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Wifi Data Leakage: How your phone, laptop, and
smart device can reveal where you live, work,
and places you’ve visited via 802.11 inception
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
The problem always seems to become more tractable when presented with the solution…
What to Expect
2
• Hand-Waving!
• Intro / Background
• Building Knowledge Requirement
• Deep Dive into 802.11 Protocol
• Developing the Sensor
• Live Demos!
• Tagging and Geotracking people
• 802.11 Vulnerability Exposure
• Security Protocol Enhancement
• Future Work
• Questions
http://logout.hu/dl/upc/2011-06/230806_gremlin_in_my_computer-lyvind_berget.jpg, Retrieved 17 Sep 13
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Whoami…
3
Security at Present…
• How far have we come?
• Is it good enough?
• Discovered vulnerabilities are fixed with patches
• Known malware removed with AV (signature based)
• Emerging malware “detected” via baselining (anomaly)
• Digitally signed software
• We still believe “Detection is the key”
• Avg malware lifespan (depending on source) ~294-300+ days still!
• Fallacy with Security:
• Current [incorrect] view: start-state is secure, bolt on security from here
• We’ll remain ahead of the adversary ;-)
Anatomy of a Cyber Attack
Reconnaissance
Scanning
Penetration
Stealth & Persistence Cover Tracks
Pivot
Pillage Paralyze
Privileges++
Source: Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Updated Anatomy of a Cyber Attack
Reconnaissance/Research
Scan Targets
Penetration
Pivot
Pillage Paralyze
Privileges++
Stage Exploits
Water-Hole
Drive-By
Phishing
Social Engineering
XSS
Trojan
Ping Sweep
ARP Scan
Port Knock
Active & Passive
DNS Lookups
IP Reservations
Embedded
Devices
Management
Protocols
Insider
Evade Detection Maintain Access
Source: Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Security of the Future
• Root of the problem lies with how security is considered during creation and
deployment:
• Bolted-on vrs. Built-in approaches
• Integration of Smart Devices
• A country’s greatest spy
• IoT… Are we ready?
Cell Phones: A country’s greatest spy
• When was the last time you audited the permissions granted to your apps?
• Is all of this necessary to show a light? (I would avoid apps like these!)
http://www.snoopwall.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Flashlight-Spyware-Appendix-2014.pdf
Really?!!!
Thought Question…
Even if we secured it all… What are
we doing still to secure the protocols
these devices are using to
communicate?
How did we get here…
12
• Researching threat intelligence last year
• Sitting at an airport enroute to a conference, watching people pass by, I
wondered if it is possible if I could determine where each person is
coming from a priori…
• Knew people usually carried cell-phone, smart device, and/or laptop on
travels and these devices are constantly probing to connect to a known
network
• Hacker’s Mantra: “I wonder what happens if…”
The Research has begun!
• Developed the following research questions to direct new research project:
• Is it possible to intercept PNL (preferred network list) probes to fingerprint certain people?
• If so, can a profile be created to reveal the area-of-habitation (likely places of work, live, play)
• Can we determine a likely device and alert on likely “places of interest” such that we can
identify a person that works/lives at specific places? (Think Intel, Google, military, etc)
• Can we expand profile on a person to determine their previous geolocations, SSIDS, and activity
times within an area such that we can know when to expect a person within a particular area?
(think home and work, etc…)
• Determining each devices’ PNL, can we establish a rogue AP and MiTM a user’s device to
route all traffic through our machine without the victim’s knowledge?!!!!
• Spoiler Alert: YES YOU CAN!!!! Let’s see how!
