The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a coalition aimed at preventing nuclear weapon proliferation through stringent export guidelines. It was established in 1974 following a nuclear explosion by a non-nuclear state and has since evolved its guidelines in response to international treaties and events. The document also emphasizes India's pursuit of NSG membership, citing geopolitical factors and China's opposition as significant challenges.

1. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a group of nuclear supplier countries that seeks to
contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of two sets of
Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.
The NSG Guidelines also contain the so-called “Non-Proliferation Principle,” adopted in 1994,
whereby a supplier, notwithstanding other provisions in the NSG Guidelines, authorises a
transfer only when satisfied that the transfer would not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. The Non-Proliferation Principle seeks to cover the rare but important cases where
adherence to the NPT or to a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty may not by itself be a guarantee
that a State will consistently share the objectives of the Treaty or that it will remain in
compliance with its Treaty obligations.
The NSG Guidelines are consistent with, and complement, the various international, legally
binding instruments in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. These include the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear
Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty
(Treaty of Rarotonga), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba), the
Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Treaty of Bangkok), and the Central
Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).
The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government (PG) in accordance
with its national laws and practices.
Decisions on export applications are taken at the national level in accordance with national
export licensing requirements
History
1974 - The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created following the explosion in 1974 of a
nuclear device by a non-nuclear-weapon State, which demonstrated that nuclear technology
transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused.
1978 - The NSG Guidelines were published in 1978 by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) as IAEA document INFCIRC/254 (subsequently amended), to apply to nuclear transfers
for peaceful purposes to help ensure that such transfers would not be diverted to an
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities.
1990 - At the 1990 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a number of
recommendations were made by the committee reviewing the implementation of Article III,
which had a significant impact on the NSG's activities in the 1990s.
1992 - In 1992, the NSG decided to establish Guidelines for transfers of nuclear-related dual-
use equipment, material and technology (items which have both nuclear and non-nuclear
applications), which could make a significant contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle

2. or nuclear explosive activity. These Dual-Use Guidelines were published as Part 2 of
INFCIRC/254, and the original Guidelines published in 1978 became Part 1 of INFCIRC/254.
1995 - The endorsement at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC) of the
full-scope Safeguards policy, already adopted by the NSG in 1992, clearly reflected the
conviction of the international community that this nuclear supply policy is a vital element to
promote shared nuclear non-proliferation commitments and obligations.
2000 - NSG Participating Governments (PGs) prepared a comprehensive information paper on
the NSG for the 2000 NPT Review Conference. This was disseminated on the IAEA website as
INFCIRC/539/Rev. 1 (Corr.) in November 2000, under the title “The NSG: Its Origins, Roles
and Activities”.
2004 - The 2004 NSG Plenary (Göteborg) decided to adopt a “catch-all” mechanism in the NSG
Guidelines, to provide a national legal basis to control the export of nuclear related items that are
not on the control lists, when such items are or may be intended for use in connection with a
nuclear weapons programme
2005 - The 2005 NSG Plenary (Oslo) adopted a decision that supplier and recipient states
should elaborate appropriate measures to invoke fall-back safeguards if the IAEA can no longer
undertake its Safeguards mandate in a recipient state.
2008 - At an extraordinary NSG Plenary in Vienna, convened by the 2008 NSG Chair
(Germany), PGs adopted a policy statement on civil nuclear cooperation with the IAEA-
safeguarded Indian civil nuclear program - INFCIRC/734(corrected
2010 - To keep pace with advances in technology, market trends and security challenges, the
2010 NSG Plenary (Christchurch) agreed to establish a technical group to conduct a fundamental
review of the NSG’s Trigger and Dual-Use Lists. The technical working group was called the
Dedicated Meeting of Technical Experts (DMTE).
2011 - The 2011 NSG Plenary (Noordwijk) agreed to strengthen the NSG Part 1 Guidelines on
the transfer of sensitive enrichment and reprocessing technologies (paragraph 6 and paragraph
7).
2012 - The 2012 NSG Plenary (Seattle) endorsed the recommendation of the NSG Consultative
Group (CG) to approve 26 technical proposals from the DMTE. The Plenary also approved an
amendment to the NSG Part 1 Guidelines, adding a new paragraph 12 entitled “Support for
Access to Nuclear Fuel for Peaceful Uses”.
2013 - The Fundamental Review was completed at the 2013 NSG Plenary (Prague). The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published all 54 agreed amendments in revised
IAEA documents INFCIRC/254/Part 1 and INFCIRC/254/Part 2 on 13 November 2013. The
2013 NSG Plenary agreed to amend Paragraph 3.a and Annex C of the Part 1 Guidelines to

