Ofer Rivlin
Hamakor, Penguin, August, 2015
Confidential
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 2Confidential
About me & why I love security
Senior Development and Security Architect at SAP Labs Israel
Why I love security ?
 Be at the front edge of technology
 Know the internals of the technology – how things really work
 Analyze the logic & behavior of the solution
 Rethink assumptions, think like a hacker
Mobile apps Threats
Model
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 4Confidential
Mobile App Threat Model Diagram
Mobile Security
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 6Confidential
Mobile Security Architecture – partial list of security measures
Access Control
Application Sandbox
Securing network connections
Permissions
Protecting data on the device
 Data in runtime, when app in background, etc
Secure Storage
 Confidential data, SQLite databases
Protecting secrets (Keychain)
App code signing
Interprocess Communication (IPC)
Android Security
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 8Confidential
Agenda
Android Access Control
Android Application Sandbox
Android rooting
Android is a Linux based OS!
Android Application
Sandboxing
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 11Confidential
Application Sandbox structure – targets
Application Sandbox target
 Limit app’s access to the minimum required
 jailed environment
Why Sandbox is necessary
 app is compromised (due to a vulnerability in the app or frameworks/libraries it uses)
 app is a Trojan
https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/#the-application-sandbox
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 12Confidential
Application Sandbox structure - HOW
Android security model - based on Linux user-based protection
 App runs with UID - identified as a unique Linux user
 App belongs to permission groups
 system processes run as ‘system’ user
Android Package (apk)
 apps are packaged - archive file that contains all the app’s resources
App data and access
 saved under its own app folder
 can be accessed only by its owner, the app, or by system
https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/#the-application-sandbox
Rooting
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 14Confidential
What is Android rooting?
What is Rooting?
 Gain system-level permissions
What is it good for?
 perform operations that are inaccessible to a normal user
Like what?
 Full access to files under applications’ sandbox
 Full access to System files
 Etc.
Example
 Deleting apps that are installed by your telephony company
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 15Confidential
How Android rooting is done?
Exploiting a vulnerability in the Android OS!
What type of vulnerabilities?
Android code vulnerabilities
Android design vulnerabilities
Linux vulnerabilities
Etc.
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 16Confidential
Example of Linux vulnerabilities exploited on Android
udev Netlink Message Validation Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1185)
Allows local users on Linux systems (2.6 kernels) to gain root privileges
This exploit was ported to Android and was used in rooting devices
* Udev is the device manager for the Linux 2.6 kernel that creates/removes device nodes in the
/dev directory dynamically. listens to events about device state change through Netlink
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34536/info
full disclosure exploit: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Apr/att-198/udev.txt
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 17Confidential
The Rooting industry!
Normal cooperation of Security researchers with the vendors
to fix major security issues
What is being different with rooting?
Vulnerabilities and their rooting exploits are not reveal to vendors
The rational behind the legitimately of rooting
It is your device - you should have full access and its full power
Rooting example
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 19Confidential
Target and attack surface
Target: get super user rights on a device shell
Attack surface carrier – adb (Android Debug Bridge)
 Daemon
obackground process runs on the device
 Client
oShell, runs on a connected PC
 Server
oManages the communication between the client and the daemon
obackground process runs on the connected PC
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 20Confidential
The adb daemon
The adb daemon (adbd)
 creates a shell instance on the device and redirect its output to the client
 When starts, it has multiple tasks to accomplish as root
 Then it lowers its privileges to AID_SHELL (a normal shell user)
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 21Confidential
The adbd code… Have an idea?
Some code
Perform tasks as root
Drop user to shell
Some more code
executed as shell-user
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/android-1.6_r2/adb/adb.c
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 22Confidential
adb setuid exhaustion attack (slide 1)
UID has a RLIMIT_NPROC – limit number of running processes
The exploit forks off processes on the AID_SHELL UID until fork() fails
Max number of processes for this UID is reached
Restart adbd
When adbd restarts, it runs as root
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 23Confidential
adb setuid exhaustion attack (slide 2)
adbd drops its privileges to ‘shell user’ using setuid()
setuid() increments the number of shell user processes
shell’s process count is at its max and setuid() fails!
the process remains with its current user
The adbd code doesn’t check for setuid() success
Drop to shell-user fails, the process continues as root!
