This document discusses the difference between sense and reference in language as introduced by philosopher Gottlob Frege. Frege was interested in differentiating between the terms "sense" and "reference" based on the observation that people continued to use the terms "morning star" and "evening star" to refer to the planet Venus, even after it was known to be the same astronomical object. The document explores applications of this distinction between sense and reference in literary interpretation, case teaching, and case-based research. It argues the distinction is important for understanding how to properly invoke and interpret cases for different purposes like teaching decision-making versus conducting research on strategy.

1. On ‘Sense’ and ‘Reference’ in the Case Method
INTRODUCTION
What is the difference between the morning-star and the evening-star? This is the
question that was posed by Gottlob Frege, the German logician and
mathematician, when he began to consider an important problem in the
philosophy of language. This problem, simply put, is the theoretical difference
between the terms, ‘sense’ and ‘reference.’ What is the difference between sense
and reference? How will understanding this difference throw light on the case
method? Let us start by discussing why Frege asked this question in the
philosophy of language before moving on to its applications in the theory and
practice of the case method (Frege, 1892). A major preoccupation in the
philosophy of language is the problem of ‘reference.’ Does language refer to the
world? If so, how? If not, why not? If language refers to the world, then, will
understanding the modalities involved in doing so help us to find our way
around? If it does not refer to the world in the way in which we assume that it
does, do we have a crisis? Is there something that we are supposed to do to
correct the situation? Or at least prevent ourselves from losing our way? These
then are a few of the practical questions that are thrown up if we consider the
1

2. implications and consequences of thinking-through problems in the philosophy
of language seriously (Dummett, 1981; Reed, 2010). To go back then to the
difference between the morning star and the evening star: what is the difference
and why does it matter? Both the morning star and the evening star refer to the
same object in astronomy, the planet ‘Venus.’ Why then do we need two names?
Why not call Venus by the same name whether we spot it in the morning or in
the evening? The answer is this: there was a time in the history of astronomy
when astronomers did not know that both the morning star and the evening star
referred to the same planet. They thought they were different astronomical
objects and were called ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star’ because they were
spotted in the mornings and evenings; that’s all. But the moment advances in
astronomy confirmed that the morning star and the evening star both referred to
the same planet, ‘Venus,’ there was a problem in the philosophy of language.
Frege addressed this problem by differentiating between the terms ‘sense’ and
‘reference.’
MORNING STAR AND EVENING STAR
Why did Frege have to do this? He had to do this because he was not only
interested in the theoretical differences between the two terms as a philosopher,
but also because it was observed that people continued to use the terms ‘morning
star’ and ‘evening star’ even though astronomers confirmed categorically that
both the terms referred to the same planet. In other words, an empirical
breakthrough in knowledge did not make the word ‘Venus’ acceptable since the
people at large were used to the terms ‘morning star’ and ‘evening star.’ It took a
logician of Frege’s brilliance to understand what the implications of this habit of
thinking are to the logical structure of language. Frege argued that there is no
harm in continuing to use these two terms in everyday life even though we have
factually verified that both these terms refer to the same planet because there is a
need for both sense and reference in language. While the ‘denotation’ (i.e. the
2