3. reference recognized IAEA recommendations for physical protection and agreed to launch the
new, revised NSG website to facilitate information sharing with the public in multiple languages
Organisation
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) works on the basis of consensus. Overall responsibility for
activities lies within NSG Plenary meetings that are held once a year. A rotating Chair has the
overall responsibility for coordination of work and outreach activities.
NSGPlenary
The NSG Plenary can decide to set up technical working groups on matters such as the review of
the NSG Guidelines, the Annexes, the NSG Procedural Arrangement, information sharing and
transparency activities. The NSG Plenary can also mandate the Chair to conduct outreach
activities with interested countries. The aim of the outreach activities is to promote adherence to
the NSG Guidelines. In addition to the Plenary meeting, the NSG has two other standing bodies
that report to the Plenary. These are the Consultative Group (CG) and the Information Exchange
Meeting (IEM) with Chairs that also rotate annually.
NSGTroika
The current NSG Chair, together with the previous and the future Chair, form the NSG Troika.
NSGConsultativeGroup (CG)
The CG meets at least twice a year and is tasked to hold consultations on issues associated with
the Guidelines on nuclear supply and its technical annexes.
NSGInformationExchangeMeeting (IEM)
The IEM precedes the NSG Plenary during the Plenary week and provides another opportunity
for NSG Participating Governments to share information and developments of relevance to the
objectives and content of the NSG Guidelines.
NSGLicensingand EnforcementExperts Meeting (LEEM)
Under the IEM, the Licensing and Enforcement Experts Meeting, or LEEM, discusses issues
relating to effective licensing and enforcement practices.
NSGTechnicalExperts Group (TEG)
The 2013 NSG Plenary in Prague, Czech Republic, agreed to establish a Technical Experts
Group (TEG), which will, at the request of the CG, be tasked with ensuring that the NSG control
lists are complete and up-to-date with technical advancements. The TEG will meet to discuss and

4. make recommendations to the CG on all technical questions referred to it by the CG, on an as
needed basis by the CG.
NSGPoint of Contact
The Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organisations in Vienna, acting as a Point
of Contact, carries out a practical support function. It receives and distributes NSG documents,
notifies meeting schedules and provides practical assistance to the NSG Plenary, the CG and
IEM Chairs and Chairs of the various working groups established by the Plenary.
Participants
The Current Participating Governments (PGs) are:
ARGENTINA, AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELARUS, BELGIUM, BRAZIL, BULGARIA,
CANADA, CHINA, CROATIA, CYPRUS, CZECH REPUBLIC, DENMARK, ESTONIA,
FINLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY, GREECE, HUNGARY, ICELAND, IRELAND, ITALY,
JAPAN, KAZAKHSTAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, LATVIA, LITHUANIA,
LUXEMBOURG, MALTA, MEXICO, NETHERLANDS, NEW ZEALAND, NORWAY,
POLAND, PORTUGAL, ROMANIA, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, SERBIA, SLOVAKIA,
SLOVENIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SPAIN, SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND, TURKEY, UKRAINE,
UNITED KINGDOM, and UNITED STATES
ON WHAT BASIS ARE PARTICIPATION DECISIONS TAKEN?
Factors taken into account for participation include the following:
 The ability to supply items (including items in transit) covered by the Annexes to Parts 1
and 2 of the NSG Guidelines;
 Adherence to the Guidelines and action in accordance with them;
 Enforcement of a legally based domestic export control system which gives effect to the
commitment to act in accordance with the Guidelines;
 Adherence to one or more of the NPT, the Treaties of Pelindaba, Rarotonga, Tlatelolco,
Bangkok , Semipalatinsk or an equivalent international nuclear non-proliferation
agreement, and full compliance with the obligations of such agreement(s);
 Support of international efforts towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and of their delivery vehicles.
Guidelines
Aimof the Guidelines
The aim of the NSG Guidelines is to ensure that nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not
contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and that
international trade and cooperation in the nuclear field is not hindered unjustly in the

