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October 4, 2016
Santa Clara Convention Center
Mission City Ballroom
IoT Security Good Practices
Joe Pilozzi
In the News 2
Invasive Product Attacks
With the case opened / removed
• Test / debug port access
• Inter device bus and IO probing
• Reset, clock attacks
• Power analysis
• Temperature / electrical attacks
Non Invasive Attacks
Misuse of network protocols
• Exploit communication protocol errors
• Flaws in software design / implementation
Invasive Silicon Attacks
Device de-packaged
• Circuit analysis and probing
• Fault injection
Solutions 3
Box Internet
The
Cloud
BOX
Add a Secure Element
• Much Better Tamper Resistant
• Trusted Crypto Services
• Secure Storage
• Independently Certified
A Better
Solution
Use an MCU’s security features
• Unique Device IDs
• Memory Protection
• Firewall
• Tamper Detection
• Crypto Hardware
• AES, T-RNG
• Debug Port Protection
Solution
SOLUTIONS
It’s All About Risk Management 4
• Understand the value of the Assets you are going
to protect, taking into account all stake holders
• Understand your Threats and Vulnerabilities
• Develop a security strategy to reduce Risk, using
right level of security for the value of the Assets
being protected
• Make use of the integrity and cryptographic tools
available
Fortified Solutions
Fortifying an IoT Device
Example Of A Simple IoT Device 6
Sensor MCU
Communications
Device
STM32
Communication
Device
Sensor
MCU Secure
Element
STSAFE
Secure Element
An IoT Device’s Security Needs 7
Prevent device misuse
Prevent device or server counterfeiting
Resistance against
hacking, cloning
Authentication
• Device to device
• Device to server
Service and network access corruption
Prevent device
misuse
Integrity and Availability
• Secure Boot
• Secure firmware upgrade
• Trusted processing
Data privacy
Prevent data collection or corruption
Confidentiality
• Data / identity protection
• Secure communications
• Secure storage
Upgradability
Secure Communications
• Secure firmware upgrade
Prevent device misuse
Need Solution
Product Integrity and Cryptography
• Cryptographic methods are used to:
• Protect the Confidentially and Integrity of data / information
• Ensure a chain of trust through Authentication
• Product integrity, availability and resistance against attacks
• Uses cryptography and stateful processes to ensure correct operation
• Uses hardware to enforce rules and countermeasures
• Uses tamper proof methods to mitigate attacks
8
Cryptography
Cryptography
The art of hiding things
• Cryptographic ciphers have been used for centuries to protect
information between communicating parties
• Cryptographic processes are mathematical algorithms that provide:-
• Encryption to keep information Confidential during communications
• Authentication to validate information, identities and trust individual items
• Underpins a platforms Integrity processes, like Secure Boot
10
Secret Key
Cryptography
(Symmetric)
Cryptography
One Key or Two ?
11
Data File Data FileData File
Clear Text Clear Text
Cipher Text
Encryption Decryption
Sender ReceiverCommunications
Channel
Public Key
Cryptography
(Asymmetric)
Data File Data FileData File
Clear Text Clear Text
Cipher Text
Encryption Decryption
Private
Public
Cryptography
Characteristics
• Symmetric – or single (or secret) key
• Use fewer compute resources and are faster
• Used to protect data - during communications or while at rest
• Issue with sharing and managing keys
• Algorithms like AES and TDES
• Asymmetric – (a key pair - public key + private key)
• Provides easier key sharing and management using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
• Algorithms are more complex, hence compute intensive, thus lower performance
• Used for authentication, key exchange, digital signatures and certificates
• Algorithms like RSA and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography)
12
Cryptography
Size Matters
• NIST recommended key sizes
13
Symmetric RSA ECC
56 512 112
80 1024 160
112 2048 224
128 3072 256
192 7680 384
256 15360 521
• Bigger is better - stronger
• ECC uses a smaller key for the same strength
as RSA
Strength
STRONG
Cryptography
Size Matters
• Just a thought …
… that’s one small key in a huge hay-stack !
