The RSA cryptosystem is the most widely used public key cryptosystem. It uses a "trapdoor" one-way function to encrypt and decrypt messages. While textbook RSA is insecure, common implementations prepend random padding like OAEP to the message before encryption, which provides chosen ciphertext security. Despite its widespread use, RSA remains computationally intensive due to the need for large key sizes for security equivalents to modern block ciphers. Timing and fault attacks remain a concern if proper countermeasures are not implemented.
We study the internal structure of the SRP key exchange protocol and experiment with it. SRP establishes a shared encryption key between communicating parties using passwords that were shared out-of-band. We perform basic cryptanalysis of SRP using open-source implementations. We present a demo of how SRP was compromised due to an implementation bug, allowing the attacker to login without the password. The author of the Go-SRP library promptly fixed the issue on the very same day we reported the vulnerability.
Slides demonstrate how to break RSA when no padding is applied. I replicated the meet-in-the-middle attack discussed in the existing Crypto literature.
We study the behavior of the RSA trapdoor function by repeatedly encrypting the ciphertext sent over the public channel. We discuss the problem of finding a cycle in order to reverse the plaintext from the given ciphertext. Simple demos and algorithms/python programs are also presented. While the attack is not necessarily practical, it is educational to learn how the RSA trapdoor function behaves.
We look into the nitty-gritty details of the RSA key generation algorithm. We study how RSA can be exploited when the public exponent e is not chosen carefully. We examine why many digital certificates use e=65537. We also experiment with Hastad's broadcast attack for short RSA exponents in particular.
We experiment with Wiener's attack to break RSA when the secret exponent is short, meaning it is smaller than one quarter of the public modulus size. We discuss cryptanalysis details and present demos of the attack. Our very minor extension of Wiener's attack is also discussed.
If we have an RSA 2048 bits configuration, but our private exponent d is only about 512 bits, then the above attack breaks RSA in a few seconds.
This work uses Continued Fractions to derive the private keys from the given public keys. It turned out that one can derive the private exponent d by approximating it as a ratio of e/n, both are public values.
In a default settings of standard RSA libaries, this attack and my minor extension are not relevant (to the best of our knowledge). However, if we configure our library to choose a very large public encryption exponent e, then our private decryption exponent d could be short enough to mount an attack.
The slides demonstrate how to reverse the plaintext from the RSA encrypted ciphertext using an oracle that answers the question: is the last bit of the message 0 or 1?
We study the internal structure of the SRP key exchange protocol and experiment with it. SRP establishes a shared encryption key between communicating parties using passwords that were shared out-of-band. We perform basic cryptanalysis of SRP using open-source implementations. We present a demo of how SRP was compromised due to an implementation bug, allowing the attacker to login without the password. The author of the Go-SRP library promptly fixed the issue on the very same day we reported the vulnerability.
Slides demonstrate how to break RSA when no padding is applied. I replicated the meet-in-the-middle attack discussed in the existing Crypto literature.
We study the behavior of the RSA trapdoor function by repeatedly encrypting the ciphertext sent over the public channel. We discuss the problem of finding a cycle in order to reverse the plaintext from the given ciphertext. Simple demos and algorithms/python programs are also presented. While the attack is not necessarily practical, it is educational to learn how the RSA trapdoor function behaves.
We look into the nitty-gritty details of the RSA key generation algorithm. We study how RSA can be exploited when the public exponent e is not chosen carefully. We examine why many digital certificates use e=65537. We also experiment with Hastad's broadcast attack for short RSA exponents in particular.
We experiment with Wiener's attack to break RSA when the secret exponent is short, meaning it is smaller than one quarter of the public modulus size. We discuss cryptanalysis details and present demos of the attack. Our very minor extension of Wiener's attack is also discussed.
If we have an RSA 2048 bits configuration, but our private exponent d is only about 512 bits, then the above attack breaks RSA in a few seconds.
This work uses Continued Fractions to derive the private keys from the given public keys. It turned out that one can derive the private exponent d by approximating it as a ratio of e/n, both are public values.
In a default settings of standard RSA libaries, this attack and my minor extension are not relevant (to the best of our knowledge). However, if we configure our library to choose a very large public encryption exponent e, then our private decryption exponent d could be short enough to mount an attack.
The slides demonstrate how to reverse the plaintext from the RSA encrypted ciphertext using an oracle that answers the question: is the last bit of the message 0 or 1?
The slides demonstrate how to break RSA when used incorrectly without integrity checks. The man-in-the-middle is allowed to edit the RSA public exponent e in such a way that the Extended Euclidean Algorithm can be employed to reconstruct the plaintexts from the given ciphertexts.
The Cryptography puzzle discussed here is part of an online challenge. I demonstrate how I broke RSA when random prime numbers were common among a set of keys. I discuss basic metrics as well as implementation/design of my exploit scripts, too.
RSA and OAEP
Diffe-Hellman Key Exchange and its Security Aspects
Model of Asymmetric Key Cryptography
Factorization and other methods for Public Key Cryptography
Results of some basic experiments with the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange System. I analyse the key-exchange algorithm using brute-force as well using the Baby-step Giant-step algorithm.