3. referential meaning) of both these terms is the planet Venus, the two terms
morning star and evening star bring out two essential semantic dimensions of
the planet because they have different ‘connotations’ for the listener. A language
requires the terms ‘sense’ and ‘reference’ and ‘denotations’ and ‘connotations’ in
order to understand the relationship between what is ‘inside’ language and what
is ‘outside’ language. Sense is inside language while reference, or rather the
‘referent,’ the object referred to, is outside language (Horton, 2008). So there is
some intuitive wisdom in the habits of the common people who continue to use
the two terms to refer to the same object in space because when they use the term
‘morning star,’ they meant morning star, and when they used the term ‘evening
star,’ they meant evening star. The language habits of the common folk therefore
were not directly affected by the discoveries of astronomers and philosophers.
Instead, as Frege demonstrated, there is greater wisdom in trying to formalize
the idioms in use in everyday life in order to infer what the structure of a natural
language might be.
FREGE’S ACHIEVEMENT
Frege’s achievement then is related to his understanding of the relationship
between sense and reference given his preoccupation with mathematical logic,
and the applications of logic, if any, to the structure of natural languages. In
mathematical logic the main focus is on sense, i.e., the logical relationships
between terms and propositions that are true since these relationships are based
on logical ‘coherence’ rather than on a resemblance or ‘correspondence’ to a
world out there to which our propositions must conform. But natural languages
cannot work with sense relations alone, since we use natural languages to not
only find our way within the realm of language but also the relationship between
language and the world out there (Kripke, 1972). If we are more interested in
sense than in reference, which is the case in the literary analysis of texts, then, we
say that questions of reference have been bracketed off for the time being for
3

4. aesthetic or poetic reasons. But, if we write a novel to bring about social change
or reform then we invoke a stronger notion of reference than that which is
available in the realm of sense. So whether sense or reference is dominant in
literary interpretation depends on what is it that we are trying to do with a text.
This analytic distinction then results in conventions of literary interpretations
that will valorize either sense or reference.
CONVENTIONS OF WRITING
Conventions of writing and literary interpretation will also vary depending on
the institutional conventions which provide the context for these hermeneutic
activities. To summarize: the difference, for instance, between poetry and prose
as elementary genres of literature can be understood as the difference between a
preoccupation with sense as opposed to reference. While there is no direct
proportional analogy between sense and poetry, and reference and prose, that is
how matters square up in the practice of interpretation. When there is a
deviation from this conventional set of modalities then we say that a particular
text is a ‘prose-poem’ meaning that a prose text is invoking techniques of ‘sense-
making’ that are more likely to be found in poetry than in prose. Why is this
analytic distinction so important? It is important because it is the difference
between sense and reference that not only helps us to understand what is built
into a text, but also gives us a clue as to what we are supposed to do when we
interpret the text in terms of which of these categories will serve as the master-
signifier in the act or process of interpretation. So then what in the beginning
appeared to be an esoteric theoretical intervention at the level of linguistic
formalization by a philosopher of mathematical logic in Germany, turns out to be
absolutely necessary to understand the basic functioning of natural languages
since Frege’s discoveries are logical and not just philological; that is, the
implications of his work are not reducible to the German language, but necessary
to understand the structure of any natural language as such. Given this
4

5. theoretical background then in terms of how an analytic distinction that was
‘formalized’ as a result of a chance discovery in the history of astronomy; but,
more specifically, in the applications of this insight into the logical structure of
language, and its development further into literary conventions of writing and
interpretation, we can begin to guess what the implications of this distinction are
in the realm of case analysis.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CASE METHOD
What then, to put matters as simply as possible, are the implications of the
analytic distinction between sense and reference to the writing and interpretation
of cases during case discussions? When should we invoke one as opposed to the
other? Is it possible to formalize these modalities of theoretical ‘invocation’? Or,
are these merely a matter of subjective preference? These then are four questions
with which we can begin to think-through the role played by this simple, but
crucial analytic distinction in the context of the case method, and which I am
defining broadly here to include using cases for both teaching and research since
it is not widely-known that a cluster of cases on a particular firm by the same
case-writer, or by different case-writers on the same firm at a particular point in
time or phase of development, can serve as an empirical base for research. In
other words, the case method has two dimensions: teaching and research. The
elementary confusions in place, not only amongst those who are new to the
method, but sometimes even amongst those who should know better, stems from
the fact that case teaching has become a ‘spectator-sport’ of late, and is therefore
better known than case research. Case teaching, for better or worse, then, is the
theoretical ‘prototype’ of the case method as such in the pedagogical imagination
in most business schools (Datar et al, 2010). So when the notion of research is
invoked, even professional case-instructors assume that the data necessary for
this research is to be found only or mainly in databases, which is perfectly true in
economics, but not necessarily the case in the functional areas of management
5