The vulnerability:
The adbd code doesn’t check for setuid() success
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 24Confidential
The adbd code vulnerability
The vulnerability 
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 25Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit run
 adb shell client starts as normal user
So far, a normal shell run.
 Execute the exploit binary
 Max number of processes for this user is
limit to 3301
 adb PID is 77 – to be killed later
 Exploit done!
 Max number of processes have been
reached, and adbd is killed
 Restarting adb, starts adbd
 adbd fails to drop from root to user
 adb client connects with adbd that has
root access!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 26Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit run
 adb shell client starts as normal user
So far, a normal shell run.
 Execute the exploit binary
 Max number of processes for this user is
limit to 3301
 adb PID is 77 – to be killed later
 Exploit done!
 Max number of processes have been
reached, and adbd is killed
 Restarting adb, starts adbd
 adbd fails to drop from root to user
 adb client connects with adbd that has
root access!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 27Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit run
 adb shell client starts as normal user
So far, a normal shell run.
 Execute the exploit binary
 Max number of processes for this user is
limit to 3301
 adb PID is 77 – to be killed later
 Exploit done!
 Max number of processes have been
reached, and adbd is killed
 Restarting adb, starts adbd
 adbd fails to drop from root to user
 adb client connects with adbd that has
root access!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 28Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit run
 adb shell client starts as normal user
So far, a normal shell run.
 Execute the exploit binary
 Max number of processes for this user is
limit to 3301
 adb PID is 77 – to be killed later
 Exploit done!
 Max number of processes have been
reached, and adbd is killed
 Restarting adb, starts adbd
 adbd fails to drop from root to user
 adb client connects with adbd that has
root access!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 29Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit run
 adb shell client starts as normal user
So far, a normal shell run.
 Execute the exploit binary
 Max number of processes for this user is
limit to 3301
 adb PID is 77 – to be killed later
 Exploit done!
 Max number of processes have been
reached, and adbd is killed
 Restarting adb, starts adbd
 adbd fails to drop from root to user
 adb client connects with adbd that has
root access!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 30Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit run
 adb shell client starts as normal user
So far, a normal shell run.
 Execute the exploit binary
 Max number of processes for this user is
limit to 3301
 adb PID is 77 – to be killed later
 Exploit done!
 Max number of processes have been
reached, and adbd is killed
 Restarting adb, starts adbd
 adbd fails to drop from root to user
 adb client connects with adbd that has
root access!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 31Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit run
 adb shell client starts as normal user
So far, a normal shell run.
 Execute the exploit binary
 Max number of processes for this user is
limit to 3301
 adb PID is 77 – to be killed later
 Exploit done!
 Max number of processes have been
reached, and adbd is killed
 Restarting adb, starts adbd
 adbd fails to drop from root to user
 adb client connects with adbd that has
root access!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 32Confidential
RageAgainstTheCage exploit
Released by Sebastian Krahmer
A binary called rageagainstthecage-arm5.bin with no source code
The exploit was reversed-engineered by Google
The vulnerability was fixed
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 33Confidential
The Android version code after the fix
The version with the fixed code
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/froyo/adb/adb.c
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 34Confidential
The Android version code after the fix
The version with the fixed code
https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/froyo/adb/adb.c
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 35Confidential
From temporary root to permanent root
We run shell as root. What’s next?
How to get permanent root?
How to enable apps root permissions?