Computing the Square Roots of Unity to break RSA using Quantum AlgorithmsDharmalingam Ganesan
We study the problem of finding the square roots of unity in a finite group in order to factor composite numbers used in RSA. We implemented Peter Shor’s algorithm to find the square root of unity. Experimental results showed that finding the square roots of unity in a finite group multiplicative group is “hard”.
Slides present a demo of exploiting the homomorphic properties of raw RSA (i.e., without any padding) to reverse an RSA ciphertext, without the private key. We have two roles: Adversary and Challenger. The challenger presents a ciphertext to the adversary to break it. The adversary is allowed to ask for encryption/decryption of any text, except the decryption of the challenge ciphertext. The goal of the adversary is to break the ciphertext.
An RSA private key is made of a few private variables. We analyze how these private variables are chained together. Further, we study if one of the private variables is leaked, can we derive the other private variables? Demos of the algorithms are also provided.
This presentation is based on the paper :
"A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems" by R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman
Key Topics are ....
Number Theory
Public key encryption
Modular Arithmetic
Euclid’s Algorithm
Chinese Remainder Theorem
Euler's Theorem
Fermat's Theorem
RSA Public Key Encryption
The slides demonstrate how to break RSA when used incorrectly without integrity checks. The man-in-the-middle is allowed to edit the RSA public exponent e in such a way that the Extended Euclidean Algorithm can be employed to reconstruct the plaintexts from the given ciphertexts.
The Cryptography puzzle discussed here is part of an online challenge. I demonstrate how I broke RSA when random prime numbers were common among a set of keys. I discuss basic metrics as well as implementation/design of my exploit scripts, too.
RSA and OAEP
Diffe-Hellman Key Exchange and its Security Aspects
Model of Asymmetric Key Cryptography
Factorization and other methods for Public Key Cryptography
Results of some basic experiments with the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange System. I analyse the key-exchange algorithm using brute-force as well using the Baby-step Giant-step algorithm.
Computing the Square Roots of Unity to break RSA using Quantum AlgorithmsDharmalingam Ganesan
We study the problem of finding the square roots of unity in a finite group in order to factor composite numbers used in RSA. We implemented Peter Shor’s algorithm to find the square root of unity. Experimental results showed that finding the square roots of unity in a finite group multiplicative group is “hard”.
Slides present a demo of exploiting the homomorphic properties of raw RSA (i.e., without any padding) to reverse an RSA ciphertext, without the private key. We have two roles: Adversary and Challenger. The challenger presents a ciphertext to the adversary to break it. The adversary is allowed to ask for encryption/decryption of any text, except the decryption of the challenge ciphertext. The goal of the adversary is to break the ciphertext.
An RSA private key is made of a few private variables. We analyze how these private variables are chained together. Further, we study if one of the private variables is leaked, can we derive the other private variables? Demos of the algorithms are also provided.
This presentation is based on the paper :
"A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems" by R.L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman
Key Topics are ....
Number Theory
Public key encryption
Modular Arithmetic
Euclid’s Algorithm
Chinese Remainder Theorem
Euler's Theorem
Fermat's Theorem
RSA Public Key Encryption
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2. The RSA cryptosystem
First published:
• Scientific American, Aug. 1977.
(after some censorship entanglements)
Currently the “work horse” of Internet security:
• Most Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) products.
• SSL/TLS: Certificates and key-exchange.
• Secure e-mail: PGP, Outlook, …
Page 2
3. The RSA trapdoor 1-to-1 function
Parameters: N=pq. N 1024 bits. p,q 512 bits.
e – encryption exponent. gcd(e, (N) ) = 1 .
1-to-1 function: RSA(M) = Me (mod N) where M ZN*
Trapdoor: d – decryption exponent.
Where e d = 1 (mod (N) )
d (N)+1
Inversion: RSA(M) = Med = Mk = M (mod N)
(n,e,t, )-RSA Assumption: For any t-time alg. A:
Pr[ A(N,e,x) = x ]<
1/e p,q R n-bit primes,
(N) :
N pq, x R ZN*
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4. Textbook RSA is insecure
Textbook RSA encryption:
• public key: (N,e) Encrypt: C = Me (mod N)
• private key: d Decrypt: Cd = M (mod N)
(M Z N* )
Completely insecure cryptosystem:
• Does not satisfy basic definitions of security.
• Many attacks exist.
The RSA trapdoor permutation is not a cryptosystem !
Page 4
5. A simple attack on textbook RSA
Rando CLIENT HELLO
m
session- Web SERVER HELLO (e,N) Web d
key K Browser Server
C=RSA(K)
Session-key K is 64 bits. View K {0,…,264}
Eavesdropper sees: C = Ke (mod N) .
Suppose K = K1 K2 where K1, K2 < 234 . (prob. 20%)
Then: C/K1e = K2e (mod N)
Build table: C/1e, C/2e, C/3e, …, C/234e . time: 234
For K2 = 0,…, 234 test if K2e is in table. time: 234 34
Attack time: 240 << 264 Page 5
6. Common RSA encryption
Never use textbook RSA.
