Cyber attacks are a real and growing threat to businesses and an increasing number of attacks take place at application layer. The best defence against is to develop applications where security is incorporated as part of the software development lifecycle.
The OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls project is designed to integrate security in the software development lifecycle. In this special presentation for PHPNW, based on v2.0 released this year, you will learn how to incorporate security into your software projects.
Recommended to all developers who want to learn the security techniques that can help them build more secure applications.
OWASP Top 10 2017 rc1 - The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security RisksAndre Van Klaveren
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A presentation of the OWASP Top 10 2017 release candidate, expected to be finalized in summer 2017. Presented at the St. Louis CYBER meetup on Wednesday, June 7, 2017.
Cyber attacks are a real and growing threat to businesses and an increasing number of attacks take place at application layer. The best defence against is to develop applications where security is incorporated as part of the software development lifecycle.
The OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls project is designed to integrate security in the software development lifecycle. In this special presentation for PHPNW, based on v2.0 released this year, you will learn how to incorporate security into your software projects.
Recommended to all developers who want to learn the security techniques that can help them build more secure applications.
OWASP Top 10 2017 rc1 - The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security RisksAndre Van Klaveren
Â
A presentation of the OWASP Top 10 2017 release candidate, expected to be finalized in summer 2017. Presented at the St. Louis CYBER meetup on Wednesday, June 7, 2017.
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 Top 10 web application security risksKun-Da Wu
Â
The OWASP team recently released the 2017 revised version of the ten most critical web application security risks. This presentation brief the OWASP Top 10 - 2017 for you to learn more about these important security issues.
A walkthrough of web application defense strategies, based around the Open Web Application Security Project's top 10 list. Presented to the Classic City Developers Meetup in August 2017.
Session on OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities presented by Aarti Bala and Saman Fatima. The session covered the below 4 vulnerabilities -
Injection,
Sensitive Data Exposure
Cross Site Scripting
Insufficient Logging and Monitoring
Introduction to Web Application Penetration TestingAnurag Srivastava
Â
Web Application Pentesting
* Process to check and penetrate the security of a web application or a website
* process involves an active analysis of the application for any weaknesses, technical flaws, or vulnerabilities
* Any security issues that are found will be presented to the system owner, together with an assessment of the impact, a proposal for mitigation or a technical solution.
Beyond OWASP Top 10 - Hack In Paris 2017Aaron Hnatiw
Â
The OWASP Top 10 is the standard first reference we give web developers who are interested in making their applications more secure. It is also the categorization scheme we give to web vulnerabilities on our security assessment reports. And finally, and perhaps most frighteningly, it is the most common framework used by organizations for securing their web applications. But what if there was more to web application security than the OWASP Top 10? In this talk, we will discuss vulnerabilities that don't fit into the OWASP Top 10 categories, but are just as dangerous if present in a web application. Developers and pentesters will benefit from this talk, as both exploits and mitigations will be covered for each of the vulnerabilities.
Beyond OWASP Top 10 - TASK October 2017Aaron Hnatiw
Â
The OWASP Top 10 is the standard first reference we give web developers who are interested in making their applications more secure. It is also the categorization scheme we give to web vulnerabilities on our security assessment reports. And finally, and perhaps most frighteningly, it is the most common framework used by organizations for securing their web applications. But what if there was more to web application security than the OWASP Top 10? In this talk, we will discuss vulnerabilities that don't fit into the OWASP Top 10 categories, but are just as dangerous if present in a web application. Developers and pentesters will benefit from this talk, as both exploits and mitigations will be covered for each of the vulnerabilities.
OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities 2017- AppTranaIshan Mathur
Â
Our latest OWASP Top Vulnerabilities Guide updated for new 2017 issues serves as a practical guide to understanding OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities and preparing a response plan to counter these vulnerabilities.
The OWASP Top Ten is the de-facto web application security standard because it reflects the evolving threat landscape, providing organizations a framework to manage and mitigate application security risk.
This presentation examines the critical newcomers and pesky incumbents from both an offensive and defensive perspective. Our experts share their insight on how to harden Web applications and align your program towards OWASP compliance.
OWASP Top 10 - 2017 Top 10 web application security risksKun-Da Wu
Â
The OWASP team recently released the 2017 revised version of the ten most critical web application security risks. This presentation brief the OWASP Top 10 - 2017 for you to learn more about these important security issues.
A walkthrough of web application defense strategies, based around the Open Web Application Security Project's top 10 list. Presented to the Classic City Developers Meetup in August 2017.
Session on OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities presented by Aarti Bala and Saman Fatima. The session covered the below 4 vulnerabilities -
Injection,
Sensitive Data Exposure
Cross Site Scripting
Insufficient Logging and Monitoring
Introduction to Web Application Penetration TestingAnurag Srivastava
Â
Web Application Pentesting
* Process to check and penetrate the security of a web application or a website
* process involves an active analysis of the application for any weaknesses, technical flaws, or vulnerabilities
* Any security issues that are found will be presented to the system owner, together with an assessment of the impact, a proposal for mitigation or a technical solution.
Beyond OWASP Top 10 - Hack In Paris 2017Aaron Hnatiw
Â
The OWASP Top 10 is the standard first reference we give web developers who are interested in making their applications more secure. It is also the categorization scheme we give to web vulnerabilities on our security assessment reports. And finally, and perhaps most frighteningly, it is the most common framework used by organizations for securing their web applications. But what if there was more to web application security than the OWASP Top 10? In this talk, we will discuss vulnerabilities that don't fit into the OWASP Top 10 categories, but are just as dangerous if present in a web application. Developers and pentesters will benefit from this talk, as both exploits and mitigations will be covered for each of the vulnerabilities.