Gaining a permanent root
Usually: install the SU binary and the Superuser app under the system partition
Hackers develop tools that:
 Gain a temporary root by exploiting a vulnerability in Android
 Use the temporary root permissions to install SU & Superuser under System
* More about the SU binary and the Superuser app - next
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 36Confidential
Summary of Android root exploits
1. Experienced hackers find vulnerabilities
2. Hide the vulnerabilities from the OS developer & device
manufactures
3. Develop exploits and package them in easy to use tools
4. Publish those tools on the internet (in blogs or forums like XDA)
5. Users (and hackers) download those tools & root their (or
others’) devices
Rooting solution behavior
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 39Confidential
shell is requesting superuser access
Rooting of an encrypted and
locked device
Background
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 42Confidential
“Industrial Espionage” Demo, revealing the Lock Pattern
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 43Confidential
What is Android Recovery
Bootable partition that has the recovery console
Set of tools to
help repair (recover) the installation
install OS updates
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 44Confidential
Android Update mechanism
To install updates locally through the recovery
Offline – no OTA-updates required
Secured with a signature
* In later devices this mechanism’s security has been strengthened
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 45Confidential
How to grant root when the screen is locked?
Gain root by exploiting the Android ‘Update’ mechanism
Copied my SU binary to the System partition
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 46Confidential
How can we grant root with a locked screen?
But how to access the Superuser prompt with a locked screen?
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 47Confidential
My solution – rewrite SU
I rewrote the SU binary
Re-lunch any requesting processes
No check for granted root access
no need Superuser app
 even stealthier!
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 48Confidential
Before the demo – why my su is so dangerous?
Malware requests root access: the user gets prompt
With my su this malware gets root without the user’s consent!
The Trojan hides its malware as a rootkit
Then it downloads and installs other malware
* https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2011/10/20/security-alert-legacy-makes-a-another-appearance-on-android-market-meet-legacy-native-lena/
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 49Confidential
Demo – rooting an encrypted and locked device
* Adi Shamir: ’post-crypto world'
http://m.theregister.co.uk/2013/03/01/post_cryptography_security_shamir/
© 2014 SAP AG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved.
Thank you
Contact information:
Ofer Rivlin
SAP Labs Israel
ofer.rivlin@sap.com

Android's security architecture

  • 1.
    Ofer Rivlin Hamakor, Penguin,August, 2015 Confidential
  • 2.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 2Confidential About me & why I love security Senior Development and Security Architect at SAP Labs Israel Why I love security ?  Be at the front edge of technology  Know the internals of the technology – how things really work  Analyze the logic & behavior of the solution  Rethink assumptions, think like a hacker
  • 3.
  • 4.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 4Confidential Mobile App Threat Model Diagram
  • 5.
  • 6.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 6Confidential Mobile Security Architecture – partial list of security measures Access Control Application Sandbox Securing network connections Permissions Protecting data on the device  Data in runtime, when app in background, etc Secure Storage  Confidential data, SQLite databases Protecting secrets (Keychain) App code signing Interprocess Communication (IPC)
  • 7.
  • 8.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 8Confidential Agenda Android Access Control Android Application Sandbox Android rooting
  • 9.
    Android is aLinux based OS!
  • 10.
  • 11.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 11Confidential Application Sandbox structure – targets Application Sandbox target  Limit app’s access to the minimum required  jailed environment Why Sandbox is necessary  app is compromised (due to a vulnerability in the app or frameworks/libraries it uses)  app is a Trojan https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/#the-application-sandbox
  • 12.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 12Confidential Application Sandbox structure - HOW Android security model - based on Linux user-based protection  App runs with UID - identified as a unique Linux user  App belongs to permission groups  system processes run as ‘system’ user Android Package (apk)  apps are packaged - archive file that contains all the app’s resources App data and access  saved under its own app folder  can be accessed only by its owner, the app, or by system https://source.android.com/devices/tech/security/#the-application-sandbox
  • 13.
  • 14.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 14Confidential What is Android rooting? What is Rooting?  Gain system-level permissions What is it good for?  perform operations that are inaccessible to a normal user Like what?  Full access to files under applications’ sandbox  Full access to System files  Etc. Example  Deleting apps that are installed by your telephony company
  • 15.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 15Confidential How Android rooting is done? Exploiting a vulnerability in the Android OS! What type of vulnerabilities? Android code vulnerabilities Android design vulnerabilities Linux vulnerabilities Etc.