13
Initial Knowledge Required…
• 802.11 Frames:
• Management Frames: Setup and maintain communications
• Authentication, Deauthentication
• Association, Disassociation
• Synchronization Messages
• Probe
• Beacon
• Control Frames: Assist in frame delivery and reduces collisions
• Acknowledgements, Request/Clear to Send, Block, Poll, End
• Data Frames: Transport data from higher layers (HTTP, etc)
• 802.11 Client Authentication Process
14
Initial Knowledge Required…
• Distributed Computing (Efficiency, Optimization, Updates)
• Socket Programming (Connections, Tokenization)
• Threads
• Wrappers(Worker Process, Conversion, Parsing, Encryption, etc)
• Coding not your thing? No problem, just use Theia! Demo coming in a few
slides from now!
15
802.11 Pertinent Frame Subtype Identifiers
• Authentication 0x0b
• Deauthentication 0x0c
• Association Request 0x00
• Association Response 0x01
• Reassociation Request 0x02
• Reassociation Response 0x03
• Probe Request 0x04 * * * (NIC is in the area)
• Probe Response 0x05 (now know AP is in the area)
• Beacon 0x08 (now know AP is in the area)
• Request to Send (RTS) 0xb0 (usually present with hidden Aps)
• Clear to Send (CTS) 0xc0
• Control and Data frames handled in future research
• More Info: https://supportforums.cisco.com/document/52391/80211-frames-starter-guide-learn-wireless-sniffer-traces
19
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
So… What do we do with this information?
20
Let’s bring it together by understanding the
802.11 Authentication Process, PNL, and then let’s demo!
Client Authentication Process and PNL
21
BROADCAST
NETGEAR
linksys
Free_Airport_WiFi
Device routinely probes to discover
available access points in the area and
rejoin previously associated networks
http://www.alohaorganizers.com/4-productivity-tools-already-
exist-iphone/
http://www.alohaorganizers.com/4-productivity-tools-already-exist-iphone/
Device Access Point
Client Authentication Process
Time
Probe Response
Authentication Response
Association Response
Probe Beacon
Client Probe Activity
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Let’s Build the Sensor!
22
Hardware Setup on the cheap…
• Minimum
• Wireless Card (Alfa Card)
• Wireshark (Tshark)
• *NIX OS (Kali 2.x.x)
• Extra Credit
• Long Range, High Gain WiFi Antennae “BAA” (12dbi Antennae)
• GPS Receiver (GlobalSat BU-353-S4 USB GPS Receiver)
23
http://mindprod.com/jgloss/wireshark.html
TShark
KALI LINUX
Intercepting Frames to Begin Analysis
• Collection process: acquire/query, parse, analyze/interpret, present, visualize
• What data should we collect?
• How do we collect it?
• Let’s begin with the protocol analyzer Tshark (shortlist)
• -Y wlan.fc.type –T fields Focus and filter on 802.11 protocol
• -e wlan.fc.subtype Display different frame types (mgt, ctrl)
• -e wlan.sa Display transmitter MAC address
• -e wlan.da Display receiver MAC address
• -e wlan Display WiFi protocol information
• -e wlan_mgt.ssid Display the SSID (if present)
24
What can we do at this point?
• Active devices within range
• Preferred Network List broadcasted by active devices
• MAC addresses for devices and access points
• SSIDs broadcasted by non-hidden Access Points
• Vendor identifying information (when linked to OUI database)
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Sensor Construction
26
Initial Sensor Construction
• What did we first capture?
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
How do we process this information to derive
meaning from the data?
28
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” – Albert Einstein
Frame Acquisition Process
• Process:
• Acquire/Query, Parse, Analyze/Interpret, Present, Visualize
• Recall:
• If we build our own sensor, what components are required?
• Wouldn’t it be nice if we had a tool to process all of this information for us?
• Options you could use: Kismet, NetStumbler, inSSIDer, Airocrack-ng suite… OR, you can
build your own and add custom features specific to your environment… I chose the
latter!
