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CLINICAL NOTES SERIES (September 2016)
DONALD WINNICOTT ON THE MIRRORING FUNCTION
Donald W. Winnicott (1967). ‘Mirror-Role of Mother and Family in Child
Development,’ Playing and Reality (London: Routledge Classics, 2005), pp. 149-159.
INTRODUCTION
These clinical notes will attempt to explain why Donald Winnicott found the
mirroring role played by the mother and the family important in the lives of infants.
Even those who are not too familiar with Winnicott will know that he is not the only
psychoanalyst interested in mirrors and the mirroring function. Winnicott points out
that his interest in this topic is related to the influence of Jacques Lacan. I will
therefore begin with a brief summary of what Lacan meant by the ‘stade du mirroir.’1
Since Lacan’s paper not only predates Winnicott’s but is also his main source of
influence, it is important to know what was at stake for Lacan in invoking the image
of the infant in front of a mirror.2 Lacan’s paper on the mirror stage was delivered at
the 16th International Congress of Psychoanalysis at Zürich on July 17, 1949. This
paper eventually became the meta-psychological platform on which he would build
his order of the Imaginary and imaginary relations. This term is usually contrasted
with the Real and the Symbolic in the Lacanian model of cognition. While these
terms are used synchronically, they can also be used to represent a diachronic
unfolding in the child’s developmental trajectory. While the Lacanian model of
development is not reducible to developmental biology, it intersects with the
1 See Jacques Lacan (1949). ‘The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as
Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,’ Écrits: A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan
(London: Tavistock/Routledge), pp. 1-7. See also Dylan Evans (1997). ‘Mirror Stage,’ An
Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge), pp. 114-116.
2 For essays on the theoretical intersections in the work of Donald W. Winnicott and Jacques
Lacan, see Lewis A. Kirshner (2011). Between Winnicott and Lacan: A Clinical Engagement
(New York: Routledge).

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concerns of both biology and a theory of development. The main difference though
is that at every stage of the developmental process, there is an underlying fear of
symbolic castration.3 The Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic can be mapped
approximately to the developmental trajectory of the subject albeit without falling
prey to reductive forms of essentialism.4 That is why Lacan invoked the Schéma L to
situate how these terms relate to each other making it possible to interpret this
schéma from both a synchronic and a diachronic point of view. 5
THE LACANIAN IMAGINARY
In this paper, Lacan is mainly preoccupied with how the Imaginary order is
instituted in the infant when he reflects upon his image in the mirror. The mirror
stage is identified with the period between six to eighteen months when the infant
has not completely learnt to stand up and walk around. It is important to note that
the infant is held up in front of the mirror since he may not always be able to
summon the motor co-ordination required to do this on his own. This kind of infant
is referred to as a trotte-bébé in French. The main ontological consequence of the
mirror stage is the ‘transformation’ that happens to the infant upon assuming his
reflection as his own. This identification is however accompanied by a sense of
alienation since there will always be an endemic gap between the fullness of the
image in the mirror and the infant’s experiential lack of adequate motor co-
ordination in his body. The institution of the Imaginary means that the infant will
always look forward to assuming his being in the future rather than in the present. The
development of motor co-ordination as a consequence of biological maturation does
not make this structural gap between the Real of his body and the Imaginary of its
representation go away. The existence of this endemic gap is proof that the
Imaginary has been instituted as an order of cognition. Another important reason for
invoking the mirror is that even the biological process of maturation depends in
some cases of encountering mirror-like phenomena. So, for instance, in the case of
the pigeon, the maturation of its gonad depends on being exposed to its own
3 For an exposition of the Lacanian theory of symbolic castration, see Serge Leclaire (1998).
‘Psychoanalyzing: A Note on Transference and Castration,’ Psychoanalyzing: On the Order of
the Unconscious and the Practice of the Letter, translated by Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford
University Press), pp. 128-139.
4 For essays on the Real, the Imaginary, and the Symbolic, see Richard Feldstein et al (1996).
Reading Seminars I and II: Lacan’s Return to Freud (Albany: SUNY Press). See also Joseph H.
Smith and William Kerrigan (1983). Interpreting Lacan (New Haven and London: Yale
University Press), Forum of Psychiatry and the Humanities, The Washington School of
Psychiatry.
5 See Dylan Evans (1997). ‘Schéma L,’ An Introductory Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (London:
Routledge), pp. 168-171.

