The document outlines a proposed national crisis doctrine for Ukraine to address the ongoing crisis. It proposes establishing a National Crisis Centre to coordinate all government agencies involved in crisis response across security, intelligence, public relations, and stabilization efforts. It emphasizes establishing political and civilian control, securing territory through coordinated military and police operations, gathering and sharing intelligence, upholding the rule of law, and coordinating hard security operations with soft power activities to isolate enemy forces and win local support. The doctrine argues this multi-pronged approach is needed to stabilize the crisis areas and restore Ukrainian sovereignty.

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THE NATIONAL DOCTRINE FOR DEFEATING OUR CURRENT CRISIS
This document is a non-paper of Doctrine put together by the Ministry of Defence to outline the
concepts and philosophies that will support government strategic aims for the return of sovereignty
to Ukraine of the crisis area and the defeat of terrorism. It outlines a multi Ministry and Agency
approach that would have to be agreed and coordinated by central government if it is to be a
success. The paper draws heavily upon experiences from other countries anti-terrorism experiences
and from MOD officers and officials, and defence NGOs.
DOCTRINE
The simple doctrinal philosophy underpinning likely government strategic desires appear to rest
upon several key principles. These bullets are explained in detail below.:
 Loyal political direction and civilian control both at national and local level
 Creating a secure environment by taking and holding ground (territory) and then ensuring
security by staying there (Three stages of action – intervention, stabilisation and
normalisation)
 Good intelligence
 Coordination of hard and soft power activities
 Police primacy of operations
 Rule of law
 Winning the information war
 HR policies designed for the crisis
 Social and economic regeneration
POLITICAL DIRECTION AND CIVILIAN CONTROL
Democratically elected or appointed civilian political control of national administrative and security
activities is an accepted principle.
Political and long-term strategic direction should come from the National Security and Defence
Council. This body should not be involved in operations but in setting aims, identifying how to gain
most international support and trying to create the best political climate for change. The Council
should set the political and strategic aims for the crisis. Below the Council should be a National Crisis
Centre run by a Minister and likely based within the cabinet of Ministers building (relocating others
out to make space). The Centre should be involved in crisis operational policy, planning and
overseeing operations, setting short-term goals to achieve the strategy, coordinating all agencies
and allocating resources. This would be an expansion of the work done on communications from the
cabinet office but strengthened with more authority and coordination tasks. This body requires a
24/7 staff made up of operations, centralised intelligence, Human resources (for the crisis area),
Public Relations and information, and a body for coordinating and delivering soft power. These
should all be located in one area next to each other. The key operators in all areas should be

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seconded from the relevant cells within power Ministries and the cell should be reinforced by sharp
youngsters from universities. That will require access to classified information.
The Council is not a 24/7 body. If a second level organisation is not created at national level then the
Council is forced to act as an operational body and cannot spend the required energy on political
and strategic thinking and activities. Coordination suffers. This severely reduces the effectiveness
and coordination of Ministries and risks the whole crisis operation.
If the decision is made not to have a second level body then one single Ministry should be given
authority to run the crisis. This would allow the system to work proactively to beat the crisis rather
than the largely reactive and sometimes uncoordinated activity that happens now.
In the crisis area are needed political and administrative leaders who are sufficiently competent and
loyal to take political decisions on behalf of the country and government. They should be capable of
politically directing the work of the police and security services. Civil-military cooperation at the local
level is vital for success in counter terrorism operations. Central Government should never attempt
to run local areas or conduct anti terrorist operations from a distance. Security Services should never
work into a regional area separately from control of the local elected or appointed official. In doing
so they may disturb or ruin local initiatives that are in-place and working. Centralised control will
invariably be wrong as command from distance means not having sufficient local knowledge to do
things right. Experience of other conflicts shows this is likely to make matters worse.
Where there is doubt about the loyalty of current officials then central government should select
officials to take their place. Officials are needed especially in areas of major conflict and separatist
activity to replace those who are not loyal. These new officials should in most circumstances be from
the local area but should be properly trained centrally before appointment. If there is a vacuum of
government in a very high threat area then it may be necessary to appoint a military or senior police
governor for a short period until the area can be stabilised. But this should only ever be until a
civilian can be found to take over the post.
At both national and local level there are suggestions of fifth columnists slowing decision making or
creating diversionary actions. To create a stronger Ukrainian environment all officials and senior
officers in key “power” Ministries must be asked to take an oath of allegiance on the constitution of
Ukraine or a Bible. Those people who show any signs of hesitation or who refuse should be removed
from post immediately. There is also an urgent need to make the current oath more relevant and
stronger to meet the current circumstances.
The criminal and administrative law should be strengthened to punish those who break the oath.
CREATING A SECURE ENVIRONMENT
(Three stages of action – intervention, stabilisation and normalisation)
Counter terrorist actions are normally seen in three separate but overlapping stages, intervention,
stabilisation and normalisation.