29
Components to Build the Sensor Suite
• 802.11 Receiver/Antennae (Sensor) - Theia_Sensor
• GPS Receiver (GPS Collector) - GPS_Collector
• IEEE OUI Specification - Theia_OUI
• Geo-Location Retrieval Agent - Theia_GEO
• Collector: Acquire/Query, Parse, Analyze/Interpret, Present - Theia_Collector
• User Interface: Visualize - Theia_Interface
GPS Collector
Sensor
OUI Agent
Log
Collector
GPS Collector
Sensor
GPS Collector
Sensor
…
Theia Interface
Theia Interface
…
Geo-Retrieval
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Enough Talk… DEMO!!!!!
Theia Sensor Suite
• Distributed Wireless Sensor Suite to acquire, analyze , process, and visualize
data extracted from 802.11 frames
• Extensible: Allows multiple sensor integration back into the central collector
(s)
• Displays linkage between PNL from each device and APs within the area
• Provides geolocation ability to display and map locations where a device (and
user) have been
• Provides tagging, alert, and notification capabilities for entry and departure of
devices and base stations
32
Theia Introduction and Live Demo
33
Theia Introduction and Live Demo
34
Theia Introduction and Live Demo
35
Theia Introduction and Live Demo
36
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
So What Have We Discovered so far…
37
So What Have We Discovered so far…
• Device Profile (Vendor, MAC, etc)
• Device PNL (full probing list)
• Relative Proximity of devices within range of sensor (RSSI)
• Arrival and Departure Activity Window
• Encryption Specifications for each requested SSID
• Frequency and communication channel for each device
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Use Theia to Tag a Person to a device…
39
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Vulnerability Exposure
Vulnerability Exposure [1]
• Profiling People (e.g., social engineer connection to planted AP, you can now
specifically tag an individual person to a device)
• Intercepting frames from a device can reveal much more than details about the
device, but locations of the user!
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Geo-Location Tracking and Tagging
42
Hello there, simply because you left your WiFi enabled…
I now know where you’ve been…
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo
43
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo
44
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo
45
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo
46
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo
47
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Vulnerability Exposure
48
Vulnerability Exposure [2]
• 802.11 protocol fails to tuple SSID to geo-location, BSSID
• Your PNL is blindly built on a system of trust… surely the AP that responds to your probe is legit right?...  This leaves
room for exploitation since any device will suffice!
• Thus, if another device “suddenly” comes into the area that matches your probe, your device will attempt to
authenticate with it
• This is especially dangerous if authenticating to OPEN WiFi networks!
• Don’t believe me? Welp, let’s start further exploitation with the WiFi Pineapple
and then build our own attacks to go after victim devices
http://www.reidlitchfield.com/these-arent-the-droids-youre-looking-for/
This is the access point you are looking for…
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
802.11 Protocol Security Recommendations
Security Recommendation
• 802.11 Protocol Enhancement
• Devices should restrict full broadcast of entire PNL unless within range of known BSSID
• Update required to tuple SSID, BSSID(MAC), and GPS Coordinates to known SSID and base station
• Notify when anomaly detected
• 802.11 MiTM Mitigation
• Never store OPEN WiFi SSIDs on your devices
• If so, device should notify when reassociated to “previous” base station
• Geo-Location tracking and Personnel Profiling Mitigation
• Remove all inactive SSIDs from devices
• Disable WiFi when not in active use
• Audit active WiFi connections on devices
• Rename AP SSID broadcasts (it turns out less unique is actually safer for you in this case…!)
• A new capability is required and we must audit 802.11 spectrum… (stay tuned, Connectionless (C)overt Channel: data-
exfil and C2 module release in the works coming next summer) simply from 802.11 frames… whose auditing this right
now???