Beyond OWASP Top 10 - TASK October 2017Aaron Hnatiw
Â
The OWASP Top 10 is the standard first reference we give web developers who are interested in making their applications more secure. It is also the categorization scheme we give to web vulnerabilities on our security assessment reports. And finally, and perhaps most frighteningly, it is the most common framework used by organizations for securing their web applications. But what if there was more to web application security than the OWASP Top 10? In this talk, we will discuss vulnerabilities that don't fit into the OWASP Top 10 categories, but are just as dangerous if present in a web application. Developers and pentesters will benefit from this talk, as both exploits and mitigations will be covered for each of the vulnerabilities.
OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities 2017- AppTranaIshan Mathur
Â
Our latest OWASP Top Vulnerabilities Guide updated for new 2017 issues serves as a practical guide to understanding OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities and preparing a response plan to counter these vulnerabilities.
The OWASP Top Ten is the de-facto web application security standard because it reflects the evolving threat landscape, providing organizations a framework to manage and mitigate application security risk.
This presentation examines the critical newcomers and pesky incumbents from both an offensive and defensive perspective. Our experts share their insight on how to harden Web applications and align your program towards OWASP compliance.
Most software developers have heard about OWASP Top Ten, describing the 10 most critical security vulnerabilities that should be avoided in web applications.
However, in order to prevent them, developers must be aware of the proactive controls that should be incorporated from early stages of software development lifecycle.
This talk briefly discusses the OWASP Top Ten Proactive Controls and then maps them to the respective OWASP Vulnerabilities that each of them addresses.
OWASP has identified the top 10 security risks for web applications. How do we as testers look for these problems in our application? This presentation discusses some ideas.
Presentation that fellow Magenicon Zach Bergman and I did at the Twin Cities Quality Assurance Association meeting in January.
Scared Straight: Mitigating OWASP Top 10 with PHPJohn Kary
Â
Overview of OWASP and its Top 10 Security Vulnerabilities. Strategies for protecting against common web application security vulnerabilities.
Presented at the January 2011 KU Web Developers meeting.
In this session, the focus will be on OWASP Top 10 mobile risks and prevention tips. Hackersâ exploitation of these most common mobile vulnerabilities will be demonstrated in the session.
What the New OWASP Top 10 2013 and Latest X-Force Report Mean for App SecIBM Security
Â
Despite being on vulnerability âTop 10â lists for many years, application vulnerabilities such as SQL injection and Cross-Site scripting continue to be significant attack paradigms for organizational data breaches. In fact, the IBM X-Force 2013 Mid-Year Trend and Risk Report confirmed that SQL Injection (SQLi) remained the most common paradigm for attackers to breach organizational security controls. Meanwhile, Cross-Site Scripting continued to be the most common type of application vulnerability.
In this session, we review the latest trends in application and mobile security vulnerabilities, and how to combat them with improved security awareness, organizational controls and application security testing technologies. We also address how to improve application security on your organizationâs mobile devices.
General Method of HTTP Messages Authentication Based on Hash Functions in Web...Denis Kolegov
Â
HTTP messages authentication method for web applications is offered. The method can protect web
application against attack based on authentication and authorization weaknesses. It is
showed how HTTP authentication can be expressed in the terms of the attribute based
access control model (ABAC). Implementation of the ABAC access control decision mechanism can use an authentication cryptographic protocol.
Rebooting Software Development - OWASP AppSecUSA Nick Galbreath
Â
If we are ever going to get ahead of the whack-a-mole security vulnerability game, we, as security professionals need to start getting involved more in the development of software. Let's review the origins of the traditional software development, and what assumptions are made. Then we'll review if those assumptions still hold for modern web applications, and what problems they cause, especially for security. Continuous deployment helps address these problems and allows for faster, more secure development. It's more than just "pushing code a lot", when done correctly it can be transformative to the organization. We'll discuss what continuous deployment is, how to get started, and what components are needed to make it successful, and secure.
Update on progress of the 4 OWASP OWTF GSoC 2013 projects, with an intro overview about OWTF and some examples on how the OWASP Testing Guide is being covered at the moment towards the end.
OWASP Free Training - SF2014 - Keary and ManicoEoin Keary
Â
A free application security class delivered by world renowned experts: Eoin Keary and Jim Manico.
This class has been delivered to over 1000 people in 2014 alone.
The OWASP Top Ten is an expert consensus of the most critical web application security threats. If properly understood, it is an invaluable framework to prioritize efforts and address flaws that expose your organization to attack.
This webcast series presents the OWASP Top 10 in an abridged format, interpreting the threats for you and providing actionable offensive and defensive best practices. It is ideal for all IT/development stakeholders that want to take a risk-based approach to Web application security.
How to Test for the OWASP Top Ten webcast focuses on tell tale markers of the OWASP Top Ten and techniques to hunt them down:
⢠Vulnerability anatomy â how they present themselves
⢠Analysis of vulnerability root cause and protection schemas
⢠Test procedures to validate susceptibility (or not) for each threat
OWASP Top 10 vs Drupal - OWASP Benelux 2012ZIONSECURITY
Â
OWASP Top 10 vs Drupal
Abstract: Drupal is the most used and well-known open source content management system in the world. Created by Dries Buytaert years ago it has grown with the support of a big community. Drupal 7 is already released and there is an entire ecosystem for Drupal and Drupal web agencies.