14
Estimated number of 1050 atoms
166 bit
Symmetric Key
≈
With ~10^50
combinations
Cryptography
Hash Algorithms
• Cryptographic Hash
• An easy to compute, one-way cryptographic function that generates a result which for all
intents and purposes is unique for any given message or file :-
• Unalterable (practically impossible to modify the original file or message without causing the result
to be altered)
• The resultant hash value is always the same length irrespective of the size of the message or file
• Used in many processes like authentication, secure boot, secure firmware down-loads
• NIST (Secure Hashing Algorithm) SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3
15
Cryptographic Hash Function
Data FileCode File
Clear Text
Hash Value
One Way Function
Hash function has no key, and the
clear text can not be recovered from
the hash value
Cryptography
Signatures
• Digital Signatures
• Used to check the authenticity of information, code, files, messages, and Public Keys in the case of
Digital Certificates
16
Sign / Encrypt
Code Signing Code File
Clear Text
Hash Hash Value
Private
Using RSA
Verify / Decrypt
Code Authentication
Public
Hash Value
Code File
Clear Text
Hash Calculated Hash Value
Compare
If the Hash values are
equal the code is authentic
Using RSA
Random Number Generator (RNG)
• Random Number Generators are typically used :-
• To generate a challenge during authentication process, a seed for keys, digital signatures
17
http://www.random.org/bitmapsPHP rand() on Windows
http://boallen.com/random-numbers.html
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_number_generator_attack
• A source of entropy (randomness)
for the crypto math
• Statistical properties of the RNG’s
output is used to evaluate level of
randomness
• A non random or predictable output
is a source weakness
Random Number Generator (RNG)
• A Pseudo Random Generator uses a software algorithm to generate
numbers
• A True Random Generator makes use of the unpredictable physical
properties of silicon to generate its numbers
• Use RNG’s complying with NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex C
18
• Always make use of a True Random Generator
Cryptography 19
• Not all crypto libraries are the same …
• Is it from a reputable source ? or is it freeware ? open source ?
• Does it come with any warranties or certifications ?
• Do you know its history, is it maintained?
• Does it have a track record of fixing security issues ?
• Silicon vendor libraries specifically make use of hardware accelerators or
are designed to execute in a secure partition or environment
Libraries
• Take care where you obtain cryptographic libraries from
• Use libraries that come from reputable sources
• Use libraries that make use of hardware accelerators or are partitioned to
execute in a secure manner
Cryptographic Accelerators
• Cryptographic accelerators are specific hardware engines that off-load
cryptographic functions from the CPU
• Providing higher data through-put performance, and lower power
• Greater integrity – more resilient against system and board level software attacks
• Often supporting secure key ladders, secure key stores or caches
• The cryptographic functions are intrinsically bound to the device
• Functions typically performed
• AES, TDES, SHA, RSA, ECC, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3
20
• Use hardware Cryptographic Accelerators
when available
Integrity and Availability
Resilience to Attacks
Root of Trust
• An anchor point for cryptographic services bound with a device
• It may be embedded in the Microcontroller or a Secure Element
• Performs stateful, trusted, cryptographic processes
• Is the first process to start after reset
• Often ROM (locked Flash) based as integrity is important
• May use hardened logic design that is tamper resistant
• Performs code authentication; acts as the First Stage in a Secure Boot
process
22
Secure Boot
• To ensure a products integrity code should be authenticated before it is run
• Secure boot uses cryptographic functions to confirm the authenticity of a
code image before allowing it to execute
• A multi-stage secure boot process, is one where each stage authenticates
the next, hence a chain of trust
23
First Stage
Code
Cert.
Reset
Chain of Trust
Second stage
Loader
Code
Cert.
Authenticates
Trusted
Third Stage
RTOS
Code
Cert.
Authenticates
Application
Authenticates
Secure Boot
• The Secure Boot process
• Performed after a reset, using a Public key stored in the device
• It is a stateful process for predictable behavior
• Its code should be stored in ROM or locked Flash
• A Root-of-Trust may be used to performed this process
24
State based process
Reset
Trusted
Verify / Decrypt
Code Authentication
Public
Hash Value
File
Code Image
Hash
Calculated Hash Value
Compare
OK
NOK
Reload
Run Code
• Code images may also
be encrypted
• Protect your private
signing key!
