![Processes in social science?
Russo (2009, p.26):
The need to look directly at social scientists’ work was motivated by a
possible difference between causal claims that involve reasonably clear
causal mechanisms and causal claims that do not. I went through five case
studies, and it turned out that none of them contains concepts typical of
aleatory causality in order to get an understanding of causal relations—to
borrow Salmon’s terminology again. Instead, statistical causality is
definitively preferred. However, to prefer statistical causality does not ipso
facto rule out mechanisms from the causal talk. […] the question is not
whether or not we aim at identifying causal mechanisms, rather, how do
we come to identify them. Causal mechanisms are not identified
through causal processes and interactions, but, according to the
social scientists’ practice, they are statistically modelled.
10](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/sansebastian-mechanisms-120705124449-phpapp01/75/San-sebastian-mechanisms-10-2048.jpg)
![Howick:
Mechanistic reasoning: involves an inference from
mechanisms to claims that an intervention
produces a patient-relevant outcome. Such
reasoning will involve an inferential chain linking the
intervention (such as antiarrhythmic drugs) with a
clinical outcome. (2011, p.128)
[…] If, as Russo and Williamson appear to argue,
mechanistic reasoning is required to establish causal
claims, then it is reasonable to doubt the causal claim
supported by strong comparative clinical studies. […]
My argument is that mechanistic reasoning is not
necessary to establish causal claims. (p.131)
24](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/sansebastian-mechanisms-120705124449-phpapp01/75/San-sebastian-mechanisms-24-2048.jpg)
San sebastian mechanisms
This document provides an overview of mechanisms in the sciences. It discusses prominent definitions of mechanisms, why mechanisms are important in sciences beyond physics, examples of mechanisms studied in biology and social science, what mechanisms are used for in explanation, evidence of mechanisms, the relationship between mechanisms and reasoning, pluralism vs monism in conceptualizing mechanisms, and the practical scientific use of mechanisms. The document serves as a field guide to the key concepts and debates around mechanisms across different domains of science.
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San sebastian mechanisms
- 1. Mechanisms in theSciences: A Field Guide Federica Russo Center Leo Apostel, VUB Centre for Reasoning, Kent
- 2. Overview 1. The receivedview 6. Evidence of mechanisms 2. The consensus 7. Mechanisms and 3. Why mechanisms? reasoning 4. Mechanisms on the stage 8. Pluralism and monism 5. What are mechanisms for? 9. Practical (scientific) use 2
- 3.
- 4. Machamer, Darden andCraver: ‘Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.’ (Machamer, Darden and Craver 2000 p3.) Glennan: ‘A mechanism for a behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, where the interactions between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating generalizations.’ (Glennan 2002b pS344.) Bechtel and Abrahamsen: ‘A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its component parts, component operations, and their organization. The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena.’ (Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 p423.) 4
- 5.
- 6. Illari& Williamson: A mechanism for a phenomenon is composed of entities and activitiesorganized so that they are responsible for the phenomenon.’ (2012, p.120) Illari& Williamson give up on: Regularity Start up, finishing conditions Complex system Mechanistic explanation: Identification of the phenomenon Identification of entities and activities involved Identification of the organisation 6
- 7.
- 8. Once upon atime: process theories Causation in physics Salmon-Dowe approach A development of Russell-Reichenbach (world-lines, at-at theory) Salmon: ‘put the cause into because’ The because is given by the physical, causal process (Ontic explanation) 8
- 9. Processes in biology? MDC(2000, p. 7): Although we acknowledge the possibility that Salmon’s analysis may be all there is to certain fundamental types of interactions in physics, his analysis is silent as to the character of the productivity in the activities investigated by many other sciences. Mere talk of transmission of a mark or exchange of a conserved quantity does not exhaust what these scientists know about productive activities and about how activities effect regular changes in mechanisms. 9
- 10. Processes in socialscience? Russo (2009, p.26): The need to look directly at social scientists’ work was motivated by a possible difference between causal claims that involve reasonably clear causal mechanisms and causal claims that do not. I went through five case studies, and it turned out that none of them contains concepts typical of aleatory causality in order to get an understanding of causal relations—to borrow Salmon’s terminology again. Instead, statistical causality is definitively preferred. However, to prefer statistical causality does not ipso facto rule out mechanisms from the causal talk. […] the question is not whether or not we aim at identifying causal mechanisms, rather, how do we come to identify them. Causal mechanisms are not identified through causal processes and interactions, but, according to the social scientists’ practice, they are statistically modelled. 10
- 11. 4 MECHANISMS ON THESTAGE 11
- 12. Biology and neuroscience Bechtel,Craver, Darden, MDC, … Functional individuation Mechanistic explanation Decomposition / re-composition … 12
- 13. Social science Analytical sociologists,Little, Russo (&Mouchart, Wunsch), … Mechanisms and Methodological individualism Statistical modelling Social regularities Human action Social ontology … 13