During this presentation we will discuss the findings of an automated static code analysis of Drupal 6 and Drupal 7 and how Drupal protects against the OWASP Top 10 Application Security Risks. We will explain the security weaknesses that remain when you use Drupal and what you can implement to have a secure cloud server running Drupal.
Vulnerabilities in modern web applicationsNiyas Nazar
Â
Microsoft powerpoint presentation for BTech academic seminar.This seminar discuses about penetration testing, penetration testing tools, web application vulnerabilities, impact of vulnerabilities and security recommendations.
Avoiding Application Attacks: A Guide to Preventing the OWASP Top 10 from Hap...IBM Security
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View the on-demand recording: http://securityintelligence.com/events/avoiding-application-attacks/
Your organization is running fast to build your business. You are developing new applications faster than ever and utilizing new cloud-based development platforms. Your customers and employees expect applications that are powerful, highly usable, and secure. Yet this need for speed coupled with new development techniques is increasing the likelihood of security issues.
How can you meet the needs of speed to market with security? Hear Paul Ionescu, IBM Security, Ethical Hacking Team Lead discuss:
- How application attacks work
- Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) goals
- How to build defenses into your applications
- The 10 most common web application attacks, including demos of the infamous Shellshock and Heartbleed vulnerabilities
- How to test for and prevent these types of threats
Application Security session given as part of the Solvay Executive Master in IT Management.
Explaining application security challenges for web, mobile, cloud and internet of things.
Positioning OWASP SAMM as structural and measurable framework to get application security under control in the complete application lifecycle.
Search and Society: Reimagining Information Access for Radical FuturesBhaskar Mitra
Â
The field of Information retrieval (IR) is currently undergoing a transformative shift, at least partly due to the emerging applications of generative AI to information access. In this talk, we will deliberate on the sociotechnical implications of generative AI for information access. We will argue that there is both a critical necessity and an exciting opportunity for the IR community to re-center our research agendas on societal needs while dismantling the artificial separation between the work on fairness, accountability, transparency, and ethics in IR and the rest of IR research. Instead of adopting a reactionary strategy of trying to mitigate potential social harms from emerging technologies, the community should aim to proactively set the research agenda for the kinds of systems we should build inspired by diverse explicitly stated sociotechnical imaginaries. The sociotechnical imaginaries that underpin the design and development of information access technologies needs to be explicitly articulated, and we need to develop theories of change in context of these diverse perspectives. Our guiding future imaginaries must be informed by other academic fields, such as democratic theory and critical theory, and should be co-developed with social science scholars, legal scholars, civil rights and social justice activists, and artists, among others.
PHP Frameworks: I want to break free (IPC Berlin 2024)Ralf Eggert
Â
In this presentation, we examine the challenges and limitations of relying too heavily on PHP frameworks in web development. We discuss the history of PHP and its frameworks to understand how this dependence has evolved. The focus will be on providing concrete tips and strategies to reduce reliance on these frameworks, based on real-world examples and practical considerations. The goal is to equip developers with the skills and knowledge to create more flexible and future-proof web applications. We'll explore the importance of maintaining autonomy in a rapidly changing tech landscape and how to make informed decisions in PHP development.
This talk is aimed at encouraging a more independent approach to using PHP frameworks, moving towards a more flexible and future-proof approach to PHP development.
Key Trends Shaping the Future of Infrastructure.pdfCheryl Hung
Â
Keynote at DIGIT West Expo, Glasgow on 29 May 2024.
Cheryl Hung, ochery.com
Sr Director, Infrastructure Ecosystem, Arm.
The key trends across hardware, cloud and open-source; exploring how these areas are likely to mature and develop over the short and long-term, and then considering how organisations can position themselves to adapt and thrive.
UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series, part 3DianaGray10
Â
Welcome to UiPath Test Automation using UiPath Test Suite series part 3. In this session, we will cover desktop automation along with UI automation.
Topics covered:
UI automation Introduction,
UI automation Sample
Desktop automation flow
Pradeep Chinnala, Senior Consultant Automation Developer @WonderBotz and UiPath MVP
Deepak Rai, Automation Practice Lead, Boundaryless Group and UiPath MVP
GDG Cloud Southlake #33: Boule & Rebala: Effective AppSec in SDLC using Deplo...James Anderson
Â
Effective Application Security in Software Delivery lifecycle using Deployment Firewall and DBOM
The modern software delivery process (or the CI/CD process) includes many tools, distributed teams, open-source code, and cloud platforms. Constant focus on speed to release software to market, along with the traditional slow and manual security checks has caused gaps in continuous security as an important piece in the software supply chain. Today organizations feel more susceptible to external and internal cyber threats due to the vast attack surface in their applications supply chain and the lack of end-to-end governance and risk management.
The software team must secure its software delivery process to avoid vulnerability and security breaches. This needs to be achieved with existing tool chains and without extensive rework of the delivery processes. This talk will present strategies and techniques for providing visibility into the true risk of the existing vulnerabilities, preventing the introduction of security issues in the software, resolving vulnerabilities in production environments quickly, and capturing the deployment bill of materials (DBOM).
Speakers:
Bob Boule
Robert Boule is a technology enthusiast with PASSION for technology and making things work along with a knack for helping others understand how things work. He comes with around 20 years of solution engineering experience in application security, software continuous delivery, and SaaS platforms. He is known for his dynamic presentations in CI/CD and application security integrated in software delivery lifecycle.
