The document summarizes the key findings of a report analyzing 126 popular mobile health and finance apps. It found that while consumers and executives believe their apps are secure, 90% of apps tested had at least two of the top 10 mobile security risks as defined by OWASP. Specifically, 98% lacked binary protections and 83% had insufficient transport layer protection. The document then outlines the 10 most critical mobile security risks according to OWASP, including improper platform usage, insecure data storage, insecure communication, and extraneous functionality.

1. OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks 2016(RC)
Prathan Phongthiproek
OWASP Mobile Security Team

2. Overview
Arxan 5th Annual State of Application Security report
The new research analyzed 126 popular mobile health and finance apps from the US, UK, Germany, and Japan
Key findings:
 Consumers and app executives believe their mobile health and finance apps are secure. A combined 84 percent of
mobile app users and mobile app executives believe that their mobile health and finance apps are “adequately secure,”
 The majority of mobile health and finance apps contain critical security vulnerabilities. 90 percent of the mobile
health and finance apps tested had at least two of the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Mobile Top 10
Risks.
 The security and safety risks are real and significant. 98 percent of the mobile apps tested lacked binary protection. 83
percent of the mobile apps had insufficient transport layer protection.
 Most consumers would change providers if they knew their apps were not secure. 80 percent of mobile app users
would change providers if they knew the apps they were using were not secure. 82 percent would change providers if they
knew alternative apps offered by similar service providers were more secure.

3. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
– OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks 2014 and 2016(RC)
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Projects/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project_-_Top_Ten_Mobile_Risks
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10
Guideline for Mobile Application Security
OWASP Top 10 Mobile 2014 OWASP Top 10 Mobile 2016(RC)
M1: Weak Server Side Controls M1 - Improper Platform Usage
M2: Insecure Data Storage M2 - Insecure Data Storage
M3: Insufficient Transport Layer Protection M3 - Insecure Communication
M4: Unintended Data Leakage M4 - Insecure Authentication
M5: Poor Authorization and Authentication M5 - Insufficient Cryptography
M6: Broken Cryptography M6 - Insecure Authorization
M7: Client Side Injection M7 - Client Code Quality
M8: Security Decisions Via Untrusted Inputs M8 - Code Tampering
M9: Improper Session Handling M9 - Reverse Engineering
M10: Lack of Binary Protections M10 - Extraneous Functionality

4. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
– OWASP Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG)
https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg
Guideline for Mobile Application Security
Ref: https://docs.google.com/document/d/132Ose0jdQwN6Z_Fp0VOJtVdGCufIwligwmf6oT0lmK8/edit

5. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
– OWASP Mobile Top 10 Controls
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project#tab=Top_10_Mobile_Controls
Guideline for Mobile Application Security

6. The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
– OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard (MASVS)
https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-masvs
Guideline for Mobile Application Security
V1: Architecture, Design
and Threat Modelling
Requirements
V2: Data Storage and
Privacy Requirements
V3: Cryptography
Verification
Requirements
V4: Authentication and
Session Management
Requirements
V5: Network
Communication
Requirements
V6: Environmental
Interaction
Requirements
V7: Code Quality and
Build Setting
Requirements
V8: Resiliency Against
Reverse Engineering
Requirements

7. OWASP Top 10 Mobile Risks – 2016 (RC)
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10

8. M1 – IMPROPER PLATFORM USAGE

9. M1 – Improper Platform Usage
Misuse of a platform feature or failure to use platform security controls
• Unintentional misuse of Android Intent, TouchID, Keychain
• Requesting too many permissions, or the wrong permissions
• Includes security control that is part of the mobile operating system

10. M1 – Improper Platform Usage
Abusing Android Content Provider for obtaining sensitive information from application database.
Sensitive
Information
.DBContentProvider

11. M1 – Improper Platform Usage
CVE-2015-1835: Remote exploit of secondary configuration variables in Apache Cordova on Android

12. M2 – INSECURE DATA STORAGE

13. M2 – Insecure Data Storage
This covers insecure data storage (M2) and unintended data leakage (M4).
2014 M2 Insecure Data Storage 2014 M4 Unintended Data Leakage
SQLite Databases URL Caching
Log Files Keystroke logging
Plist Files Screenshots (Task switcher)
XML Data stores /Manifest Files Logs (system, crash)
Binary data stores Copy/Paste buffer caching
Cookie stores Temp directories
SD card
Keychain
Cloud sync’d folders

