significance. In effect, the general commanding the SFC is willy-nilly reporting to two
heads: the bona fide military chain of command and the more significant, but civilian,
NSA.
This reveals a structural problem in India’s nuclear command and control in which
accountability is with the military, but the authority is with the NSA. Government has
promised to create the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or permanent
Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. A CDS, with executive teeth in the
nuclear realm, would ensure convergence of accountability and authority. That the
reconstitution of the dysfunctional National Security Advisory Board has been held up
for close to a year.