5. process. The NSG Guidelines facilitate the development of trade in this area by providing the
means whereby obligations to facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation can be implemented in a
manner consistent with international nuclear non-proliferation norms.
Guidelines fornuclearTransfers (INFCIRC/254,Part1)
The fundamental principles for safeguards and export controls should apply to nuclear transfers
for peaceful purposes to any non-nuclear-weapon state and, in the case of controls on retransfers,
to transfers to any State. In this connection, suppliers have defined the so-called trigger list. This
list includes guidelines for nuclear transfers such as physical protection, safeguards, special
controls on sensitive exports, special arrangements for export of enrichment facilities, controls
on material usable for nuclear weapons, controls on retransfers as well as supporting
activities. Annexes of the guidelines govern the export of items that are especially designed or
prepared for nuclear use. These include in the first annex (Annex A) material and equipment as
well as technology associated with each of the items on the trigger list.
The second annex (Annex B) includes clarification of items on the trigger list:
– nuclear reactors and equipment therefor;
– non-nuclear material for reactors;
– plants and equipment for reprocessing;
– plants and equipment for fabrication of nuclear fuel elements;
– plants and equipment for separation of isotopes;
– plants for heavy water production; and
– plants and equipment for conversion.
A further annex (Annex C) describes criteria for levels of physical protection.
Updated NSG Guidelines Part 1 - June 2013 (PDF file)
Guidelines fortransfers ofnuclear-related dual-useequipment,materials,software,and
related technology (INFCIRC/254,Part2)
With the objective of averting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and preventing acts of
nuclear terrorism, suppliers have considered procedures in relation to the transfer of certain
equipment, materials, software, and related technology that could make a major contribution to a
“nuclear explosive activity,” an “unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity” or acts of nuclear
terrorism. In this connection, suppliers have agreed on the following principles, common
definitions, and an export control list of equipment, materials, software, and related technology.
This second set of NSG Guidelines governs the export of nuclear related dual-use items and
technologies, that is, items that can make a major contribution to an unsafeguarded nuclear fuel
cycle or nuclear explosive activity, but which have non-nuclear uses as well, for example in
industry. The list includes Guidelines for the transfer of dual-use goods which are listed in the
annex. The annex lists the following categories:

6. - industrial equipment;
- materials;
- uranium isotope separation equipment and components (other than trigger list items);
- heavy water production plant related equipment (other than trigger list items);
- test and measurement equipment for the development of nuclear explosive devices;
- components for nuclear explosive devices
Why is NSGMembershipimportant for India?
The issue of India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has been the focus of
significant public and media attention over the past few weeks. It appears to have emerged as the
single most critical foreign policy priority for the Modi government. The government is
according so much importance to the issue that Prime Minster Modi hurriedly decided at the last
minute to include visits to Switzerland and Mexico during his tour to USA and some other
countries to raise this issue and obtain categorical support for India’s membership at the
forthcoming NSG plenary at Seoul on 23-24 June 2016. It is a reflection on Modi that he was
able to get unequivocal support from Mexico and Switzerland although they had initially
opposed the grant of a unique waiver to India by the NSG in 2008. They had also expressed
concerns about India's NSG membership when the issue came up in informal discussions in
recent years.
Under normal circumstances, the issue would probably not have assumed such a high profile.
What appears to have brought it so completely under the floodlights is the uncharacteristic and
open opposition by China to India’s membership in this body. Over the last few weeks, China
has issued several statements, officially as well as through its mouthpiece media publications,
maintaining that no single country waiver should be granted to India as was done in 2008. It
stated that, in any case, India is not eligible to become a member of the NSG as it is not a
member of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), adherence to which latter is necessary for
membership in the former. China has also averred that for non-NPT members some definite
criteria should be evolved rather than granting country specific waivers. At other times, it has
stated that Pakistan also has similar credentials to join the NSG; and that if India is admitted,
Pakistan should also be admitted simultaneously. China has also maintained that there are several
countries which have reservations about India’s membership of the NSG. Further, if only India
were to be admitted, it would disturb the nuclear-arms balance in South Asia as India will engage
in a massive nuclear weaponisation programme. Finally, China has stated that India's
membership will ''jeopardise'' China's national interests and touch a ''raw nerve'' in Pakistan.
None of China’s contentions appear to hold much water. However, before considering them
more critically, it will be useful to understand what the purpose and mandate of the NSG is. It is
doubtless true that NSG was established in the wake of the Pokhran I peaceful nuclear explosion
conducted by India in 1974. The intent and purpose of the NSG is, however, different from that
of the NPT. NSG is not an international treaty. It is a group of “nuclear supplier countries that
seeks to contribute to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of two sets of
Guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports.” After more than 25 years of its
establishment, some suggested guidelines were evolved in 2001 at Aspen for admitting new