14. M2 – Insecure Data Storage
Insecure Data Storage lead to Client-side based authentication flaw and File manipulation

15. M2 – Insecure Data Storage
Side-Channel Data Leakage through Android Clipboard and iOS generalPasteboard

16. M2 – Insecure Data Storage
Information Leakage through Application backgrounding

17. M3 – INSECURE COMMUNICATION

18. M3 – Insecure Communication
• Poor handshaking
• Incorrect SSL version
• Weak negotiation
• Clear-text communication of sensitive assets; IMEI and hardware addresses, phone number or home
address
• SSL certificate validity

19. M3 – Insecure Communication

20. M4 – INSECURE AUTHENTICATION

21. M4 – Insecure Authentication
Notions of authenticating the end user or bad session management. This can
include:
• Failure to identify the user at all when that should be required
• Failure to maintain the user's identity when it is required
• Weaknesses in session management
• Lack of Adequate Timeout Protection
• Using device identifier (UDID, IP, MAC address, IMEI) to identify a user or a session
• Using SMS Out-of-Band Authentication (OOBA) which can be exploited based upon the fact that SMS
was never designed to have the Confidentiality and Integrity that we as security professionals look for in
systems.
• NIST SP 800-63-3: Digital Authentication Guideline

22. M4 – Insecure Authentication
Bypass Client-side authentication using AM

23. M4 – Insecure Authentication
Bypass Client-side authentication using AM

24. M5 – INSUFFICIENT CRYPTOGRAPHY

25. M5 – Insufficient Cryptography
• Encoding != Encryption
• Creation and Use of Custom Encryption Protocols
• Use of Insecure and/or deprecated algorithms
o RC2
o MD4
o MD5
o SHA1

26. M5 – Insufficient Cryptography

27. M6 – INSECURE AUTHORIZATION

28. M6 – Insecure Authorization
• Poor or missing authorization schemes allow an adversary to anonymously execute functionality within
the mobile app or backend server used by the mobile app
• If the app does not authenticate users at all in a situation where it should (e.g., granting anonymous
access to some resource or service when authenticated and authorized access is required)

29. M6 – Insecure Authorization
Breaking Business Logic Flaw #1
Breaking Business Logic Flaw #2

30. M7 – CLIENT CODE QUALITY

31. M7 – Client Code Quality
• Code-level implementation problems in the mobile client. That's distinct from server-side coding
mistakes.

32. M7 – Client Code Quality
Attacking Protocols Handlers (URL Scheme) - Sea Surf
dvia://highaltitudehacks.com/
call_number/?phone=1234567890

33. M7 – Client Code Quality
SQLite Injection

34. M8 – CODE TAMPERING

35. M8 – Code Tampering
• Binary patching
• Local resource modification
• Method hooking or swizzling
• Dynamic memory modification.

36. M8 – Code Tampering
Instrumenting Android Applications with Frida using Brute-Force technique

37. M8 – Code Tampering
Runtime manipulation using Method Swizzling

38. M8 – Code Tampering
Breaking Business Logic flaws and Bypassing End-to-end encryption
Binary file was decrypted in
order to obtain classes/methods
using Classdump
The encryption and
decryption classes
were addresses
cy#
Encryption/Decryption
classes were intercepted
by hooking using custom
Cycript scripts
HTTPS
Request/Response
were obtained
cy#
Custom script were created for replacing the XML
request/response in order to break business logic flaws (E.g.
Authentication/Authorization/Indirect Object Reference)

39. M9 – REVERSE ENGINEERING

40. M9 – Reverse Engineering
• Unfortunately, it is extremely common for apps to be deployed without binary protection
• A lack of binary protections results in a mobile app that can be analyzed, reverse-engineered, and
modified by an adversary
• Can use an automated tool to easily visualize the control-flow and pseudo-code of the application

41. M9 – Reverse Engineering
Reverse-Engineering on iOS

42. M10 – EXTRANEOUS FUNCTIONALITY

43. M10 – Extraneous Functionality
• Developers include hidden backdoor functionality or other internal development security controls that are
not intended to be released into a production environment.
• For example, a developer may accidentally include a password as a comment in a hybrid app.
• Disabling of 2-factor authentication during testing.

44. Thank you
Q&A

45. References
• https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Projects/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project_-_Top_Ten_Mobile_Risks
• https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Mobile_Top_10_2016-Top_10
• https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Mobile_Security_Project#tab=Top_10_Mobile_Controls
• https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-mstg
• https://github.com/OWASP/owasp-masvshttps://blog.ul-ts.com/posts/nist-to-deprecate-sms-for-out-of-
band-authentication-what-is-the-impact/
• http://integricell.com/sms-out-of-band-authentication-a-false-sense-of-security/