- 14. 5 WHAT ARE MECHANISMSFOR? 14
- 15. Explanation Ontic and epistemicmechanistic explanations Craver, Bechtel (biology / neuroscience) Illari: ‘reconciliation’ of the ontic and epistemic Russo et al (social science) Explain … how? Organisation, recursive decomposition Backwards, downwards, or upwards 15
- 16. Self-rated health inthe Baltic countries 1994-1999 16
- 17. What are thecauses of self-rated health in the Baltic countries in the ‘90s? X Y Take the joint probability distribution + Make assumptions P(Education, Locus of Control, Physical Health, …, Self-Rated Health) P(X1, X1, X3, …Y) perform a recursive decomposition of the type P(Y)= P(X1) P(X3) P(X2|X3) … P(Y|X2, X3) Read as: Self-Rated Health depends on Education; on Locus of Control through Psychological distress; on Alcohol Consumption which also depends on Physical Health; … 17
- 18. Speaking of ‘upwards’ Darden: Often biologists engage in much investigative work to discover the level at which a given mechanism operates. Geneticists worked to find the operative level for genetic linkage, ruling out the coupling of paired alleles and the reduplication of germ cells and ruling in chromosomal mechanisms (Darden 1991). Genes are linked because they ride along on chromosomes in meiotic mechanisms. In immunology, the working entities in clonal selection were at first hypothesized to be self-replicating protein molecules but were later found to be self-reproducing immune cells (Darden 2006, Chapter 8). These two examples show that biologists do not always discover working entities in mechanisms by going to a smaller size level; sometimes the operative units are intermediate or larger than at first hypothesized: not genes but chromosomes, not molecules but cells. (2008, p. 961) 18
- 19. Causal assessment The (in)famousRusso-WilliamsonThesis To establish a causal claim we typically need evidence of mechanisms and of difference-making An epistemological thesis about evidence for causal claims First formulated for the health sciences, but can be extended to other sciences See however criticisms in the literature 19
- 20. Arguments for RWT Medicalpractice (IARC) History of medicine (Semmelweis) Epidemiology guidelines (Hill) 20
- 21.
- 22. “Disambiguating RWT” Evidence ofdifference-making Evidence ofmechanisms Plausible mechanisms, rather than confirmed Methods generating the evidence vs evidence itself Difference-making / Mechanisms A conceptual distinction In practice, highly intertwined 22
- 23.
- 24. Howick: Mechanisticreasoning: involves an inference from mechanisms to claims that an intervention produces a patient-relevant outcome. Such reasoning will involve an inferential chain linking the intervention (such as antiarrhythmic drugs) with a clinical outcome. (2011, p.128) […] If, as Russo and Williamson appear to argue, mechanistic reasoning is required to establish causal claims, then it is reasonable to doubt the causal claim supported by strong comparative clinical studies. […] My argument is that mechanistic reasoning is not necessary to establish causal claims. (p.131) 24
- 25. Spot the odd-manout Causal assessment is based on evidence; The evidence required concerns: Mechanisms Difference making Mechanistic reasoning Inferential Not just about linking interventions and clinical outcomes 25
- 26. Nota bene … Knowledgeof mechanisms is never ‘complete’ Evidence is never ‘necessary’ The epistemological basis of causal assessment does not always coincide with reasons for action 26
- 27.
- 28. Conceptual pluralism andmonism Evidentialpluralism, conceptual monism From RWT to the epistemic theory Information theory? An account of production 28
- 29.
- 30. Mechanisms in theevidence hierarchy The evidence hierarchy: the pillar of EBM The role of mechanisms (from top to bottom) ‘Reinforced concrete’ 30
- 31.
- 32. Diagnosis Medical diagnosis Diagnosis ofdysfunction in organisational science Enterprise Engineering and CIAO! network Cooperation & Interoperability - Architecture & Ontology 32
- 33.
- 34. Conceptualisation ‘EnviroGenomarkers’ Project Mapping the evolution of biomarkers from exposure to early clinical changes to disease development A combination of processes and mechanisms 34
- 35.
- 36. To sum upand conclude 36
- 37. Mechanisms: a (hot) field in phil sci Reasons develop the field Mechanisms in contexts A growing interest No mechanisms in isolation Important philosophical distinctions No panacea Great applicability to the Sharpening a conceptual sciences tool for a better science 37
- 38.
Editor's Notes
- #2 Field guide, gentle introductionSystematise my knowledge of the field
- #3 Many topicsMade a selection: subjective – what I find most interesting / important in the debateHappy to skip some or linger more on others depending on your interest
- #9 What kind of phenomena to account for causallyWhat kind of phenomena to exclude (causally)Mention ontic explanation – it will come back
- #11 Recall the context: when I started, Salmon was still the dominant paradigm
- #13 What concept of function – role-functions, isolated descriptionsMechanistic explanation in all its variants – see e.g. Craver on inter-level or on mutual manipulabilityDecomposition/re-composition – discovery and confirmation
- #16 Organisation: an epistemic aspect: the description of the functioning does the explainingRecursive decomposition can be interpreted as a mechanismBackwards: aetiological senseDownwards: go down into the mechanismsBut also go up to the mechanism!
- #29 Conceptual pluralism:Causation one thing, many wordsDepending on scientific area?Monism: one thing one conceptAccounts of dependence vs accounts of production
- #33 Interestingly, CIAO! Seeks to develop diagnosis along the lines of RWT.Comparisons between social systems and designed systems (enterprises) – functional architecture, functional individuation much easier