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Data in cars can be creepy…
$750,000,000,000
• Is killing the engine of a car while riding on the highway the
only threat model?Who is best served by this narrative?
• Are we sure a few hours of tinkering aren’t sufficient?Why
use sophisticated approaches when simple does it?
Who commits the most crimes?
Adversary states or common criminals?
PIRATETIP #1: FOCUS
ON COMMON
CRIMINALS (THIEVES,
FRAUDSTERS,
STALKERS, ETC.)
What is an easy and established way to
make (illegal) profits using cars?
Rethink The Threat Model
Today the narrative on vehicle cybersecurity is about foreign
actors and terrorists trying to kill us or cripple the infrastructure
BUT…
PIRATETIP #2: FOCUS
ON NEW FEATURES
THAT HAVE BEEN
ADDED FOR
CONVENIENCE ORTO
OFFER NEW SERVICES
Gone in 49 seconds
German Automotive Club (ADAC)Test of 237
vehicles: only ONE resisted keyfob attacks
• Alfa Romeo (2/2)
• Audi (17/17)
• BMW (30/30)
• Chevrolet (1/1)
• Citroen (5/5)
• DS Auto (1/1)
• Fiat (2/2)
• Ford (10/10)
• Honda (2/2)
• Hyundai (15/15)
• Infiniti (1/2)
• Peugeot (5/5)
• Renault (15/15)
• Seat (5/5)
• Skoda (9/9)
• SsangYong (2/2)
• Suzuki (6/6)
• Subaru (5/5)
• Tesla (2/2)
• Toyota (8/8)
• Volvo (12/13)
• VW (15/15)
• Jaguar (1/2)
• Jeep (1/1)
• KIA (14/14)
• Land Rover (1/4)
• Lexus (2/2)
• Mazda (6/7)
• Mercedes (9/9)
• Mini (4/4)
• Mitsubishi (3/3)
• Nissan (8/8)
• Opel (10/10)
PIRATETIP #3: INCLUDE
PHYSICAL ACCESSTO
YOURTHREAT MODEL
What is even scarier?
IT’S NOT A BUG, IT’S A FEATURE
Most scary: strangers get in other
people’s cars ALL THE TIME!
Source Driver (# users) Incidence % # opportunities
Rental 1m/day 99% 350m/year
Used sales 40m/year, 5Xvisits 50% 100m/year
Wholesaling 25m/year, 8X visits 50% 100m/year
Repos + total loss 3m/year, 10X visits 86% 25m/year
Fleets (ex. rental) 2m/year, 6X users 66% 8m/year
Service 269m 2X/year 50% 135m/year
Valet 269m 2X/year 50% 135m/year
TOTAL >700m/year
Estimates: USA only!
Is car hacking like this?
(need huge, complex tools to drill
through a 6-inch plate of steel?)
CarsBlues
$45, a few minutes, no coding
Or how about this?
Hi, my name is Sofia, I am 8 years old, and I am here
to teach you how to hack a car.
Working with the Auto-ISAC
• “Sealed” responsible
disclosure Feb-Jun ‘18
• Process guided by
Auto-ISAC
• 22 makes from many
OEMs involved (tests
conducted in NA +
EU)
• Agreed “weakness”
affects tens of
millions of vehicles in
circulation
YMMV: reactions to disclosure
That’s
cool!
That
sucked!
• <48h to
respond
• Met at R&D
center
• Had flown
people in from
across the globe
• Hack on video
• Very defensive
• Mocked hack
was nothing
new (so why
this “obvious”
vulnerability is
still around?)
• Unhappy about
not joining their
bug bounty
• Minimize risk in
front of
authorities
• Happens all the
time,
everywhere
• Worse with more
recently
manufactured
vehicles (people
sync more, more
data captured for
each vehicle
• Worse if vehicle
shared (rental,
carshare, pools,
etc.)
Plenty of Data to be Found
System absent
Percentage of sample
Not found or not
reported
System present,
personal info
present
396 vehicles
1
10 10
39
4
99
51
86
Rental US Auction UK auction
600+ vehicles 96 vehicles
MUST change the #ThreatModel
www.Privacy4Cars.com
Thoughts for future research…
CarsBlues gets
around three “pins”
Have working
hypothesis on
how to get
around 4th
layer of
defense and
hack ALL cars
CarsBluesII • Please use #CarsBlues
hashtag onTwitter if you
give CarsBlues (or
CarsBluesII) a go
• DM @Privacy4Cars if
you are interested in
collaborating
Some cool research
Thoughts for future research #2
While some have reported the fraudulent rentals as
“hacking” Car2go communications director Michael
Silverman made clear by email that no such hack
occurred. “None of our member’s personal or
confidential information has been compromised, and no
other SHARE NOW North American cities have been
affected,” Silverman commented.
Local investigative reporter Brad Edwards indicates that
the stolen cars were used to commit crimes, it would
seem he intends that to mean above and beyond grand
theft auto and alleged credit card fraud, I suppose.
The Car2go Mercedes were unlocked with the app, then.
Some speculate that this was done with stolen credit
card data. For their part, Car2go does not seem to
indicate that any app vulnerabilities existed, and claim
no customers should be worried about their data.
Our objective is to raise the public’s, industry’s, regulators’, and
advocates’ awareness on the issue of personal data collection, to
drive transparency, and to put safety nets in place for consumers
https://www.privacy4cars.com
PLEASE USETHIS INFORMATION RESPONSIBLY
Follow us:
@Privacy4Cars
Subscribe:
Privacy4Cars
Data should always be deleted before any vehicle handoff!