Gopinath Rebala
Gopinath Rebala is the CTO of OpsMx, where he has overall responsibility for the machine learning and data processing architectures for Secure Software Delivery. Gopi also has a strong connection with our customers, leading design and architecture for strategic implementations. Gopi is a frequent speaker and well-known leader in continuous delivery and integrating security into software delivery.
Dev Dives: Train smarter, not harder â active learning and UiPath LLMs for do...UiPathCommunity
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đĽ Speed, accuracy, and scaling â discover the superpowers of GenAI in action with UiPath Document Understanding and Communications Miningâ˘:
See how to accelerate model training and optimize model performance with active learning
Learn about the latest enhancements to out-of-the-box document processing â with little to no training required
Get an exclusive demo of the new family of UiPath LLMs â GenAI models specialized for processing different types of documents and messages
This is a hands-on session specifically designed for automation developers and AI enthusiasts seeking to enhance their knowledge in leveraging the latest intelligent document processing capabilities offered by UiPath.
Speakers:
đ¨âđŤ Andras Palfi, Senior Product Manager, UiPath
đŠâđŤ Lenka Dulovicova, Product Program Manager, UiPath
DevOps and Testing slides at DASA ConnectKari Kakkonen
Â
My and Rik Marselis slides at 30.5.2024 DASA Connect conference. We discuss about what is testing, then what is agile testing and finally what is Testing in DevOps. Finally we had lovely workshop with the participants trying to find out different ways to think about quality and testing in different parts of the DevOps infinity loop.
Neuro-symbolic is not enough, we need neuro-*semantic*Frank van Harmelen
Â
Neuro-symbolic (NeSy) AI is on the rise. However, simply machine learning on just any symbolic structure is not sufficient to really harvest the gains of NeSy. These will only be gained when the symbolic structures have an actual semantics. I give an operational definition of semantics as âpredictable inferenceâ.
All of this illustrated with link prediction over knowledge graphs, but the argument is general.
Connector Corner: Automate dynamic content and events by pushing a buttonDianaGray10
Â
Here is something new! In our next Connector Corner webinar, we will demonstrate how you can use a single workflow to:
Create a campaign using Mailchimp with merge tags/fields
Send an interactive Slack channel message (using buttons)
Have the message received by managers and peers along with a test email for review
But thereâs more:
In a second workflow supporting the same use case, youâll see:
Your campaign sent to target colleagues for approval
If the âApproveâ button is clicked, a Jira/Zendesk ticket is created for the marketing design team
Butâif the âRejectâ button is pushed, colleagues will be alerted via Slack message
Join us to learn more about this new, human-in-the-loop capability, brought to you by Integration Service connectors.
And...
Speakers:
Akshay Agnihotri, Product Manager
Charlie Greenberg, Host
"Impact of front-end architecture on development cost", Viktor TurskyiFwdays
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I have heard many times that architecture is not important for the front-end. Also, many times I have seen how developers implement features on the front-end just following the standard rules for a framework and think that this is enough to successfully launch the project, and then the project fails. How to prevent this and what approach to choose? I have launched dozens of complex projects and during the talk we will analyze which approaches have worked for me and which have not.
Software Delivery At the Speed of AI: Inflectra Invests In AI-Powered QualityInflectra
Â
In this insightful webinar, Inflectra explores how artificial intelligence (AI) is transforming software development and testing. Discover how AI-powered tools are revolutionizing every stage of the software development lifecycle (SDLC), from design and prototyping to testing, deployment, and monitoring.
Learn about:
⢠The Future of Testing: How AI is shifting testing towards verification, analysis, and higher-level skills, while reducing repetitive tasks.
⢠Test Automation: How AI-powered test case generation, optimization, and self-healing tests are making testing more efficient and effective.
⢠Visual Testing: Explore the emerging capabilities of AI in visual testing and how it's set to revolutionize UI verification.
⢠Inflectra's AI Solutions: See demonstrations of Inflectra's cutting-edge AI tools like the ChatGPT plugin and Azure Open AI platform, designed to streamline your testing process.
Whether you're a developer, tester, or QA professional, this webinar will give you valuable insights into how AI is shaping the future of software delivery.
Slack (or Teams) Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Soluti...Jeffrey Haguewood
Â
Sidekick Solutions uses Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apricot) and automation solutions to integrate data for business workflows.
We believe integration and automation are essential to user experience and the promise of efficient work through technology. Automation is the critical ingredient to realizing that full vision. We develop integration products and services for Bonterra Case Management software to support the deployment of automations for a variety of use cases.
This video focuses on the notifications, alerts, and approval requests using Slack for Bonterra Impact Management. The solutions covered in this webinar can also be deployed for Microsoft Teams.
Interested in deploying notification automations for Bonterra Impact Management? Contact us at sales@sidekicksolutionsllc.com to discuss next steps.
Epistemic Interaction - tuning interfaces to provide information for AI supportAlan Dix
Â
Paper presented at SYNERGY workshop at AVI 2024, Genoa, Italy. 3rd June 2024
https://alandix.com/academic/papers/synergy2024-epistemic/
As machine learning integrates deeper into human-computer interactions, the concept of epistemic interaction emerges, aiming to refine these interactions to enhance system adaptability. This approach encourages minor, intentional adjustments in user behaviour to enrich the data available for system learning. This paper introduces epistemic interaction within the context of human-system communication, illustrating how deliberate interaction design can improve system understanding and adaptation. Through concrete examples, we demonstrate the potential of epistemic interaction to significantly advance human-computer interaction by leveraging intuitive human communication strategies to inform system design and functionality, offering a novel pathway for enriching user-system engagements.