6. which can not only use, but have consistently failed to use the data, knowledge,
and generalizations on the behavior of firms that is available in the large number
of case studies that are already available from a number of leading business
schools like Harvard Business School, and in the books that have been generated
by consistently tracking firms for a number of years, as for instance, in Yoffie’s
work on Apple computers.
THE STRATEGY ‘BEAT’ AND PRACTICE LINES
In such a model of case teaching cum case-based research, cases registered in
business schools are almost like advance versions of a chapter in a full-fledged
study of firms that represent innovation and change like Apple. Such forms of
longitudinal study can develop an in-depth understanding of companies and
industries and the business professor is almost like a business journalist who has
developed a thorough understanding of his ‘beat,’ which is basically an industry
or sub-component of an industry. He knows how to sift out relevant information
from irrelevant information in his area since the beat is now a part of his
professional identity in the business media. The other analogy that is of
relevance is from the world of management consulting, especially strategy firms
like McKinsey, which devote endless resources to not only tracking but
proactively developing the knowledge needed to not only generate new practice
lines, but shape how people in a given industry think about the challenges in that
particular industry (Edersheim, 2006). This is done through the developments of
caselettes and theories of both industry and macroeconomic analyses under the
aegis of the McKinsey Global Institute and the McKinsey Quarterly. Another
strategy that consulting firms have deployed effectively is to synergize between
the best work done in strategy by academics and the world of consultancy by
sponsoring the McKinsey award for the best paper published in the Harvard
Business Review in any given year (HBR, 2009; Kiechel III, 2010). They have also
gone public with their approaches to doing strategy in the context of the
6

7. consulting business (Rasiel, 1999; Friga and Rasiel, 2001; Friga, 2009). These
analogies from business schools, the business media, and management
consultancies is an attempt to demonstrate the potential in using the case method
as not only an important modality of teaching but also as a point of entry into
case-based research, which is not only of relevance in the classroom; but, more
fundamentally, into how practitioners in industry view themselves and their
relationship to the thought-patterns and forms of social-cognition that
characterize the problem of change and strategy in a given industry. It is,
needless to say, of great consequence in understanding how strategy firms
themselves do strategy from the locus of consultants (Srinivasan, 2012). These
then are not just pro-active forms of tracking the latest developments, but
enlightened models for shaping the thought configurations of industries in both
developed and emerging economies (HBR, 1999; HBR, 2008; HBR 2011).
CASE TEACHING AND CASE RESEARCH
Having spelt out the continuity of concerns between case-based teaching and
research, let us return to the analytic distinction between sense and reference.
Just as literary conventions dictate whether we should focus on sense or
reference in literary interpretations, so do the conventions of analysis make it
possible to demarcate the concerns of case-based teaching as opposed to case-
based research. While all the information that is built into a case might have
originally been empirical in nature, i.e., related to the field-work done by a
particular case-writer, the intention, modalities, and ‘scope’ of the deployment of
this material will vary fundamentally in the class room from those necessary to
write a book about a firm. There is a good reason for this; most cases, even when
they are early versions of a chapter of a book, are mainly used for teaching
decision-making. But the later versions in the book are about strategy as such, of
which decision-making is only a subset of concerns. So, while teaching decision-
making, the focus should be on ‘sense-making’ rather than on the modalities and
7