  • 16.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 16Confidential Example of Linux vulnerabilities exploited on Android udev Netlink Message Validation Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability (CVE-2009-1185) Allows local users on Linux systems (2.6 kernels) to gain root privileges This exploit was ported to Android and was used in rooting devices * Udev is the device manager for the Linux 2.6 kernel that creates/removes device nodes in the /dev directory dynamically. listens to events about device state change through Netlink http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34536/info full disclosure exploit: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2009/Apr/att-198/udev.txt
  • 17.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 17Confidential The Rooting industry! Normal cooperation of Security researchers with the vendors to fix major security issues What is being different with rooting? Vulnerabilities and their rooting exploits are not reveal to vendors The rational behind the legitimately of rooting It is your device - you should have full access and its full power
  • 18.
  • 19.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 19Confidential Target and attack surface Target: get super user rights on a device shell Attack surface carrier – adb (Android Debug Bridge)  Daemon obackground process runs on the device  Client oShell, runs on a connected PC  Server oManages the communication between the client and the daemon obackground process runs on the connected PC
  • 20.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 20Confidential The adb daemon The adb daemon (adbd)  creates a shell instance on the device and redirect its output to the client  When starts, it has multiple tasks to accomplish as root  Then it lowers its privileges to AID_SHELL (a normal shell user)
  • 21.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 21Confidential The adbd code… Have an idea? Some code Perform tasks as root Drop user to shell Some more code executed as shell-user https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/android-1.6_r2/adb/adb.c
  • 22.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 22Confidential adb setuid exhaustion attack (slide 1) UID has a RLIMIT_NPROC – limit number of running processes The exploit forks off processes on the AID_SHELL UID until fork() fails Max number of processes for this UID is reached Restart adbd When adbd restarts, it runs as root
  • 23.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 23Confidential adb setuid exhaustion attack (slide 2) adbd drops its privileges to ‘shell user’ using setuid() setuid() increments the number of shell user processes shell’s process count is at its max and setuid() fails! the process remains with its current user The adbd code doesn’t check for setuid() success Drop to shell-user fails, the process continues as root! The vulnerability: The adbd code doesn’t check for setuid() success
  • 24.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 24Confidential The adbd code vulnerability The vulnerability 
  • 25.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 25Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit run  adb shell client starts as normal user So far, a normal shell run.  Execute the exploit binary  Max number of processes for this user is limit to 3301  adb PID is 77 – to be killed later  Exploit done!  Max number of processes have been reached, and adbd is killed  Restarting adb, starts adbd  adbd fails to drop from root to user  adb client connects with adbd that has root access!
  • 26.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 26Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit run  adb shell client starts as normal user So far, a normal shell run.  Execute the exploit binary  Max number of processes for this user is limit to 3301  adb PID is 77 – to be killed later  Exploit done!  Max number of processes have been reached, and adbd is killed  Restarting adb, starts adbd  adbd fails to drop from root to user  adb client connects with adbd that has root access!
  • 27.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 27Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit run  adb shell client starts as normal user So far, a normal shell run.  Execute the exploit binary  Max number of processes for this user is limit to 3301  adb PID is 77 – to be killed later  Exploit done!  Max number of processes have been reached, and adbd is killed  Restarting adb, starts adbd  adbd fails to drop from root to user  adb client connects with adbd that has root access!
  • 28.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 28Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit run  adb shell client starts as normal user So far, a normal shell run.  Execute the exploit binary  Max number of processes for this user is limit to 3301  adb PID is 77 – to be killed later  Exploit done!  Max number of processes have been reached, and adbd is killed  Restarting adb, starts adbd  adbd fails to drop from root to user  adb client connects with adbd that has root access!