State of ICS and IoT Cyber Threat Landscape Report 2024 previewPrayukth K V
Â
The IoT and OT threat landscape report has been prepared by the Threat Research Team at Sectrio using data from Sectrio, cyber threat intelligence farming facilities spread across over 85 cities around the world. In addition, Sectrio also runs AI-based advanced threat and payload engagement facilities that serve as sinks to attract and engage sophisticated threat actors, and newer malware including new variants and latent threats that are at an earlier stage of development.
The latest edition of the OT/ICS and IoT security Threat Landscape Report 2024 also covers:
State of global ICS asset and network exposure
Sectoral targets and attacks as well as the cost of ransom
Global APT activity, AI usage, actor and tactic profiles, and implications
Rise in volumes of AI-powered cyberattacks
Major cyber events in 2024
Malware and malicious payload trends
Cyberattack types and targets
Vulnerability exploit attempts on CVEs
Attacks on counties â USA
Expansion of bot farms â how, where, and why
In-depth analysis of the cyber threat landscape across North America, South America, Europe, APAC, and the Middle East
Why are attacks on smart factories rising?
Cyber risk predictions
Axis of attacks â Europe
Systemic attacks in the Middle East
Download the full report from here:
https://sectrio.com/resources/ot-threat-landscape-reports/sectrio-releases-ot-ics-and-iot-security-threat-landscape-report-2024/
4. 2013-A1 â Injection
⢠Tricking an application into including unintended commands in the data sent
to an interpreter
Injection meansâŚ
⢠Take strings and interpret them as commands
⢠SQL, OS Shell, LDAP, XPath, Hibernate, etcâŚ
InterpretersâŚ
⢠Many applications still susceptible (really donât know why)
⢠Even though itâs usually very simple to avoid
SQL injection is still quite common
⢠Usually severe. Entire database can usually be read or modified
⢠May also allow full database schema, or account access, or even OS level
access
Typical Impact
4
5. SQL Injection â Illustrated
Firewall
Hardened OS
Web Server
App Server
Firewall
Databases
LegacySystems
WebServices
Directories
HumanResrcs
Billing
Custom Code
APPLICATION
ATTACK
NetworkLayerApplicationLayer
Accounts
Finance
Administration
Transactions
Communication
KnowledgeMgmt
E-Commerce
Bus.Functions
HTTP
request
ď
SQL
query
ď
DB Table
ď
ďž
HTTP
response
ď
ďž
"SELECT * FROM
accounts WHERE
acct=ââ OR 1=1--
â"
1. Application presents a form to
the attacker
2. Attacker sends an attack in the
form data
3. Application forwards attack to
the database in a SQL query
Account Summary
Acct:5424-6066-2134-4334
Acct:4128-7574-3921-0192
Acct:5424-9383-2039-4029
Acct:4128-0004-1234-0293
4. Database runs query containing
attack and sends encrypted results
back to application
5. Application decrypts data as
normal and sends results to the
user
Account:
SKU:
Account:
SKU:
5
6. A1 â Avoiding Injection Flaws
⢠Avoid the interpreter entirely, or
⢠Use an interface that supports bind variables (e.g., prepared
statements, or stored procedures),
⢠Bind variables allow the interpreter to distinguish between code and
data
⢠Encode all user input before passing it to the interpreter
⢠Always perform âwhite listâ input validation on all user supplied input
⢠Always minimize database privileges to reduce the impact of a flaw
Recommendations
⢠For more details, read the
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SQL_Injection_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
References
6
8. 2013-A2 â Broken
Authentication and Session
Management
⢠Means credentials have to go with every request
⢠Should use SSL for everything requiring authentication
HTTP is a âstatelessâ protocol
⢠SESSION ID used to track state since HTTP doesnât
⢠and it is just as good as credentials to an attacker
⢠SESSION ID is typically exposed on the network, in browser, in logs, âŚ
Session management flaws
⢠Change my password, remember my password, forgot my password, secret
question, logout, email address, etcâŚ
Beware the side-doors
⢠User accounts compromised or user sessions hijacked
Typical Impact
8
10. A2 â Avoiding Broken
Authentication and Session
Management
⢠Authentication should be simple, centralized, and standardized
⢠Use the standard session id provided by your container
⢠Be sure SSL protects both credentials and session id at all times
Verify your architecture
⢠Forget automated analysis approaches
⢠Check your SSL certificate
⢠Examine all the authentication-related functions
⢠Verify that logoff actually destroys the session
⢠Use OWASPâs WebScarab to test the implementation
Verify the implementation
⢠https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet
Follow the guidance from
10
12. 2013-A3 â
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
⢠Raw data from attacker is sent to an innocent userâs browser
Occurs any timeâŚ
⢠Stored in database
⢠Reflected from web input (form field, hidden field, URL, etcâŚ)
⢠Sent directly into rich JavaScript client
Raw dataâŚ
⢠Try this in your browser â javascript:alert(document.cookie)
Virtually every web application has this problem
⢠Steal userâs session, steal sensitive data, rewrite web page, redirect user to
phishing or malware site
⢠Most Severe: Install XSS proxy which allows attacker to observe and direct all