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Intervention – Is required where the security situation in a country or region is beyond the resources
of the local police, and political control, life, and general security are at serious risk.
Stabilisation – Is where the police have primacy of operations and control the environment,
(perhaps with some military support and strengthened legal measures), where the terrorists are
limited to isolated acts and where political and civilian life is mainly secure. Stabilisation though does
not necessarily mean that all the population is supporting of the political and security situation
Normalisation – Is the political process that uses soft power measures to create political harmony
and security and to bring the population back to normalcy and economic recovery and where police
can control the environment without risk and the use of weapons.
All three stages of a terrorist crisis can be running side by side in the same geographical area
depending upon the enemy forces, population, economy and history. In Eastern Ukraine there are
pockets of normal life that are not needing intervention but despite this still do require stabilisation
efforts to stop enemy forces entering and ruining the environment worse.
The major conclusion of all counter terrorist actions is that for psychological actions to have effect
then the armed forces must deploy to fight and then to stay in the area of responsibility (AOR) to
ensure stabilisation can occur. They must stay long enough and in enough strength to stabilise the
security situation sufficiently for other stabilising political and soft-power actions to have effect.
Today, most of Eastern Ukraine requires intervention and forces permanently in place in one form or
another
This means that forces must be trained to act not only for intervention but also as stabilising forces
and to have sustainable living conditions in or close to the area of operation for long periods,
possibly years. They may also have to remain deployed in areas of normalised society if there are
possibilities that areas still in conflict could spill over and change things.
When considering which forces to use it matters that the majority of the forces can both conduct
operations and stay to hold the AOR. Even after the main terrorist actions have ended, stabilisation
and limited actions may mean that armed forces have to stay for the time needed to maintain
security and return the region to normalcy. Selection of forces is best done at local level in
negotiations with central government. Local militia type forces are always best for stabilisation as
they can also gain the intelligence needed to understand the enemy and also they have the trust of
the local population. But if the threat is high, militia type forces may not be sufficiently strong
enough technically or in high enough numbers to deal with the terrorists so army or interior units be
needed. But even when these forces are deployed, the senior security force commander and his
forces must come under local political or police control for operations.
Where centralised operations are needed is to provide the ability to move trained reinforcing troops
quickly to any area where it looks likely that terrorists are gaining the upper hand. Centralised
control is also for organising coordinated training between security services and with other agencies
and NGOs.

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Securing the border also needs more resources. The enemy must be stopped from reinforcing and
bringing in human resources, finance, vehicles, weapons and equipment. This may mean more
military deploying in support of the border forces but there is also a requirement for cameras and
sensors in remote areas. For example, countries like Finland and Estonia have good experiences of
this with Russia and should be encouraged to help either bilaterally or through EU mechanisms.
It is clear that for all security forces there needs to be a common doctrine of how to defeat terrorism
and these tactics should not only be trained before deployments but adapted constantly during
deployments as new lessons are learned. A single institution should coordinate, control and
disseminate security Lessons Learned to ensure coherence.
INTELLIGENCE
The Security Services have the lead for intelligence. Currently intelligence is being gained from
within a hostile environment where the population and police cannot always be guaranteed to help.
There is much more that can be done. The military are being used almost exclusively as a combat
tool and little for intelligence gathering despite their many capabilities. Also the local civilian
population must be given means by which to pass on what they know, either directly by phone or by
internet. Because of the complexity of the human task within the crisis region it is vital that the best
available intelligence is available to all agencies, especially for local commanders.
The key intelligence requirements are simple. First is to identify the enemy centre of gravity. This is
based upon foreign support. This means identifying within the separate groups facing Ukraine, those
which are foreign forces. These must be identified and neutralised as a matter of urgency. Second is
to identify where and how the terrorist resources are crossing the border. Third is to isolate the
Ukrainian political activists that are fomenting unrest and terrorism so they can be brought to
justice.
The fact that this information comes from different agencies reinforces the need for an all-source
intelligence cell at national and local levels to which all agencies and the population can both feed
into and draw from. These cells would provide the briefings needed for both political decisions from
Ministers and local officials and also provide direction and preparation for operations.
Intelligence must not be a secret activity. It is an operational tool. Knowledge of the enemy must be
freely shared and used to direct both operational and soft power activities. Only the source of the
information should remain secret. Good intelligence is vital for good decision making. All information
aspects of the decision making cycle must be shortened to the absolute minimum. This means close
relationships between all-source intelligence cells and operations cells. Response times between
finding intelligence and a commander being able to respond to that intelligence should be counted
in minutes not days. Bureaucracy and secrecy must never stop information flow if lives are at risk.
There needs to be a stronger relationship between intelligence and Information used to support
government, public relations and policy. The factors must be transparency and honesty. This means
colocation and cooperation of the two activities and better management of information released to