  • 29.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 29Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit run  adb shell client starts as normal user So far, a normal shell run.  Execute the exploit binary  Max number of processes for this user is limit to 3301  adb PID is 77 – to be killed later  Exploit done!  Max number of processes have been reached, and adbd is killed  Restarting adb, starts adbd  adbd fails to drop from root to user  adb client connects with adbd that has root access!
  • 30.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 30Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit run  adb shell client starts as normal user So far, a normal shell run.  Execute the exploit binary  Max number of processes for this user is limit to 3301  adb PID is 77 – to be killed later  Exploit done!  Max number of processes have been reached, and adbd is killed  Restarting adb, starts adbd  adbd fails to drop from root to user  adb client connects with adbd that has root access!
  • 31.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 31Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit run  adb shell client starts as normal user So far, a normal shell run.  Execute the exploit binary  Max number of processes for this user is limit to 3301  adb PID is 77 – to be killed later  Exploit done!  Max number of processes have been reached, and adbd is killed  Restarting adb, starts adbd  adbd fails to drop from root to user  adb client connects with adbd that has root access!
  • 32.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 32Confidential RageAgainstTheCage exploit Released by Sebastian Krahmer A binary called rageagainstthecage-arm5.bin with no source code The exploit was reversed-engineered by Google The vulnerability was fixed
  • 33.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 33Confidential The Android version code after the fix The version with the fixed code https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/froyo/adb/adb.c
  • 34.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 34Confidential The Android version code after the fix The version with the fixed code https://android.googlesource.com/platform/system/core/+/froyo/adb/adb.c
  • 35.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 35Confidential From temporary root to permanent root We run shell as root. What’s next? How to get permanent root? How to enable apps root permissions? Gaining a permanent root Usually: install the SU binary and the Superuser app under the system partition Hackers develop tools that:  Gain a temporary root by exploiting a vulnerability in Android  Use the temporary root permissions to install SU & Superuser under System * More about the SU binary and the Superuser app - next
  • 36.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 36Confidential Summary of Android root exploits 1. Experienced hackers find vulnerabilities 2. Hide the vulnerabilities from the OS developer & device manufactures 3. Develop exploits and package them in easy to use tools 4. Publish those tools on the internet (in blogs or forums like XDA) 5. Users (and hackers) download those tools & root their (or others’) devices
  • 37.
  • 38.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 39Confidential shell is requesting superuser access
  • 39.
    Rooting of anencrypted and locked device
  • 40.
  • 41.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 42Confidential “Industrial Espionage” Demo, revealing the Lock Pattern
  • 42.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 43Confidential What is Android Recovery Bootable partition that has the recovery console Set of tools to help repair (recover) the installation install OS updates
  • 43.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 44Confidential Android Update mechanism To install updates locally through the recovery Offline – no OTA-updates required Secured with a signature * In later devices this mechanism’s security has been strengthened
  • 44.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 45Confidential How to grant root when the screen is locked? Gain root by exploiting the Android ‘Update’ mechanism Copied my SU binary to the System partition
  • 45.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 46Confidential How can we grant root with a locked screen? But how to access the Superuser prompt with a locked screen?
  • 46.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 47Confidential My solution – rewrite SU I rewrote the SU binary Re-lunch any requesting processes No check for granted root access no need Superuser app  even stealthier!
  • 47.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 48Confidential Before the demo – why my su is so dangerous? Malware requests root access: the user gets prompt With my su this malware gets root without the user’s consent! The Trojan hides its malware as a rootkit Then it downloads and installs other malware * https://blog.lookout.com/blog/2011/10/20/security-alert-legacy-makes-a-another-appearance-on-android-market-meet-legacy-native-lena/
  • 48.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. 49Confidential Demo – rooting an encrypted and locked device * Adi Shamir: ’post-crypto world' http://m.theregister.co.uk/2013/03/01/post_cryptography_security_shamir/
  • 49.
    © 2014 SAPAG or an SAP affiliate company. All rights reserved. Thank you Contact information: Ofer Rivlin SAP Labs Israel ofer.rivlin@sap.com