The document discusses the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Soviet Union. It provides background on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and describes how the disaster occurred due to a safety test conducted on April 26, 1986. Serious communication lapses between personnel at different levels contributed to management mistakes and delays in addressing the problems. The summaries highlights how barriers in communication, wrong assumptions, and a reluctance to accept warnings from experts led to the reactor explosion and its devastating aftermath.

1. Group 10
Vineeth Jose
Ajai Mohan
Deepak J Prasad
Arjun S C
Jithu Kiran K
1

2. INTRODUCTION
• Chernobyl is a closed power plant near the ghost city
Pripyat, Northern Ukraine(then part of USSR)
• Chernobyl power plant was the best performing nuclear
power plant in USSR
• The Chernobyl disaster was caused by a nuclear accident
that occurred on Saturday 26 April 1986
• The accident started during a safety test on an RBMK-
Nuclear reactor (Reactor no. 4), which was commonly used
throughout the Soviet –Union
• Worst disaster in the history of nuclear power generation
(6000 Thyroid-cancer patients, $234 billion in damages)
• The real reason behind the collapse of the Soviet Union,
according to Mikhail Gorbachev, former General Secretary
of the Communist Party.
• Serious communication lapses happened before and after
the disaster.
Deepak J Prasad

3. Chernobyl was not a natural disaster; it was a man-made
one. When management is inept, mistakes can happen
and go uncorrected until the problem becomes severe. Yet
while management may fail, it is often the employees –
the unsung women and men of the organization – who
meet the challenge and correct the problem.
- John Baldoni
RATIONALE
• Area of study is the communication barriers happened at
different organizational level
• To understand how the barriers affected the decision-
making power of personnel
• How managerial incompetency combined with mistakes
from the employees lead directly to the destruction of
reactor
• Personal Ambitions have become first priorities
• Fatal Senior Management mistakes from the State
Deepak J Prasad

4. CHERNOBYL
1986
The truth doesn’t care about our
needs or wants – it doesn’t care
about our governments, our
ideologies, our religions – to lie in
wait for all time. This at last is the
gift of Chernobyl

5. THE REACTOR WAS BUILT BY
COMPROMISING THE
SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AND
CONTINUOUS WARNING
FROM EXPERTS
The
CHERNOBYL
EXPLOSION
April 26th, 1986
 The reactor was built using RBMK-1000 Design.Which
is highly unstable.
 It was operated with inadequately trained personal.
Viktor Bryukhanov –The Director of the Project.
 The test was carried out under the supervision of Dy.
Chief Engineer Anatoly Dyatlov, Unit 4 Shift Chief
Aleksandr Akimov was the and Control Engineer
Leonid F.Toptunov.
Jithu Kiran

6. They used very old technology and
international organizations concerned
about the safety send their insights but
are dropped as it had to pass too many
government authorities.
(Intermediate Stations)
Chernobyl director Viktor Bryukhanov
and his senior manager allotted Reactor
no 4 early so that he and his boss get
some reward. Safety came second.
(Categorical Thinking)
This was a prestigious project design for
USSR Govt. When the dispute regarding
the design of the reactor arise from the
side of US and other group of competing
nations USSR was not ready to accept.
(Negative Tendency)
Personal interest beyond
Safety
Prestige Issue for USSR
Valid information was hidden
6
The staffs associated with the testing are
not qualified for undertaking this big
process. To interpret the information
from the top level hierarchy of experts
was difficult for them.
(Differing Background, Language
Barrier)
Absence of Experts
Jithu Kiran

7. What is happening in control room not
known to the ones outside.
When first explosion happened, they
thought the problem was with the
hydraulic blast.
(Wrong Assumption)
The Dy. Chief Engineer was under the
assumption that only mistake was with
the men operating the reactor not with
the reactor itself. The chances of accident
are estimated to be one in a million.
(Wrong Assumption)
Control Engineer Leonid F. Toptunov
warned Dy. Chief Engineer Anatoly
Dyatlov about the power drop but the
superior was not ready to accept their
word. Since he was the superior and
experienced person but Toptunov was
just 26 years old.
(Closed Mind)
Unaware of the mistake
Superior – Subordinate
Issues
Miscommunication between the
control room and ground staff
7
The ground staff saw the rods pushed
outside tried to pass the message but
others were not attentive to the
message. They did not pay any attention
to it.
(Poor Listening Skills,
Psychological Barriers)
Message was not attended
DURING
THE TEST
Jithu Kiran

8. The radiation levels were above limit of available
dosimeters. The reactor crew chief ignored
evidences of graphite, reactor fuel etc. and
assumed it was dosimeters showing wrong
reading.
They were not told how dangerously
radioactive the smoke and the debris
were, and may not even have known that
the accident was anything more than a
regular electrical fire
Decision to shut down reactor 3 by chief
of shift after fire in reactor 4 was
overruled by chief engineer and
operators were made to work for hours
Firefighters got selective
information
Adjacent reactor was
working for hours after
accident
Measuring radiation levels
8
Ajay Mohan

9. • Meltdown of Core realised
after 13 hours of explosion
• Delay in Action
• Govt denied the seriousness
of the situation
9
Arjun C S

10. Weddings were going on and
children were playing in
open and everyone was
unaware of the seriousness
of the situation
Official news paper of
communist party of soviet
union ‘Pravda’ reported
Chernobyl after two weeks
Too many transfer station
delayed the process of
getting permission for
Evacuation.
They were not informed the
reason for evacuation and no
proper instructions were
given.
Evacuation started after
36 hours
50 Minute Notice
Evacuation
Seriousness Unexplained Delayed National Media
report
10
Arjun C S

11. Barriers in
communication
Selective and restrictive
information
Wrong assumption Negative tendency
1 2 3
11
Fear of superiors
4
Categorical thinking
5
Wrong inferences
6
Arjun C S

12.  Valery Legasov committed suicide one
day before he was due to announce his
results of the investigation into the
causes of the disaster
Twenty more Nuclear power plant
with similar flaw must have pushed
him
12
Arjun C S

13. How Chernobyl
could have been
prevented?
13
• If the staff of the Chernobyl had been better
trained.
• If the soviet Government had learnt from the
lessons of past and if they had not been so
averse to spending money.
• If they had appointed a communication
specialist.
Vineeth Jose

14. Conclusion:
14
• World’sWorst Nuclear Disaster to date.
• SpreadToxic power for 77Thousand
Square Miles.
• Chernobyl zone is Inhabitable for up to
20,000 years.
• Tens of thousands of people have been
exposed to radiation.
Vineeth Jose

15. Chernobyl serves
as a reminder of
what can happen
when a safety
culture becomes
unhinged due to
communication
barriers.
15

16. “Every lie we
tell incurs a
debt to the
truth.
Sooner or later,
that debt is
paid.” 16
Vineeth Jose