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the public and media so there are no contradictory messages. This means having high grade people
working on this subject.
Intelligence planning at the central level is vital in order to use scarce resources most efficiently. The
military should be used to reinforce the security service where tasks require numbers or staying in
one place (border observation posts for example) and to free security service officers for more
undercover work
RULE OF LAW
At present the rule of Ukrainian law does not extend throughout the crisis area. Rule of law is a multi
level concept. It firstly requires sensible laws that can be enforced. Laws require political
endorsement and legitimacy at local level. They must be publicised, followed and enforced at
national level and by local administrations. The law requires incorruptible police forces and courts.
Both criminal and civil administrative laws require to be enforced in a fair, honest and open way.
The security services must also be governed by clear and unambiguous laws. The population in crisis
will only see the security organisations as legitimate if they also strictly follow the law. There must
be clear “Rules of Engagement” that apply to everyone involved in each stage of counter terrorist
activities. This is currently not the case, and human rights, and laws of evidence, are not being
clearly followed in many areas and operations. This means more political direction, better training
and stronger democratic and military control of forces. Legitimacy may also be improved by getting
the required doctrine for the services endorsed by the Constitutional or Supreme Courts. This would
make the current actions constitutional and not the orders of any “illegitimate government” in Kiev.
Police and courts must also have legitimacy. This means that they must be local and representative
of the populations they provide justice for.
It is clear that as the enforcers of law, the police in the crisis regions are not fit for purpose. They
need to be made professional quickly. There are many tools. This can be done by concentrating upon
fewer quality police and paying these more, replacing them with new cadets who have been given
international experience, by modernising police training, by instigating internal police investigations
to enforce standards and by rotation with police from other non-crisis regions. There is urgency in
this or normalcy will never be achieved. Policing is a key topic for international support.
POLICE PRIMACY FOR OPERATIONS
One fundamental rule for terrorist operations worldwide is that wherever possible the police should
have primacy of operations. The reason is that they both live in the area and have the long term task
of ensuring stability and normalcy. They usually have the best knowledge of what needs to be done.
In Ukraine the task has been given to the Security Service. This may provide short term benefits but
it creates long term problems as it absolves the local police from the responsibility of completing the
task. The Security Service is also too small to be able to cover the Eastern Ukraine areas of operation
properly and this creates an intelligence and operational vacuum into which the enemy, local
gangsters and militia move to fill. The absence of forces on the ground has led many to say publically

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that Kiev is doing nothing for them. This further reduces central government legitimacy and makes
the spread of terrorism and loss of national control more likely.
The way to resolve this is to give the police responsibility for all areas that are stable and normal but
leave the Security Service to lead in areas where intervention is needed. There is also a powerful
need to have common operations centre in the main government apparatus with Security Services,
police and military represented to ensure common understanding of the terrorism problem.
COORDINATION OF HARD AND SOFT POWER ACTIVITIES
Intervention actions without supporting political, economic and social soft-power measures are
bound to fail. The evidence is historic and worldwide ranging from the IRA to ETA. The enemy forces
must be isolated from the environment they have entered not encouraged.
At government level there is need for centralised operations, intelligence, media and
communications (both internal and external) and other stabilisation measures. These organisations
need to be 24/7, centrally directed, co-located and working closely together to common strategies.
They must be run by senior and capable people with high grade teams. If these are not set up
already they should be immediately. A senior Minister should oversee the whole organisation. The
organisation should coordinate tasks on behalf of government, for example, the work done by the
Ministry of Culture on nationalism needs to be closely coordinated with intelligence, information
and operations so that stability and even normalcy can be restored quickly after terrorists have left
an area.
The whole system must also be closely linked to the NGOs and organisations that have both
information and extra resources. These skills and abilities must be utilised and coordinated fully not
ignored. The urgency of setting up a proper organisation cannot be stressed enough. An invasion –
which this is - needs the best organisation possible from the nation to succeed. Those people in
institutions who are not willing to work with others in other organisations must be removed because
they are damaging the national effort either by stupidity or on purpose.
Internationally there needs to be stronger use of diplomatic tools and engagement of the
international community for support in a systematic fashion. This should be focussed not only on
explaining what physical resources Ukraine needs but on what leverage other international
organisations and countries can deliver. This can be either by creating better and more focussed
sanctions or by engagement by other nations with Russian diplomats in actions that reduce their
Russian energy for supporting their own operations. Ukrainian diplomats should also engage the
international media in their host countries more closely and often explaining the propaganda and
lies. This means better knowledge for them and that means better national coordination.
Internally there is the need to engage the loyal citizens in the crisis area more. They should have a
key role in intelligence gathering and easy means to pass on their knowledge. They should see that
what they deliver is used. They should be taught how to stay safe and with use of new government
supported NGOs ensure that as many as possible stay politically involved and financially secure.