userâs behavior on vulnerable site and force user to other sites
Typical Impact
12
13. Cross-Site Scripting Illustrated
Application with
stored XSS
vulnerability
3
2
Attacker sets the trap â update my profile
Attacker enters a
malicious script into a web
page that stores the data
on the server
1
Victim views page â sees attacker profile
Script silently sends attacker Victimâs session cookie
Script runs inside victimâs
browser with full access to
the DOM and cookies
Custom Code
Accounts
Finance
Administration
Transactions
Communication
KnowledgeMgmt
E-Commerce
Bus.Functions
13
14. (AntiSamy)
Avoiding XSS Flaws
⢠Recommendations
â Eliminate Flaw
⢠Donât include user supplied input in the output page
â Defend Against the Flaw
⢠Use Content Security Policy (CSP)
⢠Primary Recommendation: Output encode all user supplied input (Use
OWASPâs ESAPI or Java Encoders to output encode)
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Java_Encoder_Project
⢠Perform âwhite listâ input validation on all user input to be included in page
⢠For large chunks of user supplied HTML, use OWASPâs AntiSamy to sanitize
this HTML to make it safe
See: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/AntiSamy
⢠References
â For how to output encode properly, read the
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross Site Scripting) Prevention Cheat Sheet 14
15. Safe Escaping Schemes in Various
HTML Execution Contexts
CSS Property Values
(e.g., .pdiv a:hover {color: red; text-decoration:
underline} )
JavaScript Data
(e.g., <script>
someFunction(âDATAâ)</script> )
HTML Attribute Values
(e.g., <input name='person' type='TEXT'
value='defaultValue'> )
HTML Element Content
(e.g., <div> some text to display </div> )
URI Attribute Values
(e.g., <a href=" http://site.com?search=DATA" )
#4: All non-alphanumeric < 256 ď HH
ESAPI: encodeForCSS()
#3: All non-alphanumeric < 256 ď xHH
ESAPI: encodeForJavaScript()
#1: ( &, <, >, " ) ď &entity; ( ', / ) ď &#xHH;
ESAPI: encodeForHTML()
#2: All non-alphanumeric < 256 ď &#xHH;
ESAPI: encodeForHTMLAttribute()
#5: All non-alphanumeric < 256 ď %HH
ESAPI: encodeForURL()
ALL other contexts CANNOT include Untrusted Data
Recommendation: Only allow #1 and #2 and disallow all others
See: www.owasp.org/index.php/XSS_(Cross_Site_Scripting)_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet15
17. 2013-A4 â Insecure Direct
Object References
⢠This is part of enforcing proper âAuthorizationâ, along with
A7 â Failure to Restrict URL Access
How do you protect access to your data?
⢠Only listing the âauthorizedâ objects for the current user, or
⢠Hiding the object references in hidden fields
⢠⌠and then not enforcing these restrictions on the server side
⢠This is called presentation layer access control, and doesnât work
⢠Attacker simply tampers with parameter value
A common mistake âŚ
⢠Users are able to access unauthorized files or data
Typical Impact
17
18. Insecure Direct Object
References Illustrated
⢠Attacker notices his acct
parameter is 6065
?acct=6065
⢠He modifies it to a nearby
number
?acct=6066
⢠Attacker views the
victimâs account
information
https://www.onlinebank.com/user?acct=6065
18
19. A4 â Avoiding Insecure Direct
Object References
⢠Eliminate the direct object reference
â Replace them with a temporary mapping value (e.g. 1, 2, 3)
â ESAPI provides support for numeric & random mappings
⢠IntegerAccessReferenceMap & RandomAccessReferenceMap
⢠Validate the direct object reference
â Verify the parameter value is properly formatted
â Verify the user is allowed to access the target object
⢠Query constraints work great!
â Verify the requested mode of access is allowed to the
target object (e.g., read, write, delete)
http://app?file=1
Report123.xls
http://app?id=7d3J93
Acct:9182374http://app?id=9182374
http://app?file=Report123.xls
Access
Reference
Map
19
21. 2013-A5 â Security
Misconfiguration
⢠Everywhere from the OS up through the App Server
Web applications rely on a secure foundation
⢠Think of all the places your source code goes
⢠Security should not require secret source code
Is your source code a secret?
⢠All credentials should change in production
CM must extend to all parts of the application
⢠Install backdoor through missing OS or server patch
⢠Unauthorized access to default accounts, application functionality or data,
or unused but accessible functionality due to poor server configuration
Typical Impact
22. Hardened OS
Web Server
App Server
Framework
Security Misconfiguration
Illustrated
App Configuration
Custom Code
Accounts
Finance
Administration
Transactions
Communication
KnowledgeMgmt
E-Commerce
Bus.Functions
Test Servers
QA Servers
Source Control
Development
Database
Insider
23. Avoiding Security
Misconfiguration
⢠Verify your systemâs configuration management
â Secure configuration âhardeningâ guideline
⢠Automation is REALLY USEFUL here
â Must cover entire platform and application
â Analyze security effects of changes
⢠Can you âdumpâ the application configuration
â Build reporting into your process
â If you canât verify it, it isnât secure
⢠Verify the implementation
â Scanning finds generic configuration and missing patch problems
25. 2013-A6 â Sensitive Data Exposure
⢠Failure to identify all sensitive data
⢠Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data gets stored
⢠Databases, files, directories, log files, backups, etc.