8. problems of reference since the preoccupation is with teaching decision-making
in a particular context (HBR, 2001; HBE, 2006; HBR, 2007). But, when the
pedagogical intent is on the broader themes that constitute the theory and
practice of strategy, then, we need a model that is animated by the possibilities of
referential knowledge. This analytic difference is captured well in terms of the
generic differences between the following genres in managerial communications:
decision essays or reports as opposed to company reports or industry reports in
business schools.
CONCLUSION
Decision reports are essays that are written in order to think-through the
modalities involved in recommending a decision in the context of a case analysis,
i.e. the focus is on making sense of the process of decision-making. But in the
latter, which prepares students to make a better contribution in the context of
summer internships, the idea is to give them an opportunity to learn as much as
possible about the firm or the company which they will join, and relate that
knowledge as far as possible to the context of the industry to which it belongs.
Students who go for summer internships without any background or interest in
either the company or the industry to which they are assigned are less likely to
add value during their internship. These then are two different ways of training
students through the genre of report writing available in the context of
managerial communications by using the case method as a theoretical platform,
albeit with a different set of boundary conditions (Christensen et al, 1991; Ellet,
2007). Understanding the fortunes of this analytic distinction then will make it
possible to re-think the role of the case method in setting out the basic
parameters of case-teaching and case-based research for faculty in business
schools. Furthermore, using this analytic distinction effectively can help us to
prepare our students better for the world of business and industry by
distinguishing between what they need to know to be better decision-makers
8

9. when they join a firm on placement vis-à-vis what they need to know about the
company or industry which they will join during their summer internships
before graduating from the MBA program. That is why this seemingly esoteric
distinction between sense and reference in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege
should be made more widely known in business schools the context of the case
method.
REFERENCES
Christensen et al, Roland C. (1991). Education for Judgment: The Artistry of
Discussion Leadership (Boston: Harvard Business School Press).
Datar et al, Srikant M. (2010). Rethinking the MBA: Business Education at a
Crossroads (Boston: Harvard Business Press).
Dummett, Michael (1981). Frege: Philosophy of Language (Cambridge; Harvard
University Press).
Edersheim, Elizabeth (2006). McKinsey’s Marvin Bower: Vision, Leadership, and the
Creation of Management Consulting (Somerset, NJ: John Wiley & Sons).
Ellet, William (2007). The Case Study Handbook: How to Read, Discuss, and Write
Persuasively About Cases (Boston: Harvard Business Review Press).
Frege, Gottlob (1892). ‘On Sinn and Bedeutung,’ in The Frege Reader, edited by
Michael Beaney (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 151-171.
Friga, Paul N. (2009). The McKinsey Engagement: A Powerful Toolkit for More
Efficient and Effective Team Problem Solving (New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill).
Harvard Business Essentials, Decision Making: 5 Steps to Better Results (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 2006).
Harvard Business Review, On Corporate Strategy (Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 1999).
Harvard Business Review, On Decision Making (Boston: Harvard Business School
Press, 2001).
9

10. Harvard Business Review, On Making Smarter Decisions (Boston: Harvard
Business School Press, 2007).
Harvard Business Review, On Strategic Renewal (Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 2008).
Harvard Business Review, McKinsey Award Winners (Boston: Harvard Business
School Press, 2009).
Harvard Business Review, HBR’s 10 Must Reads, On Strategy (Boston: Harvard
Business Review Press, 2011).
Horton, Stephen (2008). ‘Reference,’ Cultural Theory: The Key Concepts, edited by
Andrew Edgar and Peter Sedgwick (London and New York: Routledge), pp. 288-
289.
Kiechel III, Walter (2010). ‘Waking Up McKinsey,’ The Lords of Strategy: The Secret
Intellectual History of the New Corporate World (Boston: Harvard Business Press),
pp. 95-115.
Kripke, Saul (1972). Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press).
Rasiel, Ethan M. (1999). The McKinsey Way: Using the Techniques of the World’s Top
Strategic Consultants to Help You and Your Business (New York: McGraw Hill).
Rasiel, Ethan M. and Friga, Paul N. (2001). The McKinsey Mind: Understanding and
Implementing the Problem Solving Tools and Techniques of the World’s Top Strategic
Consulting Firm (New York: McGraw Hill).
Reed, Delbert (2007, 2010). The Origins of Analytic Philosophy: Kant and Frege
(London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group),
Continuum Studies in Philosophy.
Srinivasan, Shiva Kumar (2012). ‘Why Are There So Few Cases About
Professional Service Firms?’ Management Dynamics, 12:1, pp. 108-114.
SHIVA KUMAR SRINIVASAN
10