“We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking
we used when we created them.” – Albert Einstein
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Configuring and Running Theia…
53
Establishing Theia Sensor Suite
• theia_oui.exe [*NIX] or [windows]
• Will autostart and establish serversocket for new connections
• theia_geo.exe [*NIX] or [windows]
• Will autostart, establish serversocket for new connections, and allow you to import geo-location database table
• theia_sensor.exe [*NIX only] – because of the wifi drivers
• Will autostart, search for wireless interfaces, bind to interface, establish serversocket for new connections, display 802.11 collected frames ready for
transmission to collector
• GPS_collector.exe [*NIX only]
• GPS agent, autostarts, binds to GPS receiver, displays telemetry data from receiver, establishes serversocket to relay data through sockets
• First time: will download and configure dependencies for GPS reception 
• Connect theia_sensor.exe to GPS_collector.exe
• theia_collector.exe [*NIX] or [windows]
• Will autostart and establish serversocket for new connections
• Connects to theia_oui.exe, theia_geo.exe, theia_sensor.exe, theia_interface.exe
• Collected frames will now be processed by the system ready for visualization
• theia_interface.exe [windows only until Java1.8 FX release on *NIX]
• User Interface providing visualization from collector
54
Theia_OUI
55
• Provides Vendor lookup information for detected MAC’s
• java –jar theia_oui.jar
• (I have already prepackaged the OUI table within the program. )
Theia_Geo
• Provides Geo coordinates lookup for detected SSIDs
• java –jar theia_geo.jar
• Import geo-database table configuration file(s)
56
Theia_Collector
• Heart and Engine of the entire system - Processes raw sensor data from theia_sensor to establish appropriate linkages
ready to visualize in the interface
• Self configures environment ready for you to connect to
theia_geo, theia_oui, theia_sensor, theia_interface
• java –jar theia_collector.jar
57
GPS_Collector (OPTIONAL)
• Interfaces with GPS receiver to supply GPS data to all connected sockets
• java –jar gps_collector.jar
• NOTE: If this is the first time running, I programmed it to configure your system for you, and then interface
with GPS receiver
58
Theia_Sensor
• Actual sensor capturing 802.11 frames and transmitting to connected Theia_Collectors
• java –jar theia_sensor.jar
• After started, connect to GPS_Collector.jar (if applicable) using command:
• gps_connect <IP> <PORT>
59
Theia_Interface
• User Interface to visualize data intercepted by Theia Sensor Suite
• Connects to Theia_Collector
• java –jar theia_interface.jar
60
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Establishing Theia Sensor Suite and
configuring the environment
61
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Building the Sensor… From Scratch!
62
Building the Sensor - 1
• Determine wireless interfaces and place into monitor mode
• ifconfig
• ifconfig wlan<#> down
• iwconfig wlan<#> mode monitor
• ifconfig wlan<#> up
• Frequency Hopping!
• Very important otherwise, you’ll capture only on 1 channel
• There are scripts to do this, we’ll implement programmically based on our interrupt timer
• iwconfig wlan<#> channel <#>
• (we’ll code this later in the presentation)
• GPS Collector
• ServerSocket
• Transmission of frames across connected sockets
63
Building Sensor
• //Remaining slides will cover development of the sensor programically
• GPS_Collector
• Interfacing with GPS daemon, process and present telemetry
• Sensor
• Reading 802.11 frames directly from wireless interface card
• Geo
• Wigle.net API
• Database construction
• Google Map API construction
• OUI
• IEEE specification, HashTable construction for efficient retrieval
• Collector
• Most critical and robust component - HashMap, TreeMap, LinkedList required to efficiently store and link devices
• Interface
• Processing all data from Collector into User Interface
• WarDriving
64