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reflection in the mirror or seeing another member of the species. Such is the case for
the migratory locust as well which can make the transition from the solitary to the
migratory form only if it encounters an adequate reflection of itself in the
environment. While Lacan does not list all the species that are dependent on such
forms of mirroring phenomena to demonstrate the function of the Imaginary in their
quest for maturation, these examples from ethology constitute an attempt on his part
to make a case for the mirroring function as a theoretical category in Lacanian
psychoanalysis. The process of maturation, to summarize, is not biologically self-
contained; it necessarily involves a contingent encounter with the mirror function. This
then is the crucial insight in Jacques Lacan and Roger Calliois that Winnicott takes
up in his own paper on the mirroring function. In addition to ethology, Lacan points
out that what is at stake is ‘the imago of the fragmented body.’ The closest
approximation or representation of this fragmented body, he argues, is to be found
in the paintings of Hieronymus Bosch. That is why Jacques Lacan is suspicious of the
Imaginary order. So, unlike ego-psychologists, Lacanians do not locate the ego as the
locus of reason – if by ‘reason’ we mean the ability to comprehend internal or
external reality without it being subject to Imaginary distortions. That is also why
paranoia, according to Lacan, is a consequence of the forms of endemic misrecognition
that constitutes the ego function. The main methodological preoccupation in Lacanian
psychoanalysis then is to identify and minimize the role played by these Imaginary
distortions in analysis.6
THE WINNICOTTIAN MIRROR
This brief account of the Lacanian Imaginary can serve as the necessary background
to Winnicott’s paper on the mirroring function.7 The first thing to note is that
Winnicott (unlike Lacan) is not really interested in a physical mirror; he is more
interested in the mirroring function. That is why, at the very outset, he invokes the
mother’s face as the main object of his analysis. As Winnicott puts it in the first line
of his paper, ‘the precursor of the mirror is the mother’s face.’ This innovative twist to the
6 See Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis (1973). ‘Imaginary,’ The Language of
Psychoanalysis, translated by Donald Nicholson-Smith, with an introduction by Daniel
Lagache (London: Karnac Books, 1988), p. 210.
7 For a brief introduction to Winnicott’s theories, see Adam Phillips (1988). Winnicott
(London: Fontana Press). A more comprehensive biographical study is available in F. Robert
Rodman (2003). Winnicott: Life and Work (Cambridge, MS: Perseus Books). The history of
child psychoanalysis in the British Society for Psychoanalysis is available in Joseph Schwartz
(1999). ‘Child Psychoanalysis: The Beginnings of a New Paradigm’ and ‘Breakthrough in
Britain,’ Cassandra’s Daughter: A History of Psychoanalysis (New York: Penguin Books), pp.
193-244. The French approach to child psychoanalysis is explained in Serge Leclaire (1998). A
Child is Being Killed: Primary Narcissism and the Death Drive, translated by Marie-Claude Hays
(Stanford: Stanford University Press).

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definition of a mirror turned out to be so influential that it is often read back into the
Lacanian Imaginary by readers who are not aware of its source. This is also an idea
that is constantly re-discovered by readers of Lacan who are under the impression
that they are differentiating between the literal and metaphorical invocations of the
mirror without realizing that Winnicott wrote a paper on the mirroring function.
That is why I have incorporated a section on the Lacanian Imaginary into these
clinical notes on Winnicott. It will give readers an opportunity to differentiate between
the mirror and the mother’s face. What these objects have or should have in common is
the mirroring function. Like Lacan, we will find that Winnicott emphasizes the
importance of ‘holding’ the infant. In addition to holding (which was the function
that he went on to elaborate in his term ‘holding environment’), Winnicott also uses
terms like ‘handling and object-presenting.’ What is at stake for both Lacan and
Winnicott then is a theory of ‘maturation.’ It is not enough to hold the infant, he
should also feel cherished by his mother; that is why Winnicott uses the term
‘handling’ as well. If the infant is well-handled, he will find it ‘satisfying.’ Only after
that will he be able to play with the transitional objects that present themselves in
the space in-between him and his mother and develop ‘the capacity to be alone’ with
her.8 Winnicott incorporates an important insight from the analytic literature at this
point. If the holding and handling is done well then the infant looks up from the
breast and straight into the mother’s face. An important question for Winnicott is
what exactly he sees in the mother’s face. If the infant is able to see himself in the
mother’s face then the mirroring function is at play. If however the mother is depressed
or is experiencing affects that she cannot contain; then, the infant is able to feel what
she is going through, but is not able to see himself reflected in her face.
ON MATERNAL RAPPORT
This difference or the gap between what the infant ‘feels’ and what the infant ‘sees’
on the mother’s face is important for Winnicott’s account of the mirroring function.
For Winnicott, the focus is on seeing rather than feeling. The failure of the mirroring
function can affect the infant’s creativity since it makes it difficult for him to situate
himself in the maternal environment. If these failures are repeated, the infant
becomes wary of the affects suffered by the mother. The infant is then forced to track
his mother closely to avoid situations in which he might be disappointed by the
failure of the mirroring function. If the mother’s face cannot reflect him, the infant
does not look ‘into’ the mirror anymore; instead he winds up looking ‘at’ the mirror.
Winnicott illustrates this phenomenon with a few illustrations. So, for instance,
young girls expect to find ‘rapport’ with the mother when they look into the mirror;
8 Winnicott’s theory of the transitional object is available in Donald W. Winnicott (1953).
‘Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena,’ Playing and Reality (London: Routledge),
pp. 1-34.

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if they don’t, then, they begin to doubt the mother’s ability to love. Winnicott also
shares an instance of a depressed woman who would suffer from a sense of despair
on waking up; she could function only after she had ‘put on her face’ after her
morning ablutions in the bathroom. The Winnicottian mirror then is that which proves to
the subject that he or she exists. It is directly related to the function of the maternal
gaze. Winnicott also mentions a patient who was fond of the paintings of Francis
Bacon. The patient went on to relate the fact that Bacon liked to use glass to cover his
pictures so that the viewer could see his own image in its reflection. She then went
on to relate it to Lacan’s mirror stage.
CONCLUSION
In all these instances, Winnicott points out that his task is not to come up with
‘clever interpretations,’ but to mirror the patient. Interpretation then is a function of
holding; it is ‘a derivative of the face.’
While this approach to psychotherapy cannot guarantee that the patient will be
cured; it at least ensures, Winnicott points out, that ‘they are grateful to us for seeing
them as they are, and this gives us a satisfaction of a deep kind.’ When infants grow
up however they become less dependent on parental forms of mirroring. They have
by then incorporated a number of identifications and can find other mirrors in the
family. This comparative reading of Lacan and Winnicott on the mirroring function
should make it possible, if required, to study their theories of identification and
cross-identification as well. Since that will be beyond the scope of these clinical
notes, I will take it up on another occasion in this series.
SHIVA KUMAR SRINIVASAN