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Data in cars can be creepy – Hacker Halted 2019 – Andrea Amico

  • 1.
  • 2.
  • 3. Data in cars can be creepy…
  • 5.
  • 6. • Is killing the engine of a car while riding on the highway the only threat model?Who is best served by this narrative? • Are we sure a few hours of tinkering aren’t sufficient?Why use sophisticated approaches when simple does it?
  • 7. Who commits the most crimes? Adversary states or common criminals? PIRATETIP #1: FOCUS ON COMMON CRIMINALS (THIEVES, FRAUDSTERS, STALKERS, ETC.) What is an easy and established way to make (illegal) profits using cars? Rethink The Threat Model Today the narrative on vehicle cybersecurity is about foreign actors and terrorists trying to kill us or cripple the infrastructure BUT…
  • 8. PIRATETIP #2: FOCUS ON NEW FEATURES THAT HAVE BEEN ADDED FOR CONVENIENCE ORTO OFFER NEW SERVICES Gone in 49 seconds
  • 9. German Automotive Club (ADAC)Test of 237 vehicles: only ONE resisted keyfob attacks • Alfa Romeo (2/2) • Audi (17/17) • BMW (30/30) • Chevrolet (1/1) • Citroen (5/5) • DS Auto (1/1) • Fiat (2/2) • Ford (10/10) • Honda (2/2) • Hyundai (15/15) • Infiniti (1/2) • Peugeot (5/5) • Renault (15/15) • Seat (5/5) • Skoda (9/9) • SsangYong (2/2) • Suzuki (6/6) • Subaru (5/5) • Tesla (2/2) • Toyota (8/8) • Volvo (12/13) • VW (15/15) • Jaguar (1/2) • Jeep (1/1) • KIA (14/14) • Land Rover (1/4) • Lexus (2/2) • Mazda (6/7) • Mercedes (9/9) • Mini (4/4) • Mitsubishi (3/3) • Nissan (8/8) • Opel (10/10) PIRATETIP #3: INCLUDE PHYSICAL ACCESSTO YOURTHREAT MODEL What is even scarier? IT’S NOT A BUG, IT’S A FEATURE
  • 10. Most scary: strangers get in other people’s cars ALL THE TIME! Source Driver (# users) Incidence % # opportunities Rental 1m/day 99% 350m/year Used sales 40m/year, 5Xvisits 50% 100m/year Wholesaling 25m/year, 8X visits 50% 100m/year Repos + total loss 3m/year, 10X visits 86% 25m/year Fleets (ex. rental) 2m/year, 6X users 66% 8m/year Service 269m 2X/year 50% 135m/year Valet 269m 2X/year 50% 135m/year TOTAL >700m/year Estimates: USA only!
  • 11. Is car hacking like this? (need huge, complex tools to drill through a 6-inch plate of steel?)
  • 12. CarsBlues $45, a few minutes, no coding Or how about this?
  • 13. Hi, my name is Sofia, I am 8 years old, and I am here to teach you how to hack a car.
  • 14. Working with the Auto-ISAC • “Sealed” responsible disclosure Feb-Jun ‘18 • Process guided by Auto-ISAC • 22 makes from many OEMs involved (tests conducted in NA + EU) • Agreed “weakness” affects tens of millions of vehicles in circulation
  • 15. YMMV: reactions to disclosure That’s cool! That sucked! • <48h to respond • Met at R&D center • Had flown people in from across the globe • Hack on video • Very defensive • Mocked hack was nothing new (so why this “obvious” vulnerability is still around?) • Unhappy about not joining their bug bounty • Minimize risk in front of authorities
  • 16. • Happens all the time, everywhere • Worse with more recently manufactured vehicles (people sync more, more data captured for each vehicle • Worse if vehicle shared (rental, carshare, pools, etc.) Plenty of Data to be Found System absent Percentage of sample Not found or not reported System present, personal info present 396 vehicles 1 10 10 39 4 99 51 86 Rental US Auction UK auction 600+ vehicles 96 vehicles
  • 17. MUST change the #ThreatModel www.Privacy4Cars.com
  • 18. Thoughts for future research… CarsBlues gets around three “pins” Have working hypothesis on how to get around 4th layer of defense and hack ALL cars CarsBluesII • Please use #CarsBlues hashtag onTwitter if you give CarsBlues (or CarsBluesII) a go • DM @Privacy4Cars if you are interested in collaborating
  • 20. Thoughts for future research #2 While some have reported the fraudulent rentals as “hacking” Car2go communications director Michael Silverman made clear by email that no such hack occurred. “None of our member’s personal or confidential information has been compromised, and no other SHARE NOW North American cities have been affected,” Silverman commented. Local investigative reporter Brad Edwards indicates that the stolen cars were used to commit crimes, it would seem he intends that to mean above and beyond grand theft auto and alleged credit card fraud, I suppose. The Car2go Mercedes were unlocked with the app, then. Some speculate that this was done with stolen credit card data. For their part, Car2go does not seem to indicate that any app vulnerabilities existed, and claim no customers should be worried about their data.
  • 21. Our objective is to raise the public’s, industry’s, regulators’, and advocates’ awareness on the issue of personal data collection, to drive transparency, and to put safety nets in place for consumers https://www.privacy4cars.com PLEASE USETHIS INFORMATION RESPONSIBLY Follow us: @Privacy4Cars Subscribe: Privacy4Cars Data should always be deleted before any vehicle handoff!