Protect Assets and Keys 25
• Sensitive data should be encrypted when not being used
• Sensitive applications data, confidentiality, privacy, customer financial and health info.
• Trusted root keys (symmetric keys or asymmetric Private keys)
• Access to this data must be carefully controlled and restricted to authorized
persons and processes
• Lock down Public keys and certificates
• They don’t need to be encrypted only immovable - locked to the platform
• Only allow replacement through a cryptographic process
Secure Storage – Data at Rest
• The key to success is to protect your keys
• Don’t allow unauthorized access to keys
Secure Communications 26
• The IoT ecosystem relies on confidential and trusted communications
• Use a cryptographic authentication process to establish trust
All devices should be uniquely identified and able to verify the identity and authenticity of other
communicating devices
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) standards
• RSA, ECC
• Use end-to-end encryption
• Ciphers: AES, TDES
Data in Motion
• Make use of established secure communication protocol standards
• Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS),
• Datagram TLS (DTLS)
Application Data 27
• Handle confidential and sensitive data securely when being used
• Segmented processing
• Uses memory protection or firewall mechanisms to segment memory and code execution into secure
and non secure zones
• Requires a clear understanding of software and hardware to develop a partitioned solution
• Dual mode CPU’s – Trusted processing
• Provide context switching between “trusted” and “untrusted” processing
• Simplifies the partitioning and development of secure processes
• Secure Processing using a Secure Processor, like ST’s STSAFE
• Provides the highest level tamper resistance for protecting cryptographic services and keys
Data In Use
Layers of Security Services 28
• Security services should be handled
independently in silo’ed processes
System Layers
Application / Cloud
• Access control and right management
• Feature and product management
Data / Transport Layer
• TLS/DTLS, HTTPS etc
Link Layer / Physical Layer
• Network physical layer security
• e.g. WiFi – WPA2, 802.11i
Device Security Services
• Secure Boot
Debug Ports
• Debug ports, like JTAG, represent any easy access route for hackers
• Remove test headers, debug access points from the board
• Remove from code any debug processes as these could be exploited
• This includes potential boot-loader paths (UART, SPI, I2C, USB, etc.)
• Restricted access to production keys
• Only use test or dummy keys while the product is in debug mode
29
• If the device has a lockable debug port – don’t forget to lock it!
Life Cycle
Product Life Cycle 31
Definition
Design
Development
Prototype / Test
Decommissioning
Product Launch
Maintenance
• Define the product and identify the
Assets you plan to protect
• Design the product based on the
correct level of security
• Develop methods and processes
to protect those Assets over the
entire life-cycle
• Develop secure processes to
handle firmware throughout the
products life-cycle
• Product security should be factored
in from day-one
Do Verify Your Implementation
• Today’s largest threats are through software based attacks
• Used defensive coding practices and tools to detect possible vulnerabilities
• Review carefully the trustworthiness of code coming from external sources
• Check that all the latest security patches are being used
• Analyze code to remove debug and native firmware loading interface capabilities
• Use code integrity checking techniques like Secure Boot, Secure Firmware Update
• Rigorously test and support interoperability workshops
• You may also use Security Assessment Services
• Provide independent security assessment of products and ecosystems
• Support standards compliance evaluation and certification
32
Security Partnerships
• Use trusted partners throughout your value chain – protect your
products, services and brand
• Use partners equally committed to security and integrity
• Select partner provided schemes, processes and solutions that allow
you to securely provision and update your products firmware in
untrusted environments
33
Conclusions / Recommendations
Trusted IoT Platforms Do Matter ! 35
Who’s Watching your loved ones !