⢠Failure to identify all the places that this sensitive data is sent
⢠On the web, to backend databases, to business partners, internal
communications
⢠Failure to properly protect this data in every location
Storing and transmitting sensitive data insecurely
⢠Attackers access or modify confidential or private information
⢠e.g, credit cards, health care records, financial data (yours or your customers)
⢠Attackers extract secrets to use in additional attacks
⢠Company embarrassment, customer dissatisfaction, and loss of trust
⢠Expense of cleaning up the incident, such as forensics, sending apology
letters, reissuing thousands of credit cards, providing identity theft
insurance
⢠Business gets sued and/or fined
Typical Impact
26. Insecure Cryptographic
Storage Illustrated
Custom Code
Accounts
Finance
Administration
Transactions
Communication
Knowledge
Mgmt
E-Commerce
Bus.Functions
1
Victim enters credit card
number in form
2Error handler logs CC
details because merchant
gateway is unavailable
4 Malicious insider
steals 4 million credit
card numbers
Log files
3Logs are accessible to all
members of IT staff for
debugging purposes
27. Avoiding Insecure
Cryptographic Storage
⢠Verify your architecture
â Identify all sensitive data
â Identify all the places that data is stored
â Ensure threat model accounts for possible attacks
â Use encryption to counter the threats, donât just âencryptâ the data
⢠Protect with appropriate mechanisms
â File encryption, database encryption, data element encryption
⢠Use the mechanisms correctly
â Use standard strong algorithms
â Generate, distribute, and protect keys properly
â Be prepared for key change
⢠Verify the implementation
â A standard strong algorithm is used, and itâs the proper algorithm for this situation
â All keys, certificates, and passwords are properly stored and protected
â Safe key distribution and an effective plan for key change are in place
â Analyze encryption code for common flaws
28. Insufficient Transport Layer
Protection Illustrated
Custom Code
Employees
Business Partners
External Victim
Backend Systems
External Attacker
1
External attacker
steals credentials
and data off
network
2
Internal attacker
steals credentials and
data from internal
network
Internal Attacker
29. Avoiding Insufficient Transport
Layer Protection
⢠Protect with appropriate mechanisms
â Use TLS on all connections with sensitive data
â Use HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security)
â Use key pinning
â Individually encrypt messages before transmission
⢠E.g., XML-Encryption
â Sign messages before transmission
⢠E.g., XML-Signature
⢠Use the mechanisms correctly
â Use standard strong algorithms (disable old SSL algorithms)
â Manage keys/certificates properly
â Verify SSL certificates before using them
â Use proven mechanisms when sufficient
⢠E.g., SSL vs. XML-Encryption
⢠See: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Transport_Layer_Protection_Cheat_Sheet for more
details
31. 2013-A7 â Missing Function
Level Access Control
⢠This is part of enforcing proper âauthorizationâ, along with
A4 â Insecure Direct Object References
How do you protect access to URLs (pages)?
Or functions referenced by a URL plus parameters ?
⢠Displaying only authorized links and menu choices
⢠This is called presentation layer access control, and doesnât work
⢠Attacker simply forges direct access to âunauthorizedâ pages
A common mistake âŚ
⢠Attackers invoke functions and services theyâre not authorized for
⢠Access other userâs accounts and data
⢠Perform privileged actions
Typical Impact
32. Missing Function Level Access
Control Illustrated
⢠Attacker notices the URL
indicates his role
/user/getAccounts
⢠He modifies it to another
directory (role)
/admin/getAccounts, or
/manager/getAccounts
⢠Attacker views more
accounts than just their
own
https://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccountshttps://www.onlinebank.com/user/getAccounts
33. Avoiding Missing Function
Level Access Control
⢠For function, a site needs to do 3 things
â Restrict access to authenticated users (if not public)
â Enforce any user or role based permissions (if private)
â Completely disallow requests to unauthorized page types (e.g., config files, log files,
source files, etc.)
⢠Verify your architecture
â Use a simple, positive model at every layer
â Be sure you actually have a mechanism at every layer
⢠Verify the implementation
â Forget automated analysis approaches
â Verify that each URL (plus any parameters) referencing a function is protected by
⢠An external filter, like Java EE web.xml or a commercial product
⢠Or internal checks in YOUR code â e.g., use ESAPIâs isAuthorizedForURL() method
â Verify the server configuration disallows requests to unauthorized file types
â Use OWASPâs ZAP or your browser to forge unauthorized requests
35. 2013-A8 â Cross Site Request
Forgery (CSRF)
⢠An attack where the victimâs browser is tricked into issuing a command to a
vulnerable web application
⢠Vulnerability is caused by browsers automatically including user
authentication data (session ID, IP address, Windows domain credentials, âŚ)
with each request
Cross Site Request Forgery
⢠What if a hacker could steer your mouse and get you to click on links in your
online banking application?
⢠What could they make you do?
ImagineâŚ
⢠Initiate transactions (transfer funds, logout user, close account)
⢠Access sensitive data
⢠Change account details
Typical Impact
36. CSRF Vulnerability Pattern
⢠The Problem
â Web browsers automatically include most credentials with each request
â Even for requests caused by a form, script, or image on another site
⢠All sites relying solely on automatic
credentials are vulnerable!