RSA in practice:
Preprocessing RSA
ciphertext
msg
Main question:
• How should the preprocessing be done?
• Can we argue about security of resulting system?
Page 6
7. PKCS1 V1.5
PKCS1 mode 2: (encryption)
16 bits
02 random pad FF msg
1024 bits
Resulting value is RSA encrypted.
Widely deployed in web servers and browsers.
No security analysis !!
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8. Attack on PKCS1
Bleichenbacher 98. Chosen-ciphertext attack.
PKCS1 used in SSL: C= ciphertext
d C
Is this
PKCS1? Web Attacker
Yes: continue
Server
02 No: error
attacker can test if 16 MSBs of plaintext = ’02’.
Attack: to decrypt a given ciphertext C do:
e
• Pick r ZN. Compute C’ = C = (r PKCS1(M)) .
re
• Send C’ to web server and use response.
Page 8
9. Chosen ciphertext security (CCS)
No efficient attacker can win the following game:
(with non-negligible advantage)
M0 , M1
C=E(Mb) b Decryption
Challenger R
Attacker oracle
Challenge
C
b’
Attacker wins if b=b’
Page 9
10. PKCS1 V2.0 - OAEP
New preprocessing function: OAEP (BR94).
M 01 00..0 rand.
+ H
Check pad
on decryption.
Reject CT if invalid.
G +
Plaintext to encrypt with RSA {0,1}n-1
Thm: RSA is trap-door permutation OAEP is CCS
when H,G are “random oracles”.
In practice: use SHA-1 or MD5 for H and G.
Page 10
11. OAEP Improvements
OAEP+: (Shoup’01) M W(M,R) R
trap-door permutation F + H
F-OAEP+ is CCS when
H,G,W are “random oracles”. G +
SAEP+: (B’01)
M W(M,R) R
RSA trap-door perm
RSA-SAEP+ is CCS when + H
H,W are “random oracle”.
Page 11
12. Subtleties in implementing OAEP [M ’00]
OAEP-decrypt(C) {
error = 0;
if ( RSA-1(C) > 2n-1 )
{ error =1; goto exit; }
if ( pad(OAEP-1(RSA-1(C))) != “01000” )
} { error = 1; goto exit; }
Problem: timing information leaks type of error.
Attacker can decrypt any ciphertext C.
Lesson: Don’t implement RSA-OAEP yourself …
Page 12
14. Is RSA a one-way permutation?
To invert the RSA one-way function (without d) attacker
must compute:
M from C = Me (mod N).
How hard is computing e’th roots modulo N ??
Best known algorithm:
• Step 1: factor N. (hard)
• Step 2: Find e’th roots modulo p and q. (easy)
Page 14
15. Shortcuts?
Must one factor N in order to compute e’th roots?
Exists shortcut for breaking RSA without factoring?
To prove no shortcut exists show a reduction:
• Efficient algorithm for e’th roots mod N
efficient algorithm for factoring N.
• Oldest problem in public key cryptography.
Evidence no reduction exists: (BV’98)
• “Algebraic” reduction factoring is easy.
• Unlike Diffie-Hellman (Maurer’94).
Page 15
16. Improving RSA’s performance
To speed up RSA decryption use
small private key d. Cd = M (mod N)
• Wiener87: if d < N0.25 then RSA is insecure.
• BD’98: if d < N0.292 then RSA is insecure
(open: d < N0.5 )
• Insecure: priv. key d can be found from (N,e).
• Small d should never be used.
Page 16
17. Wiener’s attack
Recall: e d = 1 (mod (N) )
k Z : e d = k (N) + 1
e k 1
-
(N) d d (N)
(N) = N-p-q+1 |N- (N)| p+q 3 N
e - k 1
d N0.25/3 N d 2d2
Continued fraction expansion of e/N gives k/d.
e d = 1 (mod k) gcd(d,k)=1
Page 17
18. RSA With Low public exponent
To speed up RSA encryption (and sig. verify)
use a small e. C = Me (mod N)
Minimal value: e=3 ( gcd(e, (N) ) = 1)
Recommended value: e=65537=216+1
Encryption: 17 mod. multiplies.
Several weak attacks. Non known on RSA-OAEP.
Asymmetry of RSA: fast enc. / slow dec.
• ElGamal: approx. same time for both.
Page 18
19. Implementation attacks
Attack the implementation of RSA.
Timing attack: (Kocher 97)
The time it takes to compute Cd (mod N)
can expose d.
Power attack: (Kocher 99)
The power consumption of a smartcard while
it is computing Cd (mod N) can expose d.
Faults attack: (BDL 97)
A computer error during Cd (mod N)
can expose d.
OpenSSL defense: check output. 5% slowdown.
Page 19
20. Key lengths
Security of public key system should be
comparable to security of block cipher.
NIST:
Cipher key-size Modulus size
64 bits 512 bits.
80 bits 1024 bits
128 bits 3072 bits.
256 bits (AES) 15360 bits
High security very large moduli.
Not necessary with Elliptic Curve Cryptography.
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