Source Engadget
Recommendations 36
• Internet of Things presents a wealth of opportunities and growth for business. It also represents
increased opportunity for theft, mischief and damage or even loss of life
• Reduce risk by designing and managing products fortified against attacks
• Hackers will go after the weakest links in a system not necessarily directly to their target
• Understand the value of assets for all the stake holders in your solution
• Perform a Threat analysis to better understand your Risks
• Remember Confidentially, Availability and Integrity are key
• Using these good design practices to develop and maintain secure products
• Design a products resilient against attacks through out its whole life-cycle
• Products robust can achieved through use of security features and tools
• Work with trusted and experienced partners throughput your value chain
Work with ST,
your experienced
partner
Demos
ST Solutions for Security in IoT 38
Smart City Solution
for IoT Node
39
Thank You

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Track 5 session 2 - st dev con 2016 - security iot best practices

  • 1. October 4, 2016 Santa Clara Convention Center Mission City Ballroom IoT Security Good Practices Joe Pilozzi
  • 3. Invasive Product Attacks With the case opened / removed • Test / debug port access • Inter device bus and IO probing • Reset, clock attacks • Power analysis • Temperature / electrical attacks Non Invasive Attacks Misuse of network protocols • Exploit communication protocol errors • Flaws in software design / implementation Invasive Silicon Attacks Device de-packaged • Circuit analysis and probing • Fault injection Solutions 3 Box Internet The Cloud BOX Add a Secure Element • Much Better Tamper Resistant • Trusted Crypto Services • Secure Storage • Independently Certified A Better Solution Use an MCU’s security features • Unique Device IDs • Memory Protection • Firewall • Tamper Detection • Crypto Hardware • AES, T-RNG • Debug Port Protection Solution SOLUTIONS
  • 4. It’s All About Risk Management 4 • Understand the value of the Assets you are going to protect, taking into account all stake holders • Understand your Threats and Vulnerabilities • Develop a security strategy to reduce Risk, using right level of security for the value of the Assets being protected • Make use of the integrity and cryptographic tools available Fortified Solutions
  • 6. Example Of A Simple IoT Device 6 Sensor MCU Communications Device STM32 Communication Device Sensor MCU Secure Element STSAFE Secure Element
  • 7. An IoT Device’s Security Needs 7 Prevent device misuse Prevent device or server counterfeiting Resistance against hacking, cloning Authentication • Device to device • Device to server Service and network access corruption Prevent device misuse Integrity and Availability • Secure Boot • Secure firmware upgrade • Trusted processing Data privacy Prevent data collection or corruption Confidentiality • Data / identity protection • Secure communications • Secure storage Upgradability Secure Communications • Secure firmware upgrade Prevent device misuse Need Solution
  • 8. Product Integrity and Cryptography • Cryptographic methods are used to: • Protect the Confidentially and Integrity of data / information • Ensure a chain of trust through Authentication • Product integrity, availability and resistance against attacks • Uses cryptography and stateful processes to ensure correct operation • Uses hardware to enforce rules and countermeasures • Uses tamper proof methods to mitigate attacks 8
  • 10. Cryptography The art of hiding things • Cryptographic ciphers have been used for centuries to protect information between communicating parties • Cryptographic processes are mathematical algorithms that provide:- • Encryption to keep information Confidential during communications • Authentication to validate information, identities and trust individual items • Underpins a platforms Integrity processes, like Secure Boot 10
  • 11. Secret Key Cryptography (Symmetric) Cryptography One Key or Two ? 11 Data File Data FileData File Clear Text Clear Text Cipher Text Encryption Decryption Sender ReceiverCommunications Channel Public Key Cryptography (Asymmetric) Data File Data FileData File Clear Text Clear Text Cipher Text Encryption Decryption Private Public
  • 12. Cryptography Characteristics • Symmetric – or single (or secret) key • Use fewer compute resources and are faster • Used to protect data - during communications or while at rest • Issue with sharing and managing keys • Algorithms like AES and TDES • Asymmetric – (a key pair - public key + private key) • Provides easier key sharing and management using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) • Algorithms are more complex, hence compute intensive, thus lower performance • Used for authentication, key exchange, digital signatures and certificates • Algorithms like RSA and ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) 12