â (almost all sites are this way)
⢠Automatically Provided Credentials
â Session cookie
â Basic authentication header
â IP address
â Client side SSL certificates
â Windows domain authentication
37. CSRF Illustrated
3
2
Attacker sets the trap on some website on the internet
(or simply via an e-mail)1
While logged into vulnerable site,
victim views attacker site
Vulnerable site sees
legitimate request from
victim and performs the
action requested
<img> tag loaded by
browser â sends GET
request (including
credentials) to vulnerable
site
Custom Code
Accounts
Finance
Administration
Transactions
Communication
KnowledgeMgmt
E-Commerce
Bus.Functions
Hidden <img> tag
contains attack against
vulnerable site
Application with CSRF
vulnerability
38. A8 â Avoiding CSRF Flaws
⢠Add a secret, not automatically submitted, token to ALL sensitive requests
â This makes it impossible for the attacker to spoof the request
⢠(unless thereâs an XSS hole in your application)
â Tokens should be cryptographically strong or random
⢠Options
â Store a single token in the session and add it to all forms and links
⢠Hidden Field: <input name="token" value="687965fdfaew87agrde"
type="hidden"/>
⢠Single use URL: /accounts/687965fdfaew87agrde
⢠Form Token: /accounts?auth=687965fdfaew87agrde âŚ
â Beware exposing the token in a referer header
⢠Hidden fields are recommended
â Can have a unique token for each function
⢠Use a hash of function name, session id, and a secret
â Can require secondary authentication for sensitive functions (e.g., eTrade)
⢠Donât allow attackers to store attacks on your site
â Properly encode all input on the way out
â This renders all links/requests inert in most interpreters
See the: www.owasp.org/index.php/CSRF_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet
for more details
40. 2013-A9 â Using Known
Vulnerable Components
⢠Some vulnerable components (e.g., framework libraries) can be identified
and exploited with automated tools
⢠This expands the threat agent pool beyond targeted attackers to include
chaotic actors
Vulnerable Components Are Common
⢠Virtually every application has these issues because most development teams donât
focus on ensuring their components/libraries are up to date
⢠In many cases, the developers donât even know all the components they are using,
never mind their versions. Component dependencies make things even worse
Widespread
⢠Full range of weaknesses is possible, including injection, broken access control, XSS ...
⢠The impact could range from minimal to complete host takeover and data
compromise
Typical Impact
40
42. What Can You Do
to Avoid This?
⢠Automation checks periodically (e.g., nightly build) to see if your libraries are out of
date
⢠Even better, automation also tells you about known vulnerabilities
Ideal
⢠By hand, periodically check to see if your libraries are out of date and upgrade those
that are
⢠If any are out of date, but you really donât want to upgrade, check to see if there are
any known security issues with these out of data libraries
⢠If so, upgrade those
Minimum
⢠By hand, periodically check to see if any of your libraries have any known
vulnerabilities at this time
⢠Check CVE, other vuln repositories
⢠If any do, update at least these
Could also
42
43. Automation Example for Java
â Use Maven âVersionsâ Plugin
Output from the Maven Versions Plugin â Automated Analysis of Librariesâ Status
against Central repository
Most out of Date! Details Developer Needs
This can automatically be run EVERY TIME software is built!! 43
45. 2013-A10 â Unvalidated
Redirects and Forwards
⢠And frequently include user supplied parameters in the destination URL
⢠If they arenât validated, attacker can send victim to a site of their choice
Web application redirects are very common
⢠They internally send the request to a new page in the same application
⢠Sometimes parameters define the target page
⢠If not validated, attacker may be able to use unvalidated forward to
bypass authentication or authorization checks
Forwards (aka Transfer in .NET) are common too
⢠Redirect victim to phishing or malware site
⢠Attackerâs request is forwarded past security checks, allowing
unauthorized function or data access
Typical Impact
46. Unvalidated Redirect Illustrated
3
2
Attacker sends attack to victim via email or webpage
From: Internal Revenue Service
Subject: Your Unclaimed Tax Refund
Our records show you have an
unclaimed federal tax refund. Please
click here to initiate your claim.
1
Application redirects
victim to attackerâs site
Request sent to vulnerable
site, including attackerâs
destination site as parameter.
Redirect sends victim to
attacker site
Custom Code
Accounts
Finance
Administration
Transactions
Communication
KnowledgeMgmt
E-Commerce
Bus.Functions
4 Evil site installs malware on
victim, or phishâs for private
information
Victim clicks link containing unvalidated parameter
Evil Site
http://www.irs.gov/taxrefund/claim.jsp?year=2006
& ⌠&dest=www.evilsite.com
47. A10 â Avoiding Unvalidated
Redirects and Forwards
⢠There are a number of options
1. Avoid using redirects and forwards as much as you can
2. If used, donât involve user parameters in defining the target URL
3. If you âmustâ involve user parameters, then either
a) Validate each parameter to ensure its valid and authorized for the current user, or
b) (preferred) â Use server side mapping to translate choice provided to user with actual target page
â Defense in depth: For redirects, validate the target URL after it is calculated to make sure it
goes to an authorized external site
â ESAPI can do this for you!!
⢠See: SecurityWrapperResponse.sendRedirect( URL )
⢠http://owasp-esapi-java.googlecode.com/svn/trunk_doc/org/owasp/esapi/filters/
SecurityWrapperResponse.html#sendRedirect(java.lang.String)
⢠Some thoughts about protecting Forwards
â Ideally, youâd call the access controller to make sure the user is authorized before you
perform the forward (with ESAPI, this is easy)
â With an external filter, like Siteminder, this is not very practical
â Next best is to make sure that users who can access the original page are ALL authorized to
access the target page.
48. Summary: How do you
address these problems?
⢠Develop Secure Code
â Follow the best practices in OWASPâs Guide to Building Secure Web Applications
⢠https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Guide
⢠And the cheat sheets: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Cheat_Sheets
â Use OWASPâs Application Security Verification Standard as a guide to what an
application needs to be secure
⢠https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ASVS
â Use standard security components that are a fit for your organization
⢠Use OWASPâs ESAPI as a basis for your standard components
⢠https://www.owasp.org/index.php/ESAPI
⢠Review Your Applications
â Have an expert team review your applications
â Review your applications yourselves following OWASP Guidelines
⢠OWASP Code Review Guide:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Code_Review_Guide
⢠OWASP Testing Guide:
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_Guide