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Upcoming Features
65
Upcoming Features / Releases
• Light-weight deployment
module to Raspberry Pi
• Sensor distribution package for
Windows OS
• Simultaneous multi-antennae
integration
• Crowd-source SSID database (distributed sharing)
• Increased accuracy: GEO lat/lon to address
• Additional wardriving compatibility with Kismet and Netstumbler
66
Acknowledgements:
 TakeDownCon – RocketCity
 Devona Valdez
 Paul Coggin @PaulCoggin
 Wigle.net, @bobzilla
 Google
 Vivek Ramachandaran, @securitytube
 Sushail M. “The Boss” @hackcon
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
WiFi Data Leakage by Solomon Sonya

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WiFi Data Leakage by Solomon Sonya

  • 1. Wifi Data Leakage: How your phone, laptop, and smart device can reveal where you live, work, and places you’ve visited via 802.11 inception Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 The problem always seems to become more tractable when presented with the solution…
  • 2. What to Expect 2 • Hand-Waving! • Intro / Background • Building Knowledge Requirement • Deep Dive into 802.11 Protocol • Developing the Sensor • Live Demos! • Tagging and Geotracking people • 802.11 Vulnerability Exposure • Security Protocol Enhancement • Future Work • Questions http://logout.hu/dl/upc/2011-06/230806_gremlin_in_my_computer-lyvind_berget.jpg, Retrieved 17 Sep 13
  • 4. Security at Present… • How far have we come? • Is it good enough? • Discovered vulnerabilities are fixed with patches • Known malware removed with AV (signature based) • Emerging malware “detected” via baselining (anomaly) • Digitally signed software • We still believe “Detection is the key” • Avg malware lifespan (depending on source) ~294-300+ days still! • Fallacy with Security: • Current [incorrect] view: start-state is secure, bolt on security from here • We’ll remain ahead of the adversary ;-)
  • 5. Anatomy of a Cyber Attack Reconnaissance Scanning Penetration Stealth & Persistence Cover Tracks Pivot Pillage Paralyze Privileges++ Source: Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
  • 6. Updated Anatomy of a Cyber Attack Reconnaissance/Research Scan Targets Penetration Pivot Pillage Paralyze Privileges++ Stage Exploits Water-Hole Drive-By Phishing Social Engineering XSS Trojan Ping Sweep ARP Scan Port Knock Active & Passive DNS Lookups IP Reservations Embedded Devices Management Protocols Insider Evade Detection Maintain Access Source: Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010
  • 7. Security of the Future • Root of the problem lies with how security is considered during creation and deployment: • Bolted-on vrs. Built-in approaches • Integration of Smart Devices • A country’s greatest spy • IoT… Are we ready?
  • 8. Cell Phones: A country’s greatest spy • When was the last time you audited the permissions granted to your apps? • Is all of this necessary to show a light? (I would avoid apps like these!) http://www.snoopwall.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Flashlight-Spyware-Appendix-2014.pdf Really?!!!
  • 9. Thought Question… Even if we secured it all… What are we doing still to secure the protocols these devices are using to communicate?
  • 10. How did we get here… 12 • Researching threat intelligence last year • Sitting at an airport enroute to a conference, watching people pass by, I wondered if it is possible if I could determine where each person is coming from a priori… • Knew people usually carried cell-phone, smart device, and/or laptop on travels and these devices are constantly probing to connect to a known network • Hacker’s Mantra: “I wonder what happens if…”