  • 13. Cryptography Size Matters • NIST recommended key sizes 13 Symmetric RSA ECC 56 512 112 80 1024 160 112 2048 224 128 3072 256 192 7680 384 256 15360 521 • Bigger is better - stronger • ECC uses a smaller key for the same strength as RSA Strength STRONG
  • 14. Cryptography Size Matters • Just a thought … … that’s one small key in a huge hay-stack ! 14 Estimated number of 1050 atoms 166 bit Symmetric Key ≈ With ~10^50 combinations
  • 15. Cryptography Hash Algorithms • Cryptographic Hash • An easy to compute, one-way cryptographic function that generates a result which for all intents and purposes is unique for any given message or file :- • Unalterable (practically impossible to modify the original file or message without causing the result to be altered) • The resultant hash value is always the same length irrespective of the size of the message or file • Used in many processes like authentication, secure boot, secure firmware down-loads • NIST (Secure Hashing Algorithm) SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3 15 Cryptographic Hash Function Data FileCode File Clear Text Hash Value One Way Function Hash function has no key, and the clear text can not be recovered from the hash value
  • 16. Cryptography Signatures • Digital Signatures • Used to check the authenticity of information, code, files, messages, and Public Keys in the case of Digital Certificates 16 Sign / Encrypt Code Signing Code File Clear Text Hash Hash Value Private Using RSA Verify / Decrypt Code Authentication Public Hash Value Code File Clear Text Hash Calculated Hash Value Compare If the Hash values are equal the code is authentic Using RSA
  • 17. Random Number Generator (RNG) • Random Number Generators are typically used :- • To generate a challenge during authentication process, a seed for keys, digital signatures 17 http://www.random.org/bitmapsPHP rand() on Windows http://boallen.com/random-numbers.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random_number_generator_attack • A source of entropy (randomness) for the crypto math • Statistical properties of the RNG’s output is used to evaluate level of randomness • A non random or predictable output is a source weakness
  • 18. Random Number Generator (RNG) • A Pseudo Random Generator uses a software algorithm to generate numbers • A True Random Generator makes use of the unpredictable physical properties of silicon to generate its numbers • Use RNG’s complying with NIST FIPS 140-2 Annex C 18 • Always make use of a True Random Generator
  • 19. Cryptography 19 • Not all crypto libraries are the same … • Is it from a reputable source ? or is it freeware ? open source ? • Does it come with any warranties or certifications ? • Do you know its history, is it maintained? • Does it have a track record of fixing security issues ? • Silicon vendor libraries specifically make use of hardware accelerators or are designed to execute in a secure partition or environment Libraries • Take care where you obtain cryptographic libraries from • Use libraries that come from reputable sources • Use libraries that make use of hardware accelerators or are partitioned to execute in a secure manner
  • 20. Cryptographic Accelerators • Cryptographic accelerators are specific hardware engines that off-load cryptographic functions from the CPU • Providing higher data through-put performance, and lower power • Greater integrity – more resilient against system and board level software attacks • Often supporting secure key ladders, secure key stores or caches • The cryptographic functions are intrinsically bound to the device • Functions typically performed • AES, TDES, SHA, RSA, ECC, SHA-1, SHA-2, SHA-3 20 • Use hardware Cryptographic Accelerators when available
  • 22. Root of Trust • An anchor point for cryptographic services bound with a device • It may be embedded in the Microcontroller or a Secure Element • Performs stateful, trusted, cryptographic processes • Is the first process to start after reset • Often ROM (locked Flash) based as integrity is important • May use hardened logic design that is tamper resistant • Performs code authentication; acts as the First Stage in a Secure Boot process 22
  • 23. Secure Boot • To ensure a products integrity code should be authenticated before it is run • Secure boot uses cryptographic functions to confirm the authenticity of a code image before allowing it to execute • A multi-stage secure boot process, is one where each stage authenticates the next, hence a chain of trust 23 First Stage Code Cert. Reset Chain of Trust Second stage Loader Code Cert. Authenticates Trusted Third Stage RTOS Code Cert. Authenticates Application Authenticates
  • 24. Secure Boot • The Secure Boot process • Performed after a reset, using a Public key stored in the device • It is a stateful process for predictable behavior • Its code should be stored in ROM or locked Flash • A Root-of-Trust may be used to performed this process 24 State based process Reset Trusted Verify / Decrypt Code Authentication Public Hash Value File Code Image Hash Calculated Hash Value Compare OK NOK Reload Run Code • Code images may also be encrypted • Protect your private signing key!