7. members to the organisation. Amongst these, membership of NPT is only a guideline, a
consideration, and not a mandatory requirement while deciding on a country's application.
India is keen to become a member of the NSG and other export control regimes such as the
Wassenaar Agreement and Australia Group as it seeks to significantly expand its nuclear power
generation and also enter the export market in the coming years. Although the 2008 NSG waiver
does provide significant possibilities for India to engage in civilian nuclear trade with other
countries (and indeed, India has entered into such agreements with several countries like Russia,
France, UK, USA, Kazakhstan, Australia, and others), membership of the NSG will provide
greater certainty and a legal foundation for India's nuclear regime and thus greater confidence for
those countries investing billions of dollars to set up ambitious nuclear power projects in India.
Moreover, as India’s international political, economic, military and strategic profile and clout
increases, India would like to move into the category of international rule-creating nations rather
than stay in the ranks of rule-adhering nations. For this, it is essential that India gets due
recognition and a place on the NSG high table.
India’s track-record in observing the provisions of the NPT and NSG, even though it has not
been a member of either body, is impeccable. If the NSG was able to grant a waiver to India in
2008 on the basis of its past performance, it should have no objection to admitting the country as
a member this time as well because of its record in adhering to all its commitments over the last
eight years. It is, however, obvious that the decision on 23-24 June in Seoul will be taken by
some countries on political considerations rather than on merit. Usually China has been seen to
stay in the background and put up smaller countries in the forefront to articulate opposition to
any issue that it does not concur with. This time, in addition to instigating smaller countries to
raise objections, China has itself come out openly in opposition to India’s membership. Since all
decisions at NSG are taken by consensus, any country, small or big, can stand in the way of a
consensus. India has therefore launched a blitzkrieg of hectic diplomatic activity to explain its
position, allay fears and overcome the opposition of a few countries which might still have
concerns.
India has also reached out to China directly to explain that its interest in NSG membership is not
guided by any political or strategic considerations but only to facilitate the expansion of its clean
and green nuclear energy programme. It took the unusual step of dispatching its foreign secretary
to Beijing on 16-17 June to hold discussions on this and other important issues with his
counterpart. If the issue goes to the wire, Prime Minister Modi is expected to take up the issue
with President Xi Jinping in Tashkent where both leaders are likely to be present for the SCO
Summit on 23-24 June.
India became a Member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on 7 June 2016. All
34 members of MTCR are members of the NSG. India is hence assured of support of these 34
members in its quest for NSG membership. It may be noted that China is not a member of
MTCR, although it put in its application in 2004, because several members have concerns about
China’s dubious proliferation record in supplying missile technology to countries like Pakistan,
Iran and North Korea.