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Following this should be a strong campaign to strengthen national unity through ideas like sport and
cultural
THE INFORMATION WAR
Ukraine is losing the information war both internationally and locally. Russia is setting the agenda
and is constantly changing the rules. The Ukrainian effort is poor, both because it is uncoordinated
but also because the best people are not engaged in it. There needs to be separate government level
information policies for the international and internal battles. This means of warfare is now so
significant that it needs a strategic unit as a military capability.
In philosophical terms, the two key tenets of information warfare must be openness and honesty.
Both are well hidden at the moment and some Ministries are even shying away from telling what is
happening. It is likely that because of the heavy bureaucratic processes and the historic desire for
secrecy as a tool that many PR staffs in Ministries do not even know what is happening so they
cannot then tell others.
It is also important that media content should be delivered to the Russian speaking population. The
Baltic States are considering setting up a Russian-speaking television channel and the country could
perhaps join this. The Ministry of Culture could lead on this. Radio is vital in this area where internet
use is low. Broadband should also be delivered there with urgency and ideas like sending second
hand computers to poor households should be considered. Again, this is an area where international
NGOs might help.
Protection of media delivery hardware is important and radio and communications towers must be a
high priority for military protection.
HR POLICIES DESIGNED FOR THE CRISIS
There are many government and administrative posts within the crisis area that require to show
loyalty to Ukraine and to obey the laws and constitution. There are also many posts where
legitimacy with the local population is most important. Furthermore, there are jobs where
transparency and lack of corruption are vital. To create stabilization it is important that central
government realizes that it is vital to get this mix of people right if stabilization is to work. The mix
must also be acceptable and understandable at the local level, especially where appointees come
from outside the area.
In this respect, clear centralized HR policies are needed from now within the whole crisis area to
ensure that the current military intervention is not wasted. This will require government led
coordinated work from across, security, social, economic and justice institutions.
Part of normalisation will be returning the maximum of administrative posts to local elected rule.
However, this must be only when the terrorist activity has been fully defeated.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REGENERATION

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The key part of stabilisation and returning the crisis area to normal will include economic and social
recovery. To do this requires a coordinated central plan and engagement of central government,
local government and NGOs.
It is vital to engage the community with a long-term vision of something better and safer. This vision
should concentrate upon ideas like youth, schooling and future development programmes. It should
explain that a future with Russia is bleak and the current changes to laws should be highlighted,
referenda, honest voting and laws should be explained. Social dialogue should build upon a common
future for all Ukrainian citizens, not on arguments about the past. Positive social activities and
initiatives at local level should be encouraged with good examples shown from elsewhere.
International involvement and exchanges through the EU should be organised. Even simple benefits
like working on bad teeth for free would have a highly positive effect on social attitudes.
The crisis region is currently unsustainable with its present economic structure. It needs investment,
new industries and businesses. Broadband internet needs to be spread throughout the region to
open up communications and opportunities for small businesses. A special educational programme
about entrepreneurship should be created. Tax breaks for small businesses are vital. Foreign
investment opportunities are likely but not until terrorism is beaten. This should be one of the key
government messages.
Some parts of the crisis area will need strong social support and intervention to prevent possible
humanitarian disaster (which enemy forces would be happy to create). This may be needed even
during the intervention phase requiring extra military skills and support. In due course,
normalisation in the crisis area will also require dealing with the ecological problems.
CONCLUSION
The crisis is not just about beating terrorism but is much more complex. It is about using all the hard
and soft power tools of state to rebuild a new sovereign, honest, united and democratic State where
respect for people is the highest value. To do this we first need to create a crisis organisation to run
the crisis activities on a 24/7 basis. This must be strongly linked to the peacetime strategic and
sustainable development work from the cabinet of Ministers. Without serious coordination of the
work of Ministries and a common doctrine the crisis will take much longer to resolve and could
result in protracted damage to the country.

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PROPOSED NATIONAL LEVEL STRUCTURE
Security
Council
Cabinet of
Ministers
Crisis
Organisation
National
intelligence cell
Crisis Planning
and Operations
Cell
Cabinet
Information
Office
Soft-Power
measures Cell
Human
Resources Cell
MINISTRIES, AGENCIES, ORGANISATIONS
Normal
Crisis