  • 11. The Research has begun! • Developed the following research questions to direct new research project: • Is it possible to intercept PNL (preferred network list) probes to fingerprint certain people? • If so, can a profile be created to reveal the area-of-habitation (likely places of work, live, play) • Can we determine a likely device and alert on likely “places of interest” such that we can identify a person that works/lives at specific places? (Think Intel, Google, military, etc) • Can we expand profile on a person to determine their previous geolocations, SSIDS, and activity times within an area such that we can know when to expect a person within a particular area? (think home and work, etc…) • Determining each devices’ PNL, can we establish a rogue AP and MiTM a user’s device to route all traffic through our machine without the victim’s knowledge?!!!! • Spoiler Alert: YES YOU CAN!!!! Let’s see how! 13
  • 12. Initial Knowledge Required… • 802.11 Frames: • Management Frames: Setup and maintain communications • Authentication, Deauthentication • Association, Disassociation • Synchronization Messages • Probe • Beacon • Control Frames: Assist in frame delivery and reduces collisions • Acknowledgements, Request/Clear to Send, Block, Poll, End • Data Frames: Transport data from higher layers (HTTP, etc) • 802.11 Client Authentication Process 14
  • 13. Initial Knowledge Required… • Distributed Computing (Efficiency, Optimization, Updates) • Socket Programming (Connections, Tokenization) • Threads • Wrappers(Worker Process, Conversion, Parsing, Encryption, etc) • Coding not your thing? No problem, just use Theia! Demo coming in a few slides from now! 15
  • 14. 802.11 Pertinent Frame Subtype Identifiers • Authentication 0x0b • Deauthentication 0x0c • Association Request 0x00 • Association Response 0x01 • Reassociation Request 0x02 • Reassociation Response 0x03 • Probe Request 0x04 * * * (NIC is in the area) • Probe Response 0x05 (now know AP is in the area) • Beacon 0x08 (now know AP is in the area) • Request to Send (RTS) 0xb0 (usually present with hidden Aps) • Clear to Send (CTS) 0xc0 • Control and Data frames handled in future research • More Info: https://supportforums.cisco.com/document/52391/80211-frames-starter-guide-learn-wireless-sniffer-traces 19
  • 15. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 So… What do we do with this information? 20 Let’s bring it together by understanding the 802.11 Authentication Process, PNL, and then let’s demo!
  • 16. Client Authentication Process and PNL 21 BROADCAST NETGEAR linksys Free_Airport_WiFi Device routinely probes to discover available access points in the area and rejoin previously associated networks http://www.alohaorganizers.com/4-productivity-tools-already- exist-iphone/ http://www.alohaorganizers.com/4-productivity-tools-already-exist-iphone/ Device Access Point Client Authentication Process Time Probe Response Authentication Response Association Response Probe Beacon Client Probe Activity
  • 17. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Let’s Build the Sensor! 22
  • 18. Hardware Setup on the cheap… • Minimum • Wireless Card (Alfa Card) • Wireshark (Tshark) • *NIX OS (Kali 2.x.x) • Extra Credit • Long Range, High Gain WiFi Antennae “BAA” (12dbi Antennae) • GPS Receiver (GlobalSat BU-353-S4 USB GPS Receiver) 23 http://mindprod.com/jgloss/wireshark.html TShark KALI LINUX
  • 19. Intercepting Frames to Begin Analysis • Collection process: acquire/query, parse, analyze/interpret, present, visualize • What data should we collect? • How do we collect it? • Let’s begin with the protocol analyzer Tshark (shortlist) • -Y wlan.fc.type –T fields Focus and filter on 802.11 protocol • -e wlan.fc.subtype Display different frame types (mgt, ctrl) • -e wlan.sa Display transmitter MAC address • -e wlan.da Display receiver MAC address • -e wlan Display WiFi protocol information • -e wlan_mgt.ssid Display the SSID (if present) 24
  • 20. What can we do at this point? • Active devices within range • Preferred Network List broadcasted by active devices • MAC addresses for devices and access points • SSIDs broadcasted by non-hidden Access Points • Vendor identifying information (when linked to OUI database)
  • 22. Initial Sensor Construction • What did we first capture?