  • 25. Protect Assets and Keys 25 • Sensitive data should be encrypted when not being used • Sensitive applications data, confidentiality, privacy, customer financial and health info. • Trusted root keys (symmetric keys or asymmetric Private keys) • Access to this data must be carefully controlled and restricted to authorized persons and processes • Lock down Public keys and certificates • They don’t need to be encrypted only immovable - locked to the platform • Only allow replacement through a cryptographic process Secure Storage – Data at Rest • The key to success is to protect your keys • Don’t allow unauthorized access to keys
  • 26. Secure Communications 26 • The IoT ecosystem relies on confidential and trusted communications • Use a cryptographic authentication process to establish trust All devices should be uniquely identified and able to verify the identity and authenticity of other communicating devices • Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) standards • RSA, ECC • Use end-to-end encryption • Ciphers: AES, TDES Data in Motion • Make use of established secure communication protocol standards • Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS), • Datagram TLS (DTLS)
  • 27. Application Data 27 • Handle confidential and sensitive data securely when being used • Segmented processing • Uses memory protection or firewall mechanisms to segment memory and code execution into secure and non secure zones • Requires a clear understanding of software and hardware to develop a partitioned solution • Dual mode CPU’s – Trusted processing • Provide context switching between “trusted” and “untrusted” processing • Simplifies the partitioning and development of secure processes • Secure Processing using a Secure Processor, like ST’s STSAFE • Provides the highest level tamper resistance for protecting cryptographic services and keys Data In Use
  • 28. Layers of Security Services 28 • Security services should be handled independently in silo’ed processes System Layers Application / Cloud • Access control and right management • Feature and product management Data / Transport Layer • TLS/DTLS, HTTPS etc Link Layer / Physical Layer • Network physical layer security • e.g. WiFi – WPA2, 802.11i Device Security Services • Secure Boot
  • 29. Debug Ports • Debug ports, like JTAG, represent any easy access route for hackers • Remove test headers, debug access points from the board • Remove from code any debug processes as these could be exploited • This includes potential boot-loader paths (UART, SPI, I2C, USB, etc.) • Restricted access to production keys • Only use test or dummy keys while the product is in debug mode 29 • If the device has a lockable debug port – don’t forget to lock it!
  • 31. Product Life Cycle 31 Definition Design Development Prototype / Test Decommissioning Product Launch Maintenance • Define the product and identify the Assets you plan to protect • Design the product based on the correct level of security • Develop methods and processes to protect those Assets over the entire life-cycle • Develop secure processes to handle firmware throughout the products life-cycle • Product security should be factored in from day-one
  • 32. Do Verify Your Implementation • Today’s largest threats are through software based attacks • Used defensive coding practices and tools to detect possible vulnerabilities • Review carefully the trustworthiness of code coming from external sources • Check that all the latest security patches are being used • Analyze code to remove debug and native firmware loading interface capabilities • Use code integrity checking techniques like Secure Boot, Secure Firmware Update • Rigorously test and support interoperability workshops • You may also use Security Assessment Services • Provide independent security assessment of products and ecosystems • Support standards compliance evaluation and certification 32
  • 33. Security Partnerships • Use trusted partners throughout your value chain – protect your products, services and brand • Use partners equally committed to security and integrity • Select partner provided schemes, processes and solutions that allow you to securely provision and update your products firmware in untrusted environments 33
  • 35. Trusted IoT Platforms Do Matter ! 35 Who’s Watching your loved ones ! Source Engadget
  • 36. Recommendations 36 • Internet of Things presents a wealth of opportunities and growth for business. It also represents increased opportunity for theft, mischief and damage or even loss of life • Reduce risk by designing and managing products fortified against attacks • Hackers will go after the weakest links in a system not necessarily directly to their target • Understand the value of assets for all the stake holders in your solution • Perform a Threat analysis to better understand your Risks • Remember Confidentially, Availability and Integrity are key • Using these good design practices to develop and maintain secure products • Design a products resilient against attacks through out its whole life-cycle • Products robust can achieved through use of security features and tools • Work with trusted and experienced partners throughput your value chain Work with ST, your experienced partner
  • 37. Demos
  • 38. ST Solutions for Security in IoT 38 Smart City Solution for IoT Node
  • 39. 39