8. Most questions raised by China against India’s membership have little validity. For instance,
membership of NPT is not a condition for becoming a member of NSG. It is only a guiding
principle to which consideration needs to be given. Pakistan’s credentials for NSG membership
are highly flawed and inadequate. Over the last eight years India, as per its commitment, has
separated its reactors which are under IAEA safeguards and those which are not. Pakistan has a
blemished and flawed proliferation record as it has engaged in illicit supply of nuclear
technology and materials to Iran, Libya and North Korea. No comparison between the track
records of the two countries is hence justified. India maintains that rather than evolving criteria,
its performance should be the basis on which the decision on its application should be taken.
Both substantively and commensurate with its expanding international prestige and profile,
India's membership of NSG is of vital significance. A decision at the NSG plenary session in
Seoul will depend on China's stance. All other countries are expected to fall in line. President
Putin has also assured India that Russia will intercede with China on India’s behalf. India can be
reasonably hopeful that China will see reason and logic in India's arguments and will gracefully
withdraw its strident opposition. Responsibility devolves upon China, more than it does upon
India, to bridge the trust deficit between the two countries. This is a sterling opportunity that
China should welcome and grasp with both hands.
India’s bid for NSG was stopped by China on 24 Jun 2016 at Seoul
China remained the last major obstacle in the way of India's membership bid in the Nuclear
Suppliers Group as 47 of 48 members supported New Delhi's application at the group's special
plenary session in Seoul on Thursday.
The session debated until midnight but failed to come to a conclusion after hours of discussions,
with China adamant in its opposition. Questions and doubts by other fence-sitting countries
dissolved in the course of the evening, leaving China as the last man standing against India.
Officials in Seoul said the meeting would restart on Friday. After Thursday's NSG meeting,
delegations were asked to revert to their headquarters for fresh instructions.
China raised a procedural block early in the day, refusing to admit the India membership issue to
be discussed in the meeting. This, diplomats in the room said, caused a delay of over five hours,
as the members wrestled with an agenda item. Finally, it was decided to discuss a heavily
worded agenda on "political, legal and technical issues of non-NPT countries' membership. The
discussions began at 9pm and ended around midnight, but remained in a deadlock.
Indian officials will be lobbying hard with the members before the meeting begins on Friday
morning. The US is also expected to be working the phones on India's behalf.
Earlier Thursday afternoon, PM Narendra Modi delivered a candid message to Chinese President
Xi Jinping who he met for a bilateral on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Tashkent. Sources
said Modi conveyed to Xi New Delhi's expectation that China would support India in the NSG, a

9. position that suggests that continued opposition will impact ties.
The 45-minute Modi-Xi meeting was almost entirely devoted to the NSG issue and China's
opposition. A readout of the meeting was given by official spokesperson Vikas Swarup who said,
"PM Modi urged China to make a fair and objective assessment of India's application and judge
it on its own merit. He said China should contribute to the emerging consensus in Seoul."
Until late Thursday evening however, Chinese diplomats in Seoul held on to their tough stand
against India. Brazil and South Africa, two other members of BRICS, stood behind India, as did
Russia. The consensus emerged through the evening's discussions, with countries like Ireland,
Switzerland and Austria, even Brazil raising questions on process - but these whittled down to
supporting India's candidature. Turkey stuck to its position of supporting India and Pakistan.
However, Pakistan's NSG bid was not discussed at length, however the presence of the
application was the reason for a lot of discussion on non-NPT countries.
China's continued obduracy raises serious questions in the Indian government about the value of
organisations like BRICS, RIC or even BASIC, where India and China are believed to be
working together. If China continues with its opposition, sources said there could be
consequences for bilateral relations with Beijing, because it would be a direct refusal to an Indian
head of the government.
The meeting in Seoul began with the outgoing Argentine chair Rafael Grossi presenting a
positive report on India's commitments and compliance. South Korea, which took over the
chairmanship of the nuclear cartel steered the discussion on India's membership, said sources.
China's stand might wreck India's chances this time if Beijing continues to hold out. But the fact
that India has mounted such a huge diplomatic exercise will play to India's advantage going
forward. All eyes now will be on the last minute role that the US and other big supporters of
India play on Friday to help bring China around.
Meanwhile, Xi met Pakistan President Mamnoon Hussain in Tashkent, where the two sides
reaffirmed their strong bonds , describing themselves as "iron brothers". A Pakistan foreign
ministry statement quoted Pak president as saying, "exception given for NSG membership could
disturb strategic stability in South Asia."