  • 23. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 How do we process this information to derive meaning from the data? 28 “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler.” – Albert Einstein
  • 24. Frame Acquisition Process • Process: • Acquire/Query, Parse, Analyze/Interpret, Present, Visualize • Recall: • If we build our own sensor, what components are required? • Wouldn’t it be nice if we had a tool to process all of this information for us? • Options you could use: Kismet, NetStumbler, inSSIDer, Airocrack-ng suite… OR, you can build your own and add custom features specific to your environment… I chose the latter! 29
  • 25. Components to Build the Sensor Suite • 802.11 Receiver/Antennae (Sensor) - Theia_Sensor • GPS Receiver (GPS Collector) - GPS_Collector • IEEE OUI Specification - Theia_OUI • Geo-Location Retrieval Agent - Theia_GEO • Collector: Acquire/Query, Parse, Analyze/Interpret, Present - Theia_Collector • User Interface: Visualize - Theia_Interface GPS Collector Sensor OUI Agent Log Collector GPS Collector Sensor GPS Collector Sensor … Theia Interface Theia Interface … Geo-Retrieval
  • 27. Theia Sensor Suite • Distributed Wireless Sensor Suite to acquire, analyze , process, and visualize data extracted from 802.11 frames • Extensible: Allows multiple sensor integration back into the central collector (s) • Displays linkage between PNL from each device and APs within the area • Provides geolocation ability to display and map locations where a device (and user) have been • Provides tagging, alert, and notification capabilities for entry and departure of devices and base stations 32
  • 28. Theia Introduction and Live Demo 33
  • 29. Theia Introduction and Live Demo 34
  • 30. Theia Introduction and Live Demo 35
  • 31. Theia Introduction and Live Demo 36
  • 32. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 So What Have We Discovered so far… 37
  • 33. So What Have We Discovered so far… • Device Profile (Vendor, MAC, etc) • Device PNL (full probing list) • Relative Proximity of devices within range of sensor (RSSI) • Arrival and Departure Activity Window • Encryption Specifications for each requested SSID • Frequency and communication channel for each device
  • 34. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Use Theia to Tag a Person to a device… 39
  • 36. Vulnerability Exposure [1] • Profiling People (e.g., social engineer connection to planted AP, you can now specifically tag an individual person to a device) • Intercepting frames from a device can reveal much more than details about the device, but locations of the user!
  • 37. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Geo-Location Tracking and Tagging 42 Hello there, simply because you left your WiFi enabled… I now know where you’ve been…
  • 38. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo 43
  • 39. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo 44
  • 40. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo 45
  • 41. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo 46
  • 42. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Theia Live Geo-Tracking Demo 47
  • 44. Vulnerability Exposure [2] • 802.11 protocol fails to tuple SSID to geo-location, BSSID • Your PNL is blindly built on a system of trust… surely the AP that responds to your probe is legit right?...  This leaves room for exploitation since any device will suffice! • Thus, if another device “suddenly” comes into the area that matches your probe, your device will attempt to authenticate with it • This is especially dangerous if authenticating to OPEN WiFi networks! • Don’t believe me? Welp, let’s start further exploitation with the WiFi Pineapple and then build our own attacks to go after victim devices http://www.reidlitchfield.com/these-arent-the-droids-youre-looking-for/ This is the access point you are looking for…
  • 45. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 802.11 Protocol Security Recommendations
  • 46. Security Recommendation • 802.11 Protocol Enhancement • Devices should restrict full broadcast of entire PNL unless within range of known BSSID • Update required to tuple SSID, BSSID(MAC), and GPS Coordinates to known SSID and base station • Notify when anomaly detected • 802.11 MiTM Mitigation • Never store OPEN WiFi SSIDs on your devices • If so, device should notify when reassociated to “previous” base station • Geo-Location tracking and Personnel Profiling Mitigation • Remove all inactive SSIDs from devices • Disable WiFi when not in active use • Audit active WiFi connections on devices • Rename AP SSID broadcasts (it turns out less unique is actually safer for you in this case…!) • A new capability is required and we must audit 802.11 spectrum… (stay tuned, Connectionless (C)overt Channel: data- exfil and C2 module release in the works coming next summer) simply from 802.11 frames… whose auditing this right now??? “We can't solve problems by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.” – Albert Einstein
