The document discusses causal pluralism and proposes a "causal mosaic" approach to conceptualizing causality. It summarizes that:
1) Analyses of scientific practices report a plurality of concepts, meanings, sources of evidence, and methods related to causality across domains.
2) A "causal mosaic" can make philosophical sense of this pluralism by arranging "tiles" representing causal concepts according to the philosophical questions and scientific problems they address.
3) Manipulationism, the view that causality means invariance under intervention, is one tile in the mosaic that applies primarily to methodology and experimental problems rather than conceptual or metaphysical questions.
1. The mosaic of causal theory*
Federica Russo
Philosophy | Humanities | Amsterdam
russofederica.wordpress.com | @federicarusso
*Joint work with Phyllis Illari
2. Overview
Approaches to causality
Conceptual analysis, analysis of scientific practice
Causal pluralism
A plurality of pluralism
How to build a causal mosaic
Manipulationism in the mosaic
Assessing the debate and suggesting a way forward
2
4. Conceptual analysis
What explicates the concept of ‘causality’
What makes causal claims true
What is causality / are causes, metaphysically
>> Causal language | >> Causal intuitions
4
5. Causal language
Analyse occurrences of cause / causality in everyday language to
draw conclusions about meaning and use of the concept
A heir of Oxon phil language
Examples
Short-circuit and fire (Mackie’s INUS)
…
Some conclusions
Distinction between causes and conditions
…
5
6. Causal intuitions
Exploit intuitions to draw conclusions about the metaphysics
of causation from everyday or toy examples
A heir of the ‘Canberra Plan’
Examples
The ‘Billy and Suzy’ episodes
The assassins
…
Some conclusions
Two concepts of cause: production and dependence
Counterexamples undermine the counterfactual approach
…
6
7. Analysis of scientific practice
Growing
CitS / PSP / PI
Philosophical questions about causation (and other topics) are motivated by
methodological and practical problems in real science
Start from scientific practice to bottom up philosophy
Partly descriptive and partly normative
Examples
Causal assessment in medicine
Causal reasoning in quantitative social science
…
Some conclusions
Evidential components in causal assessment: mechanisms and difference-making
‘Variation’ (rather than regularity) guides causal reasoning
…
7
9. Making sense of
a vast intellectual enterprise
Diversity in philosophical theorising about causes
Long history, ups and downs
Many concepts
Expansion of philosophical theorising about causes
Beyond physics, attention to the special sciences, and medicine
Attention for questions about use, besides traditional metaphysics,
epistemology, and semantics
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10. How many concepts? Many!
Causality
Polysemic, thick concept
Causal verbs
Pulling, pushing, binding, …
Causal methods
Tracking what varies with what
Understanding what produces what, and how, and when
Different sources of evidence
Evidence of difference making, of production
…
10
13. Ad hoc pluralism
A concept for each scientific domain
Physics ?
Social science ?
Medicine ?
Biology ?
Any unifying concept? Irreducible different concepts?
13
14. Ad hoc monism?
The ‘epistemic’ turn:
From concepts of cause to evidential components
From causings in the world to causal beliefs
14
15. Pluralisms, de facto
Types of causing
Anscombian pluralism:
pulling, pushing, binding, …
Aristotelian causes
Concepts of causation
Hall: Dependence vs
production
Types of inferences
Inferential bases, inferential
targets, practices
Sources of evidence
Difference-making and
mechanisms
Methods for causal
inference
Quantitative, qualitative,
observational,
experimental, …
15
16. Anything does not go,
but something does
Look at the scientific practice:
Diversity of causes
Production and difference-making
Evidence
Causal methods
16
18. Philosophical Questions
Metaphysics
What is causality? What kind of things
are causes and effects?
Semantics
What does it mean that C causes E?
Epistemology
What notions guide causal reasoning?
How can we use C to explain E?
Methodology
How to establish whether C causes E?
Or how much of C causes E?
Use
What to do once we know that C
causes E?
Scientific Problems
Inference
Does C cause E? To what extent?
Prediction
What to expect if C does (not) cause E?
Explanation
How does C cause or prevent E?
Control
What factors to hold fixed to study the
relation between C and E?
