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DeViL
Detect Virtual Machine in Linux
@srlkhmi
● Sreelakshmi Panangatt
● Member of Team bi0s
● Graduated from Vrije University and Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham.
● Focusing on Reverse engineering.
Outline
● Introduction
● VM- Detection Techniques
● DeViL
● Demo
Introduction
● Malware implements anti-analysis techniques for self defence
● Anti-analysis techniques = Make analysis harder
● Anti-analysis techniques
○ Anti-VM detection
○ Anti-Debugger
○ Obfuscation
Virtualization
● Creation of virtual version of resources like Storage, OS
● Examples: VMware, VirtualBox, KVM, QEMU
● Benefits in Malware Analysis
○ Researchers can intrepidly execute potential malware samples without having their
systems affected.
○ If a malware destabilizes the OS, analyst just needs to load in a fresh image on a VM.
○ Reduce the time and cost
○ Increase the productivity
Anti-VM Techniques
● To evade the analysis in VM`s
● Types
○ File based detection
○ Time based detection
○ Instruction based detection
Presence of VM
● /usr/bin - standard directory contains most of the executable files
● Searching for the files that start with ”vmw” or ”VirtualBox” provides
information regarding the presence of VMware and Virtualbox.
/usr/bin
Information Collection from Files
● Linux stores information in file.
● Reads from the file and compare with specific values to detect VM.
Some Interesting Files.
● /proc/cpuinfo
● /proc/scsi/scsi
● /sys/class/net/eth0/address
● /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_vendor
● /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name
● /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor
● /proc/sys/kernel/ostype
● /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor
● /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_vendor
● /sys/class/dmi/id/board_vendor
● /proc/modules
/proc/cpuinfo
/proc/scsi/scsi
/sys/class/dmi/id/bios_vendor
/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name
/proc/modules
Known MAC Address
● VMWare
○ 00:05:69
○ 00:0C:29
○ 00:1C:14
○ 00:50:56
● VirtualBox
○ 08:00:27
CPUID Instruction
● Hypervisor bit
○ CPUID instruction with EAX=0x01
○ 31st bit in ECX
● Virtualization vendor string
○ EAX=40000000
○ Strings in EBX, ECX and EDX
Hypervisor port - IN Instruction
● Specific for VMware.
● Performs an IN operation to port 0x5658 (the VMware hypervisor port).
○ eax = 0x564D5868 (VMware hypervisor magic value)
○ ebx = 0xFFFFFFFF (UINT_MAX)
○ ecx = 10 (Getversion command identifier)
○ edx = 0x5658 (hypervisor port number)
● Value of register ebx to 0x564D5868 (the VMware hypervisor magic
value).
VMEXIT through CPUID Instruction
● Timing based
● Measures time takes to run instruction CPUID.
● Context switch from guest caller to hypervisor causes VMEXIT.
● Summary - Execution on VM`s will take more time!
DeViL
● Demonstration tool
● Determines how the current configuration expose itself to malware
● Supports only Linux
● Tested in Ubuntu 16.04
DEMO
DeViL
@srlkhmi

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DeViL - Detect Virtual Machine in Linux by Sreelakshmi

  • 2. @srlkhmi ● Sreelakshmi Panangatt ● Member of Team bi0s ● Graduated from Vrije University and Amrita Vishwa Vidyapeetham. ● Focusing on Reverse engineering.
  • 3. Outline ● Introduction ● VM- Detection Techniques ● DeViL ● Demo
  • 4. Introduction ● Malware implements anti-analysis techniques for self defence ● Anti-analysis techniques = Make analysis harder ● Anti-analysis techniques ○ Anti-VM detection ○ Anti-Debugger ○ Obfuscation
  • 5. Virtualization ● Creation of virtual version of resources like Storage, OS ● Examples: VMware, VirtualBox, KVM, QEMU ● Benefits in Malware Analysis ○ Researchers can intrepidly execute potential malware samples without having their systems affected. ○ If a malware destabilizes the OS, analyst just needs to load in a fresh image on a VM. ○ Reduce the time and cost ○ Increase the productivity
  • 6. Anti-VM Techniques ● To evade the analysis in VM`s ● Types ○ File based detection ○ Time based detection ○ Instruction based detection
  • 7. Presence of VM ● /usr/bin - standard directory contains most of the executable files ● Searching for the files that start with ”vmw” or ”VirtualBox” provides information regarding the presence of VMware and Virtualbox.
  • 9. Information Collection from Files ● Linux stores information in file. ● Reads from the file and compare with specific values to detect VM.
  • 10. Some Interesting Files. ● /proc/cpuinfo ● /proc/scsi/scsi ● /sys/class/net/eth0/address ● /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_vendor ● /sys/class/dmi/id/product_name ● /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor ● /proc/sys/kernel/ostype ● /sys/class/dmi/id/sys_vendor ● /sys/class/dmi/id/bios_vendor ● /sys/class/dmi/id/board_vendor ● /proc/modules
  • 16. Known MAC Address ● VMWare ○ 00:05:69 ○ 00:0C:29 ○ 00:1C:14 ○ 00:50:56 ● VirtualBox ○ 08:00:27
  • 17. CPUID Instruction ● Hypervisor bit ○ CPUID instruction with EAX=0x01 ○ 31st bit in ECX ● Virtualization vendor string ○ EAX=40000000 ○ Strings in EBX, ECX and EDX
  • 18. Hypervisor port - IN Instruction ● Specific for VMware. ● Performs an IN operation to port 0x5658 (the VMware hypervisor port). ○ eax = 0x564D5868 (VMware hypervisor magic value) ○ ebx = 0xFFFFFFFF (UINT_MAX) ○ ecx = 10 (Getversion command identifier) ○ edx = 0x5658 (hypervisor port number) ● Value of register ebx to 0x564D5868 (the VMware hypervisor magic value).
  • 19. VMEXIT through CPUID Instruction ● Timing based ● Measures time takes to run instruction CPUID. ● Context switch from guest caller to hypervisor causes VMEXIT. ● Summary - Execution on VM`s will take more time!
  • 20. DeViL ● Demonstration tool ● Determines how the current configuration expose itself to malware ● Supports only Linux ● Tested in Ubuntu 16.04
  • 21. DEMO

Editor's Notes

  1. VMware implements an I/O port that programs can query to detect if software is running in a VMware hypervisor. This hypervisor port behaves differently depending on magic values in certain registers and modifies some registers as a side effect. VMware hypervisor is detected by performing an IN operation to port 0x5658 (the VMware hypervisor port). Doing a IN on port 0x5658 with eax = 0x564D5868 (VMware hypervisor magic value) ebx = 0xFFFFFFFF (UINT_MAX) ecx = 10 (Getversion command identifier) edx = 0x5658 (hypervisor port number) On VMware, this operation modifies the value of register ebx to 0x564D5868 (the VMware hypervisor magic value).