  • 47. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Configuring and Running Theia… 53
  • 48. Establishing Theia Sensor Suite • theia_oui.exe [*NIX] or [windows] • Will autostart and establish serversocket for new connections • theia_geo.exe [*NIX] or [windows] • Will autostart, establish serversocket for new connections, and allow you to import geo-location database table • theia_sensor.exe [*NIX only] – because of the wifi drivers • Will autostart, search for wireless interfaces, bind to interface, establish serversocket for new connections, display 802.11 collected frames ready for transmission to collector • GPS_collector.exe [*NIX only] • GPS agent, autostarts, binds to GPS receiver, displays telemetry data from receiver, establishes serversocket to relay data through sockets • First time: will download and configure dependencies for GPS reception  • Connect theia_sensor.exe to GPS_collector.exe • theia_collector.exe [*NIX] or [windows] • Will autostart and establish serversocket for new connections • Connects to theia_oui.exe, theia_geo.exe, theia_sensor.exe, theia_interface.exe • Collected frames will now be processed by the system ready for visualization • theia_interface.exe [windows only until Java1.8 FX release on *NIX] • User Interface providing visualization from collector 54
  • 49. Theia_OUI 55 • Provides Vendor lookup information for detected MAC’s • java –jar theia_oui.jar • (I have already prepackaged the OUI table within the program. )
  • 50. Theia_Geo • Provides Geo coordinates lookup for detected SSIDs • java –jar theia_geo.jar • Import geo-database table configuration file(s) 56
  • 51. Theia_Collector • Heart and Engine of the entire system - Processes raw sensor data from theia_sensor to establish appropriate linkages ready to visualize in the interface • Self configures environment ready for you to connect to theia_geo, theia_oui, theia_sensor, theia_interface • java –jar theia_collector.jar 57
  • 52. GPS_Collector (OPTIONAL) • Interfaces with GPS receiver to supply GPS data to all connected sockets • java –jar gps_collector.jar • NOTE: If this is the first time running, I programmed it to configure your system for you, and then interface with GPS receiver 58
  • 53. Theia_Sensor • Actual sensor capturing 802.11 frames and transmitting to connected Theia_Collectors • java –jar theia_sensor.jar • After started, connect to GPS_Collector.jar (if applicable) using command: • gps_connect <IP> <PORT> 59
  • 54. Theia_Interface • User Interface to visualize data intercepted by Theia Sensor Suite • Connects to Theia_Collector • java –jar theia_interface.jar 60
  • 55. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Establishing Theia Sensor Suite and configuring the environment 61
  • 56. Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Building the Sensor… From Scratch! 62
  • 57. Building the Sensor - 1 • Determine wireless interfaces and place into monitor mode • ifconfig • ifconfig wlan<#> down • iwconfig wlan<#> mode monitor • ifconfig wlan<#> up • Frequency Hopping! • Very important otherwise, you’ll capture only on 1 channel • There are scripts to do this, we’ll implement programmically based on our interrupt timer • iwconfig wlan<#> channel <#> • (we’ll code this later in the presentation) • GPS Collector • ServerSocket • Transmission of frames across connected sockets 63
  • 58. Building Sensor • //Remaining slides will cover development of the sensor programically • GPS_Collector • Interfacing with GPS daemon, process and present telemetry • Sensor • Reading 802.11 frames directly from wireless interface card • Geo • Wigle.net API • Database construction • Google Map API construction • OUI • IEEE specification, HashTable construction for efficient retrieval • Collector • Most critical and robust component - HashMap, TreeMap, LinkedList required to efficiently store and link devices • Interface • Processing all data from Collector into User Interface • WarDriving 64
  • 60. Upcoming Features / Releases • Light-weight deployment module to Raspberry Pi • Sensor distribution package for Windows OS • Simultaneous multi-antennae integration • Crowd-source SSID database (distributed sharing) • Increased accuracy: GEO lat/lon to address • Additional wardriving compatibility with Kismet and Netstumbler 66
  • 61. Acknowledgements:  TakeDownCon – RocketCity  Devona Valdez  Paul Coggin @PaulCoggin  Wigle.net, @bobzilla  Google  Vivek Ramachandaran, @securitytube  Sushail M. “The Boss” @hackcon Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010 Solomon Sonya @Carpenter1010