Reasoning
What considerations about whether /
how / to what extent C causes E?
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21. Tiles for the
Causal Mosaic
…
necessary and sufficient;
levels; evidence;
probabilistic causality; counterfactuals;
manipulation and invariance;
processes; mechanisms; information
exogeneity; Simpson’s paradox;
dispositions;
regularity; variation;
action; inference;
validity; truth;
…
To be arranged by
Philosophical Questions
Metaphysics, Semantics,
Epistemology,
Methodology, Use
Scientific Problems
Inference, Prediction,
Explanation, Control,
Reasoning
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22. Unifying the fragments
into the causal mosaic
A (causal) mosaic is picture made of tiles
Each fragment has a role that
Is determined by the scientific challenge / philosophical
question it addresses
Stands in a relation with neighboring concepts
The causal mosaic is dynamic, partly depends on
scientists’ / philosophers’ perspectives
22
24. Philosophical consequences of
causal pluralism
Conceptual analysis
Building networks of concepts
No winning concepts
Epistemology
Constructionism
Philosophical argumentation
Use of examples and counterexamples
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25. Accounts of causality Counterexamples
Scope Relevant questions How many Found in the literature
All possible worlds.
What does causation
logically/metaphysically
mean?
One logically possible
example.
Witches casting spells;
Angels protecting
glasses.
Worlds close to the
actual world.
What is causation
metaphysically?
One metaphysically
possible example.
World with reverse
temporal direction;
Salmon’s moving spot of
light.
This world.
What is causation in this
world?
One or more real
examples.
Kinetic theory of gases /
quantum mechanics;
Billy and Suzy / bombing
the enemy town.
Some region in this
world.
What is causation in
biochemistry, or
physics?
A few real examples in
the relevant domain.
Causality in protein
synthesis mechanisms.
Some region of this
world at some time.
What kind of causal
explanation can we give
of the economic crisis in
1929? Can we give the
same kind of
explanation of the
economic crisis now?
A few real examples in
the relevant domain at
the relevant time;
Typical not skewed
examples.
Causality in the
discovery of protein
synthesis. Causality in
systems biological
approaches to protein
synthesis. 25
28. ‘Standard’ manipulationism
Causality is / means invariance under intervention
X causes Y if, wiggling X, Y wiggles, and the relation between
X and Y remains stable
X causes Y if, were we to wiggle X, Y would wiggle, and the
relation between X and Y would remain stable
28
P V = n R T
29. Manipulationism under debate
Where does this apply?
Physics, economics, biology, …, anywhere?
What intervention?
Possible, feasible, real, ideal, imaginary?
What philosophical questions does it answer?
Conceptual analysis, metaphysics, methodology?
What scientific problem does it address?
Inference, control, reasoning?
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32. Pluralisms
Two traditions in philosophical investigation about
causality
Conceptual analysis
Analysis of scientific practice
Analyses of scientific practices report a plurality of
pluralisms
In the methods, concepts, meanings, sources of evidence,
…
Can we make (philosophical) sense of such pluralism?
32
33. Causal mosaics
(Re)Locate causal tiles according to the
philosophical questions and scientific
problems addressed
Causal mosaics: many, and changing
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34. Liberalising methodologies
Philosophical traditions and methodological approaches
in context
Non-neutral philosophical methodology
Philosophy (of causality)
Inclusive, collaborative, engaging (with the sciences)
34
Philosophers have long tried to pin down the one meaning of causality. Invariably, other philosophers offered counterexamples to undermine these monist accounts. Thus, to overcome these difficulties, other philosophers still have proposed pluralist approaches to causality. But is causal pluralism a viable solution? In this talk I argue that we need an altogether different approach to causal pluralism. I suggest that philosophical theorising about causation has to support scientific methodology in providing answers to key challenges: inference, explanation, prediction, control, and reasoning. To do so, philosophical theorising has to carefully distinguish epistemological, metaphysical, and methodological questions about causality. This leads me to delineate a pluralistic understanding of causal theory, in analogy with the construction of a mosaic. In a mosaic, each single tile is essential to build a picture, and each single tile is meaningful when lodged in the appropriate position. I offer a reassessment of the debate on manipulationist theories of causation to show how to build a causal mosaic.